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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channel.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
14
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
19
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
24
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs;
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
30 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
32 use ln::chan_utils;
33 use chain::BestBlock;
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::transaction_utils;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
44
45 use io;
46 use prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
48 use core::convert::TryFrom;
49 use core::ops::Deref;
50 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
51 use sync::Mutex;
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
53
54 #[cfg(test)]
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
64 }
65
66 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
67 enum FeeUpdateState {
68         // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
69         RemoteAnnounced,
70         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
71         // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
72         // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
73         // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
74         // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
75         // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
76
77         // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
78         Outbound,
79 }
80
81 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
82         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
83         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
84         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
85 }
86
87 enum InboundHTLCState {
88         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
89         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
90         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
91         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
92         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
93         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
94         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
95         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
96         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
97         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
98         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
99         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
100         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
101         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
102         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
103         ///
104         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
105         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
106         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
107         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
108         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
109         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
110         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
111         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
112         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
113         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
114         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
115         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
116         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
117         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
118         ///
119         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
120         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
121         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
122         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
123         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
124         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
125         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
126         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
127         Committed,
128         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
129         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
130         /// we'll drop it.
131         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
132         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
133         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
134         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
135         /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
136         /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
137         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
138         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
139 }
140
141 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
142         htlc_id: u64,
143         amount_msat: u64,
144         cltv_expiry: u32,
145         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
146         state: InboundHTLCState,
147 }
148
149 enum OutboundHTLCState {
150         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
151         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
152         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
153         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
154         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
155         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
156         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
157         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
158         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
159         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
160         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
161         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
162         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
163         Committed,
164         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
165         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
166         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
167         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
168         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
169         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
170         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
171         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
172         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
173         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
174         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
175         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
176         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
177         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
178         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
179 }
180
181 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
182         htlc_id: u64,
183         amount_msat: u64,
184         cltv_expiry: u32,
185         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
186         state: OutboundHTLCState,
187         source: HTLCSource,
188 }
189
190 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
191 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
192         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
193                 // always outbound
194                 amount_msat: u64,
195                 cltv_expiry: u32,
196                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
197                 source: HTLCSource,
198                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
199         },
200         ClaimHTLC {
201                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
202                 htlc_id: u64,
203         },
204         FailHTLC {
205                 htlc_id: u64,
206                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
207         },
208 }
209
210 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
211 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
212 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
213 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
214 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
215 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
216 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
217 enum ChannelState {
218         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
219         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
220         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
221         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
222         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
223         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
224         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
225         FundingCreated = 4,
226         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
227         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
228         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
229         FundingSent = 8,
230         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
231         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
232         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
233         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
234         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
235         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
236         ChannelFunded = 64,
237         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
238         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
239         /// dance.
240         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
241         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
242         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
243         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
244         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
245         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
246         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
247         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
248         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
249         /// later.
250         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
251         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
252         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
253         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
254         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
255         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
256         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
257         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
258         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
259         /// us their shutdown.
260         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
261         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
262         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
263         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
264 }
265 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
266 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
267
268 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
269
270 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
271 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
272 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
273 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
274 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
275 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
276 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
277         /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
278         Enabled,
279         /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
280         DisabledStaged,
281         /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
282         EnabledStaged,
283         /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
284         Disabled,
285 }
286
287 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
288 enum HTLCInitiator {
289         LocalOffered,
290         RemoteOffered,
291 }
292
293 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
294 struct HTLCStats {
295         pending_htlcs: u32,
296         pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
297         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
298         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
299 }
300
301 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
302 struct HTLCCandidate {
303         amount_msat: u64,
304         origin: HTLCInitiator,
305 }
306
307 impl HTLCCandidate {
308         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
309                 Self {
310                         amount_msat,
311                         origin,
312                 }
313         }
314 }
315
316 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
318 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
319         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
320         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
321         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
322         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
323         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
324         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
325         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
326         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
327 }
328
329 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
330 /// description
331 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
332         NewClaim {
333                 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
334                 htlc_value_msat: u64,
335                 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
336         },
337         DuplicateClaim {},
338 }
339
340 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
341 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
342         /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
343         /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
344         /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
345         NewClaim {
346                 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
347                 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
348                 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
349                 htlc_value_msat: u64,
350                 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
351                 /// in the holding cell).
352                 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
353         },
354         /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
355         /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
356         DuplicateClaim {},
357 }
358
359 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
360 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
361 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
362 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
363 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
364 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
365 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
366 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
367 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
368 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
369 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
370 #[cfg(fuzzing)]
371 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
372 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
373 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
374
375 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
376 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
377 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
378 // inbound channel.
379 //
380 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
381 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
382 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
383         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
384         pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
385         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
386         config: ChannelConfig,
387
388         user_id: u64,
389
390         channel_id: [u8; 32],
391         channel_state: u32,
392         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
393         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
394
395         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
396
397         holder_signer: Signer,
398         shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
399         destination_script: Script,
400
401         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
402         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
403         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
404
405         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
406         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
407         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
408         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
409         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
410         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
411
412         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
413         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
414         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
415         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
416         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
417         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
418         /// send it first.
419         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
420
421         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
422         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
423         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
424         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
425         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
426
427         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
428         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
429         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
430         //
431         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
432         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
433         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
434         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
435         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
436         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
437         // commitment_signed.
438         pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
439         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
440         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
441         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
442         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
443         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
444         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
445         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
446         update_time_counter: u32,
447         feerate_per_kw: u32,
448
449         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
450         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
451         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
452         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
453         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
454         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
455
456         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
457
458         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
459         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
460         funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
461         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
462
463         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
464         #[cfg(test)]
465         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
466         #[cfg(not(test))]
467         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
468         #[cfg(test)]
469         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
470         #[cfg(not(test))]
471         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
472         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
473         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
474         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
475         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
476         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
477         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
478         #[cfg(test)]
479         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
480         #[cfg(not(test))]
481         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
482         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
483         minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
484
485         counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
486
487         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
488         funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
489
490         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
491         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
492         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
493
494         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
495
496         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
497
498         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
499
500         /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
501         /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
502         announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
503
504         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
505         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
506         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
507         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
508         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
509         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
510         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
511         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
512
513         /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
514         /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
515         /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
516         /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
517         /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
518         ///
519         /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
520         pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
521
522         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
523         // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
524         // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
525         // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
526         // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
527         // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
528         // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
529         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
530 }
531
532 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
533 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
534         fee: u64,
535         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
536         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
537         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
538         feerate: u32,
539 }
540
541 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
542
543 #[cfg(not(test))]
544 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
545 #[cfg(test)]
546 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
547 #[cfg(not(test))]
548 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
549 #[cfg(test)]
550 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
551
552 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
553 /// it's 2^24.
554 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
555
556 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
557 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
558 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
559 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
560 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
561 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
562 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
563 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
564 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
565
566 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
567 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
568 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
569 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
570 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
571
572 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
573 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
574 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
575 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
576         Ignore(String),
577         Close(String),
578         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
579 }
580
581 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
582         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
583                 match self {
584                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
585                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
586                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
587                 }
588         }
589 }
590
591 macro_rules! secp_check {
592         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
593                 match $res {
594                         Ok(thing) => thing,
595                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
596                 }
597         };
598 }
599
600 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
601         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
602         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
603                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
604         }
605
606         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
607         /// required by us.
608         ///
609         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
610         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
611                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
612                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
613         }
614
615         // Constructors:
616         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
617         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
618               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
619         {
620                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
621                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
622                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
623
624                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
625                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
626                 }
627                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
628                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
629                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
630                 }
631                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
632                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
633                 }
634                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
635                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
636                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel  reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
637                 }
638
639                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
640
641                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
642                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
643
644                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
645                         Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
646                 } else { None };
647
648                 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
649                         if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
650                                 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
651                         }
652                 }
653
654                 Ok(Channel {
655                         user_id,
656                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
657
658                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
659                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
660                         secp_ctx,
661                         channel_value_satoshis,
662
663                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
664
665                         holder_signer,
666                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
667                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
668
669                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
670                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
671                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
672
673                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
674                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
675                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
676                         pending_update_fee: None,
677                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
678                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
679                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
680                         update_time_counter: 1,
681
682                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
683
684                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
685                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
686                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
687                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
688                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
689
690                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
691                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
692                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
693                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
694
695                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
696
697                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
698                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
699                         short_channel_id: None,
700
701                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
702                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
703                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
704                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
705                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
706                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
707                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
708                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
709                         minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
710
711                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
712
713                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
714                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
715                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
716                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
717                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
718                                 funding_outpoint: None
719                         },
720                         funding_transaction: None,
721
722                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
723                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
724                         counterparty_node_id,
725
726                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
727
728                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
729
730                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
731
732                         announcement_sigs: None,
733
734                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
735                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
736                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
737                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
738
739                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
740
741                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
742                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
743                 })
744         }
745
746         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
747                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
748         {
749                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
750                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
751                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
752                 }
753                 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
754                 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
755                 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
756                 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
757                 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
758                         fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
759                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
760                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
761                 }
762                 Ok(())
763         }
764
765         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
766         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
767         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
768                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
769           F::Target: FeeEstimator
770         {
771                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
772                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
773                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
774                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
775                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
776                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
777                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
778                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
779                 };
780                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
781
782                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
783                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
784                 }
785
786                 // Check sanity of message fields:
787                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
788                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
789                 }
790                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
791                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
792                 }
793                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
794                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
795                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
796                 }
797                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
798                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
799                 }
800                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
801                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
802                 }
803                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
804                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
805                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
806                 }
807                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
808
809                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
810                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
811                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
812                 }
813                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
814                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
815                 }
816                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
817                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
818                 }
819
820                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
821                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
822                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
823                 }
824                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
825                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
826                 }
827                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
828                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
829                 }
830                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
831                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
832                 }
833                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
834                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
835                 }
836                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
837                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
838                 }
839                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis >  MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
840                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
841                 }
842
843                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
844
845                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
846                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
847                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
848                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
849                         }
850                 }
851                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
852                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
853
854                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
855
856                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
857                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
858                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
859                 }
860                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
861                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
862                 }
863                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
864                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
865                 }
866
867                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
868                 // for full fee payment
869                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
870                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
871                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
872                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
873                 }
874
875                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
876                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
877                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
878                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
879                 }
880
881                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
882                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
883                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
884                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
885                                         if script.len() == 0 {
886                                                 None
887                                         } else {
888                                                 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
889                                                         Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
890                                                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
891                                                 }
892                                         }
893                                 },
894                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
895                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
896                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
897                                 }
898                         }
899                 } else { None };
900
901                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
902                         Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
903                 } else { None };
904
905                 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
906                         if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
907                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
908                         }
909                 }
910
911                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
912                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
913
914                 let chan = Channel {
915                         user_id,
916                         config: local_config,
917
918                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
919                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
920                         secp_ctx,
921
922                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
923
924                         holder_signer,
925                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
926                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
927
928                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
929                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
930                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
931
932                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
933                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
934                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
935                         pending_update_fee: None,
936                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
937                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
938                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
939                         update_time_counter: 1,
940
941                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
942
943                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
944                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
945                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
946                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
947                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
948
949                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
950                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
951                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
952                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
953
954                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
955
956                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
957                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
958                         short_channel_id: None,
959
960                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
961                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
962                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
963                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
964                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
965                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
966                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
967                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
968                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
969                         minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
970
971                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
972
973                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
974                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
975                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
976                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
977                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
978                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
979                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
980                                 }),
981                                 funding_outpoint: None
982                         },
983                         funding_transaction: None,
984
985                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
986                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
987                         counterparty_node_id,
988
989                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
990
991                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
992
993                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
994
995                         announcement_sigs: None,
996
997                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
998                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
999                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1000                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1001
1002                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1003
1004                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1005                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1006                 };
1007
1008                 Ok(chan)
1009         }
1010
1011         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1012         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1013         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1014         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1015         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1016         /// an HTLC to a).
1017         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1018         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1019         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1020         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1021         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1022         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1023         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1024         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
1025         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
1026         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the fourth return value, but not the third, and
1027         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the fourth return value.
1028         #[inline]
1029         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, u32, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1030                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1031                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1032                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1033
1034                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1035                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1036                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1037                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1038
1039                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1040                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1041                         if match update_state {
1042                                 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1043                                 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1044                                 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1045                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1046                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound());  generated_by_local },
1047                         } {
1048                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1049                         }
1050                 }
1051
1052                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1053                         commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1054                         get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1055                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1056
1057                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1058                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1059                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1060                                         offered: $offered,
1061                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1062                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1063                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1064                                         transaction_output_index: None
1065                                 }
1066                         }
1067                 }
1068
1069                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1070                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1071                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1072                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1073                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1074                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1075                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1076                                         } else {
1077                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1078                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1079                                         }
1080                                 } else {
1081                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1082                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1083                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1084                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1085                                         } else {
1086                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1087                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1088                                         }
1089                                 }
1090                         }
1091                 }
1092
1093                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1094                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1095                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1096                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1097                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1098                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1099                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1100                         };
1101
1102                         if include {
1103                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1104                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1105                         } else {
1106                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1107                                 match &htlc.state {
1108                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1109                                                 if generated_by_local {
1110                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1111                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1112                                                         }
1113                                                 }
1114                                         },
1115                                         _ => {},
1116                                 }
1117                         }
1118                 }
1119
1120                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1121                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1122                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1123                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1124                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1125                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1126                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1127                         };
1128
1129                         if include {
1130                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1131                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1132                         } else {
1133                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1134                                 match htlc.state {
1135                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1136                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1137                                         },
1138                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1139                                                 if !generated_by_local {
1140                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1141                                                 }
1142                                         },
1143                                         _ => {},
1144                                 }
1145                         }
1146                 }
1147
1148                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1149                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1150                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1151                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1152                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1153                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1154                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1155                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1156
1157                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1158                 {
1159                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1160                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1161                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1162                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1163                         } else {
1164                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1165                         };
1166                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1167                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1168                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1169                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1170                 }
1171
1172                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1173                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1174                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1175                 } else {
1176                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1177                 };
1178
1179                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1180                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1181
1182                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1183                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1184                 } else {
1185                         value_to_a = 0;
1186                 }
1187
1188                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1189                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1190                 } else {
1191                         value_to_b = 0;
1192                 }
1193
1194                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1195
1196                 let channel_parameters =
1197                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1198                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1199                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1200                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1201                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1202                                                                              keys.clone(),
1203                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1204                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1205                                                                              &channel_parameters
1206                 );
1207                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1208                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1209                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1210                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1211
1212                 (tx, feerate_per_kw, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1213         }
1214
1215         #[inline]
1216         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1217                 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1218                 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1219                 // outside of those situations will fail.
1220                 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1221         }
1222
1223         #[inline]
1224         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1225                 let mut ret =
1226                 (4 +                                           // version
1227                  1 +                                           // input count
1228                  36 +                                          // prevout
1229                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1230                  4 +                                           // sequence
1231                  1 +                                           // output count
1232                  4                                             // lock time
1233                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1234                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1235                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1236                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1237                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1238                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1239                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1240                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1241                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1242                 }
1243                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1244                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1245                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1246                 }
1247                 ret
1248         }
1249
1250         #[inline]
1251         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1252                 let txins = {
1253                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1254                         ins.push(TxIn {
1255                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1256                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1257                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1258                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1259                         });
1260                         ins
1261                 };
1262
1263                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1264                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1265                 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1266                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1267
1268                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1269                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1270                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1271
1272                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1273                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1274                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1275                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1276                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1277                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1278                 }
1279
1280                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1281                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1282                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1283                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1284                         }, ()));
1285                 }
1286
1287                 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1288                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1289                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1290                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1291                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1292                         }, ()));
1293                 }
1294
1295                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1296
1297                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1298                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1299                         outputs.push(out.0);
1300                 }
1301
1302                 (Transaction {
1303                         version: 2,
1304                         lock_time: 0,
1305                         input: txins,
1306                         output: outputs,
1307                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1308         }
1309
1310         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1311                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1312         }
1313
1314         #[inline]
1315         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1316         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1317         /// our counterparty!)
1318         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1319         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1320         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1321                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1322                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1323                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1324                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1325
1326                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1327         }
1328
1329         #[inline]
1330         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1331         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1332         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1333         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1334                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1335                 //may see payments to it!
1336                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1337                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1338                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1339
1340                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1341         }
1342
1343         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1344         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1345         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1346         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1347                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1348         }
1349
1350         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1351                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1352                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1353                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1354                 // either.
1355                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1356                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1357                 }
1358                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1359
1360                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1361
1362                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1363                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1364                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1365
1366                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1367                 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1368                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1369                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1370                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1371                                 match htlc.state {
1372                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1373                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1374                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1375                                                 } else {
1376                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1377                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1378                                                 }
1379                                                 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1380                                         },
1381                                         _ => {
1382                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1383                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1384                                         }
1385                                 }
1386                                 pending_idx = idx;
1387                                 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1388                                 break;
1389                         }
1390                 }
1391                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1392                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1393                         // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1394                         // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1395                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1396                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1397                 }
1398
1399                 // Now update local state:
1400                 //
1401                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1402                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1403                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1404                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1405                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1406                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1407                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1408                         }],
1409                 };
1410
1411                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1412                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1413                                 match pending_update {
1414                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1415                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1416                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1417                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1418                                                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1419                                                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1420                                                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1421                                                 }
1422                                         },
1423                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1424                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1425                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1426                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1427                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1428                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1429                                                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1430                                                 }
1431                                         },
1432                                         _ => {}
1433                                 }
1434                         }
1435                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1436                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1437                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1438                         });
1439                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1440                         self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1441                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1442                 }
1443                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1444                 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1445
1446                 {
1447                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1448                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1449                         } else {
1450                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1451                                 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1452                         }
1453                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1454                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1455                 }
1456
1457                 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1458                         monitor_update,
1459                         htlc_value_msat,
1460                         msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1461                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1462                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1463                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1464                         }),
1465                 }
1466         }
1467
1468         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1469                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1470                         UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1471                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1472                                         Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1473                                         Ok(res) => res
1474                                 };
1475                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1476                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1477                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1478                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1479                                 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1480                         },
1481                         UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1482                                 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1483                         UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1484                 }
1485         }
1486
1487         /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1488         /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1489         /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1490         /// before we fail backwards.
1491         /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1492         /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1493         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1494                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1495                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1496                 }
1497                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1498
1499                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1500                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1501                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1502
1503                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1504                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1505                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1506                                 match htlc.state {
1507                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1508                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1509                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1510                                                 } else {
1511                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1512                                                 }
1513                                                 return Ok(None);
1514                                         },
1515                                         _ => {
1516                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1517                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1518                                         }
1519                                 }
1520                                 pending_idx = idx;
1521                         }
1522                 }
1523                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1524                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1525                         // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1526                         // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1527                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1528                         return Ok(None);
1529                 }
1530
1531                 // Now update local state:
1532                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1533                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1534                                 match pending_update {
1535                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1536                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1537                                                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1538                                                         debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1539                                                         return Ok(None);
1540                                                 }
1541                                         },
1542                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1543                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1544                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1545                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1546                                                 }
1547                                         },
1548                                         _ => {}
1549                                 }
1550                         }
1551                         log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1552                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1553                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1554                                 err_packet,
1555                         });
1556                         return Ok(None);
1557                 }
1558
1559                 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1560                 {
1561                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1562                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1563                 }
1564
1565                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1566                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1567                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1568                         reason: err_packet
1569                 }))
1570         }
1571
1572         // Message handlers:
1573
1574         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1575                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1576                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1577                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1578                 }
1579                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1580                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1581                 }
1582                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1583                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1584                 }
1585                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1586                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1587                 }
1588                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1589                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1590                 }
1591                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1592                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1593                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1594                 }
1595                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1596                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1597                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1598                 }
1599                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1600                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1601                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1602                 }
1603                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1604                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1605                 }
1606                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1607                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1608                 }
1609
1610                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1611                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1612                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1613                 }
1614                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1615                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1616                 }
1617                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1618                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1619                 }
1620                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1621                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1622                 }
1623                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1624                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1625                 }
1626                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1627                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1628                 }
1629                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1630                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1631                 }
1632                 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1633                         // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1634                         // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1635                         // channel.
1636                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1637                 }
1638
1639                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1640                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1641                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1642                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1643                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1644                                                 None
1645                                         } else {
1646                                                 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
1647                                                         Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
1648                                                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
1649                                                 }
1650                                         }
1651                                 },
1652                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1653                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1654                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1655                                 }
1656                         }
1657                 } else { None };
1658
1659                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1660                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1661                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1662                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1663                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1664                 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1665
1666                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1667                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1668                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1669                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1670                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1671                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1672                 };
1673
1674                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1675                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1676                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1677                 });
1678
1679                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1680                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1681
1682                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1683
1684                 Ok(())
1685         }
1686
1687         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1688                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1689
1690                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1691                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).0;
1692                 {
1693                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1694                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1695                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1696                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1697                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1698                                 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1699                                 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1700                                 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1701                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1702                 }
1703
1704                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1705                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1706
1707                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1708                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1709                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1710                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1711
1712                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1713                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1714
1715                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1716                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1717         }
1718
1719         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1720                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1721         }
1722
1723         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1724                 if self.is_outbound() {
1725                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1726                 }
1727                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1728                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1729                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1730                         // channel.
1731                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1732                 }
1733                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1734                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1735                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1736                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1737                 }
1738
1739                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1740                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1741                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1742                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1743                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1744
1745                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1746                         Ok(res) => res,
1747                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1748                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1749                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1750                         },
1751                         Err(e) => {
1752                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1753                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1754                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1755                         }
1756                 };
1757
1758                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1759                         initial_commitment_tx,
1760                         msg.signature,
1761                         Vec::new(),
1762                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1763                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1764                 );
1765
1766                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1767
1768                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1769                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1770                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1771                 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1772                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1773                                                           shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1774                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1775                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1776                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1777                                                           obscure_factor,
1778                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1779
1780                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1781
1782                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1783                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1784                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1785                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1786
1787                 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1788
1789                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1790                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1791                         signature
1792                 }, channel_monitor))
1793         }
1794
1795         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1796         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1797         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1798                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1799                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1800                 }
1801                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1802                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1803                 }
1804                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1805                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1806                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1807                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1808                 }
1809
1810                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1811
1812                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1813                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1814                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1815                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1816
1817                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1818                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1819
1820                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1821                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).0;
1822                 {
1823                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1824                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1825                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1826                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1827                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1828                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1829                         }
1830                 }
1831
1832                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1833                         initial_commitment_tx,
1834                         msg.signature,
1835                         Vec::new(),
1836                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1837                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1838                 );
1839
1840
1841                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1842                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1843                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1844                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1845                 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1846                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1847                                                           shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1848                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1849                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1850                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1851                                                           obscure_factor,
1852                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1853
1854                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1855
1856                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1857                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1858                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1859                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1860
1861                 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1862
1863                 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1864         }
1865
1866         pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1867                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1868                         self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1869                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1870                 }
1871
1872                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1873
1874                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1875                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1876                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1877                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1878                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1879                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1880                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1881                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1882                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1883                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1884                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1885                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1886                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1887                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1888                         }
1889                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1890                         return Ok(());
1891                 } else {
1892                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1893                 }
1894
1895                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1896                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1897
1898                 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1899
1900                 Ok(())
1901         }
1902
1903         /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1904         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1905                 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1906                         pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1907                         pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1908                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1909                         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1910                 };
1911
1912                 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1913                 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1914                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1915                         stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1916                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1917                                 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1918                         }
1919                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1920                                 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1921                         }
1922                 }
1923                 stats
1924         }
1925
1926         /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1927         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1928                 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1929                         pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1930                         pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1931                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1932                         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1933                 };
1934
1935                 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1936                 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1937                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1938                         stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1939                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1940                                 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1941                         }
1942                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1943                                 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1944                         }
1945                 }
1946
1947                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1948                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1949                                 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1950                                 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1951                                 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1952                                         stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1953                                 }
1954                                 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1955                                         stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1956                                 }
1957                         }
1958                 }
1959                 stats
1960         }
1961
1962         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1963         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1964         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1965         /// corner case properly.
1966         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1967                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1968                 (
1969                         cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1970                                 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1971                                 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1972                                 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
1973                         0) as u64,
1974                         cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1975                                 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1976                                 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
1977                         0) as u64
1978                 )
1979         }
1980
1981         pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1982                 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
1983                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1984         }
1985
1986         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1987         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1988         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1989                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1990                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1991                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1992         }
1993
1994         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1995         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1996         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1997         // are excluded.
1998         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1999                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2000
2001                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2002                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2003
2004                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2005                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2006                 match htlc.origin {
2007                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2008                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2009                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2010                                 }
2011                         },
2012                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2013                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2014                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2015                                 }
2016                         }
2017                 }
2018
2019                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2020                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2021                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2022                                 continue
2023                         }
2024                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2025                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2026                         included_htlcs += 1;
2027                 }
2028
2029                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2030                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2031                                 continue
2032                         }
2033                         match htlc.state {
2034                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2035                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2036                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2037                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2038                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2039                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2040                                 _ => {},
2041                         }
2042                 }
2043
2044                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2045                         match htlc {
2046                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2047                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2048                                                 continue
2049                                         }
2050                                         included_htlcs += 1
2051                                 },
2052                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2053                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2054                         }
2055                 }
2056
2057                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2058                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2059                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2060                 {
2061                         let mut fee = res;
2062                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2063                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2064                         }
2065                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2066                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2067                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2068                                 fee,
2069                                 total_pending_htlcs,
2070                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2071                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2072                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2073                                 },
2074                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2075                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2076                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2077                                 },
2078                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2079                         };
2080                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2081                 }
2082                 res
2083         }
2084
2085         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2086         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2087         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2088         // excluded.
2089         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2090                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2091
2092                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2093                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2094
2095                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2096                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2097                 match htlc.origin {
2098                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2099                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2100                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2101                                 }
2102                         },
2103                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2104                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2105                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
2106                                 }
2107                         }
2108                 }
2109
2110                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2111                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2112                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2113                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2114                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2115                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2116                                 continue
2117                         }
2118                         included_htlcs += 1;
2119                 }
2120
2121                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2122                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2123                                 continue
2124                         }
2125                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2126                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2127                         match htlc.state {
2128                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2129                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2130                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2131                                 _ => {},
2132                         }
2133                 }
2134
2135                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2136                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2137                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2138                 {
2139                         let mut fee = res;
2140                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2141                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2142                         }
2143                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2144                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2145                                 fee,
2146                                 total_pending_htlcs,
2147                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2148                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2149                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2150                                 },
2151                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2152                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2153                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2154                                 },
2155                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2156                         };
2157                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2158                 }
2159                 res
2160         }
2161
2162         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2163         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2164                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2165                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2166                 if local_sent_shutdown {
2167                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
2168                 }
2169                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2170                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2171                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2172                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2173                 }
2174                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2175                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2176                 }
2177                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2178                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2179                 }
2180                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2181                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2182                 }
2183                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2184                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2185                 }
2186
2187                 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2188                 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2189                 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2190                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2191                 }
2192                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2193                 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2194                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2195                 }
2196                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2197                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2198                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2199                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2200                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2201                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2202                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2203                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2204                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2205                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2206                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2207                 // transaction).
2208                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2209                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2210                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2211                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2212                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2213                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2214                         }
2215                 }
2216
2217                 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2218                 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2219                         let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2220                         if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2221                                 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2222                                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2223                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2224                         }
2225                 }
2226
2227                 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2228                 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2229                         let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2230                         if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2231                                 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2232                                         on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2233                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2234                         }
2235                 }
2236
2237                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2238                         self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2239                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2240                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2241                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2242                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2243                 }
2244
2245                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2246                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2247                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2248                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2249                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2250                 };
2251                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2252                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2253                 };
2254
2255                 let chan_reserve_msat =
2256                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2257                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2258                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2259                 }
2260
2261                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2262                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2263                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2264                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2265                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2266                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2267                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2268                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2269                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
2270                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2271                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2272                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2273                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2274                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2275                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2276                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2277                         }
2278                 } else {
2279                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2280                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2281                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2282                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2283                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2284                         }
2285                 }
2286                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2287                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2288                 }
2289                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2290                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2291                 }
2292
2293                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2294                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2295                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2296                         }
2297                 }
2298
2299                 // Now update local state:
2300                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2301                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2302                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2303                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2304                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2305                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2306                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2307                 });
2308                 Ok(())
2309         }
2310
2311         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2312         #[inline]
2313         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2314                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2315                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2316                                 match check_preimage {
2317                                         None => {},
2318                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2319                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2320                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2321                                                 }
2322                                 };
2323                                 match htlc.state {
2324                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2325                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2326                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2327                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2328                                         },
2329                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2330                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2331                                 }
2332                                 return Ok(htlc);
2333                         }
2334                 }
2335                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2336         }
2337
2338         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2339                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2340                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2341                 }
2342                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2343                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2344                 }
2345
2346                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2347                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2348         }
2349
2350         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2351                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2352                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2353                 }
2354                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2355                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2356                 }
2357
2358                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2359                 Ok(())
2360         }
2361
2362         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2363                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2364                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2365                 }
2366                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2367                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2368                 }
2369
2370                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2371                 Ok(())
2372         }
2373
2374         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2375         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2376                                 L::Target: Logger
2377         {
2378                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2379                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2380                 }
2381                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2382                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2383                 }
2384                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2385                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2386                 }
2387
2388                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2389
2390                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2391
2392                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw) = {
2393                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2394                         let commitment_txid = {
2395                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2396                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2397                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2398
2399                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2400                                         log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2401                                         log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2402                                         log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2403                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2404                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2405                                 }
2406                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2407                         };
2408                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.3.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2409                         (commitment_tx.2, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid, commitment_tx.1)
2410                 };
2411
2412                 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2413                 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2414                 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2415                         update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2416                 } else { false };
2417                 if update_fee { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); }
2418                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2419                 if update_fee {
2420                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2421                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2422                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2423                         }
2424                 }
2425                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2426                 {
2427                         if self.is_outbound() {
2428                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2429                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2430                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2431                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2432                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2433                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2434                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2435                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2436                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2437                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2438                                                 }
2439                                 }
2440                         }
2441                 }
2442
2443                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2444                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2445                 }
2446
2447                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2448                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2449                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2450                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2451                                 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2452                                         self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2453                                         &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2454
2455                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2456                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2457                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2458                                         log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2459                                         encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2460                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2461                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2462                                 }
2463                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2464                         } else {
2465                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2466                         }
2467                 }
2468
2469                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2470                         commitment_tx,
2471                         msg.signature,
2472                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2473                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2474                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2475                 );
2476
2477                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2478                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2479
2480                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2481                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2482                 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2483                         if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2484                                 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2485                                 need_commitment = true;
2486                         }
2487                 }
2488
2489                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2490                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2491                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2492                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2493                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2494                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2495                         }]
2496                 };
2497
2498                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2499                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2500                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2501                         } else { None };
2502                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2503                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2504                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2505                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2506                                 need_commitment = true;
2507                         }
2508                 }
2509                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2510                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2511                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2512                         } else { None } {
2513                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2514                                         log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2515                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2516                                 need_commitment = true;
2517                         }
2518                 }
2519
2520                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2521                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2522                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2523                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2524
2525                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2526                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2527                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2528                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2529                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2530                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2531                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2532                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2533                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2534                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2535                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2536                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2537                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2538                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2539                         }
2540                         log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2541                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2542                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2543                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2544                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2545                 }
2546
2547                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2548                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2549                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2550                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2551                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2552                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2553                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2554                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2555                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2556                         (Some(msg), None)
2557                 } else if !need_commitment {
2558                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2559                 } else { (None, None) };
2560
2561                 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2562                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2563
2564                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2565                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2566                         per_commitment_secret,
2567                         next_per_commitment_point,
2568                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2569         }
2570
2571         /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2572         /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2573         /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2574         pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2575                 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2576                    (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2577                         self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2578                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2579         }
2580
2581         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2582         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2583         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2584                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2585                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2586                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2587                                 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2588
2589                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2590                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2591                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2592                         };
2593
2594                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2595                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2596                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2597                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2598                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2599                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2600                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2601                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2602                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2603                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2604                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2605                                 // to rebalance channels.
2606                                 match &htlc_update {
2607                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2608                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2609                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2610                                                         Err(e) => {
2611                                                                 match e {
2612                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2613                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2614                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2615                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2616                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2617                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2618                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2619                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2620                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2621                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2622                                                                         },
2623                                                                         _ => {
2624                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2625                                                                         },
2626                                                                 }
2627                                                         }
2628                                                 }
2629                                         },
2630                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2631                                                 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2632                                                 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2633                                                 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2634                                                 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2635                                                 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2636                                                 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2637                                                         if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2638                                                                 (msg, monitor_update)
2639                                                         } else { unreachable!() };
2640                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2641                                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2642                                         },
2643                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2644                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2645                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2646                                                                 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2647                                                                 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2648                                                                 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2649                                                                 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2650                                                                 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2651                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2652                                                         },
2653                                                         Err(e) => {
2654                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2655                                                                 else {
2656                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2657                                                                 }
2658                                                         }
2659                                                 }
2660                                         },
2661                                 }
2662                         }
2663                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2664                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2665                         }
2666                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
2667                                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2668                                 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2669                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2670                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2671                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2672                                 })
2673                         } else {
2674                                 None
2675                         };
2676
2677                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2678                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2679                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2680                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2681                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2682
2683                         log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2684                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2685                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2686
2687                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2688                                 update_add_htlcs,
2689                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2690                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2691                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2692                                 update_fee,
2693                                 commitment_signed,
2694                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2695                 } else {
2696                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2697                 }
2698         }
2699
2700         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2701         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2702         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2703         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2704         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2705         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2706                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2707                                         L::Target: Logger,
2708         {
2709                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2710                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2711                 }
2712                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2713                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2714                 }
2715                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2716                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2717                 }
2718
2719                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2720                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2721                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2722                         }
2723                 }
2724
2725                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2726                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2727                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2728                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2729                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2730                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2731                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2732                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2733                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2734                 }
2735
2736                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2737                 {
2738                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2739                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2740                 }
2741
2742                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2743                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2744                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2745                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2746                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2747                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2748                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2749                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2750                         }],
2751                 };
2752
2753                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2754                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2755                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2756                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2757                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2758                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2759                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2760                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2761
2762                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2763                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2764                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2765                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2766                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2767                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2768                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2769
2770                 {
2771                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2772                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2773                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2774
2775                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2776                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2777                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2778                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2779                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2780                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2781                                         }
2782                                         false
2783                                 } else { true }
2784                         });
2785                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2786                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2787                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2788                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2789                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2790                                         } else {
2791                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2792                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2793                                         }
2794                                         false
2795                                 } else { true }
2796                         });
2797                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2798                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2799                                         true
2800                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2801                                         true
2802                                 } else { false };
2803                                 if swap {
2804                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2805                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2806
2807                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2808                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2809                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2810                                                 require_commitment = true;
2811                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2812                                                 match forward_info {
2813                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2814                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2815                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2816                                                                 match fail_msg {
2817                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2818                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2819                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2820                                                                         },
2821                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2822                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2823                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2824                                                                         },
2825                                                                 }
2826                                                         },
2827                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2828                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2829                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2830                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2831                                                         }
2832                                                 }
2833                                         }
2834                                 }
2835                         }
2836                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2837                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2838                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2839                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2840                                 }
2841                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2842                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2843                                 } else { None } {
2844                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2845                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2846                                         require_commitment = true;
2847                                 }
2848                         }
2849                 }
2850                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2851
2852                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2853                         match update_state {
2854                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
2855                                         debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
2856                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2857                                         self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2858                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2859                                 },
2860                                 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
2861                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
2862                                         debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2863                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2864                                         require_commitment = true;
2865                                         self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2866                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2867                                 },
2868                         }
2869                 }
2870
2871                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2872                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2873                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2874                         if require_commitment {
2875                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2876                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2877                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2878                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2879                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2880                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2881                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2882                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2883                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2884                         }
2885                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2886                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2887                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2888                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2889                 }
2890
2891                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2892                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2893                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2894                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2895                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2896                                 }
2897                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2898                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2899                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2900                                 }
2901
2902                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2903                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2904                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2905                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2906
2907                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2908                         },
2909                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2910                                 if require_commitment {
2911                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2912
2913                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2914                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2915                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2916                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2917
2918                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2919                                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2920                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2921                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2922                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2923                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2924                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2925                                                 update_fee: None,
2926                                                 commitment_signed
2927                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2928                                 } else {
2929                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2930                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2931                                 }
2932                         }
2933                 }
2934
2935         }
2936
2937         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2938         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2939         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2940         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2941                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2942                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2943                 }
2944                 if !self.is_usable() {
2945                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2946                 }
2947                 if !self.is_live() {
2948                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2949                 }
2950
2951                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
2952                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2953                         return None;
2954                 }
2955
2956                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2957                 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2958
2959                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2960                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2961                         feerate_per_kw,
2962                 })
2963         }
2964
2965         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2966                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2967                         Some(update_fee) => {
2968                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2969                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2970                         },
2971                         None => Ok(None)
2972                 }
2973         }
2974
2975         /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2976         /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2977         /// resent.
2978         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2979         /// completed.
2980         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L)  where L::Target: Logger {
2981                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2982                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2983                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2984                         return;
2985                 }
2986                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2987                 // will be retransmitted.
2988                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2989
2990                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2991                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2992                         match htlc.state {
2993                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2994                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2995                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2996                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2997                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2998                                         false
2999                                 },
3000                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3001                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3002                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3003                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3004                                         true
3005                                 },
3006                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3007                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3008                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3009                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3010                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3011                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3012                                         true
3013                                 },
3014                         }
3015                 });
3016                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3017
3018                 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3019                         if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3020                                 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3021                                 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3022                         }
3023                 }
3024
3025                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3026                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3027                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3028                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3029                                 // the update upon reconnection.
3030                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3031                         }
3032                 }
3033
3034                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3035                 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3036         }
3037
3038         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3039         /// updates are partially paused.
3040         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3041         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3042         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3043         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3044         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
3045                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3046                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
3047                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
3048                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
3049                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3050                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
3051                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3052                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3053         }
3054
3055         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3056         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3057         /// to the remote side.
3058         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
3059                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3060                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3061
3062                 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
3063                         self.funding_transaction.take()
3064                 } else { None };
3065
3066                 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3067                 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3068                 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
3069                 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
3070                 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
3071                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
3072                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3073                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
3074                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3075                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3076                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3077                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3078                         })
3079                 } else { None };
3080
3081                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
3082                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3083                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
3084                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3085
3086                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3087                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3088                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3089                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3090                 }
3091
3092                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3093                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3094                 } else { None };
3095                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3096                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3097                 } else { None };
3098
3099                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3100                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3101                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3102                 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3103                         log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3104                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3105                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3106                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
3107         }
3108
3109         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3110                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3111         {
3112                 if self.is_outbound() {
3113                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3114                 }
3115                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3116                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3117                 }
3118                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3119                 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate();
3120
3121                 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3122                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3123                 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3124                 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3125                 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3126                 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3127                         let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3128                         let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3129                         let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3130                         let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3131                         if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3132                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3133                                         msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3134                         }
3135                         if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3136                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3137                                         msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3138                         }
3139                 }
3140                 Ok(())
3141         }
3142
3143         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3144                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3145                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3146                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3147                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3148                         per_commitment_secret,
3149                         next_per_commitment_point,
3150                 }
3151         }
3152
3153         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3154                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3155                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3156                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3157                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3158
3159                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3160                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3161                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3162                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3163                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3164                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3165                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3166                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3167                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3168                                 });
3169                         }
3170                 }
3171
3172                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3173                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3174                                 match reason {
3175                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3176                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3177                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3178                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3179                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
3180                                                 });
3181                                         },
3182                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3183                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3184                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3185                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3186                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3187                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3188                                                 });
3189                                         },
3190                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3191                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3192                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3193                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3194                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3195                                                 });
3196                                         },
3197                                 }
3198                         }
3199                 }
3200
3201                 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3202                         Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3203                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3204                                 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3205                         })
3206                 } else { None };
3207
3208                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3209                                 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3210                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3211                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3212                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3213                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3214                 }
3215         }
3216
3217         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3218         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3219         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3220                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3221                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3222                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3223                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3224                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3225                 }
3226
3227                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3228                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3229                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3230                 }
3231
3232                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3233                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
3234                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3235                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3236                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3237                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3238                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3239                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3240                                         }
3241                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3242                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3243                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3244                                                 ));
3245                                         }
3246                                 },
3247                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3248                         }
3249                 }
3250
3251                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3252                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3253                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3254
3255                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3256                         assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3257                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3258                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3259                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3260                         })
3261                 } else { None };
3262
3263                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3264                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3265                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3266                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3267                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3268                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3269                                 }
3270                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3271                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3272                         }
3273
3274                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3275                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3276                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3277                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3278                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3279                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3280                 }
3281
3282                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3283                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3284                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3285                         None
3286                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3287                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3288                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3289                                 None
3290                         } else {
3291                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3292                         }
3293                 } else {
3294                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3295                 };
3296
3297                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3298                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3299                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3300                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3301                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3302
3303                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3304                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3305                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3306                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3307                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3308                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3309                         })
3310                 } else { None };
3311
3312                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3313                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3314                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3315                         } else {
3316                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3317                         }
3318
3319                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3320                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3321                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3322                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3323                                 // now!
3324                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3325                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3326                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3327                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3328                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3329                                         },
3330                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3331                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3332                                         },
3333                                 }
3334                         } else {
3335                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3336                         }
3337                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3338                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3339                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3340                         } else {
3341                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3342                         }
3343
3344                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3345                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3346                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3347                         }
3348
3349                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3350                 } else {
3351                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3352                 }
3353         }
3354
3355         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3356                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3357         {
3358                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3359                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3360                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3361                         return None;
3362                 }
3363
3364                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3365                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3366                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3367                 }
3368                 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3369                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3370                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3371
3372                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3373                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3374                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3375                         .ok();
3376                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3377                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3378
3379                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3380                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3381                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3382                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3383                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3384                 })
3385         }
3386
3387         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref, K: Deref>(
3388                 &mut self, fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3389         ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3390         where
3391                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3392                 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3393         {
3394                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3395                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3396                 }
3397                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3398                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3399                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3400                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3401                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3402                 }
3403                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3404                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3405                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3406                         }
3407                 }
3408                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3409
3410                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match ShutdownScript::try_from((msg.scriptpubkey.clone(), their_features)) {
3411                         Ok(script) => script.into_inner(),
3412                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
3413                 };
3414
3415                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3416                         if Some(&shutdown_scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3417                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", shutdown_scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3418                         }
3419                 } else {
3420                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3421                 }
3422
3423                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3424                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3425                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3426                 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3427
3428                 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3429                         Some(_) => false,
3430                         None => {
3431                                 assert!(send_shutdown);
3432                                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3433                                 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3434                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
3435                                 }
3436                                 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3437                                 true
3438                         },
3439                 };
3440
3441                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3442
3443                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3444                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3445
3446                 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3447                         self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3448                         Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3449                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3450                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3451                                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3452                                 }],
3453                         })
3454                 } else { None };
3455                 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3456                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3457                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3458                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3459                         })
3460                 } else { None };
3461
3462                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3463                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3464                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3465                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3466                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3467                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3468                         match htlc_update {
3469                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3470                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3471                                         false
3472                                 },
3473                                 _ => true
3474                         }
3475                 });
3476
3477                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3478                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3479
3480                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3481         }
3482
3483         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3484                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3485                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3486                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3487
3488                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3489
3490                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3491                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3492                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3493                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3494                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3495                 } else {
3496                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3497                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3498                 }
3499                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3500                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3501
3502                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3503         }
3504
3505         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3506                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3507         {
3508                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3509                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3510                 }
3511                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3512                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3513                 }
3514                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3515                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3516                 }
3517                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3518                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3519                 }
3520
3521                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3522                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3523                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3524                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3525                 }
3526                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3527
3528                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3529                         Ok(_) => {},
3530                         Err(_e) => {
3531                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3532                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3533                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3534                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3535                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3536                         },
3537                 };
3538
3539                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3540                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3541                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3542                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3543                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3544                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3545                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3546                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3547                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3548                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3549                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3550                         }
3551                 }
3552
3553                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3554                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3555                                 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3556                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3557                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3558                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3559                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3560                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3561                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3562                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3563                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3564                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3565                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3566                                         signature: sig,
3567                                 }), None))
3568                         }
3569                 }
3570
3571                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3572                 if self.is_outbound() {
3573                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3574                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3575                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3576                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3577                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3578                                         }
3579                                 }
3580                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3581                         }
3582                 } else {
3583                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3584                 }
3585                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3586                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3587                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3588                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3589                                 }
3590                         }
3591                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3592                 }
3593
3594                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3595                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3596                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3597                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3598                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3599                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3600
3601                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3602                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3603
3604                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3605                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3606                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3607                         signature: sig,
3608                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3609         }
3610
3611         // Public utilities:
3612
3613         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3614                 self.channel_id
3615         }
3616
3617         pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3618                 self.minimum_depth
3619         }
3620
3621         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3622         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3623         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3624                 self.user_id
3625         }
3626
3627         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3628         /// is_usable() returns true).
3629         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3630         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3631                 self.short_channel_id
3632         }
3633
3634         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3635         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3636         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3637                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3638         }
3639
3640         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3641                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3642         }
3643
3644         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3645                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3646         }
3647
3648         pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3649                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3650                         .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3651         }
3652
3653         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3654                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3655         }
3656
3657         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3658         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3659                 self.counterparty_node_id
3660         }
3661
3662         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3663         #[cfg(test)]
3664         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3665                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3666         }
3667
3668         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3669         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3670                 return cmp::min(
3671                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3672                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3673                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3674                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3675
3676                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3677                 );
3678         }
3679
3680         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3681         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3682                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3683         }
3684
3685         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3686                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3687         }
3688
3689         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3690                 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3691         }
3692
3693         pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3694                 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3695         }
3696
3697         pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3698                 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
3699         }
3700
3701         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3702                 self.feerate_per_kw
3703         }
3704
3705         pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3706                 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
3707                 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
3708                 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
3709                 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
3710                 // which are near the dust limit.
3711                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3712                 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3713                         feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
3714                 }
3715                 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
3716         }
3717
3718         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3719                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3720         }
3721
3722         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3723                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3724         }
3725
3726         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3727                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3728         }
3729
3730         #[cfg(test)]
3731         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3732                 &self.holder_signer
3733         }
3734
3735         #[cfg(test)]
3736         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3737                 ChannelValueStat {
3738                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3739                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3740                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3741                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3742                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3743                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3744                                 let mut res = 0;
3745                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3746                                         match h {
3747                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3748                                                         res += amount_msat;
3749                                                 }
3750                                                 _ => {}
3751                                         }
3752                                 }
3753                                 res
3754                         },
3755                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3756                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3757                 }
3758         }
3759
3760         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3761         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3762                 self.update_time_counter
3763         }
3764
3765         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3766                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3767         }
3768
3769         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3770                 self.config.announced_channel
3771         }
3772
3773         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3774                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3775         }
3776
3777         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3778         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3779         pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3780                 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3781         }
3782
3783         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3784         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3785                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3786         }
3787
3788         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3789         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3790         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3791                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3792                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3793         }
3794
3795         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3796         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3797         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3798         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3799                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3800         }
3801
3802         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3803         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3804         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3805                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3806         }
3807
3808         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3809         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3810                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3811         }
3812
3813         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3814         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3815         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3816         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3817                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3818                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3819                         true
3820                 } else { false }
3821         }
3822
3823         pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3824                 self.channel_update_status
3825         }
3826
3827         pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3828                 self.channel_update_status = status;
3829         }
3830
3831         fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3832                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3833                         return None;
3834                 }
3835
3836                 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3837                 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3838                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3839                 }
3840
3841                 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
3842                         return None;
3843                 }
3844
3845                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3846                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3847                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3848                         true
3849                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3850                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3851                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3852                         true
3853                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3854                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3855                         false
3856                 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3857                         panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3858                 } else {
3859                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3860                         false
3861                 };
3862
3863                 if need_commitment_update {
3864                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3865                                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3866                                 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3867                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3868                                         next_per_commitment_point,
3869                                 });
3870                         } else {
3871                                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3872                         }
3873                 }
3874                 None
3875         }
3876
3877         /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3878         /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3879         /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3880         pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3881                         -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3882                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3883                 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3884                         if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3885                                 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3886                                 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3887                                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3888                                         if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3889                                                 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3890                                                 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3891                                                                 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3892                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3893                                                                 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3894                                                                 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3895                                                                 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3896                                                                 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3897                                                                 // channel and move on.
3898                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3899                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3900                                                         }
3901                                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3902                                                         return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3903                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3904                                                                 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3905                                                         });
3906                                                 } else {
3907                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3908                                                                 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3909                                                                         if input.witness.is_empty() {
3910                                                                                 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3911                                                                                 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3912                                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3913                                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3914                                                                         }
3915                                                                 }
3916                                                         }
3917                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3918                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3919                                                         self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3920                                                                 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3921                                                                 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3922                                                         }
3923                                                 }
3924                                         }
3925                                         // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3926                                         // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3927                                         // may have already happened for this block).
3928                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3929                                                 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3930                                                 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3931                                         }
3932                                 }
3933                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3934                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3935                                                 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3936                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3937                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3938                                                         data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3939                                                 });
3940                                         }
3941                                 }
3942                         }
3943                 }
3944                 Ok(None)
3945         }
3946
3947         /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3948         /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3949         /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3950         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3951         ///
3952         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3953         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3954         /// post-shutdown.
3955         ///
3956         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3957         /// back.
3958         pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
3959                         -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3960                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3961                 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3962                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3963                         match htlc_update {
3964                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3965                                         if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3966                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3967                                                 false
3968                                         } else { true }
3969                                 },
3970                                 _ => true
3971                         }
3972                 });
3973
3974                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3975
3976                 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3977                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3978                         return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3979                 }
3980
3981                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3982                 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3983                    (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3984                         let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3985                         if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3986                                 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3987                                 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3988                                 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3989                                 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3990                         }
3991
3992                         // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3993                         // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3994                         // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3995                         // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3996                         if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
3997                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3998                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3999                                         data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
4000                                 });
4001                         }
4002                 }
4003
4004                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
4005         }
4006
4007         /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4008         /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4009         /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
4010         pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4011                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4012                         // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4013                         // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4014                         let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4015                         // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4016                         // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4017                         // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4018                         let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4019                         match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
4020                                 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
4021                                         assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4022                                         assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4023                                         Ok(())
4024                                 },
4025                                 Err(e) => Err(e)
4026                         }
4027                 } else {
4028                         // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4029                         Ok(())
4030                 }
4031         }
4032
4033         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4034         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4035
4036         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4037                 if !self.is_outbound() {
4038                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
4039                 }
4040                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
4041                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
4042                 }
4043
4044                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4045                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4046                 }
4047
4048                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4049                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4050
4051                 msgs::OpenChannel {
4052                         chain_hash,
4053                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4054                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4055                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
4056                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4057                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4058                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4059                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4060                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
4061                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4062                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4063                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4064                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4065                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4066                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4067                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4068                         first_per_commitment_point,
4069                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
4070                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4071                                 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4072                                 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4073                         }),
4074                 }
4075         }
4076
4077         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4078                 if self.is_outbound() {
4079                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4080                 }
4081                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4082                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4083                 }
4084                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4085                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4086                 }
4087
4088                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4089                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4090
4091                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4092                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4093                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4094                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4095                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4096                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4097                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4098                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4099                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4100                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4101                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4102                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4103                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4104                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4105                         first_per_commitment_point,
4106                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4107                                 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4108                                 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4109                         }),
4110                 }
4111         }
4112
4113         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
4114         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4115                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4116                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
4117                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4118                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
4119         }
4120
4121         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
4122         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
4123         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
4124         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
4125         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
4126         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
4127         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
4128         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4129                 if !self.is_outbound() {
4130                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
4131                 }
4132                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4133                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
4134                 }
4135                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
4136                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4137                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4138                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4139                 }
4140
4141                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4142                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4143
4144                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4145                         Ok(res) => res,
4146                         Err(e) => {
4147                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4148                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4149                                 return Err(e);
4150                         }
4151                 };
4152
4153                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4154
4155                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4156
4157                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4158                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4159                 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4160
4161                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4162                         temporary_channel_id,
4163                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4164                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4165                         signature
4166                 })
4167         }
4168
4169         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4170         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4171         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4172         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4173         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4174         /// closing).
4175         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4176         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4177         ///
4178         /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4179         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4180                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4181                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4182                 }
4183                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4184                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4185                 }
4186                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4187                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4188                 }
4189
4190                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4191
4192                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4193                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4194                         chain_hash,
4195                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4196                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4197                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4198                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4199                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4200                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4201                 };
4202
4203                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4204                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4205
4206                 Ok((msg, sig))
4207         }
4208
4209         /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4210         /// available.
4211         fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4212                 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4213                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4214
4215                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4216                         Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4217                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4218                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4219                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4220                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4221                                 contents: announcement,
4222                         })
4223                 } else {
4224                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4225                 }
4226         }
4227
4228         /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4229         /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4230         /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4231         pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4232                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4233
4234                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4235
4236                 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4237                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4238                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4239                                  &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4240                 }
4241                 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4242                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4243                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4244                                 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4245                 }
4246
4247                 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4248
4249                 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4250         }
4251
4252         /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4253         /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4254         pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4255                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4256                         Ok(res) => res,
4257                         Err(_) => return None,
4258                 };
4259                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4260                 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4261                         Ok(res) => Some(res),
4262                         Err(_) => None,
4263                 }
4264         }
4265
4266         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4267         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4268         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4269                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4270                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4271                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4272                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4273                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4274                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4275                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4276                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4277                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4278                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4279                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4280                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4281                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4282                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4283                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4284                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4285                         })
4286                 } else {
4287                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4288                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4289                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4290                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4291                         })
4292                 };
4293                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4294                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4295                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4296                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4297                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4298                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4299                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4300                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4301
4302                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4303                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4304                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4305                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4306                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4307                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4308                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4309                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4310                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4311                         // overflow here.
4312                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4313                         data_loss_protect,
4314                 }
4315         }
4316
4317
4318         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4319
4320         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4321         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4322         ///
4323         /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4324         /// the wire:
4325         /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4326         ///   wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4327         ///   awaiting ACK.
4328         /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4329         ///   may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4330         ///   them.
4331         ///
4332         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4333         ///
4334         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4335         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4336                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4337                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4338                 }
4339                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4340                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4341                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4342                 }
4343
4344                 if amount_msat == 0 {
4345                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4346                 }
4347
4348                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4349                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4350                 }
4351
4352                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4353                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4354                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4355                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4356                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4357                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4358                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4359                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4360                 }
4361
4362                 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4363                 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4364                 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4365                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4366                 }
4367                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4368                 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4369                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4370                 }
4371
4372                 if !self.is_outbound() {
4373                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4374                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4375                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4376                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4377                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4378                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4379                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4380                         }
4381                 }
4382
4383                 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4384                 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4385                         let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4386                         if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4387                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4388                                         on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4389                         }
4390                 }
4391
4392                 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4393                 if amount_msat / 1000 <  exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4394                         let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4395                         if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4396                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4397                                         on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4398                         }
4399                 }
4400
4401                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
4402                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4403                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4404                 }
4405
4406                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4407                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4408                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4409                         FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4410                 } else { 0 };
4411                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4412                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4413                 }
4414
4415                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4416                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4417                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4418                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4419                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4420                 }
4421
4422                 // Now update local state:
4423                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4424                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4425                                 amount_msat,
4426                                 payment_hash,
4427                                 cltv_expiry,
4428                                 source,
4429                                 onion_routing_packet,
4430                         });
4431                         return Ok(None);
4432                 }
4433
4434                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4435                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4436                         amount_msat,
4437                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4438                         cltv_expiry,
4439                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4440                         source,
4441                 });
4442
4443                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4444                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4445                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4446                         amount_msat,
4447                         payment_hash,
4448                         cltv_expiry,
4449                         onion_routing_packet,
4450                 };
4451                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4452
4453                 Ok(Some(res))
4454         }
4455
4456         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4457         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4458         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4459         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4460         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4461                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4462                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4463                 }
4464                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4465                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4466                 }
4467                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4468                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4469                 }
4470                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4471                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4472                 }
4473                 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4474                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4475                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4476                                 have_updates = true;
4477                         }
4478                         if have_updates { break; }
4479                 }
4480                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4481                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4482                                 have_updates = true;
4483                         }
4484                         if have_updates { break; }
4485                 }
4486                 if !have_updates {
4487                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4488                 }
4489                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4490         }
4491         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4492         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4493                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
4494                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4495                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4496                 // is acceptable.
4497                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4498                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4499                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4500                         } else { None };
4501                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4502                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4503                                 htlc.state = state;
4504                         }
4505                 }
4506                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4507                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4508                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4509                         } else { None } {
4510                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4511                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4512                         }
4513                 }
4514                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4515                         if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
4516                                 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
4517                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4518                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4519                                 self.pending_update_fee = None;
4520                         }
4521                 }
4522                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4523
4524                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4525                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4526                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4527                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4528                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4529                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4530                         },
4531                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4532                 };
4533
4534                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4535                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4536                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4537                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4538                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4539                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4540                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4541                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4542                         }]
4543                 };
4544                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4545                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4546         }
4547
4548         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4549         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4550         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4551                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4552                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
4553                 let feerate_per_kw = counterparty_commitment_tx.1;
4554                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4555                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4556
4557                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4558                 {
4559                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4560                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4561                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4562                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4563                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4564                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4565                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4566                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4567                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4568                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.2);
4569                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4570                                                 }
4571                                 }
4572                         }
4573                 }
4574
4575                 {
4576                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.3.len());
4577                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.3.iter() {
4578                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4579                         }
4580
4581                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4582                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4583                         signature = res.0;
4584                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4585
4586                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4587                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4588                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4589                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4590
4591                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4592                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4593                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4594                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4595                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4596                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4597                         }
4598                 }
4599
4600                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4601                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4602                         signature,
4603                         htlc_signatures,
4604                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.3)))
4605         }
4606
4607         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4608         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4609         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4610         /// more info.
4611         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4612                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4613                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4614                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4615                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4616                         },
4617                         None => Ok(None)
4618                 }
4619         }
4620
4621         /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4622         pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4623                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4624         }
4625
4626         pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4627                 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4628                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4629                 }
4630                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4631                         fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4632                         fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4633                         cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4634                 });
4635
4636                 Ok(())
4637         }
4638
4639         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4640         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4641         pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
4642         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4643                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4644                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4645                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4646                         }
4647                 }
4648                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4649                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4650                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4651                         }
4652                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4653                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4654                         }
4655                 }
4656                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4657                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4658                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4659                 }
4660
4661                 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4662                         Some(_) => false,
4663                         None => {
4664                                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4665                                 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4666                                         return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
4667                                 }
4668                                 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4669                                 true
4670                         },
4671                 };
4672
4673                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4674                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4675                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4676                 } else {
4677                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4678                 }
4679                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4680
4681                 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4682                         self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4683                         Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4684                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4685                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4686                                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4687                                 }],
4688                         })
4689                 } else { None };
4690                 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
4691                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4692                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4693                 };
4694
4695                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4696                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4697                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4698                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4699                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4700                         match htlc_update {
4701                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4702                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4703                                         false
4704                                 },
4705                                 _ => true
4706                         }
4707                 });
4708
4709                 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4710         }
4711
4712         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4713         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4714         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4715         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4716         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4717         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4718                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4719                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4720                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4721                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4722                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4723
4724                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4725                 // return them to fail the payment.
4726                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4727                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4728                         match htlc_update {
4729                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4730                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4731                                 },
4732                                 _ => {}
4733                         }
4734                 }
4735                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4736                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4737                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4738                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4739                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4740                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4741                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4742                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4743                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4744                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4745                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4746                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4747                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4748                                 }))
4749                         } else { None }
4750                 } else { None };
4751
4752                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4753                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4754                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4755         }
4756 }
4757
4758 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4759 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4760
4761 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4762         (0, FailRelay),
4763         (1, FailMalformed),
4764         (2, Fulfill),
4765 );
4766
4767 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4768         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4769                 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4770                 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4771                 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4772                 match self {
4773                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4774                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4775                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4776                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4777                 }
4778                 Ok(())
4779         }
4780 }
4781
4782 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4783         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4784                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4785                         0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4786                         1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4787                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4788                 })
4789         }
4790 }
4791
4792 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4793         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4794                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4795                 // called.
4796
4797                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4798
4799                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4800
4801                 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4802                 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4803                 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4804                 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4805                 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4806                 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4807
4808                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4809                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4810                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4811
4812                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4813
4814                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4815                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4816                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4817                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4818                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4819                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4820
4821                 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
4822                 // deserialized from that format.
4823                 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
4824                         Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
4825                         None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
4826                 }
4827                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4828
4829                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4830                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4831                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4832
4833                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4834                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4835                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4836                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4837                         }
4838                 }
4839                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4840                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4841                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4842                                 continue; // Drop
4843                         }
4844                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4845                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4846                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4847                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4848                         match &htlc.state {
4849                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4850                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4851                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4852                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4853                                 },
4854                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4855                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4856                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4857                                 },
4858                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4859                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4860                                 },
4861                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4862                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4863                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4864                                 },
4865                         }
4866                 }
4867
4868                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4869                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4870                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4871                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4872                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4873                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4874                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4875                         match &htlc.state {
4876                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4877                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4878                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4879                                 },
4880                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4881                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4882                                 },
4883                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
4884                                         // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
4885                                         // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
4886                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4887                                 },
4888                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4889                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4890                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4891                                 },
4892                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4893                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4894                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4895                                 },
4896                         }
4897                 }
4898
4899                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4900                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4901                         match update {
4902                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4903                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4904                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4905                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4906                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4907                                         source.write(writer)?;
4908                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4909                                 },
4910                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4911                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4912                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4913                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4914                                 },
4915                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4916                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4917                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4918                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4919                                 }
4920                         }
4921                 }
4922
4923                 match self.resend_order {
4924                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4925                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4926                 }
4927
4928                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4929                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4930                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4931
4932                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4933                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4934                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4935                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4936                 }
4937
4938                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4939                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4940                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4941                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4942                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4943                 }
4944
4945                 if self.is_outbound() {
4946                         self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
4947                 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4948                         // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed, drop it.
4949                         Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
4950                 } else {
4951                         None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
4952                 }
4953                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4954
4955                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4956                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4957                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4958                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4959
4960                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4961                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4962                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4963                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4964                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4965                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4966                         },
4967                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4968                 }
4969
4970                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4971                 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4972                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4973
4974                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4975                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4976                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4977
4978                 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4979                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4980
4981                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4982                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4983                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4984
4985                 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4986                 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4987
4988                 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4989                         Some(info) => {
4990                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4991                                 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4992                                 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4993                                 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4994                         },
4995                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4996                 }
4997
4998                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4999                 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
5000
5001                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5002                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5003                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
5004
5005                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
5006
5007                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
5008
5009                 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
5010
5011                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5012                 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5013                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5014                 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
5015                         htlc.write(writer)?;
5016                 }
5017
5018                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5019                         (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
5020                         // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
5021                         // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
5022                         // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
5023                         // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
5024                         // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
5025                         // override that.
5026                         (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
5027                         (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5028                         (5, self.config, required),
5029                         (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5030                 });
5031
5032                 Ok(())
5033         }
5034 }
5035
5036 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
5037 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
5038                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5039         fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5040                 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5041
5042                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5043
5044                 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
5045                 if ver == 1 {
5046                         // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
5047                         config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
5048                         config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
5049                         config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
5050                         config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5051                 } else {
5052                         // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
5053                         let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5054                 }
5055
5056                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5057                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
5058                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5059
5060                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5061
5062                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5063                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
5064                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
5065                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
5066                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
5067                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
5068                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
5069                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
5070                 }
5071                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
5072
5073                 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
5074                 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
5075                         Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
5076                         Err(_) => None,
5077                 };
5078                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
5079
5080                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5081                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5082                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5083
5084                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5085                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5086                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
5087                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5088                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5089                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5090                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5091                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5092                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5093                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
5094                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5095                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5096                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5097                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5098                                 },
5099                         });
5100                 }
5101
5102                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5103                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5104                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
5105                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5106                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5107                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5108                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5109                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5110                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5111                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5112                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5113                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5114                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5115                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
5116                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5117                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5118                                 },
5119                         });
5120                 }
5121
5122                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5123                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
5124                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
5125                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5126                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5127                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5128                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5129                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5130                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5131                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5132                                 },
5133                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
5134                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
5135                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5136                                 },
5137                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
5138                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5139                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5140                                 },
5141                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5142                         });
5143                 }
5144
5145                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5146                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5147                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5148                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5149                 };
5150
5151                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
5152                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
5153                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
5154
5155                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5156                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5157                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
5158                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5159                 }
5160
5161                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5162                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5163                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
5164                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5165                 }
5166
5167                 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5168
5169                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5170
5171                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5172                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5173                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5174                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5175
5176                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5177                         0 => None,
5178                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
5179                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5180                 };
5181
5182                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5183                 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5184                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5185
5186                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5187                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5188                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5189                 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5190                 if ver == 1 {
5191                         // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5192                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5193                 } else {
5194                         // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5195                         let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5196                 }
5197                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5198                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5199                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5200
5201                 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5202                 if ver == 1 {
5203                         // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5204                         minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5205                 } else {
5206                         // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5207                         let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5208                 }
5209
5210                 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5211                         0 => None,
5212                         1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5213                                 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5214                                 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5215                                 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5216                         }),
5217                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5218                 };
5219
5220                 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5221                 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5222
5223                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5224
5225                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5226                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5227
5228                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5229                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5230
5231                 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5232
5233                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5234                 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5235                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5236                 {
5237                         let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5238                         for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5239                                 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5240                         }
5241                 }
5242
5243                 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
5244                         Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
5245                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
5246                         } else {
5247                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
5248                         }))
5249                 } else {
5250                         None
5251                 };
5252
5253                 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5254                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5255                         (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5256                         (1, minimum_depth, option),
5257                         (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5258                         (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5259                         (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5260                 });
5261
5262                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5263                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5264
5265                 Ok(Channel {
5266                         user_id,
5267
5268                         config: config.unwrap(),
5269                         channel_id,
5270                         channel_state,
5271                         secp_ctx,
5272                         channel_value_satoshis,
5273
5274                         latest_monitor_update_id,
5275
5276                         holder_signer,
5277                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5278                         destination_script,
5279
5280                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5281                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5282                         value_to_self_msat,
5283
5284                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
5285                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
5286                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5287
5288                         resend_order,
5289
5290                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5291                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5292                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5293                         monitor_pending_forwards,
5294                         monitor_pending_failures,
5295
5296                         pending_update_fee,
5297                         holding_cell_update_fee,
5298                         next_holder_htlc_id,
5299                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5300                         update_time_counter,
5301                         feerate_per_kw,
5302
5303                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5304                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5305                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5306                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5307
5308                         last_sent_closing_fee,
5309
5310                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5311                         funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5312                         short_channel_id,
5313
5314                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5315                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5316                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5317                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5318                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5319                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5320                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5321                         minimum_depth,
5322
5323                         counterparty_forwarding_info,
5324
5325                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5326                         funding_transaction,
5327
5328                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5329                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5330                         counterparty_node_id,
5331
5332                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5333
5334                         commitment_secrets,
5335
5336                         channel_update_status,
5337
5338                         announcement_sigs,
5339
5340                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5341                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5342                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5343                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5344
5345                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5346
5347                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5348                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5349                 })
5350         }
5351 }
5352
5353 #[cfg(test)]
5354 mod tests {
5355         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5356         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5357         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5358         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5359         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5360         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5361         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5362         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5363         use hex;
5364         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5365         use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5366         use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5367         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5368         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5369         use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5370         use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5371         use ln::chan_utils;
5372         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5373         use chain::BestBlock;
5374         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5375         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5376         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5377         use util::config::UserConfig;
5378         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5379         use util::errors::APIError;
5380         use util::test_utils;
5381         use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5382         use util::logger::Logger;
5383         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5384         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5385         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5386         use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5387         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5388         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5389         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5390         use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5391         use sync::Arc;
5392         use prelude::*;
5393
5394         struct TestFeeEstimator {
5395                 fee_est: u32
5396         }
5397         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5398                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5399                         self.fee_est
5400                 }
5401         }
5402
5403         #[test]
5404         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5405                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5406                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5407         }
5408
5409         struct Keys {
5410                 signer: InMemorySigner,
5411         }
5412         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5413                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5414
5415                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5416                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5417                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5418                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5419                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5420                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5421                 }
5422
5423                 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5424                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5425                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5426                         ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5427                 }
5428
5429                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5430                         self.signer.clone()
5431                 }
5432                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5433                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5434                 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5435         }
5436
5437         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5438                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5439         }
5440
5441         #[test]
5442         fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5443                 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5444                 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5445                         ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5446
5447                 let seed = [42; 32];
5448                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5449                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5450                 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
5451                         returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
5452                 });
5453
5454                 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5455                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5456                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5457                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5458                 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config) {
5459                         Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
5460                                 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
5461                         },
5462                         Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5463                         Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5464                 }
5465         }
5466
5467         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5468         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5469         #[test]
5470         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5471                 let original_fee = 253;
5472                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5473                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5474                 let seed = [42; 32];
5475                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5476                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5477
5478                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5479                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5480                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5481
5482                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5483                 // same as the old fee.
5484                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5485                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5486                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5487         }
5488
5489         #[test]
5490         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5491                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5492                 // dust limits are used.
5493                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5494                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5495                 let seed = [42; 32];
5496                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5497                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5498
5499                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5500                 // they have different dust limits.
5501
5502                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5503                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5504                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5505                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5506
5507                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5508                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5509                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5510                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5511                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5512
5513                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5514                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5515                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5516                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5517                 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5518
5519                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5520                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5521                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5522                         htlc_id: 0,
5523                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5524                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5525                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5526                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5527                 });
5528
5529                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5530                         htlc_id: 1,
5531                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5532                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5533                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5534                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5535                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5536                                 path: Vec::new(),
5537                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5538                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5539                         }
5540                 });
5541
5542                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5543                 // the dust limit check.
5544                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5545                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5546                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5547                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5548
5549                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5550                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5551                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5552                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5553                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5554                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5555                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5556         }
5557
5558         #[test]
5559         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5560                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5561                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5562                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5563                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5564                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5565                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5566                 let seed = [42; 32];
5567                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5568                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5569
5570                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5571                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5572                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5573
5574                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5575                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5576
5577                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5578                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5579                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5580                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5581                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5582                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5583
5584                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5585                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5586                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5587                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5588                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5589
5590                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5591
5592                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5593                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5594                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5595                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5596                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5597
5598                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5599                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5600                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5601                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5602                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5603         }
5604
5605         #[test]
5606         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5607                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5608                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5609                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5610                 let seed = [42; 32];
5611                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5612                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5613                 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5614                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5615
5616                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5617
5618                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5619                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5620                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5621                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5622
5623                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5624                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5625                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5626                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5627
5628                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5629                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5630                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5631
5632                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5633                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5634                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5635                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5636                 }]};
5637                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5638                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5639                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5640
5641                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5642                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5643
5644                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5645                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5646                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5647                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5648                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5649                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5650                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5651                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5652                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5653                         },
5654                         _ => panic!()
5655                 }
5656
5657                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5658                 // is sane.
5659                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5660                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5661                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5662                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5663                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5664                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5665                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5666                         },
5667                         _ => panic!()
5668                 }
5669         }
5670
5671         #[test]
5672         fn channel_update() {
5673                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5674                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5675                 let seed = [42; 32];
5676                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5677                 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5678                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5679
5680                 // Create a channel.
5681                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5682                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5683                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5684                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5685                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5686                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5687
5688                 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5689                 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5690                         contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5691                                 chain_hash,
5692                                 short_channel_id: 0,
5693                                 timestamp: 0,
5694                                 flags: 0,
5695                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5696                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5697                                 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5698                                 fee_base_msat: 110,
5699                                 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5700                                 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5701                         },
5702                         signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5703                 };
5704                 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5705
5706                 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5707                 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5708                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5709                 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5710                         Some(info) => {
5711                                 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5712                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5713                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5714                         },
5715                         None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5716                 }
5717         }
5718
5719         #[test]
5720         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5721                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5722                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5723                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5724                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5725
5726                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5727                         &secp_ctx,
5728                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5729                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5730                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5731                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5732                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5733
5734                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5735                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5736                         10_000_000,
5737                         [0; 32]
5738                 );
5739
5740                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5741                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5742                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5743
5744                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5745                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5746                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5747                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5748                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5749                 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5750
5751                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5752
5753                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5754                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5755                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5756                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5757                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5758                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5759                 };
5760                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5761                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5762                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5763                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5764                         });
5765                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5766                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5767
5768                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5769                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5770
5771                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5772                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5773
5774                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5775                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5776
5777                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5778                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5779                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5780                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5781                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5782                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5783                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5784                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5785
5786                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5787                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5788                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5789                         } ) => { {
5790                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5791                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
5792
5793                                         let htlcs = res.3.drain(..)
5794                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5795                                                 .collect();
5796                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5797                                 };
5798                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5799                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5800                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5801                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5802                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5803                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5804
5805                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5806                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5807                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5808                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5809                                 $({
5810                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5811                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5812                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5813                                 })*
5814                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5815
5816                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5817                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5818                                         counterparty_signature,
5819                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5820                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5821                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5822                                 );
5823                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5824                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5825
5826                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5827                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5828                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5829
5830                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5831                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5832
5833                                 $({
5834                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5835
5836                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5837                                         let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
5838                                                 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
5839                                                 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
5840                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5841                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5842                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5843
5844                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5845                                         if !htlc.offered {
5846                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5847                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5848                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5849                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5850                                                         }
5851                                                 }
5852
5853                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5854                                         }
5855
5856                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5857                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5858
5859                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5860                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5861                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5862                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5863                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5864                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5865                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5866                                 })*
5867                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5868                         } }
5869                 }
5870
5871                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5872                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5873
5874                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5875                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5876                                                  "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", {});
5877
5878                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5879                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5880                                 htlc_id: 0,
5881                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5882                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5883                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5884                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5885                         };
5886                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5887                         out
5888                 });
5889                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5890                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5891                                 htlc_id: 1,
5892                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5893                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5894                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5895                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5896                         };
5897                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5898                         out
5899                 });
5900                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5901                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5902                                 htlc_id: 2,
5903                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5904                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5905                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5906                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5907                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5908                         };
5909                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5910                         out
5911                 });
5912                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5913                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5914                                 htlc_id: 3,
5915                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5916                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5917                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5918                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5919                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5920                         };
5921                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5922                         out
5923                 });
5924                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5925                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5926                                 htlc_id: 4,
5927                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5928                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5929                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5930                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5931                         };
5932                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5933                         out
5934                 });
5935
5936                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5937                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5938                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5939
5940                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5941                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5942                                  "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", {
5943
5944                                   { 0,
5945                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5946                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5947                                   "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" },
5948
5949                                   { 1,
5950                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5951                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5952                                   "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" },
5953
5954                                   { 2,
5955                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5956                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5957                                   "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" },
5958
5959                                   { 3,
5960                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5961                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5962                                   "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" },
5963
5964                                   { 4,
5965                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5966                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5967                                   "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" }
5968                 } );
5969
5970                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5971                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5972                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5973
5974                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5975                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5976                                  "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", {
5977
5978                                   { 0,
5979                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5980                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5981                                   "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
5982
5983                                   { 1,
5984                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5985                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5986                                   "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" },
5987
5988                                   { 2,
5989                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5990                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5991                                   "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" },
5992
5993                                   { 3,
5994                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5995                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5996                                   "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" },
5997
5998                                   { 4,
5999                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
6000                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
6001                                   "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" }
6002                 } );
6003
6004                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6005                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6006                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
6007
6008                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
6009                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
6010                                  "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", {
6011
6012                                   { 0,
6013                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
6014                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
6015                                   "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" },
6016
6017                                   { 1,
6018                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
6019                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
6020                                   "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" },
6021
6022                                   { 2,
6023                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
6024                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
6025                                   "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" },
6026
6027                                   { 3,
6028                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
6029                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
6030                                   "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" }
6031                 } );
6032
6033                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6034                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6035                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
6036
6037                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
6038                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
6039                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6040
6041                                   { 0,
6042                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
6043                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
6044                                   "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
6045
6046                                   { 1,
6047                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
6048                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
6049                                   "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" },
6050
6051                                   { 2,
6052                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
6053                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
6054                                   "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" },
6055
6056                                   { 3,
6057                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
6058                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
6059                                   "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" }
6060                 } );
6061
6062                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6063                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6064                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
6065
6066                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
6067                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
6068                                  "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", {
6069
6070                                   { 0,
6071                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
6072                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
6073                                   "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" },
6074
6075                                   { 1,
6076                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
6077                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
6078                                   "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" },
6079
6080                                   { 2,
6081                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
6082                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
6083                                   "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" }
6084                 } );
6085
6086                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6087                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6088                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
6089
6090                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
6091                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
6092                                  "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", {
6093
6094                                   { 0,
6095                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
6096                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
6097                                   "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" },
6098
6099                                   { 1,
6100                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
6101                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
6102                                   "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" },
6103
6104                                   { 2,
6105                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
6106                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
6107                                   "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" }
6108                 } );
6109
6110                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6111                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6112                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
6113
6114                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
6115                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
6116                                  "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", {
6117
6118                                   { 0,
6119                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
6120                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
6121                                   "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" },
6122
6123                                   { 1,
6124                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
6125                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
6126                                   "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" }
6127                 } );
6128
6129                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6130                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6131                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
6132
6133                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
6134                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
6135                                  "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", {
6136
6137                                   { 0,
6138                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
6139                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
6140                                   "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" },
6141
6142                                   { 1,
6143                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
6144                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
6145                                   "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" }
6146                 } );
6147
6148                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6149                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6150                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
6151
6152                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
6153                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
6154                                  "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", {
6155
6156                                   { 0,
6157                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
6158                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
6159                                   "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" }
6160                 } );
6161
6162                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6163                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6164                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
6165
6166                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
6167                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
6168                                  "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", {
6169
6170                                   { 0,
6171                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
6172                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
6173                                   "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" }
6174                 } );
6175
6176                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6177                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6178                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
6179
6180                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
6181                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
6182                                  "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", {});
6183
6184                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6185                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6186                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
6187
6188                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
6189                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
6190                                  "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", {});
6191
6192                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6193                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6194                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6195
6196                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6197                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6198                                  "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", {});
6199
6200                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6201                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6202                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6203
6204                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6205                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6206                                  "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", {});
6207
6208                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6209                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6210                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6211                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6212                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6213                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6214                                 htlc_id: 1,
6215                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
6216                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
6217                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6218                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6219                         };
6220                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6221                         out
6222                 });
6223                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6224                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6225                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6226                                 htlc_id: 6,
6227                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
6228                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
6229                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6230                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6231                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6232                         };
6233                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6234                         out
6235                 });
6236                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6237                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6238                                 htlc_id: 5,
6239                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
6240                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
6241                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6242                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6243                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6244                         };
6245                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6246                         out
6247                 });
6248
6249                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6250                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6251                                  "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", {
6252
6253                                   { 0,
6254                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6255                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6256                                   "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc34000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050048304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c60148304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
6257                                   { 1,
6258                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6259                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6260                                   "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" },
6261                                   { 2,
6262                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6263                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6264                                   "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" }
6265                 } );
6266         }
6267
6268         #[test]
6269         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6270                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6271
6272                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6273                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6274                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6275                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6276
6277                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6278                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6279                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6280
6281                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6282                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6283
6284                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6285                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6286
6287                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6288                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6289                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6290         }
6291
6292         #[test]
6293         fn test_key_derivation() {
6294                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6295                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6296
6297                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6298                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6299
6300                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6301                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6302
6303                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6304                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6305
6306                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6307                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6308
6309                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6310                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6311
6312                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6313                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6314
6315                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6316                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6317         }
6318 }