1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
30 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::transaction_utils;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
48 use core::convert::TryFrom;
50 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
68 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
70 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
71 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
72 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
73 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
74 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
75 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
77 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
81 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
82 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
83 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
84 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
87 enum InboundHTLCState {
88 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
89 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
90 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
91 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
92 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
93 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
94 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
95 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
96 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
97 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
98 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
99 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
100 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
101 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
102 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
104 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
105 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
106 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
107 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
108 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
109 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
110 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
111 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
112 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
113 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
114 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
115 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
116 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
117 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
119 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
120 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
121 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
122 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
123 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
124 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
125 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
126 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
128 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
129 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
131 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
132 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
133 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
134 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
135 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
136 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
137 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
138 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
141 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
145 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
146 state: InboundHTLCState,
149 enum OutboundHTLCState {
150 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
151 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
152 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
153 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
154 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
155 /// money back (though we won't), and,
156 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
157 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
158 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
159 /// we'll never get out of sync).
160 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
161 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
162 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
164 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
165 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
166 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
167 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
168 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
169 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
170 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
171 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
172 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
173 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
174 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
175 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
176 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
177 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
178 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
181 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
185 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
186 state: OutboundHTLCState,
190 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
191 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
192 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
196 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
198 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
201 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
206 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
210 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
211 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
212 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
213 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
214 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
215 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
216 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
218 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
219 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
220 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
221 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
222 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
223 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
224 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
226 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
227 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
228 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
230 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
231 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
232 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
233 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
234 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
235 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
237 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
238 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
240 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
241 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
242 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
243 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
244 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
245 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
246 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
247 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
248 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
250 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
251 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
252 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
253 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
254 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
255 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
256 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
257 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
258 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
259 /// us their shutdown.
260 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
261 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
262 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
263 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
265 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
266 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
268 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
270 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
271 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
272 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
273 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
274 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
275 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
276 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
277 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
279 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
281 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
283 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
287 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
293 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
296 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
297 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
298 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
301 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
302 struct HTLCCandidate {
304 origin: HTLCInitiator,
308 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
316 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
318 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
319 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
320 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
321 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
322 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
323 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
324 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
325 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
326 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
329 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
331 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
333 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
334 htlc_value_msat: u64,
335 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
340 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
341 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
342 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
343 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
344 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
346 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
347 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
348 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
349 htlc_value_msat: u64,
350 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
351 /// in the holding cell).
352 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
354 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
355 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
359 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
360 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
361 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
362 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
363 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
364 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
365 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
366 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
367 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
368 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
369 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
371 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
373 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
375 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
376 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
377 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
380 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
381 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
382 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
383 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
384 pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
385 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
386 config: ChannelConfig,
390 channel_id: [u8; 32],
392 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
393 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
395 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
397 holder_signer: Signer,
398 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
399 destination_script: Script,
401 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
402 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
403 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
405 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
406 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
407 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
408 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
409 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
410 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
412 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
413 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
414 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
415 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
416 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
417 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
419 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
421 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
422 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
423 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
424 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
425 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
427 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
428 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
429 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
431 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
432 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
433 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
434 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
435 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
436 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
437 // commitment_signed.
438 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
439 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
440 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
441 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
442 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
443 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
444 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
445 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
446 update_time_counter: u32,
449 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
450 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
451 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
452 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
453 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
454 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
456 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
458 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
459 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
460 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
461 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
463 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
465 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
467 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
469 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
471 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
472 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
473 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
474 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
475 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
476 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
477 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
479 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
481 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
482 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
483 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
485 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
487 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
488 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
490 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
491 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
492 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
494 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
496 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
498 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
500 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
501 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
502 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
504 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
505 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
506 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
507 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
508 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
509 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
510 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
511 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
513 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
514 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
515 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
516 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
517 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
519 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
520 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
522 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
523 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
524 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
525 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
526 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
527 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
528 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
529 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
532 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
533 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
535 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
536 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
537 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
541 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
544 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
546 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
548 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
550 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
552 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
554 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
556 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
557 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
558 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
559 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
560 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
561 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
562 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
563 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
564 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
566 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
567 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
568 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
569 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
570 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
572 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
573 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
574 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
575 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
578 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
581 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
582 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
584 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
585 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
586 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
591 macro_rules! secp_check {
592 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
595 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
600 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
601 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
602 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
603 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
606 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
609 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
610 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
611 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
612 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
616 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
617 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
618 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
620 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
621 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
622 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
624 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
625 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
627 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
628 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
629 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
631 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
632 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
634 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
635 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
636 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
639 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
641 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
642 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
644 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
645 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
648 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
649 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
650 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
656 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
658 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
659 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
661 channel_value_satoshis,
663 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
666 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
667 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
669 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
670 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
671 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
673 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
674 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
675 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
676 pending_update_fee: None,
677 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
678 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
679 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
680 update_time_counter: 1,
682 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
684 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
685 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
686 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
687 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
688 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
691 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
692 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
693 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
695 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
697 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
698 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
699 short_channel_id: None,
701 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
702 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
703 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
704 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
705 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
706 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
707 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
708 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
709 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
711 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
713 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
714 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
715 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
716 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
717 counterparty_parameters: None,
718 funding_outpoint: None
720 funding_transaction: None,
722 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
723 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
724 counterparty_node_id,
726 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
728 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
730 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
732 announcement_sigs: None,
734 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
735 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
736 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
737 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
739 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
741 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
742 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
746 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
747 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
749 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
750 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
751 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
753 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
754 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
755 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
756 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
757 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
758 fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
759 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
760 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
765 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
766 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
767 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
768 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
769 F::Target: FeeEstimator
771 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
772 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
773 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
774 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
775 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
776 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
777 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
778 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
780 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
782 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
783 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
786 // Check sanity of message fields:
787 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
788 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
790 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
791 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
793 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
794 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
795 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
797 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
798 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
800 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
801 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
803 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
804 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
805 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
807 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
809 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
810 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
811 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
813 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
814 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
816 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
820 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
821 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
822 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
824 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
825 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
827 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
828 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
830 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
831 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
833 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
834 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
836 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
837 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
839 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
840 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
843 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
845 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
846 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
847 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
851 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
852 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
854 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
856 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
857 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
858 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
860 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
861 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
863 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
864 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
867 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
868 // for full fee payment
869 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
870 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
871 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
872 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
875 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
876 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
877 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
878 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
881 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
882 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
883 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
884 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
885 if script.len() == 0 {
888 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
889 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
890 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
894 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
895 &OptionalField::Absent => {
896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
901 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
902 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
905 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
906 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
907 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
911 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
912 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
916 config: local_config,
918 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
919 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
922 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
925 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
926 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
928 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
929 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
930 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
932 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
933 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
934 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
935 pending_update_fee: None,
936 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
937 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
938 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
939 update_time_counter: 1,
941 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
943 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
944 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
945 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
946 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
947 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
949 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
950 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
951 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
952 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
954 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
956 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
957 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
958 short_channel_id: None,
960 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
961 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
962 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
963 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
964 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
965 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
966 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
967 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
968 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
969 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
971 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
973 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
974 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
975 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
976 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
977 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
978 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
979 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
981 funding_outpoint: None
983 funding_transaction: None,
985 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
986 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
987 counterparty_node_id,
989 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
991 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
993 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
995 announcement_sigs: None,
997 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
998 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
999 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1000 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1002 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1004 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1005 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1011 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1012 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1013 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1014 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1015 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1017 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1018 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1019 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1020 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1021 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1022 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1023 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1024 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
1025 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
1026 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the fourth return value, but not the third, and
1027 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the fourth return value.
1029 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, u32, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1030 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1031 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1032 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1034 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1035 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1036 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1037 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1039 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1040 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1041 if match update_state {
1042 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1043 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1044 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1045 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1046 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1048 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1052 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1053 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1054 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1055 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1057 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1058 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1059 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1061 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1062 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1063 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1064 transaction_output_index: None
1069 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1070 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1071 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1072 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1073 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1074 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1075 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1077 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1078 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1081 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1082 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1083 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1084 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1086 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1087 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1093 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1094 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1095 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1096 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1097 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1098 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1099 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1103 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1104 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1106 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1108 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1109 if generated_by_local {
1110 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1111 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1120 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1121 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1122 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1123 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1124 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1125 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1126 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1130 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1131 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1133 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1135 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1136 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1138 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1139 if !generated_by_local {
1140 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1148 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1149 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1150 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1151 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1152 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1153 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1154 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1155 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1157 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1159 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1160 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1161 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1162 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1164 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1166 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1167 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1168 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1169 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1172 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1173 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1174 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1176 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1179 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1180 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1182 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1183 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1188 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1189 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1194 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1196 let channel_parameters =
1197 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1198 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1199 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1204 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1207 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1208 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1209 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1210 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1212 (tx, feerate_per_kw, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1216 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1217 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1218 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1219 // outside of those situations will fail.
1220 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1224 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1229 1 + // script length (0)
1233 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1234 2 + // witness marker and flag
1235 1 + // witness element count
1236 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1237 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1238 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1239 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1240 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1241 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1243 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1244 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1245 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1251 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1253 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1255 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1256 script_sig: Script::new(),
1257 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1258 witness: Vec::new(),
1263 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1264 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1265 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1266 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1268 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1269 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1270 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1272 if value_to_self < 0 {
1273 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1274 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1275 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1276 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1277 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1280 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1281 txouts.push((TxOut {
1282 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1283 value: value_to_remote as u64
1287 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1288 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1289 txouts.push((TxOut {
1290 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1291 value: value_to_self as u64
1295 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1297 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1298 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1299 outputs.push(out.0);
1307 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1310 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1311 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1315 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1316 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1317 /// our counterparty!)
1318 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1319 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1320 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1321 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1322 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1323 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1324 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1326 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1330 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1331 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1332 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1333 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1334 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1335 //may see payments to it!
1336 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1337 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1338 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1340 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1343 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1344 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1345 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1346 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1347 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1350 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1351 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1352 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1353 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1355 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1356 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1358 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1360 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1362 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1363 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1364 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1366 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1367 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1368 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1369 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1370 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1372 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1373 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1374 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1376 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1377 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1379 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1382 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1383 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1387 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1391 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1392 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1393 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1394 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1395 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1396 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1399 // Now update local state:
1401 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1402 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1403 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1404 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1405 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1406 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1407 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1411 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1412 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1413 match pending_update {
1414 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1415 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1416 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1417 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1418 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1419 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1420 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1423 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1424 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1425 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1426 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1427 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1428 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1429 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1435 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1436 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1437 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1439 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1440 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1441 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1443 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1444 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1447 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1448 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1450 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1451 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1453 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1454 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1457 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1460 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1461 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1462 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1463 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1468 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1469 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1470 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1471 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1472 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1475 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1476 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1477 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1478 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1479 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1481 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1482 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1483 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1487 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1488 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1489 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1490 /// before we fail backwards.
1491 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1492 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1493 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1494 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1495 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1497 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1499 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1500 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1501 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1503 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1504 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1505 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1507 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1508 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1509 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1511 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1516 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1517 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1523 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1525 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1526 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1527 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1531 // Now update local state:
1532 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1533 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1534 match pending_update {
1535 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1536 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1537 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1538 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1542 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1543 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1544 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1545 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1551 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1552 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1553 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1559 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1561 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1562 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1565 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1566 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1567 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1572 // Message handlers:
1574 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1575 // Check sanity of message fields:
1576 if !self.is_outbound() {
1577 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1579 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1580 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1582 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1583 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1585 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1586 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1588 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1589 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1591 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1592 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1593 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1595 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1596 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1597 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1599 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1600 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1601 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1603 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1604 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1606 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1607 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1610 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1611 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1612 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1614 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1615 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1617 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1618 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1620 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1621 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1623 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1624 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1626 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1627 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1629 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1630 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1632 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1633 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1634 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1636 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1639 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1640 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1641 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1642 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1643 if script.len() == 0 {
1646 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
1647 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
1648 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
1652 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1653 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1659 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1660 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1661 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1662 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1663 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1664 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1666 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1667 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1668 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1669 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1670 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1671 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1674 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1675 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1676 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1679 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1680 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1682 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1687 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1688 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1690 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1691 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).0;
1693 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1694 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1695 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1696 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1697 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1698 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1699 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1700 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1701 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1704 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1705 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1707 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1708 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1709 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1710 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1712 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1713 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1715 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1716 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1719 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1720 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1723 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1724 if self.is_outbound() {
1725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1727 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1728 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1729 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1733 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1734 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1735 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1736 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1739 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1740 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1741 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1742 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1743 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1745 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1747 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1748 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1749 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1752 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1753 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1754 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1758 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1759 initial_commitment_tx,
1762 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1763 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1766 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1768 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1769 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1770 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1771 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1772 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1773 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1774 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1775 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1776 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1778 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1780 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1782 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1783 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1784 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1785 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1787 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1789 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1790 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1792 }, channel_monitor))
1795 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1796 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1797 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1798 if !self.is_outbound() {
1799 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1801 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1802 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1804 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1805 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1806 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1807 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1810 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1812 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1813 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1814 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1815 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1817 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1818 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1820 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1821 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).0;
1823 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1824 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1825 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1826 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1827 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1832 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1833 initial_commitment_tx,
1836 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1837 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1841 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1842 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1843 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1844 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1845 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1846 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1847 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1848 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1849 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1850 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1852 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1854 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1856 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1857 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1858 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1859 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1861 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1863 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1866 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1867 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1868 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1869 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1872 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1874 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1875 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1876 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1877 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1878 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1879 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1880 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1881 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1882 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1883 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1884 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1885 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1886 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1889 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1895 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1896 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1898 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1903 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1904 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1905 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1906 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1907 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1908 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1909 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1912 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1913 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1914 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1915 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1916 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1917 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1919 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1920 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1926 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1927 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1928 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1929 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1930 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1931 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1932 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1935 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1936 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1937 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1938 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1939 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1940 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1942 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1943 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1947 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1948 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1949 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1950 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1951 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1952 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1954 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1955 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1962 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1963 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1964 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1965 /// corner case properly.
1966 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1967 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1969 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1970 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1971 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1972 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
1974 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
1975 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1976 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
1981 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1982 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
1983 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1986 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1987 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1988 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1989 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1990 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1991 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1994 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1995 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1996 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1998 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1999 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2001 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2002 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2004 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2005 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2007 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2008 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2012 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2013 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2019 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2020 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2021 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2024 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2025 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2026 included_htlcs += 1;
2029 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2030 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2034 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2035 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2036 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2037 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2038 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2039 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2044 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2046 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2047 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2052 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2053 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2057 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2058 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2059 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2062 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2063 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2065 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2066 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2067 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2069 total_pending_htlcs,
2070 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2071 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2072 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2074 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2075 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2076 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2078 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2080 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2085 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2086 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2087 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2089 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2090 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2092 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2093 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2095 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2096 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2098 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2099 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2103 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2104 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2110 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2111 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2112 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2113 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2114 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2115 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2118 included_htlcs += 1;
2121 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2122 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2125 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2126 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2128 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2129 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2130 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2135 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2136 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2137 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2140 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2141 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2143 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2144 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2146 total_pending_htlcs,
2147 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2148 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2149 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2151 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2152 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2153 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2155 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2157 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2162 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2163 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2164 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2165 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2166 if local_sent_shutdown {
2167 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
2169 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2170 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2171 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2172 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2174 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2177 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2180 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2181 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2183 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2187 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2188 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2189 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2192 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2193 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2196 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2197 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2198 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2199 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2200 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2201 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2202 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2203 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2204 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2205 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2206 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2208 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2209 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2210 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2211 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2212 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2213 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2217 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2218 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2219 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2220 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2221 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2222 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2223 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2227 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2228 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2229 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2230 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2231 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2232 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2233 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2237 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2238 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2239 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2240 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2241 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2245 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2246 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2247 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2248 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2249 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2251 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2255 let chan_reserve_msat =
2256 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2257 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2261 if !self.is_outbound() {
2262 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2263 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2264 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2265 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2266 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2267 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2268 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2269 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2270 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2271 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2272 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2273 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2274 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2275 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2276 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2279 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2280 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2281 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2282 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2286 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2289 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2293 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2294 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2295 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2299 // Now update local state:
2300 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2301 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2302 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2303 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2304 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2305 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2306 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2311 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2313 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2314 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2315 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2316 match check_preimage {
2318 Some(payment_hash) =>
2319 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2324 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2326 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2327 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2329 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2335 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2338 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2339 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2342 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2346 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2347 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2350 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2351 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2354 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2358 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2362 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2363 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2364 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2366 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2370 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2374 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2375 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2378 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2379 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2381 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2382 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2384 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2385 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2388 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2390 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2392 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw) = {
2393 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2394 let commitment_txid = {
2395 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2396 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2397 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2399 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2400 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2401 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2402 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2403 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2404 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2408 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.3.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2409 (commitment_tx.2, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid, commitment_tx.1)
2412 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2413 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2414 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2415 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2417 if update_fee { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); }
2418 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2420 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2421 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2422 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2425 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2427 if self.is_outbound() {
2428 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2429 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2430 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2431 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2432 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2433 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2434 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2435 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2436 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2437 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2443 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2444 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2447 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2448 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2449 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2450 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2451 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2452 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2453 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2455 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2456 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2457 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2458 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2459 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2460 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2461 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2463 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2465 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2469 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2472 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2473 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2474 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2477 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2478 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2480 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2481 let mut need_commitment = false;
2482 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2483 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2484 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2485 need_commitment = true;
2489 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2490 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2491 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2492 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2493 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2494 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2498 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2499 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2500 Some(forward_info.clone())
2502 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2503 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2504 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2505 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2506 need_commitment = true;
2509 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2510 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2511 Some(fail_reason.take())
2513 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2514 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2515 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2516 need_commitment = true;
2520 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2521 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2522 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2523 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2525 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2526 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2527 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2528 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2529 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2530 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2531 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2532 // includes the right HTLCs.
2533 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2534 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2535 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2536 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2537 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2538 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2540 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2541 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2542 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2543 // re-send the message on restoration)
2544 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2547 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2548 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2549 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2550 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2551 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2552 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2553 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2554 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2555 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2557 } else if !need_commitment {
2558 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2559 } else { (None, None) };
2561 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2562 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2564 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2565 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2566 per_commitment_secret,
2567 next_per_commitment_point,
2568 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2571 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2572 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2573 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2574 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2575 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2576 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2577 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2578 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2581 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2582 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2583 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2584 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2585 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2586 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2587 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2589 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2590 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2591 updates: Vec::new(),
2594 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2595 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2596 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2597 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2598 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2599 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2600 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2601 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2602 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2603 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2604 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2605 // to rebalance channels.
2606 match &htlc_update {
2607 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2608 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2609 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2612 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2613 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2614 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2615 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2616 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2617 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2618 // into the holding cell without ever being
2619 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2620 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2621 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2624 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2630 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2631 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2632 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2633 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2634 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2635 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2636 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2637 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2638 (msg, monitor_update)
2639 } else { unreachable!() };
2640 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2641 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2643 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2644 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2645 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2646 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2647 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2648 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2649 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2650 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2651 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2654 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2656 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2663 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2664 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2666 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
2667 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2668 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2669 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2670 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2671 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2677 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2678 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2679 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2680 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2681 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2683 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2684 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2685 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2687 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2689 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2691 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2694 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2696 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2700 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2701 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2702 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2703 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2704 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2705 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2706 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2709 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2710 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2712 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2713 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2715 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2719 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2720 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2721 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2725 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2726 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2727 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2728 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2729 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2730 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2731 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2732 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2733 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2736 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2738 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2739 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2742 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2743 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2744 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2745 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2746 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2747 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2748 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2749 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2753 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2754 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2755 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2756 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2757 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2758 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2759 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2760 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2762 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2763 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2764 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2765 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2766 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2767 let mut require_commitment = false;
2768 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2771 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2772 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2773 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2775 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2776 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2777 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2778 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2779 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2780 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2785 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2786 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2787 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2788 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2789 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2791 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2792 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2797 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2798 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2800 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2804 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2805 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2807 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2808 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2809 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2810 require_commitment = true;
2811 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2812 match forward_info {
2813 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2814 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2815 require_commitment = true;
2817 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2818 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2819 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2821 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2822 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2823 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2827 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2828 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2829 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2830 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2836 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2837 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2838 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2839 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2841 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2842 Some(fail_reason.take())
2844 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2845 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2846 require_commitment = true;
2850 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2852 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2853 match update_state {
2854 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
2855 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
2856 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2857 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2858 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2860 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
2861 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
2862 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2863 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2864 require_commitment = true;
2865 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2866 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2871 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2872 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2873 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2874 if require_commitment {
2875 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2876 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2877 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2878 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2879 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2880 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2881 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2882 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2883 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2885 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2886 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2887 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2888 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2891 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2892 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2893 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2894 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2895 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2897 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2898 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2899 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2902 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2903 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2904 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2905 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2907 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2909 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2910 if require_commitment {
2911 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2913 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2914 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2915 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2916 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2918 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2919 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2920 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2921 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2922 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2924 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2927 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2929 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2930 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2937 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2938 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2939 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2940 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2941 if !self.is_outbound() {
2942 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2944 if !self.is_usable() {
2945 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2947 if !self.is_live() {
2948 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2951 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
2952 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2956 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2957 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2959 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2960 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2965 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2966 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2967 Some(update_fee) => {
2968 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2969 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2975 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
2976 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
2978 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2980 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2981 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2982 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2983 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2986 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2987 // will be retransmitted.
2988 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2990 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2991 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2993 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2994 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2995 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2996 // this HTLC accordingly
2997 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3000 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3001 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3002 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3003 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3006 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3007 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3008 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3009 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3010 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3011 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3016 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3018 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3019 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3020 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3021 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3025 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3026 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3027 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3028 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3029 // the update upon reconnection.
3030 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3034 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3035 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3038 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3039 /// updates are partially paused.
3040 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3041 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3042 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3043 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3044 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
3045 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3046 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
3047 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
3048 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
3049 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3050 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
3051 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3052 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3055 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3056 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3057 /// to the remote side.
3058 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
3059 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3060 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3062 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
3063 self.funding_transaction.take()
3066 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3067 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3068 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
3069 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
3070 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
3071 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
3072 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3073 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
3074 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3075 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3076 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3077 next_per_commitment_point,
3081 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
3082 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3083 let mut failures = Vec::new();
3084 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3086 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3087 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3088 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3089 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3092 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3093 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3095 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3096 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3099 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3100 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3101 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3102 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3103 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3104 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3105 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3106 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
3109 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3110 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3112 if self.is_outbound() {
3113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3115 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3118 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3119 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate();
3121 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3122 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3123 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3124 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3125 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3126 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3127 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3128 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3129 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3130 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3131 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3133 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3135 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3136 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3137 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3143 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3144 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3145 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3146 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3147 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3148 per_commitment_secret,
3149 next_per_commitment_point,
3153 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3154 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3155 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3156 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3157 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3159 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3160 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3161 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3162 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3163 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3164 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3165 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3166 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3167 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3172 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3173 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3175 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3176 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3177 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3178 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3179 reason: err_packet.clone()
3182 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3183 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3184 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3185 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3186 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3187 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3190 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3191 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3192 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3193 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3194 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3201 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3202 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3203 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3204 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3208 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3209 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3210 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3211 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3212 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3213 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3217 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3218 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3219 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3220 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3221 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3222 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3223 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3227 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3228 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3229 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3232 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3233 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3234 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3235 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3236 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3237 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3238 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3239 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3241 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3242 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3243 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3247 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3251 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3252 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3253 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3255 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3256 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3257 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3258 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3259 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3263 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3264 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3265 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3266 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3267 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3270 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3271 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3274 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3275 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3276 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3277 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3278 next_per_commitment_point,
3279 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3282 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3283 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3284 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3286 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3287 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3288 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3291 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3297 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3298 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3299 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3300 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3301 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3303 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3304 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3305 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3306 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3307 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3308 next_per_commitment_point,
3312 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3313 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3314 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3316 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3319 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3320 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3321 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3322 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3324 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3325 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3326 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3327 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3328 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3330 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3331 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3335 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3337 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3338 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3339 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3341 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3344 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3345 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3346 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3349 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3355 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3356 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3358 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3359 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3360 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3364 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3365 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3366 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3368 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3369 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3370 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3372 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3373 let sig = self.holder_signer
3374 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3376 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3377 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3379 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3380 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3381 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3382 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3383 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3387 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref, K: Deref>(
3388 &mut self, fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3389 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3391 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3392 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3394 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3395 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3397 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3398 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3399 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3400 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3401 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3403 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3404 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3408 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3410 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match ShutdownScript::try_from((msg.scriptpubkey.clone(), their_features)) {
3411 Ok(script) => script.into_inner(),
3412 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
3415 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3416 if Some(&shutdown_scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3417 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", shutdown_scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3420 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3423 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3424 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3425 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3426 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3428 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3431 assert!(send_shutdown);
3432 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3433 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3434 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
3436 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3441 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3443 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3444 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3446 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3447 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3448 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3449 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3450 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3451 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3455 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3456 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3457 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3458 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3462 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3463 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3464 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3465 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3466 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3467 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3469 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3470 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3477 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3478 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3480 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3483 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3484 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3485 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3486 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3488 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3490 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3491 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3492 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3493 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3494 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3496 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3497 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3499 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3500 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3502 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3505 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3506 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3508 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3509 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3511 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3512 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3514 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3515 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3517 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3518 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3521 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3522 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3523 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3526 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3528 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3531 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3532 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3533 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3534 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3535 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3539 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3540 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3541 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3542 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3543 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3544 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3545 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3546 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3547 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3548 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3549 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3553 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3554 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3555 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3556 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3557 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3558 let sig = self.holder_signer
3559 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3560 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3561 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3562 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3563 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3564 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3565 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3571 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3572 if self.is_outbound() {
3573 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3574 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3575 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3576 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3577 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3580 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3583 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3585 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3586 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3587 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3588 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3591 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3594 let sig = self.holder_signer
3595 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3596 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3597 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3598 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3599 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3601 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3602 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3604 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3605 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3606 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3608 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3611 // Public utilities:
3613 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3617 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3621 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3622 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3623 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3627 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3628 /// is_usable() returns true).
3629 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3630 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3631 self.short_channel_id
3634 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3635 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3636 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3637 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3640 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3641 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3644 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3645 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3648 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3649 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3650 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3653 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3654 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3657 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3658 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3659 self.counterparty_node_id
3662 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3664 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3665 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3668 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3669 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3671 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3672 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3673 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3674 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3676 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3680 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3681 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3682 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3685 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3686 self.channel_value_satoshis
3689 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3690 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3693 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3694 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3697 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3698 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
3701 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3705 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3706 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
3707 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
3708 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
3709 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
3710 // which are near the dust limit.
3711 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3712 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3713 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
3715 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
3718 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3719 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3722 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3723 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3726 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3727 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3731 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3736 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3738 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3739 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3740 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3741 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3742 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3743 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3745 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3747 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3755 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3756 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3760 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3761 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3762 self.update_time_counter
3765 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3766 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3769 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3770 self.config.announced_channel
3773 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3774 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3777 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3778 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3779 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3780 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3783 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3784 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3785 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3788 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3789 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3790 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3791 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3792 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3795 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3796 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3797 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3798 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3799 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3802 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3803 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3804 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3805 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3808 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3809 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3810 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3813 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3814 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3815 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3816 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3817 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3818 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3823 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3824 self.channel_update_status
3827 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3828 self.channel_update_status = status;
3831 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3832 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3836 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3837 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3838 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3841 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
3845 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3846 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3847 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3849 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3850 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3851 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3853 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3854 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3856 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3857 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3859 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3863 if need_commitment_update {
3864 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3865 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3866 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3867 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3868 next_per_commitment_point,
3871 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3877 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3878 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3879 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3880 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3881 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3882 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3883 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3884 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3885 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3886 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3887 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3888 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3889 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3890 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3891 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3892 if self.is_outbound() {
3893 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3894 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3895 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3896 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3897 // channel and move on.
3898 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3899 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3901 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3902 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3903 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3904 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3907 if self.is_outbound() {
3908 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3909 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3910 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3911 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3912 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3913 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3917 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3918 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3919 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3920 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3921 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3925 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3926 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3927 // may have already happened for this block).
3928 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3929 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3930 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3933 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3934 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3935 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3936 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3937 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3938 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3947 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3948 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3949 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3950 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3952 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3953 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3956 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3958 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
3959 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3960 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3961 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3962 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3964 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3965 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3966 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3974 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3976 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3977 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3978 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3981 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3982 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3983 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3984 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3985 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3986 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3987 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3988 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3989 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3992 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3993 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3994 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3995 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3996 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
3997 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3998 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3999 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
4004 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
4007 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4008 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4009 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
4010 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4011 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4012 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4013 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4014 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4015 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4016 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4017 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4018 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4019 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
4020 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
4021 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4022 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4028 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4033 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4034 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4036 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4037 if !self.is_outbound() {
4038 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
4040 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
4041 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
4044 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4045 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4048 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4049 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4053 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4054 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4055 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
4056 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4057 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4058 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4059 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4060 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
4061 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4062 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4063 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4064 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4065 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4066 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4067 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4068 first_per_commitment_point,
4069 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
4070 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4071 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4072 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4077 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4078 if self.is_outbound() {
4079 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4081 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4082 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4084 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4085 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4088 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4089 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4091 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4092 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4093 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4094 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4095 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4096 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4097 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4098 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4099 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4100 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4101 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4102 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4103 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4104 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4105 first_per_commitment_point,
4106 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4107 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4108 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4113 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
4114 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4115 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4116 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
4117 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4118 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
4121 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
4122 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
4123 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
4124 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
4125 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
4126 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
4127 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
4128 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4129 if !self.is_outbound() {
4130 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
4132 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4133 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
4135 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
4136 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4137 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4138 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4141 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4142 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4144 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4147 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4148 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4153 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4155 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4157 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4158 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4159 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4161 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4162 temporary_channel_id,
4163 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4164 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4169 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4170 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4171 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4172 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4173 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4175 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4176 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4178 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4179 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4180 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4181 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4183 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4184 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4186 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4187 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4190 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4192 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4193 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4195 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4196 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4197 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4198 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4199 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4200 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4203 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4204 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4209 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4211 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4212 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4213 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4215 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4216 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4217 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4218 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4219 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4220 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4221 contents: announcement,
4224 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4228 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4229 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4230 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4231 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4232 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4234 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4236 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4237 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4238 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4239 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4241 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4243 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4244 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4247 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4249 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4252 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4253 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4254 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4255 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4257 Err(_) => return None,
4259 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4260 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4261 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4266 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4267 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4268 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4269 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4270 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4271 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4272 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4273 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4274 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4275 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4276 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4277 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4278 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4279 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4280 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4281 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4282 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4283 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4284 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4287 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4288 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4289 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4290 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4293 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4294 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4295 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4296 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4297 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4298 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4299 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4300 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4302 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4303 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4304 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4305 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4306 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4307 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4308 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4309 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4310 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4312 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4318 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4320 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4321 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4323 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4325 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4326 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4328 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4329 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4332 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4334 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4335 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4336 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4337 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4339 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4340 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4341 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4344 if amount_msat == 0 {
4345 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4348 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4349 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4352 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4353 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4354 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4355 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4356 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4357 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4358 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4362 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4363 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4364 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4365 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4367 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4368 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4369 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4372 if !self.is_outbound() {
4373 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4374 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4375 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4376 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4377 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4378 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4379 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4383 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4384 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4385 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4386 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4387 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4388 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4392 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4393 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4394 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4395 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4396 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4397 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4401 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
4402 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4403 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4406 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4407 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4408 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4409 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4411 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4415 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4416 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4417 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4418 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4419 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4422 // Now update local state:
4423 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4424 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4429 onion_routing_packet,
4434 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4435 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4437 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4439 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4443 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4444 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4445 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4449 onion_routing_packet,
4451 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4456 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4457 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4458 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4459 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4460 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4461 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4462 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4464 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4465 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4467 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4468 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4470 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4471 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4473 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4474 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4475 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4476 have_updates = true;
4478 if have_updates { break; }
4480 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4481 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4482 have_updates = true;
4484 if have_updates { break; }
4487 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4489 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4491 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4492 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4493 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
4494 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4495 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4497 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4498 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4499 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4501 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4502 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4506 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4507 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4508 Some(fail_reason.take())
4510 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4511 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4514 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4515 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
4516 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
4517 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4518 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4519 self.pending_update_fee = None;
4522 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4524 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4525 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4526 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4527 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4528 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4529 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4531 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4534 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4535 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4536 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4537 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4538 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4539 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4540 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4541 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4544 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4545 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4548 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4549 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4550 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4551 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4552 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
4553 let feerate_per_kw = counterparty_commitment_tx.1;
4554 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4555 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4557 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4559 if !self.is_outbound() {
4560 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4561 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4562 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4563 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4564 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4565 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4566 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4567 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4568 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.2);
4569 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4576 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.3.len());
4577 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.3.iter() {
4581 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4582 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4584 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4586 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4587 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4588 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4589 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4591 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4592 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4593 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4594 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4595 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4596 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4600 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4601 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4604 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.3)))
4607 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4608 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4609 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4611 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4612 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4613 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4614 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4615 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4621 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4622 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4623 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4626 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4627 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4628 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4630 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4631 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4632 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4633 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4639 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4640 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4641 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
4642 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4643 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4644 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4645 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4648 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4649 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4650 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4652 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4653 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4656 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4657 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4658 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4661 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4664 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4665 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4666 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
4668 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4673 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4674 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4675 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4677 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4679 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4681 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4682 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4683 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4684 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4685 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4686 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4690 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
4691 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4692 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4695 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4696 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4697 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4698 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4699 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4701 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4702 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4709 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4712 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4713 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4714 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4715 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4716 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4717 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4718 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4719 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4720 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4721 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4722 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4724 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4725 // return them to fail the payment.
4726 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4727 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4729 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4730 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4735 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4736 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4737 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4738 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4739 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4740 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4741 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4742 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4743 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4744 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4745 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4746 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4747 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4752 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4753 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4754 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4758 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4759 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4761 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4767 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4768 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4769 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4770 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4771 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4773 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4774 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4775 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4776 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4782 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4783 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4784 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4785 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4786 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4787 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4792 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4793 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4794 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4797 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4799 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4801 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4802 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4803 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4804 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4805 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4806 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4808 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4809 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4810 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4812 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4814 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4815 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4816 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4817 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4818 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4819 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4821 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
4822 // deserialized from that format.
4823 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
4824 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
4825 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
4827 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4829 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4830 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4831 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4833 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4834 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4835 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4836 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4839 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4840 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4841 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4844 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4845 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4846 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4847 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4849 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4850 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4852 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4854 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4856 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4858 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4861 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4863 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4868 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4869 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4870 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4871 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4872 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4873 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4874 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4876 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4878 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4880 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4883 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
4884 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
4885 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
4888 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4890 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4892 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4894 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4899 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4900 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4902 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4904 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4905 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4906 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4907 source.write(writer)?;
4908 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4910 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4912 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4913 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4915 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4917 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4918 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4923 match self.resend_order {
4924 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4925 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4928 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4929 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4930 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4932 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4933 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4934 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4935 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4938 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4939 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4940 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4941 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4942 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4945 if self.is_outbound() {
4946 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
4947 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4948 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed, drop it.
4949 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
4951 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
4953 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4955 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4956 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4957 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4958 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4960 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4961 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4963 feerate.write(writer)?;
4967 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4970 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4971 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4972 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4974 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4975 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4976 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4978 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4979 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4981 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4982 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4983 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4985 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
4986 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
4988 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4991 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4992 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4993 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4995 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4998 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4999 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
5001 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5002 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5003 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
5005 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
5007 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
5009 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
5011 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5012 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5013 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5014 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
5015 htlc.write(writer)?;
5018 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5019 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
5020 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
5021 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
5022 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
5023 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
5024 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
5026 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
5027 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5028 (5, self.config, required),
5029 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5036 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
5037 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
5038 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5039 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5040 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5042 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5044 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
5046 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
5047 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
5048 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
5049 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
5050 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5052 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
5053 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5056 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5057 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
5058 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5060 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5062 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5063 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
5064 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
5065 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
5066 let mut data = [0; 1024];
5067 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
5068 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
5069 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
5071 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
5073 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
5074 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
5075 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
5078 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
5080 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5081 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5082 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5084 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5085 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5086 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
5087 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5088 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5089 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5090 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5091 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5092 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5093 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
5094 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5095 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5096 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5097 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5102 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5103 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5104 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
5105 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5106 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5107 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5108 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5109 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5110 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5111 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5112 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5113 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5114 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5115 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
5116 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5117 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5122 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5123 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
5124 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
5125 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5126 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5127 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5128 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5129 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5130 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5131 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5133 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
5134 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
5135 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5137 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
5138 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5139 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5141 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5145 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5146 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5147 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5148 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5151 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
5152 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
5153 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
5155 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5156 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5157 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
5158 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5161 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5162 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5163 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
5164 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5167 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5169 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5171 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5172 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5173 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5174 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5176 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5178 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
5179 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5182 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5183 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5184 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5186 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5187 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5188 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5189 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5191 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5192 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5194 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5195 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5197 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5198 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5199 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5201 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5203 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5204 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5206 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5207 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5210 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5212 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5213 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5214 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5215 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5217 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5220 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5221 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5223 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5225 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5226 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5228 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5229 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5231 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5233 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5234 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5235 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5237 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5238 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5239 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5243 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
5244 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
5245 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
5247 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
5253 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5254 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5255 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5256 (1, minimum_depth, option),
5257 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5258 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5259 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5262 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5263 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5268 config: config.unwrap(),
5272 channel_value_satoshis,
5274 latest_monitor_update_id,
5277 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5280 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5281 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5284 pending_inbound_htlcs,
5285 pending_outbound_htlcs,
5286 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5290 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5291 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5292 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5293 monitor_pending_forwards,
5294 monitor_pending_failures,
5297 holding_cell_update_fee,
5298 next_holder_htlc_id,
5299 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5300 update_time_counter,
5303 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5304 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5305 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5306 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5308 last_sent_closing_fee,
5310 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5311 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5314 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5315 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5316 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5317 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5318 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5319 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5320 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5323 counterparty_forwarding_info,
5325 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5326 funding_transaction,
5328 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5329 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5330 counterparty_node_id,
5332 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5336 channel_update_status,
5340 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5341 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5342 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5343 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5345 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5347 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5348 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5355 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5356 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5357 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5358 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5359 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5360 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5361 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5362 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5364 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5365 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5366 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5367 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5368 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5369 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5370 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5372 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5373 use chain::BestBlock;
5374 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5375 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5376 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5377 use util::config::UserConfig;
5378 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5379 use util::errors::APIError;
5380 use util::test_utils;
5381 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5382 use util::logger::Logger;
5383 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5384 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5385 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5386 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5387 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5388 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5389 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5390 use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5394 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5397 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5398 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5404 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5405 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5406 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5410 signer: InMemorySigner,
5412 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5413 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5415 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5416 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5417 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5418 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5419 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5420 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5423 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5424 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5425 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5426 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5429 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5432 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5433 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5434 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5437 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5438 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5442 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5443 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5444 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5445 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5447 let seed = [42; 32];
5448 let network = Network::Testnet;
5449 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5450 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
5451 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
5454 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5455 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5456 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5457 let config = UserConfig::default();
5458 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config) {
5459 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
5460 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
5462 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5463 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5467 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5468 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5470 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5471 let original_fee = 253;
5472 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5473 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5474 let seed = [42; 32];
5475 let network = Network::Testnet;
5476 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5478 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5479 let config = UserConfig::default();
5480 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5482 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5483 // same as the old fee.
5484 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5485 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5486 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5490 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5491 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5492 // dust limits are used.
5493 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5494 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5495 let seed = [42; 32];
5496 let network = Network::Testnet;
5497 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5499 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5500 // they have different dust limits.
5502 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5503 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5504 let config = UserConfig::default();
5505 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5507 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5508 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5509 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5510 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5511 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5513 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5514 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5515 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5516 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5517 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5519 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5520 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5521 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5523 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5524 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5525 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5526 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5529 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5531 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5532 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5533 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5534 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5535 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5537 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5538 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5542 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5543 // the dust limit check.
5544 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5545 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5546 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5547 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5549 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5550 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5551 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5552 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5553 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5554 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5555 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5559 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5560 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5561 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5562 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5563 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5564 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5565 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5566 let seed = [42; 32];
5567 let network = Network::Testnet;
5568 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5570 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5571 let config = UserConfig::default();
5572 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5574 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5575 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5577 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5578 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5579 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5580 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5581 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5582 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5584 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5585 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5586 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5587 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5588 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5590 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5592 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5593 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5594 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5595 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5596 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5598 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5599 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5600 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5601 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5602 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5606 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5607 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5608 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5609 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5610 let seed = [42; 32];
5611 let network = Network::Testnet;
5612 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5613 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5614 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5616 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5618 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5619 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5620 let config = UserConfig::default();
5621 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5623 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5624 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5625 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5626 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5628 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5629 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5630 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5632 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5633 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5634 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5635 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5637 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5638 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5639 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5641 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5642 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5644 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5645 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5646 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5647 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5648 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5649 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5650 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5651 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5652 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5657 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5659 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5660 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5661 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5662 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5663 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5664 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5665 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5672 fn channel_update() {
5673 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5674 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5675 let seed = [42; 32];
5676 let network = Network::Testnet;
5677 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5678 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5680 // Create a channel.
5681 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5682 let config = UserConfig::default();
5683 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5684 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5685 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5686 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5688 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5689 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5690 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5692 short_channel_id: 0,
5695 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5696 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5697 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5699 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5700 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5702 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5704 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5706 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5707 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5708 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5709 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5711 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5712 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5713 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5715 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5720 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5721 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5722 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5723 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5724 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5726 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5728 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5729 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5730 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5731 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5732 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5734 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5735 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5740 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5741 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5742 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5744 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5745 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5746 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5747 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5748 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5749 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5751 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5753 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5754 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5755 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5756 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5757 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5758 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5760 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5761 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5762 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5763 selected_contest_delay: 144
5765 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5766 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5768 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5769 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5771 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5772 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5774 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5775 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5777 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5778 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5779 // build_commitment_transaction.
5780 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5781 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5782 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5783 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5784 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5786 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5787 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5788 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5790 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5791 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
5793 let htlcs = res.3.drain(..)
5794 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5798 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5799 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5800 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5801 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5802 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5803 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5805 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5806 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5807 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5808 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5810 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5811 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5812 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5814 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5816 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5817 commitment_tx.clone(),
5818 counterparty_signature,
5819 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5820 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5821 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5823 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5824 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5826 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5827 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5828 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5830 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5831 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5834 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5836 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5837 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
5838 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
5839 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
5840 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5841 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5842 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5844 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5847 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5848 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5849 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5853 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5856 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5857 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5859 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5860 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5861 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5862 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5863 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5864 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5865 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5867 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5871 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5872 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5874 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5875 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5876 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5878 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5879 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5881 amount_msat: 1000000,
5883 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5884 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5886 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5889 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5890 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5892 amount_msat: 2000000,
5894 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5895 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5897 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5900 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5901 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5903 amount_msat: 2000000,
5905 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5906 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5907 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5909 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5912 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5913 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5915 amount_msat: 3000000,
5917 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5918 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5919 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5921 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5924 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5925 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5927 amount_msat: 4000000,
5929 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5930 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5932 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5936 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5937 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5938 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5940 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5941 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5942 "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", {
5945 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5946 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5947 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
5950 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5951 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5952 "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" },
5955 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5956 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5957 "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" },
5960 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5961 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5962 "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" },
5965 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5966 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5967 "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" }
5970 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5971 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5972 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5974 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5975 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5976 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5979 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5980 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5981 "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" },
5984 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5985 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5986 "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" },
5989 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5990 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5991 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
5994 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5995 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5996 "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" },
5999 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
6000 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
6001 "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" }
6004 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6005 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6006 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
6008 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
6009 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
6010 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6013 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
6014 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
6015 "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" },
6018 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
6019 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
6020 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
6023 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
6024 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
6025 "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" },
6028 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
6029 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
6030 "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" }
6033 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6034 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6035 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
6037 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
6038 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
6039 "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", {
6042 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
6043 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
6044 "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" },
6047 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
6048 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
6049 "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" },
6052 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
6053 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
6054 "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" },
6057 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
6058 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
6059 "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" }
6062 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6063 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6064 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
6066 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
6067 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
6068 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6071 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
6072 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
6073 "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" },
6076 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
6077 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
6078 "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" },
6081 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
6082 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
6083 "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" }
6086 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6087 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6088 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
6090 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
6091 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
6092 "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", {
6095 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
6096 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
6097 "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" },
6100 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
6101 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
6102 "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" },
6105 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
6106 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
6107 "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" }
6110 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6111 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6112 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
6114 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
6115 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
6116 "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", {
6119 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
6120 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
6121 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
6124 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
6125 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
6126 "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" }
6129 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6130 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6131 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
6133 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
6134 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
6135 "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", {
6138 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
6139 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
6140 "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" },
6143 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
6144 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
6145 "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" }
6148 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6149 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6150 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
6152 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
6153 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
6154 "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", {
6157 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
6158 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
6159 "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" }
6162 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6163 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6164 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
6166 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
6167 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
6168 "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", {
6171 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
6172 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
6173 "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" }
6176 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6177 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6178 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
6180 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
6181 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
6182 "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", {});
6184 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6185 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6186 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
6188 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
6189 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
6190 "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", {});
6192 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6193 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6194 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6196 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6197 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6198 "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", {});
6200 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6201 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6202 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6204 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6205 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6206 "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", {});
6208 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6209 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6210 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6211 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6212 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6213 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6215 amount_msat: 2000000,
6217 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6218 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6220 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6223 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6224 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6225 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6227 amount_msat: 5000000,
6229 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6230 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6231 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6233 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6236 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6237 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6239 amount_msat: 5000000,
6241 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6242 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6243 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6245 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6249 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6250 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6251 "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", {
6254 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6255 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6256 "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" },
6258 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6259 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6260 "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" },
6262 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6263 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6264 "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" }
6269 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6270 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6272 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6273 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6274 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6275 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6277 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6278 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6279 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6281 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6282 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6284 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6285 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6287 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6288 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6289 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6293 fn test_key_derivation() {
6294 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6295 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6297 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6298 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6300 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6301 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6303 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6304 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6306 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6307 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6309 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6310 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6312 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6313 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6315 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6316 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());