Merge pull request #642 from ariard/2020-06-anchor-backend-refacto
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / chain / package.rs
diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/package.rs b/lightning/src/chain/package.rs
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..2e1e503
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,1037 @@
+// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+// history.
+//
+// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
+// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
+// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
+// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
+// licenses.
+
+//! Various utilities to assemble claimable outpoints in package of one or more transactions. Those
+//! packages are attached metadata, guiding their aggregable or fee-bumping re-schedule. This file
+//! also includes witness weight computation and fee computation methods.
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,TxIn, Transaction, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+
+use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
+
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+
+use ln::PaymentPreimage;
+use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE};
+use ln::chan_utils;
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
+use chain::keysinterface::Sign;
+use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
+use util::byte_utils;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
+
+use std::cmp;
+use std::mem;
+use std::ops::Deref;
+
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
+
+
+// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+pub(crate) const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133;
+// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+pub(crate) const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 +  139;
+// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig  + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
+pub(crate) const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133;
+// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+pub(crate) const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139;
+// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
+pub(crate) const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77;
+
+/// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a low priority.
+const LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 15;
+/// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a middle priority.
+const MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 3;
+/// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a high priority.
+const HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 1;
+
+/// A struct to describe a revoked output and corresponding information to generate a solving
+/// witness spending a commitment `to_local` output or a second-stage HTLC transaction output.
+///
+/// CSV and pubkeys are used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used
+/// as part of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct RevokedOutput {
+       per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+       counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+       per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
+       weight: u64,
+       amount: u64,
+       on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
+}
+
+impl RevokedOutput {
+       pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16) -> Self {
+               RevokedOutput {
+                       per_commitment_point,
+                       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+                       counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+                       per_commitment_key,
+                       weight: WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT,
+                       amount,
+                       on_counterparty_tx_csv
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(RevokedOutput, 33*3 + 32 + 8 + 8 + 2, {
+       per_commitment_point,
+       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+       counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+       per_commitment_key,
+       weight,
+       amount,
+       on_counterparty_tx_csv
+});
+
+/// A struct to describe a revoked offered output and corresponding information to generate a
+/// solving witness.
+///
+/// HTLCOuputInCommitment (hash timelock, direction) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
+/// witnessScript.
+///
+/// CSV is used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used as part
+/// of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct RevokedHTLCOutput {
+       per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+       counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+       per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
+       weight: u64,
+       amount: u64,
+       htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
+}
+
+impl RevokedHTLCOutput {
+       pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> Self {
+               let weight = if htlc.offered { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC };
+               RevokedHTLCOutput {
+                       per_commitment_point,
+                       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+                       counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+                       per_commitment_key,
+                       weight,
+                       amount,
+                       htlc
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(RevokedHTLCOutput, 33*3 + 32 + 8 + 8 + HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE, {
+       per_commitment_point,
+       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+       counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+       per_commitment_key,
+       weight,
+       amount,
+       htlc
+});
+
+/// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
+///
+/// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
+/// witnessScript.
+///
+/// The preimage is used as part of the witness.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
+       per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+       counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+       preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+       htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
+}
+
+impl CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
+       pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> Self {
+               CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
+                       per_commitment_point,
+                       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+                       counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+                       preimage,
+                       htlc
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, 33*3 + 32 + HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE, {
+       per_commitment_point,
+       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+       counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+       preimage,
+       htlc
+});
+
+/// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
+///
+/// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
+/// witnessScript.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
+       per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
+       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
+       counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
+       htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment
+}
+
+impl CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
+       pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> Self {
+               CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
+                       per_commitment_point,
+                       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+                       counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+                       htlc
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, 33*3 + HTLC_OUTPUT_IN_COMMITMENT_SIZE, {
+       per_commitment_point,
+       counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
+       counterparty_htlc_base_key,
+       htlc
+});
+
+/// A struct to describe a HTLC output on holder commitment transaction.
+///
+/// Either offered or received, the amount is always used as part of the bip143 sighash.
+/// Preimage is only included as part of the witness in former case.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct HolderHTLCOutput {
+       preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+       amount: u64,
+}
+
+impl HolderHTLCOutput {
+       pub(crate) fn build(preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, amount: u64) -> Self {
+               HolderHTLCOutput {
+                       preimage,
+                       amount
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(HolderHTLCOutput, 0, {
+       preimage,
+       amount
+});
+
+/// A struct to describe the channel output on the funding transaction.
+///
+/// witnessScript is used as part of the witness redeeming the funding utxo.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) struct HolderFundingOutput {
+       funding_redeemscript: Script,
+}
+
+impl HolderFundingOutput {
+       pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script) -> Self {
+               HolderFundingOutput {
+                       funding_redeemscript,
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+impl_writeable!(HolderFundingOutput, 0, {
+       funding_redeemscript
+});
+
+/// A wrapper encapsulating all in-protocol differing outputs types.
+///
+/// The generic API offers access to an outputs common attributes or allow transformation such as
+/// finalizing an input claiming the output.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) enum PackageSolvingData {
+       RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput),
+       RevokedHTLCOutput(RevokedHTLCOutput),
+       CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
+       CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
+       HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput),
+       HolderFundingOutput(HolderFundingOutput),
+}
+
+impl PackageSolvingData {
+       fn amount(&self) -> u64 {
+               let amt = match self {
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.amount },
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.amount },
+                       PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000 },
+                       PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000 },
+                       // Note: Currently, amounts of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
+                       // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
+                       // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
+                       PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { 0 },
+                       PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { 0 },
+               };
+               amt
+       }
+       fn weight(&self) -> usize {
+               let weight = match self {
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { outp.weight as usize },
+                       PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC as usize },
+                       PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC as usize },
+                       // Note: Currently, weights of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
+                       // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
+                       // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
+                       PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { debug_assert!(false); 0 },
+                       PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { debug_assert!(false); 0 },
+               };
+               weight
+       }
+       fn is_compatible(&self, input: &PackageSolvingData) -> bool {
+               match self {
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => {
+                               match input {
+                                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
+                                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
+                                       _ => { false }
+                               }
+                       },
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => {
+                               match input {
+                                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
+                                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
+                                       _ => { false }
+                               }
+                       },
+                       _ => { mem::discriminant(self) == mem::discriminant(&input) }
+               }
+       }
+       fn finalize_input<Signer: Sign>(&self, bumped_tx: &mut Transaction, i: usize, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> bool {
+               match self {
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => {
+                               if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+                                       let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
+                                       //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
+                                       if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+                                       } else { return false; }
+                               }
+                       },
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
+                               if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+                                       let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+                                       //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
+                                       if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+                                       } else { return false; }
+                               }
+                       },
+                       PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
+                               if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+                                       let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+
+                                       if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec());
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       },
+                       PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
+                               if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) {
+                                       let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
+
+                                       bumped_tx.lock_time = outp.htlc.cltv_expiry; // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
+                                       if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+                                               // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
+                                               bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       },
+                       _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
+               }
+               true
+       }
+       fn get_finalized_tx<Signer: Sign>(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> Option<Transaction> {
+               match self {
+                       PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { return onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage); }
+                       PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => { return Some(onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&outp.funding_redeemscript)); }
+                       _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for PackageSolvingData {
+       fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+               match self {
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref revoked_outp) => {
+                               0u8.write(writer)?;
+                               revoked_outp.write(writer)?;
+                       },
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref revoked_outp) => {
+                               1u8.write(writer)?;
+                               revoked_outp.write(writer)?;
+                       },
+                       PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref counterparty_outp) => {
+                               2u8.write(writer)?;
+                               counterparty_outp.write(writer)?;
+                       },
+                       PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref counterparty_outp) => {
+                               3u8.write(writer)?;
+                               counterparty_outp.write(writer)?;
+                       },
+                       PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref holder_outp) => {
+                               4u8.write(writer)?;
+                               holder_outp.write(writer)?;
+                       },
+                       PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref funding_outp) => {
+                               5u8.write(writer)?;
+                               funding_outp.write(writer)?;
+                       }
+               }
+               Ok(())
+       }
+}
+
+impl Readable for PackageSolvingData {
+       fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+               let byte = <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
+               let solving_data = match byte {
+                       0 => {
+                               PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(Readable::read(reader)?)
+                       },
+                       1 => {
+                               PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(Readable::read(reader)?)
+                       },
+                       2 => {
+                               PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(Readable::read(reader)?)
+                       },
+                       3 => {
+                               PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(Readable::read(reader)?)
+                       },
+                       4 => {
+                               PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(Readable::read(reader)?)
+                       },
+                       5 => {
+                               PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(Readable::read(reader)?)
+                       }
+                       _ => return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion)
+               };
+               Ok(solving_data)
+       }
+}
+
+/// A malleable package might be aggregated with other packages to save on fees.
+/// A untractable package has been counter-signed and aggregable will break cached counterparty
+/// signatures.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub(crate) enum PackageMalleability {
+       Malleable,
+       Untractable,
+}
+
+/// A structure to describe a package content that is generated by ChannelMonitor and
+/// used by OnchainTxHandler to generate and broadcast transactions settling onchain claims.
+///
+/// A package is defined as one or more transactions claiming onchain outputs in reaction
+/// to confirmation of a channel transaction. Those packages might be aggregated to save on
+/// fees, if satisfaction of outputs's witnessScript let's us do so.
+///
+/// As packages are time-sensitive, we fee-bump and rebroadcast them at scheduled intervals.
+/// Failing to confirm a package translate as a loss of funds for the user.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct PackageTemplate {
+       // List of onchain outputs and solving data to generate satisfying witnesses.
+       inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)>,
+       // Packages are deemed as malleable if we have local knwoledge of at least one set of
+       // private keys yielding a satisfying witnesses. Malleability implies that we can aggregate
+       // packages among them to save on fees or rely on RBF to bump their feerates.
+       // Untractable packages have been counter-signed and thus imply that we can't aggregate
+       // them without breaking signatures. Fee-bumping strategy will also rely on CPFP.
+       malleability: PackageMalleability,
+       // Block height after which the earlier-output belonging to this package is mature for a
+       // competing claim by the counterparty. As our chain tip becomes nearer from the timelock,
+       // the fee-bumping frequency will increase. See `OnchainTxHandler::get_height_timer`.
+       soonest_conf_deadline: u32,
+       // Determines if this package can be aggregated.
+       // Timelocked outputs belonging to the same transaction might have differing
+       // satisfying heights. Picking up the later height among the output set would be a valid
+       // aggregable strategy but it comes with at least 2 trade-offs :
+       // * earlier-output fund are going to take longer to come back
+       // * CLTV delta backing up a corresponding HTLC on an upstream channel could be swallowed
+       // by the requirement of the later-output part of the set
+       // For now, we mark such timelocked outputs as non-aggregable, though we might introduce
+       // smarter aggregable strategy in the future.
+       aggregable: bool,
+       // Cache of package feerate committed at previous (re)broadcast. If bumping resources
+       // (either claimed output value or external utxo), it will keep increasing until holder
+       // or counterparty successful claim.
+       feerate_previous: u64,
+       // Cache of next height at which fee-bumping and rebroadcast will be attempted. In
+       // the future, we might abstract it to an observed mempool fluctuation.
+       height_timer: Option<u32>,
+       // Confirmation height of the claimed outputs set transaction. In case of reorg reaching
+       // it, we wipe out and forget the package.
+       height_original: u32,
+}
+
+impl PackageTemplate {
+       pub(crate) fn is_malleable(&self) -> bool {
+               self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn timelock(&self) -> u32 {
+               self.soonest_conf_deadline
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn aggregable(&self) -> bool {
+               self.aggregable
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn set_feerate(&mut self, new_feerate: u64) {
+               self.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn timer(&self) -> Option<u32> {
+               if let Some(ref timer) = self.height_timer {
+                       return Some(*timer);
+               }
+               None
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn set_timer(&mut self, new_timer: Option<u32>) {
+               self.height_timer = new_timer;
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn outpoints(&self) -> Vec<&BitcoinOutPoint> {
+               self.inputs.iter().map(|(o, _)| o).collect()
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn split_package(&mut self, split_outp: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> Option<PackageTemplate> {
+               match self.malleability {
+                       PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
+                               let mut split_package = None;
+                               let timelock = self.soonest_conf_deadline;
+                               let aggregable = self.aggregable;
+                               let feerate_previous = self.feerate_previous;
+                               let height_timer = self.height_timer;
+                               let height_original = self.height_original;
+                               self.inputs.retain(|outp| {
+                                       if *split_outp == outp.0 {
+                                               split_package = Some(PackageTemplate {
+                                                       inputs: vec![(outp.0, outp.1.clone())],
+                                                       malleability: PackageMalleability::Malleable,
+                                                       soonest_conf_deadline: timelock,
+                                                       aggregable,
+                                                       feerate_previous,
+                                                       height_timer,
+                                                       height_original,
+                                               });
+                                               return false;
+                                       }
+                                       return true;
+                               });
+                               return split_package;
+                       },
+                       _ => {
+                               // Note, we may try to split on remote transaction for
+                               // which we don't have a competing one (HTLC-Success before
+                               // timelock expiration). This explain we don't panic!
+                               // We should refactor OnchainTxHandler::block_connected to
+                               // only test equality on competing claims.
+                               return None;
+                       }
+               }
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn merge_package(&mut self, mut merge_from: PackageTemplate) {
+               assert_eq!(self.height_original, merge_from.height_original);
+               if self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable || merge_from.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable {
+                       panic!("Merging template on untractable packages");
+               }
+               if !self.aggregable || !merge_from.aggregable {
+                       panic!("Merging non aggregatable packages");
+               }
+               if let Some((_, lead_input)) = self.inputs.first() {
+                       for (_, v) in merge_from.inputs.iter() {
+                               if !lead_input.is_compatible(v) { panic!("Merging outputs from differing types !"); }
+                       }
+               } else { panic!("Merging template on an empty package"); }
+               for (k, v) in merge_from.inputs.drain(..) {
+                       self.inputs.push((k, v));
+               }
+               //TODO: verify coverage and sanity?
+               if self.soonest_conf_deadline > merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline {
+                       self.soonest_conf_deadline = merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline;
+               }
+               if self.feerate_previous > merge_from.feerate_previous {
+                       self.feerate_previous = merge_from.feerate_previous;
+               }
+               self.height_timer = cmp::min(self.height_timer, merge_from.height_timer);
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn package_amount(&self) -> u64 {
+               let mut amounts = 0;
+               for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
+                       amounts += outp.amount();
+               }
+               amounts
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn package_weight(&self, destination_script: &Script) -> usize {
+               let mut inputs_weight = 0;
+               let mut witnesses_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+               for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
+                       // previous_out_point: 36 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; sequence: 4 bytes
+                       inputs_weight += 41 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
+                       witnesses_weight += outp.weight();
+               }
+               // version: 4 bytes ; count_tx_in: 1 byte ; count_tx_out: 1 byte ; lock_time: 4 bytes
+               let transaction_weight = 10 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
+               // value: 8 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; pk_script: `destination_script.len()`
+               let output_weight = (8 + 1 + destination_script.len()) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
+               inputs_weight + witnesses_weight + transaction_weight + output_weight
+       }
+       pub(crate) fn finalize_package<L: Deref, Signer: Sign>(&self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, value: u64, destination_script: Script, logger: &L) -> Option<Transaction>
+               where L::Target: Logger,
+       {
+               match self.malleability {
+                       PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
+                               let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
+                                       version: 2,
+                                       lock_time: 0,
+                                       input: vec![],
+                                       output: vec![TxOut {
+                                               script_pubkey: destination_script,
+                                               value,
+                                       }],
+                               };
+                               for (outpoint, _) in self.inputs.iter() {
+                                       bumped_tx.input.push(TxIn {
+                                               previous_output: *outpoint,
+                                               script_sig: Script::new(),
+                                               sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+                                               witness: Vec::new(),
+                                       });
+                               }
+                               for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
+                                       log_trace!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
+                                       if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; }
+                               }
+                               log_trace!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid());
+                               return Some(bumped_tx);
+                       },
+                       PackageMalleability::Untractable => {
+                               if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() {
+                                       if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) {
+                                               log_trace!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
+                                               log_trace!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid());
+                                               return Some(final_tx);
+                                       }
+                                       return None;
+                               } else { panic!("API Error: Package must not be inputs empty"); }
+                       },
+               }
+       }
+       /// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
+       /// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
+       /// height that once reached we should generate a new bumped "version" of the claim tx to be sure that we safely claim outputs before
+       /// that our counterparty can do so. If timelock expires soon, height timer is going to be scaled down in consequence to increase
+       /// frequency of the bump and so increase our bets of success.
+       pub(crate) fn get_height_timer(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
+               if self.soonest_conf_deadline <= current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
+                       return current_height + HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
+               } else if self.soonest_conf_deadline - current_height <= LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
+                       return current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
+               }
+               current_height + LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
+       }
+       /// Returns value in satoshis to be included as package outgoing output amount and feerate with which package finalization should be done.
+       pub(crate) fn compute_package_output<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, predicted_weight: usize, input_amounts: u64, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
+               where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+                     L::Target: Logger,
+       {
+               // If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation
+               if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
+                       if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = feerate_bump(predicted_weight, input_amounts, self.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, logger) {
+                               // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
+                               if new_fee > input_amounts {
+                                       return Some((0, feerate));
+                               } else {
+                                       return Some((input_amounts - new_fee, feerate));
+                               }
+                       }
+               } else {
+                       if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
+                               return Some((input_amounts - new_fee, feerate));
+                       }
+               }
+               None
+       }
+       pub (crate) fn build_package(txid: Txid, vout: u32, input_solving_data: PackageSolvingData, soonest_conf_deadline: u32, aggregable: bool, height_original: u32) -> Self {
+               let malleability = match input_solving_data {
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
+                       PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
+                       PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
+                       PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Malleable },
+                       PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Untractable },
+                       PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { PackageMalleability::Untractable },
+               };
+               let mut inputs = Vec::with_capacity(1);
+               inputs.push((BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout }, input_solving_data));
+               PackageTemplate {
+                       inputs,
+                       malleability,
+                       soonest_conf_deadline,
+                       aggregable,
+                       feerate_previous: 0,
+                       height_timer: None,
+                       height_original,
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for PackageTemplate {
+       fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+               writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.inputs.len() as u64))?;
+               for (ref outpoint, ref rev_outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
+                       outpoint.write(writer)?;
+                       rev_outp.write(writer)?;
+               }
+               self.soonest_conf_deadline.write(writer)?;
+               self.feerate_previous.write(writer)?;
+               self.height_timer.write(writer)?;
+               self.height_original.write(writer)?;
+               Ok(())
+       }
+}
+
+impl Readable for PackageTemplate {
+       fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+               let inputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
+               let mut inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(inputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+               for _ in 0..inputs_count {
+                       let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+                       let rev_outp = Readable::read(reader)?;
+                       inputs.push((outpoint, rev_outp));
+               }
+               let (malleability, aggregable) = if let Some((_, lead_input)) = inputs.first() {
+                       match lead_input {
+                               PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
+                               PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
+                               PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
+                               PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, false) },
+                               PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
+                               PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
+                       }
+               } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); };
+               let soonest_conf_deadline = Readable::read(reader)?;
+               let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
+               let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
+               let height_original = Readable::read(reader)?;
+               Ok(PackageTemplate {
+                       inputs,
+                       malleability,
+                       soonest_conf_deadline,
+                       aggregable,
+                       feerate_previous,
+                       height_timer,
+                       height_original,
+               })
+       }
+}
+
+/// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
+/// weight. We start with the highest priority feerate returned by the node's fee estimator then
+/// fall-back to lower priorities until we have enough value available to suck from.
+///
+/// If the proposed fee is less than the available spent output's values, we return the proposed
+/// fee and the corresponding updated feerate. If the proposed fee is equal or more than the
+/// available spent output's values, we return nothing
+fn compute_fee_from_spent_amounts<F: Deref, L: Deref>(input_amounts: u64, predicted_weight: usize, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
+       where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+             L::Target: Logger,
+{
+       let mut updated_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64;
+       let mut fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+       if input_amounts <= fee {
+               updated_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64;
+               fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+               if input_amounts <= fee {
+                       updated_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u64;
+                       fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+                       if input_amounts <= fee {
+                               log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+                                       fee, input_amounts);
+                               None
+                       } else {
+                               log_warn!(logger, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+                                       input_amounts);
+                               Some((fee, updated_feerate))
+                       }
+               } else {
+                       log_warn!(logger, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+                               input_amounts);
+                       Some((fee, updated_feerate))
+               }
+       } else {
+               Some((fee, updated_feerate))
+       }
+}
+
+/// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
+/// weight. If feerates proposed by the fee-estimator have been increasing since last fee-bumping
+/// attempt, use them. Otherwise, blindly bump the feerate by 25% of the previous feerate. We also
+/// verify that those bumping heuristics respect BIP125 rules 3) and 4) and if required adjust
+/// the new fee to meet the RBF policy requirement.
+fn feerate_bump<F: Deref, L: Deref>(predicted_weight: usize, input_amounts: u64, previous_feerate: u64, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
+       where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+             L::Target: Logger,
+{
+       // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
+       let new_fee = if let Some((new_fee, _)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
+               let updated_feerate = new_fee / (predicted_weight as u64 * 1000);
+               if updated_feerate > previous_feerate {
+                       new_fee
+               } else {
+                       // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
+                       let new_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 750;
+                       if input_amounts <= new_fee {
+                               log_trace!(logger, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
+                               return None;
+                       }
+                       new_fee
+               }
+       } else {
+               log_trace!(logger, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
+               return None;
+       };
+
+       let previous_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+       let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+       // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
+       //      * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
+       //      * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
+       let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
+               new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
+       } else {
+               new_fee
+       };
+       Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / (predicted_weight as u64)))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+       use chain::package::{CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageTemplate, PackageSolvingData, RevokedOutput, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
+       use chain::Txid;
+       use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
+       use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+
+       use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
+       use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+       use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+
+       use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
+
+       use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+       use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+
+       macro_rules! dumb_revk_output {
+               ($secp_ctx: expr) => {
+                       {
+                               let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+                               let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
+                               PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_scalar, 0, 0))
+                       }
+               }
+       }
+
+       macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_output {
+               ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr) => {
+                       {
+                               let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+                               let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
+                               let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
+                               let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: true, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 0, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
+                               PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, htlc))
+                       }
+               }
+       }
+
+       macro_rules! dumb_htlc_output {
+               () => {
+                       {
+                               let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
+                               PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput::build(Some(preimage), 0))
+                       }
+               }
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       #[should_panic]
+       fn test_package_differing_heights() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+
+               let mut package_one_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
+               let package_two_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 200);
+               package_one_hundred.merge_package(package_two_hundred);
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       #[should_panic]
+       fn test_package_untractable_merge_to() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+               let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
+
+               let mut untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
+               let malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
+               untractable_package.merge_package(malleable_package);
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       #[should_panic]
+       fn test_package_untractable_merge_from() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
+               let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+
+               let mut malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
+               let untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
+               malleable_package.merge_package(untractable_package);
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       #[should_panic]
+       fn test_package_noaggregation_to() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+
+               let mut noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
+               let aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
+               noaggregation_package.merge_package(aggregation_package);
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       #[should_panic]
+       fn test_package_noaggregation_from() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+
+               let mut aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
+               let noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
+               aggregation_package.merge_package(noaggregation_package);
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       #[should_panic]
+       fn test_package_empty() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+
+               let mut empty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
+               empty_package.inputs = vec![];
+               let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
+               empty_package.merge_package(package);
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       #[should_panic]
+       fn test_package_differing_categories() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+               let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0);
+
+               let mut revoked_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
+               let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
+               revoked_package.merge_package(counterparty_package);
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       fn test_package_split_malleable() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let revk_outp_one = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+               let revk_outp_two = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+               let revk_outp_three = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+
+               let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
+               let package_two = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp_two, 1000, true, 100);
+               let package_three = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 2, revk_outp_three, 1000, true, 100);
+
+               package_one.merge_package(package_two);
+               package_one.merge_package(package_three);
+               assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 3);
+
+               if let Some(split_package) = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 1 }) {
+                       // Packages attributes should be identical
+                       assert!(split_package.is_malleable());
+                       assert_eq!(split_package.soonest_conf_deadline, package_one.soonest_conf_deadline);
+                       assert_eq!(split_package.aggregable, package_one.aggregable);
+                       assert_eq!(split_package.feerate_previous, package_one.feerate_previous);
+                       assert_eq!(split_package.height_timer, package_one.height_timer);
+                       assert_eq!(split_package.height_original, package_one.height_original);
+               } else { panic!(); }
+               assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 2);
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       fn test_package_split_untractable() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let htlc_outp_one = dumb_htlc_output!();
+
+               let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
+               let ret_split = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 0});
+               assert!(ret_split.is_none());
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       fn test_package_timer() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+
+               let mut package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
+               let timer_none = package.timer();
+               assert!(timer_none.is_none());
+               package.set_timer(Some(100));
+               if let Some(timer_some) = package.timer() {
+                       assert_eq!(timer_some, 100);
+               } else { panic!() }
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       fn test_package_amounts() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000);
+
+               let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
+               assert_eq!(package.package_amount(), 1000);
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       fn test_package_weight() {
+               let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
+               let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+               let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
+
+               let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 0, true, 100);
+               // (nVersion (4) + nLocktime (4) + count_tx_in (1) + prevout (36) + sequence (4) + script_length (1) + count_tx_out (1) + value (8) + var_int (1)) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR
+               // + witness marker (2) + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT
+               assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), (4 + 4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 8 + 1) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + 2 + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT as usize);
+       }
+}