_ Git - ldk-java/blob - c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/BaseSign.cs

   1 using org.ldk.impl;
   2 using org.ldk.enums;
   3 using org.ldk.util;
   4 using System;
   5
   6 namespace org { namespace ldk { namespace structs {
   7
   8 /**
   9  * A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
  10  * [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
  11  *
  12  * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
  13  * policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
  14  * Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
  15  * for an example of such policies.
  16  */
  17 public class BaseSign : CommonBase {
  18         internal readonly bindings.LDKBaseSign bindings_instance;
  19         internal BaseSign(object _dummy, long ptr) : base(ptr) { bindings_instance = null; }
  20         private BaseSign(bindings.LDKBaseSign arg, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) : base(bindings.LDKBaseSign_new(arg, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr())) {
  21                 this.ptrs_to.AddLast(arg);
  22                 this.bindings_instance = arg;
  23         }
  24         ~BaseSign() {
  25                 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.BaseSign_free(ptr); }
  26         }
  27
  28         public interface BaseSignInterface {
  29                 /**
  30                  * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
  31                  *
  32                  * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
  33                  */
  34                 byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long _idx);
  35                 /**
  36                  * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
  37                  *
  38                  * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
  39                  * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
  40                  *
  41                  * May be called more than once for the same index.
  42                  *
  43                  * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
  44                  */
  45                 byte[] release_commitment_secret(long _idx);
  46                 /**
  47                  * Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
  48                  *
  49                  * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
  50                  * secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
  51                  * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
  52                  * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
  53                  *
  54                  * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
  55                  * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
  56                  * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
  57                  *
  58                  * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
  59                  * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
  60                  */
  61                 Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction _holder_tx, byte[][] _preimages);
  62                 /**
  63                  * Returns an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
  64                  * some [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`] types. This should be sufficient to identify this
  65                  * [`BaseSign`] object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
  66                  */
  67                 byte[] channel_keys_id();
  68                 /**
  69                  * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
  70                  *
  71                  * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
  72                  *
  73                  * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
  74                  * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
  75                  *
  76                  * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
  77                  * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
  78                  * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
  79                  *
  80                  * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
  81                  * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
  82                  */
  83                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx, byte[][] _preimages);
  84                 /**
  85                  * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
  86                  *
  87                  * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
  88                  * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
  89                  */
  90                 Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, byte[] _secret);
  91                 /**
  92                  * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
  93                  *
  94                  * This will be called
  95                  * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
  96                  * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
  97                  * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
  98                  * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
  99                  * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 100                  * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
 101                  *
 102                  * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
 103                  *
 104                  * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
 105                  *
 106                  * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 107                  */
 108                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx);
 109                 /**
 110                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
 111                  * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 112                  *
 113                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 114                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 115                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 116                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 117                  *
 118                  * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 119                  *
 120                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 121                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 122                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
 123                  * so).
 124                  */
 125                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key);
 126                 /**
 127                  * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 128                  * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 129                  *
 130                  * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 131                  * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 132                  * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 133                  * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 134                  *
 135                  * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 136                  * signature.
 137                  *
 138                  * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 139                  * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 140                  * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 141                  * so).
 142                  *
 143                  * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 144                  * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 145                  */
 146                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc);
 147                 /**
 148                  * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 149                  * transaction, either offered or received.
 150                  *
 151                  * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 152                  * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 153                  * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 154                  * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 155                  *
 156                  * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 157                  * outputs.
 158                  *
 159                  * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 160                  *
 161                  * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 162                  * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 163                  * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 164                  * BIP 143 signature.
 165                  */
 166                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc);
 167                 /**
 168                  * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 169                  *
 170                  * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 171                  * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 172                  */
 173                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction _closing_tx);
 174                 /**
 175                  * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 176                  * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 177                  */
 178                 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] _anchor_tx, long _input);
 179                 /**
 180                  * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka
 181                  * node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants.
 182                  *
 183                  * The first returned signature should be from our node secret key, the second from our
 184                  * funding key.
 185                  *
 186                  * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 187                  * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 188                  * protocol.
 189                  */
 190                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement _msg);
 191                 /**
 192                  * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
 193                  * `counterparty_selected`/`holder_selected_contest_delay` and funding outpoint. Since these
 194                  * are static channel data, they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set,
 195                  * as LDK may call this method more than once.
 196                  *
 197                  * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
 198                  */
 199                 void provide_channel_parameters(ChannelTransactionParameters _channel_parameters);
 200         }
 201         private class LDKBaseSignHolder { internal BaseSign held; }
 202         private class LDKBaseSignImpl : bindings.LDKBaseSign {
 203                 internal LDKBaseSignImpl(BaseSignInterface arg, LDKBaseSignHolder impl_holder) { this.arg = arg; this.impl_holder = impl_holder; }
 204                 private BaseSignInterface arg;
 205                 private LDKBaseSignHolder impl_holder;
 206                 public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long _idx) {
 207                         byte[] ret = arg.get_per_commitment_point(_idx);
 208                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 209                         byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 33);
 210                         return result;
 211                 }
 212                 public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long _idx) {
 213                         byte[] ret = arg.release_commitment_secret(_idx);
 214                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 215                         byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
 216                         return result;
 217                 }
 218                 public long validate_holder_commitment(long _holder_tx, byte[][] _preimages) {
 219                         org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction _holder_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_holder_tx < 0 || _holder_tx > 4096) { _holder_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, _holder_tx); }
 220                         Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_holder_commitment(_holder_tx_hu_conv, _preimages);
 221                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 222                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 223                         return result;
 224                 }
 225                 public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
 226                         byte[] ret = arg.channel_keys_id();
 227                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 228                         byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
 229                         return result;
 230                 }
 231                 public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long _commitment_tx, byte[][] _preimages) {
 232                         org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); }
 233                         Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv, _preimages);
 234                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 235                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 236                         return result;
 237                 }
 238                 public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, byte[] _secret) {
 239                         Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(_idx, _secret);
 240                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 241                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 242                         return result;
 243                 }
 244                 public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long _commitment_tx) {
 245                         org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); }
 246                         Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(_commitment_tx_hu_conv);
 247                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 248                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 249                         return result;
 250                 }
 251                 public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key) {
 252                         Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(_justice_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key);
 253                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 254                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 255                         return result;
 256                 }
 257                 public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key, long _htlc) {
 258                         org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc < 0 || _htlc > 4096) { _htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, _htlc); }
 259                         Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(_justice_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key, _htlc_hu_conv);
 260                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 261                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 262                         return result;
 263                 }
 264                 public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_point, long _htlc) {
 265                         org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc < 0 || _htlc > 4096) { _htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, _htlc); }
 266                         Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_point, _htlc_hu_conv);
 267                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 268                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 269                         return result;
 270                 }
 271                 public long sign_closing_transaction(long _closing_tx) {
 272                         org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction _closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_closing_tx < 0 || _closing_tx > 4096) { _closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, _closing_tx); }
 273                         Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(_closing_tx_hu_conv);
 274                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 275                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 276                         return result;
 277                 }
 278                 public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] _anchor_tx, long _input) {
 279                         Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(_anchor_tx, _input);
 280                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 281                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 282                         return result;
 283                 }
 284                 public long sign_channel_announcement(long _msg) {
 285                         org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement _msg_hu_conv = null; if (_msg < 0 || _msg > 4096) { _msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, _msg); }
 286                         Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement(_msg_hu_conv);
 287                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 288                         long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
 289                         return result;
 290                 }
 291                 public void provide_channel_parameters(long _channel_parameters) {
 292                         org.ldk.structs.ChannelTransactionParameters _channel_parameters_hu_conv = null; if (_channel_parameters < 0 || _channel_parameters > 4096) { _channel_parameters_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelTransactionParameters(null, _channel_parameters); }
 293                         arg.provide_channel_parameters(_channel_parameters_hu_conv);
 294                                 GC.KeepAlive(arg);
 295                 }
 296         }
 297         public static BaseSign new_impl(BaseSignInterface arg, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
 298                 LDKBaseSignHolder impl_holder = new LDKBaseSignHolder();
 299                 impl_holder.held = new BaseSign(new LDKBaseSignImpl(arg, impl_holder), pubkeys);
 300                 return impl_holder.held;
 301         }
 302         /**
 303          * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
 304          *
 305          * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
 306          */
 307         public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx) {
 308                 byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_get_per_commitment_point(this.ptr, idx);
 309                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 310                 GC.KeepAlive(idx);
 311                 return ret;
 312         }
 313
 314         /**
 315          * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
 316          *
 317          * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
 318          * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
 319          *
 320          * May be called more than once for the same index.
 321          *
 322          * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
 323          */
 324         public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx) {
 325                 byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_release_commitment_secret(this.ptr, idx);
 326                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 327                 GC.KeepAlive(idx);
 328                 return ret;
 329         }
 330
 331         /**
 332          * Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
 333          *
 334          * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
 335          * secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
 336          * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
 337          * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
 338          *
 339          * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
 340          * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
 341          * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
 342          *
 343          * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
 344          * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
 345          */
 346         public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
 347                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_validate_holder_commitment(this.ptr, holder_tx == null ? 0 : holder_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? InternalUtils.mapArray(preimages, preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)) : null);
 348                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 349                 GC.KeepAlive(holder_tx);
 350                 GC.KeepAlive(preimages);
 351                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 352                 Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 353                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(holder_tx); };
 354                 return ret_hu_conv;
 355         }
 356
 357         /**
 358          * Returns an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
 359          * some [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`] types. This should be sufficient to identify this
 360          * [`BaseSign`] object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
 361          */
 362         public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
 363                 byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_channel_keys_id(this.ptr);
 364                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 365                 return ret;
 366         }
 367
 368         /**
 369          * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
 370          *
 371          * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
 372          *
 373          * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
 374          * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
 375          *
 376          * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
 377          * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
 378          * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
 379          *
 380          * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
 381          * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
 382          */
 383         public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
 384                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? InternalUtils.mapArray(preimages, preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)) : null);
 385                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 386                 GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx);
 387                 GC.KeepAlive(preimages);
 388                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 389                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 390                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); };
 391                 return ret_hu_conv;
 392         }
 393
 394         /**
 395          * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
 396          *
 397          * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
 398          * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
 399          */
 400         public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
 401                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
 402                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 403                 GC.KeepAlive(idx);
 404                 GC.KeepAlive(secret);
 405                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 406                 Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 407                 return ret_hu_conv;
 408         }
 409
 410         /**
 411          * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
 412          *
 413          * This will be called
 414          * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
 415          * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
 416          * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
 417          * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
 418          * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
 419          * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
 420          *
 421          * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
 422          *
 423          * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
 424          *
 425          * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
 426          */
 427         public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
 428                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
 429                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 430                 GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx);
 431                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 432                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 433                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); };
 434                 return ret_hu_conv;
 435         }
 436
 437         /**
 438          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
 439          * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 440          *
 441          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 442          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 443          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 444          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 445          *
 446          * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 447          *
 448          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 449          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 450          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
 451          * so).
 452          */
 453         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
 454                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
 455                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 456                 GC.KeepAlive(justice_tx);
 457                 GC.KeepAlive(input);
 458                 GC.KeepAlive(amount);
 459                 GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_key);
 460                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 461                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 462                 return ret_hu_conv;
 463         }
 464
 465         /**
 466          * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
 467          * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
 468          *
 469          * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
 470          * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
 471          * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
 472          * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 473          *
 474          * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
 475          * signature.
 476          *
 477          * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
 478          * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
 479          * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
 480          * so).
 481          *
 482          * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
 483          * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
 484          */
 485         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 486                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 487                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 488                 GC.KeepAlive(justice_tx);
 489                 GC.KeepAlive(input);
 490                 GC.KeepAlive(amount);
 491                 GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_key);
 492                 GC.KeepAlive(htlc);
 493                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 494                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 495                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc); };
 496                 return ret_hu_conv;
 497         }
 498
 499         /**
 500          * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
 501          * transaction, either offered or received.
 502          *
 503          * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
 504          * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
 505          * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
 506          * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
 507          *
 508          * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
 509          * outputs.
 510          *
 511          * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
 512          *
 513          * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
 514          * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
 515          * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
 516          * BIP 143 signature.
 517          */
 518         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
 519                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
 520                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 521                 GC.KeepAlive(htlc_tx);
 522                 GC.KeepAlive(input);
 523                 GC.KeepAlive(amount);
 524                 GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_point);
 525                 GC.KeepAlive(htlc);
 526                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 527                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 528                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc); };
 529                 return ret_hu_conv;
 530         }
 531
 532         /**
 533          * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
 534          *
 535          * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
 536          * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
 537          */
 538         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
 539                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
 540                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 541                 GC.KeepAlive(closing_tx);
 542                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 543                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 544                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(closing_tx); };
 545                 return ret_hu_conv;
 546         }
 547
 548         /**
 549          * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
 550          * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
 551          */
 552         public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
 553                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
 554                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 555                 GC.KeepAlive(anchor_tx);
 556                 GC.KeepAlive(input);
 557                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 558                 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 559                 return ret_hu_conv;
 560         }
 561
 562         /**
 563          * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka
 564          * node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants.
 565          *
 566          * The first returned signature should be from our node secret key, the second from our
 567          * funding key.
 568          *
 569          * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
 570          * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
 571          * protocol.
 572          */
 573         public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
 574                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_channel_announcement(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
 575                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 576                 GC.KeepAlive(msg);
 577                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 578                 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
 579                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(msg); };
 580                 return ret_hu_conv;
 581         }
 582
 583         /**
 584          * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
 585          * `counterparty_selected`/`holder_selected_contest_delay` and funding outpoint. Since these
 586          * are static channel data, they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set,
 587          * as LDK may call this method more than once.
 588          *
 589          * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
 590          */
 591         public void provide_channel_parameters(org.ldk.structs.ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters) {
 592                 bindings.BaseSign_provide_channel_parameters(this.ptr, channel_parameters == null ? 0 : channel_parameters.ptr);
 593                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 594                 GC.KeepAlive(channel_parameters);
 595                 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(channel_parameters); };
 596         }
 597
 598         /**
 599          * Frees any resources associated with this object given its this_arg pointer.
 600          * Does not need to free the outer struct containing function pointers and may be NULL is no resources need to be freed.
 601          */
 602         public ChannelPublicKeys get_pubkeys() {
 603                 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_get_pubkeys(this.ptr);
 604                 GC.KeepAlive(this);
 605                 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
 606                 org.ldk.structs.ChannelPublicKeys ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelPublicKeys(null, ret); }
 607                 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); };
 608                 return ret_hu_conv;
 609         }
 610
 611 }
 612 } } }