1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
22 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
23 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
24 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
27 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
28 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
30 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
32 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
33 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
34 use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
35 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
36 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
37 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
38 use util::logger::Logger;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
40 use util::{byte_utils, events};
42 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
44 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
47 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
48 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
49 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
52 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
53 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
54 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
55 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
56 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
58 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
59 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
60 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
64 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
65 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
66 self.update_id.write(w)?;
67 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
68 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
69 update_step.write(w)?;
74 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
75 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
76 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
77 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
78 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
80 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
82 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
86 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
88 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
89 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
90 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
92 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
93 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
94 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
95 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
97 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
98 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
99 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
101 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
102 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
103 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
104 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
105 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
106 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
109 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
110 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
113 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
114 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
115 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
116 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
117 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
120 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
121 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
122 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
124 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
125 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
126 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
127 /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
129 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
134 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
135 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
136 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
138 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
140 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
142 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
143 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
144 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
145 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
146 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
147 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
148 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
150 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
152 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
153 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
154 /// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
157 /// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
158 /// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
159 /// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
160 /// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
161 /// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
162 /// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
164 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
165 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
166 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
167 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
169 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
170 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
171 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
172 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
173 /// all registered listeners in one go.
174 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
175 /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
177 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
178 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
179 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
181 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
182 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
183 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
185 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
186 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
187 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
189 /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
191 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
192 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
193 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
195 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
196 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
197 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
199 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
200 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
201 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
203 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
204 /// with success or failure.
206 /// You should probably just call through to
207 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
209 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
212 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
213 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
215 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
217 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
218 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
219 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
221 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
222 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
223 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref>
224 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
225 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
227 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
229 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
230 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
232 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
239 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send>
240 ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
241 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
242 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
244 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
246 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
247 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
249 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
250 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
251 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
253 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
254 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
255 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
262 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
263 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
264 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
265 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
266 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
271 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
272 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
273 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
275 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
277 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
278 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
279 pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C> {
280 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
281 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
285 fee_estimator: feeest,
291 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
292 pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
293 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
294 let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
295 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
296 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
298 log_trace!(self.logger, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(monitor.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
299 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&monitor.funding_info.0.txid, &monitor.funding_info.1);
300 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((monitor.funding_info.0.txid, monitor.funding_info.0.index as u32), &monitor.funding_info.1);
301 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
302 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
303 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
306 entry.insert(monitor);
310 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
311 pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
312 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
313 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
314 Some(orig_monitor) => {
315 log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
316 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster, &self.logger)
318 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
323 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send, C: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
324 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
325 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
327 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
329 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
330 match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
332 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
336 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
337 match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
339 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
343 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
344 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
345 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
346 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
348 pending_htlcs_updated
352 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, C: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F, L, C>
353 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
354 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
356 C::Target: ChainWatchInterface,
358 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
359 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
360 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
361 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
367 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
368 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
369 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
370 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
371 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
372 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
373 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
374 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
375 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
376 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
377 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
378 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
379 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
380 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
381 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
382 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
383 /// accurate block height.
384 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
385 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
386 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
387 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
388 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
389 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
390 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
391 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
392 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
393 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
394 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
395 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
396 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
398 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
399 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
400 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
402 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
403 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
404 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
405 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
407 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
408 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
410 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
411 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
412 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
414 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
415 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
416 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
418 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
419 struct LocalSignedTx {
420 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
422 revocation_key: PublicKey,
423 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
424 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
425 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
426 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
428 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
431 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
432 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
433 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
434 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
435 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
437 witness_script: Script,
438 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
444 witness_script: Script,
446 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
451 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
455 funding_redeemscript: Script,
459 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
460 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
462 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
463 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
464 witness_script.write(writer)?;
465 pubkey.write(writer)?;
466 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
467 is_htlc.write(writer)?;
468 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
470 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
471 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
472 witness_script.write(writer)?;
474 preimage.write(writer)?;
475 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
476 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
478 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
479 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
480 preimage.write(writer)?;
481 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
483 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref funding_redeemscript } => {
484 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
485 funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
492 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
493 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
494 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
496 let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
497 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
498 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
499 let is_htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
500 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
501 InputMaterial::Revoked {
510 let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
511 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
512 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
513 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
514 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
515 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
524 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
525 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
526 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
532 InputMaterial::Funding {
533 funding_redeemscript: Readable::read(reader)?,
536 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
542 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
543 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
544 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
545 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
546 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
547 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
548 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
549 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
550 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
551 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
552 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
553 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
554 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
555 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
556 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
557 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
558 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
559 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
560 // and satisfy witness program.
561 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
564 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
565 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
566 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
568 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
569 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
570 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
572 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
575 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
579 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
580 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
582 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
584 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
585 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
586 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
587 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
589 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
590 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
591 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
592 commitment_number: u64,
593 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
596 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
602 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
603 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
605 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
606 /// think we've fallen behind!
607 should_broadcast: bool,
611 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
612 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
614 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
616 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
617 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
618 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
624 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
626 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
627 commitment_number.write(w)?;
628 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
629 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
630 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
632 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
635 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
637 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
639 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
644 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
646 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
652 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
653 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
654 match Readable::read(r)? {
656 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
657 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
659 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
660 let mut res = Vec::new();
662 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
669 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
670 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
671 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
672 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
674 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
675 let mut res = Vec::new();
677 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
684 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
685 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
689 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
690 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
691 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
695 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
696 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
699 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
704 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
705 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
707 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
708 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
710 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
711 /// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
712 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
713 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
714 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
715 latest_update_id: u64,
716 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
718 destination_script: Script,
719 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>,
720 remote_payment_script: Script,
721 shutdown_script: Script,
724 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
725 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
726 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
728 their_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
729 their_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
730 funding_redeemscript: Script,
731 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
732 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
733 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
735 our_to_self_delay: u16,
736 their_to_self_delay: u16,
738 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
739 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
740 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
741 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
742 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
743 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
744 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
745 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
746 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
747 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
748 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
749 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
750 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
752 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
753 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
754 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
755 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
756 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
757 current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
759 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
761 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
762 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
764 current_local_commitment_number: u64,
766 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
768 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
769 pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
771 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
772 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
773 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
774 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
776 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
777 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
778 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
779 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
780 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>>,
783 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
785 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
787 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
788 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further local commitment transaction
789 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
790 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
792 // Set once we've signed a local commitment transaction and handed it over to our
793 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our local commitment transactions
794 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
795 local_tx_signed: bool,
797 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
798 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
799 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
800 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
801 // the full block_connected).
802 pub(crate) last_block_hash: BlockHash,
803 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
806 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
807 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
808 /// underlying object
809 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
810 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
811 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
812 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
813 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
814 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
815 self.remote_payment_script != other.remote_payment_script ||
816 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
817 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
818 self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
819 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
820 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
821 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
822 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
823 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
824 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
825 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
826 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
827 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
828 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
829 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
830 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
831 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
832 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
833 self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
834 self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
835 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
836 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
837 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
838 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
839 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
840 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
841 self.local_tx_signed != other.local_tx_signed
850 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
851 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
853 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
854 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
855 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
856 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
857 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
858 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
859 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
860 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
861 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
862 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
864 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
866 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
867 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
869 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
870 if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
871 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
872 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
873 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
874 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
876 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
879 self.remote_payment_script.write(writer)?;
880 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
882 self.keys.write(writer)?;
883 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
884 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
885 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
886 self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
887 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
889 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.serialize())?;
890 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.serialize())?;
891 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
892 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
894 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
895 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
896 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
897 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
898 match second_option {
899 Some(second_pubkey) => {
900 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
903 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
908 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
912 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
913 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay))?;
915 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
917 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
918 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
919 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
920 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
921 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
922 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
923 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
927 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
928 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
929 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
930 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
931 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
932 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
933 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
937 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
938 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
939 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
940 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
941 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
942 for script in txouts.iter() {
943 script.write(writer)?;
947 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
948 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
949 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
950 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
953 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
954 ($local_tx: expr) => {
955 $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
956 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
957 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
958 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
959 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
960 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
962 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
963 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
964 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
965 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
966 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
968 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
972 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
977 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
978 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
979 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
981 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
984 serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
986 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
987 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
989 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
990 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
991 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
994 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
995 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
999 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
1000 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1001 event.write(writer)?;
1004 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1006 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1007 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1008 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1009 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1010 for ev in events.iter() {
1012 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1014 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1015 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1017 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1019 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1025 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1026 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1027 txid.write(writer)?;
1028 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1029 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1030 script.write(writer)?;
1033 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1035 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1036 self.local_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1042 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1043 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1044 our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1045 their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1046 their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1047 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1048 initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1050 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1051 let our_channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1052 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1053 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1054 let remote_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1056 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), their_to_self_delay);
1058 let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1059 let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1060 let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1061 txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
1062 revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1063 a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1064 b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1065 delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1066 per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1067 feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1068 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1070 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1071 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1072 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1073 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1074 // now but we should consider it later.
1075 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
1078 latest_update_id: 0,
1079 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1081 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1082 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
1083 remote_payment_script,
1088 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1089 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1091 their_htlc_base_key: their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
1092 their_delayed_payment_base_key: their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
1093 funding_redeemscript,
1094 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1095 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1098 their_to_self_delay,
1100 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1101 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1102 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1103 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1105 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1106 current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
1107 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1108 current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1110 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1111 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1112 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1114 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1115 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1119 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1120 local_tx_signed: false,
1122 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1123 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1127 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1128 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1129 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1130 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1131 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1132 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1135 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1136 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1137 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1138 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1143 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1144 let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
1145 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1146 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1147 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1149 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1150 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1151 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1155 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1156 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1157 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1162 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1169 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1178 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1179 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1180 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1181 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1182 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info<L: Deref>(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1183 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1184 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1185 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1187 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1188 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1191 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1192 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1193 log_trace!(logger, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1194 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1195 self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1196 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1197 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1198 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1199 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1200 Some(old_points) => {
1201 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1202 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1203 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1204 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1205 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1207 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1210 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1214 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1219 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1220 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1221 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1222 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1223 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1224 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1225 if self.local_tx_signed {
1226 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("A local commitment tx has already been signed, no new local commitment txn can be sent to our counterparty"));
1228 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1229 let sequence = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.input[0].sequence as u64;
1230 let locktime = commitment_tx.unsigned_tx.lock_time as u64;
1231 let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1233 revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1234 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1235 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1236 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1237 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1238 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1239 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1241 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1242 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1243 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1244 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1245 // now but we should consider it later.
1246 if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
1247 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
1249 self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1250 mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1251 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
1255 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1256 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1257 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1258 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1261 pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1262 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1265 for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1266 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1270 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1271 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo<L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> where L::Target: Logger {
1272 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1274 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1275 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1276 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1278 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1279 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1280 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1281 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1282 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1283 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1284 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
1287 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1291 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1294 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1295 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1296 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1299 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1300 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1302 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1304 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1305 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1306 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1308 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1309 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger),
1310 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1311 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1312 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1313 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1314 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1315 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1316 if should_broadcast {
1317 self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1319 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1324 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1328 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1330 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1331 self.latest_update_id
1334 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1335 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> OutPoint {
1339 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1340 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1341 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<Script>> {
1342 &self.outputs_to_watch
1345 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1346 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1347 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1348 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1349 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, &Script)> {
1350 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1351 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1352 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1353 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1359 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1360 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1361 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1362 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1363 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1367 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1370 /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1371 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1372 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1373 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1374 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1375 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1379 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1380 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1381 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1384 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1385 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1388 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1389 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1392 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1393 self.current_local_commitment_number
1396 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1397 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1398 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1399 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1400 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1401 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1402 fn check_spend_remote_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1403 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1404 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1405 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1406 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1408 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1409 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1411 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1412 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1415 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1420 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1421 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1422 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1423 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1424 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1425 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1426 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
1427 let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
1428 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
1429 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_htlc_base_key));
1431 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1432 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1434 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
1435 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1436 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1437 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value };
1438 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1442 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1443 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1444 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1445 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1446 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1447 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1448 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1449 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1450 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1452 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value };
1453 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1458 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1459 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1460 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1461 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1462 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1463 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1465 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1466 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1467 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1468 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1469 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1470 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1471 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1473 let e = entry.get_mut();
1474 e.retain(|ref event| {
1476 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1477 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1482 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1484 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1485 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1493 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1494 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1496 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1497 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1499 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1501 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1502 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1503 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1504 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1505 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1506 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1507 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1509 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1510 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1512 log_trace!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1514 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1515 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1516 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1517 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1518 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1519 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1520 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1521 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1522 // payment_preimage.
1523 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1524 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1525 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1526 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1528 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1529 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1533 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1534 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1536 let e = entry.get_mut();
1537 e.retain(|ref event| {
1539 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1540 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1545 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1548 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1556 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1557 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1559 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1560 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1563 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1564 let revocation_point_option =
1565 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1566 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1567 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1569 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1570 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1571 let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
1572 let htlc_privkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.htlc_base_key()));
1573 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.their_htlc_base_key));
1575 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1576 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1577 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1578 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1579 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1580 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1581 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1582 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1584 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1585 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1586 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1587 let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { witness_script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry };
1588 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1595 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1598 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1599 fn check_spend_remote_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1600 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1601 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1602 return (Vec::new(), None)
1605 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1606 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1609 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1614 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1615 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1616 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1617 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1618 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
1619 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
1620 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1622 log_trace!(logger, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1623 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value };
1624 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1625 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1628 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>) {
1629 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1630 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1632 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1633 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, self.keys.delayed_payment_base_key()) {
1634 Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_delayedkey, redeemscript))
1637 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1638 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1639 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 },
1640 witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
1641 preimage: if !htlc.offered {
1642 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1643 Some(preimage.clone())
1645 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1649 amount: htlc.amount_msat,
1651 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1655 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
1658 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1659 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1660 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1661 fn check_spend_local_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Txid, Vec<TxOut>)) where L::Target: Logger {
1662 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1663 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1664 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1666 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1667 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1668 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1669 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1670 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1671 let e = entry.get_mut();
1672 e.retain(|ref event| {
1674 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1675 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1680 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1683 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1689 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1690 ($updates: expr) => {
1691 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1692 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1693 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1697 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1698 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1700 if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1702 log_trace!(logger, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1703 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1704 append_onchain_update!(res);
1705 } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1706 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1708 log_trace!(logger, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1709 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
1710 append_onchain_update!(res);
1714 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1715 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1716 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1717 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1718 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1719 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1727 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1728 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1729 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1733 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1736 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
1737 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
1738 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
1739 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1740 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1741 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1742 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1743 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1744 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1745 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1746 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
1747 self.local_tx_signed = true;
1748 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1749 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1750 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1751 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1752 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1753 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1754 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1755 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1759 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1760 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1765 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1766 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1772 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1773 /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1774 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1776 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
1777 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
1778 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1779 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1780 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1781 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1782 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1783 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
1784 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
1785 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
1789 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
1790 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
1800 /// Called when a new block has been connected to the best chain by <SimpleManyChannelMonitor
1801 /// as ChainListener>::block_connected, and should thus generally not be called during normal
1802 /// operation. It is exposed both for users who wish to use ChannelMonitors directly and to
1803 /// simplify rescans that occur at load-time.
1805 /// This is very similar to ChainListener::block_connected itself, but requires an &mut self,
1806 /// and an explicit reference to a transaction broadcaster and fee estimator.
1808 /// Returns a list of new (txid, outputs) pairs which spends of must be watched for. Note that
1809 /// after this call these are also available via get_outputs_to_watch().
1810 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<TxOut>)>
1811 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1812 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1815 for tx in txn_matched {
1816 let mut output_val = 0;
1817 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1818 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1819 output_val += out.value;
1820 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1824 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1825 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1826 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1827 for tx in txn_matched {
1828 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1829 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1830 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1831 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1833 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1834 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1835 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1836 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1837 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1838 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1840 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1841 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
1842 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1843 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1845 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1847 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1850 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1851 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
1852 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1853 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1854 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1859 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1860 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1861 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1862 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1864 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
1866 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height, &logger);
1867 if should_broadcast {
1868 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { funding_redeemscript: self.funding_redeemscript.clone() }});
1870 if should_broadcast {
1871 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
1872 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1873 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1874 watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1876 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1879 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1882 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1883 log_trace!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1884 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
1885 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1886 payment_preimage: None,
1887 source: htlc_update.0,
1890 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1891 log_trace!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1892 self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
1893 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1899 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
1901 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1902 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
1903 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
1909 /// Called when a block has been disconnected from the best chain by <SimpleManyChannelMonitor
1910 /// as ChainListener>::block_disconnected, and should thus generally not be called during
1911 /// normal operation. It is exposed both for users who wish to use ChannelMonitors directly and
1912 /// to simplify rescans that occur at load-time.
1914 /// This is very similar to ChainListener::block_disconnected itself, but requires an &mut self,
1915 /// and an explicit reference to a transaction broadcaster and fee estimator.
1916 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
1917 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1918 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1921 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1922 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1924 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1925 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1928 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1930 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1933 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
1934 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1935 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1936 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1937 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1938 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1939 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1940 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1941 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1942 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1943 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1944 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1945 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1946 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1947 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1948 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1949 // time out the HTLC first.
1950 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1951 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1952 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1953 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1954 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1955 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1956 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1957 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1958 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1959 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1960 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1961 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1962 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1963 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1964 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1965 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1966 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1967 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1968 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1969 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1970 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
1971 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1972 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1973 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1980 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1982 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1983 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1984 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1987 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1988 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1989 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1996 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1997 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1998 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1999 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2000 let mut payment_data = None;
2001 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2002 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2003 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2004 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2006 macro_rules! log_claim {
2007 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2008 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2009 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2010 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2011 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2012 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2013 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2014 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2015 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2016 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2017 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2018 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2020 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2021 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2022 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2023 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2028 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2029 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2030 if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2031 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2032 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2033 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2034 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2035 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2044 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2045 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2046 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2047 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2048 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2049 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2050 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2051 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2052 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2053 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2054 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2055 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2056 } else if !$local_tx {
2057 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2058 if payment_data.is_none() {
2059 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2062 if payment_data.is_none() {
2063 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2064 continue 'outer_loop;
2071 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
2072 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2073 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2075 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2076 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2077 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2078 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2081 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2082 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2083 "remote commitment tx", false);
2086 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2087 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2088 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2089 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2090 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2091 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2092 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2093 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2095 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2099 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2100 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2101 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2102 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2104 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2109 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2110 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2112 let e = entry.get_mut();
2113 e.retain(|ref event| {
2115 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2116 return htlc_update.0 != source
2121 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2123 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2124 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2132 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2133 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2134 let mut spendable_output = None;
2135 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2136 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2137 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2138 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2139 output: outp.clone(),
2142 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
2143 if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2144 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2145 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2146 key: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
2147 witness_script: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2148 to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
2149 output: outp.clone(),
2153 } else if self.remote_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
2154 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2155 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2156 key: self.keys.payment_key().clone(),
2157 output: outp.clone(),
2160 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2161 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2162 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2163 output: outp.clone(),
2167 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2168 log_trace!(logger, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2169 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2171 let e = entry.get_mut();
2172 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2175 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2182 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2184 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> Readable for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2185 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2186 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2190 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2195 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2196 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2197 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2198 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2201 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2202 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2204 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2205 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2207 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2208 let local_delayedkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2209 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2210 Some((revokable_address, local_delayedkey, revokable_script))
2213 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2215 let remote_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2216 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2218 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2219 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2220 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2221 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2222 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2223 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2225 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2226 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2227 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2229 let their_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2230 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2231 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2232 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2234 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2235 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2239 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2240 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2241 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2242 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2244 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2249 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2250 let their_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2252 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2254 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2257 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2258 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2259 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2260 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2261 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2263 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2264 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2270 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2271 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2272 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2273 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2274 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2275 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2276 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2277 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2279 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2280 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2284 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2285 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2286 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2287 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2288 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2289 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2290 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2291 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2292 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2294 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2295 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2299 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2300 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2301 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2302 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2303 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2304 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2305 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2309 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2312 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2313 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2314 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2315 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2316 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2317 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2318 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2320 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2321 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2322 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2323 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2324 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2326 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2327 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2329 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2334 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2341 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2344 Some(read_local_tx!())
2346 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2348 let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
2350 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2351 let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2353 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2354 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2355 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2356 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2357 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2358 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2359 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2363 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2364 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2365 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
2366 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2369 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2370 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
2371 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2372 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2373 pending_events.push(event);
2377 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2379 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2380 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2381 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2382 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2383 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2384 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2385 for _ in 0..events_len {
2386 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2388 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2389 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2390 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2391 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2395 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2396 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2400 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2404 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2407 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2408 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2409 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2410 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2411 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2412 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2413 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2414 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2416 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2417 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2420 let onchain_tx_handler = Readable::read(reader)?;
2422 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2423 let local_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
2425 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2427 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2430 broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
2431 remote_payment_script,
2436 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2437 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2439 their_htlc_base_key,
2440 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2441 funding_redeemscript,
2442 channel_value_satoshis,
2443 their_cur_revocation_points,
2446 their_to_self_delay,
2449 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2450 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2451 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2453 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2454 current_local_commitment_tx,
2455 current_remote_commitment_number,
2456 current_local_commitment_number,
2459 pending_htlcs_updated,
2462 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2467 lockdown_from_offchain,
2471 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2478 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2479 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2480 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2481 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2482 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2483 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
2484 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2485 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
2486 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
2488 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2489 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2490 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2491 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2493 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
2494 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2495 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2496 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2497 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2499 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2502 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2503 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2504 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2506 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2507 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2509 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2511 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2513 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2514 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2515 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2516 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2520 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2521 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2523 let mut res = Vec::new();
2524 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2525 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2529 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2530 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2537 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2538 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2540 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2541 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2547 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2548 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2549 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2550 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2555 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2557 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2558 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2559 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2560 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2561 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2566 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2568 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2569 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2570 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2571 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2572 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2573 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
2575 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2576 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
2577 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
2578 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
2579 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
2580 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2581 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2584 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2585 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2586 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2587 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2588 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2589 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2590 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2592 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2593 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2594 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2595 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2596 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2597 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2599 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2600 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2601 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2602 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2603 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2604 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2605 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2606 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2608 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2609 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2610 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2611 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2612 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2613 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2617 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2618 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2619 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2621 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2622 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2623 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2624 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2626 macro_rules! sign_input {
2627 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2628 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2629 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2631 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2632 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2633 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2635 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2636 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2637 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2638 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2639 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2640 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
2641 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2642 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2643 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2644 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2645 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2646 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2648 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2650 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2651 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2652 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2653 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2657 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2658 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2660 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2661 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2663 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2664 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2668 script_sig: Script::new(),
2669 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2670 witness: Vec::new(),
2673 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2674 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2677 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2678 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2679 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2680 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2681 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2683 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2685 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2686 claim_tx.input.clear();
2687 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2689 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2690 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2694 script_sig: Script::new(),
2695 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2696 witness: Vec::new(),
2699 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2700 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2701 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2702 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2703 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2705 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2707 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2708 claim_tx.input.clear();
2709 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2710 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2711 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2715 script_sig: Script::new(),
2716 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2717 witness: Vec::new(),
2719 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2720 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2721 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2722 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2723 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2725 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2728 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.