--- /dev/null
+use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+
+use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
+use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
+use secp256k1;
+
+use ln::msgs;
+use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, LocalFeatures, DataLossProtect};
+use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
+use ln::chan_utils;
+use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
+use util::transaction_utils;
+use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
+use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
+use util::errors::APIError;
+use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
+
+use std;
+use std::default::Default;
+use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
+use std::sync::{Arc};
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub struct ChannelValueStat {
+ pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
+ pub channel_value_msat: u64,
+ pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
+ pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
+ pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
+ pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
+ pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
+}
+
+enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+ FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
+ FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
+ Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
+}
+
+enum InboundHTLCState {
+ /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
+ RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
+ /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
+ /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
+ /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
+ /// revoke_and_ack.
+ AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
+ Committed,
+ /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
+ /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
+ /// we'll drop it.
+ /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
+ /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
+ /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
+ /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
+ /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
+ /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
+ /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
+ LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
+}
+
+struct InboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ cltv_expiry: u32,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ state: InboundHTLCState,
+}
+
+enum OutboundHTLCState {
+ /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
+ /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
+ /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
+ /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
+ /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
+ /// money back (though we won't), and,
+ /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
+ /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
+ /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
+ /// we'll never get out of sync).
+ /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
+ /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
+ LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
+ Committed,
+ /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
+ /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
+ RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
+ /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
+ /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
+ /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
+ /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
+ /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
+ /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
+ AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
+}
+
+struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ cltv_expiry: u32,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState,
+ source: HTLCSource,
+}
+
+/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
+enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
+ AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
+ // always outbound
+ amount_msat: u64,
+ cltv_expiry: u32,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash,
+ source: HTLCSource,
+ onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
+ },
+ ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ },
+ FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: u64,
+ err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
+ },
+}
+
+/// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
+/// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
+/// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
+/// move on to ChannelFunded.
+/// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
+/// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
+/// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
+enum ChannelState {
+ /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
+ OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
+ /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
+ TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
+ /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
+ /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
+ /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
+ FundingCreated = 4,
+ /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
+ /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
+ /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
+ FundingSent = 8,
+ /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
+ /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
+ TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
+ /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
+ /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
+ OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
+ ChannelFunded = 64,
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
+ /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
+ /// dance.
+ PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
+ /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
+ /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
+ MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
+ /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
+ /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
+ /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
+ /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
+ /// later.
+ /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
+ AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
+ /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
+ /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
+ RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
+ /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
+ /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
+ /// us their shutdown.
+ LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
+ /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
+ /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
+ ShutdownComplete = 4096,
+}
+const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
+const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+
+const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+
+// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
+// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
+// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
+// inbound channel.
+pub(super) struct Channel {
+ config: ChannelConfig,
+
+ user_id: u64,
+
+ channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ channel_state: u32,
+ channel_outbound: bool,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+
+ local_keys: ChannelKeys,
+ shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
+
+ // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
+ // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
+ // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
+
+ cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
+ cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
+ value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
+
+ /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
+ /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
+ /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
+ /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
+ /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
+ /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
+ /// send it first.
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
+
+ // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
+ // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
+ // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
+ //
+ // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
+ // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
+ // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
+ // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
+ // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
+ // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
+ // commitment_signed.
+ pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
+ // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
+ // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
+ // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
+ // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
+ holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
+ next_local_htlc_id: u64,
+ next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
+ channel_update_count: u32,
+ feerate_per_kw: u64,
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
+ max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
+ max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ // Used in ChannelManager's tests to send a revoked transaction
+ pub last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ last_local_commitment_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64)>, // (feerate, fee)
+
+ /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
+ /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
+ /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
+ /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
+ short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
+ /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
+ /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
+ pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
+ funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
+
+ their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
+ //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
+ /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
+ their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
+ //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
+ their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+ their_to_self_delay: u16,
+ our_to_self_delay: u16,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
+ minimum_depth: u32,
+
+ their_funding_pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_revocation_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_htlc_basepoint: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
+ their_node_id: PublicKey,
+
+ their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
+
+ channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
+
+ logger: Arc<Logger>,
+}
+
+pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
+/// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
+/// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
+/// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
+const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
+/// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
+const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
+/// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
+/// it's 2^24.
+pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 138; //Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 139;
+pub const OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 133;
+
+/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
+/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
+/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
+pub(super) enum ChannelError {
+ Ignore(&'static str),
+ Close(&'static str),
+ CloseDelayBroadcast {
+ msg: &'static str,
+ update: Option<ChannelMonitor>
+ },
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ match self {
+ &ChannelError::Ignore(e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
+ &ChannelError::Close(e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
+ &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", msg)
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! secp_check {
+ ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(thing) => thing,
+ Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
+ }
+ };
+}
+
+impl Channel {
+ // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
+ fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
+ channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
+ }
+
+ /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
+ ///
+ /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
+ pub(crate) fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
+ let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
+ cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
+ }
+
+ fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
+ cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
+ }
+
+ fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
+ 1000 // TODO
+ }
+
+ // Constructors:
+ pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
+ let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
+
+ if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
+ }
+
+ if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
+ }
+ if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
+ }
+
+
+ let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ if Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
+ return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
+ }
+
+ let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
+
+ Ok(Channel {
+ user_id: user_id,
+ config: config.channel_options.clone(),
+
+ channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
+ channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
+ channel_outbound: true,
+ secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
+ channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
+
+ local_keys: chan_keys,
+ shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
+ cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
+
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
+ pending_update_fee: None,
+ holding_cell_update_fee: None,
+ next_local_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
+ channel_update_count: 1,
+
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+
+ last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ last_block_connected: Default::default(),
+ funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
+
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate,
+ their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
+ our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
+ their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
+ their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
+ their_to_self_delay: 0,
+ our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+ minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
+
+ their_funding_pubkey: None,
+ their_revocation_basepoint: None,
+ their_payment_basepoint: None,
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: None,
+ their_htlc_basepoint: None,
+ their_cur_commitment_point: None,
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point: None,
+ their_node_id: their_node_id,
+
+ their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
+
+ channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+
+ logger,
+ })
+ }
+
+ fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
+ }
+ if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
+ /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
+ pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
+ let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
+ let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
+
+ if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
+ }
+
+ // Check sanity of message fields:
+ if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
+ }
+ if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
+ }
+ Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+
+ if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
+ }
+
+ // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
+ if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+
+ // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
+
+ let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
+ if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
+ if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
+ }
+ }
+ // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
+ local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
+
+ let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+
+ let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
+ let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
+ if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
+ }
+ if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
+ }
+
+ // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
+ // for full fee payment
+ let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
+ if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
+ }
+
+ let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
+ let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
+ if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
+ }
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
+ channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+ channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
+
+ let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
+ if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ Some(script.clone())
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
+ } else if script.len() == 0 {
+ None
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
+ }
+ },
+ // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
+ &OptionalField::Absent => {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
+ }
+ }
+ } else { None };
+
+ let mut chan = Channel {
+ user_id: user_id,
+ config: local_config,
+
+ channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
+ channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
+ channel_outbound: false,
+ secp_ctx: secp_ctx,
+
+ local_keys: chan_keys,
+ shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
+ cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
+
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
+ pending_update_fee: None,
+ holding_cell_update_fee: None,
+ next_local_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
+ channel_update_count: 1,
+
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+
+ last_local_commitment_txn: Vec::new(),
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ last_block_connected: Default::default(),
+ funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
+
+ feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
+ channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
+ our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
+ their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
+ their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
+ minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
+
+ their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
+ their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
+ their_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.payment_basepoint),
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint: Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
+ their_htlc_basepoint: Some(msg.htlc_basepoint),
+ their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point: None,
+ their_node_id: their_node_id,
+
+ their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+
+ channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
+
+ logger,
+ };
+
+ let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
+ chan.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
+
+ Ok(chan)
+ }
+
+ // Utilities to derive keys:
+
+ fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
+ let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, idx);
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
+ }
+
+ // Utilities to build transactions:
+
+ fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
+ let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
+ let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
+
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+ sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
+ } else {
+ sha.input(&self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize());
+ sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
+ }
+ let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
+
+ ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
+ ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
+ ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
+ ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
+ ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
+ ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
+ }
+
+ /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
+ /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
+ /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
+ /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
+ /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
+ /// an HTLC to a).
+ /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
+ /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
+ /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
+ /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
+ /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
+ /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
+ /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
+ /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
+ /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
+ /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
+ /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
+ #[inline]
+ fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
+ let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
+
+ let txins = {
+ let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
+ ins.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ ins
+ };
+
+ let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
+ let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
+
+ let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
+ let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
+ let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
+ let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
+
+ log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
+
+ macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
+ ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
+ HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered: $offered,
+ amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
+ cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
+ transaction_output_index: None
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
+ ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
+ if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
+ let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
+ if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
+ }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
+ included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
+ }
+ } else {
+ let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
+ if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
+ txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
+ script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
+ }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
+ included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
+ };
+
+ if include {
+ add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
+ remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
+ match &htlc.state {
+ &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+ if generated_by_local {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
+ };
+
+ if include {
+ add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
+ local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
+ match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ },
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
+ if !generated_by_local {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
+ // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
+ // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
+ // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
+ // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
+ let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ {
+ // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
+ // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
+ let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
+ self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
+ } else {
+ self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
+ };
+ debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
+ max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
+ debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
+ max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
+ }
+
+ let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+ let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
+ (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
+ } else {
+ (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
+ };
+
+ let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
+ let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
+
+ if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
+ if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
+ &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
+ value: value_to_a as u64
+ }, None));
+ }
+
+ if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
+ .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
+ .into_script(),
+ value: value_to_b as u64
+ }, None));
+ }
+
+ transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
+ if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
+ if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
+ a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
+ // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
+ // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
+ // may fail)!
+ .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
+ // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
+ // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
+ } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
+ } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
+ });
+
+ let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
+ let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
+ for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ outputs.push(out.0);
+ if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
+ htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
+ htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
+ }
+ }
+ let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
+ htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
+
+ (Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
+ input: txins,
+ output: outputs,
+ }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
+ let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
+ (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
+ let txins = {
+ let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
+ ins.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xffffffff,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ ins
+ };
+
+ assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
+ let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
+
+ let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
+ let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
+ let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
+
+ if value_to_self < 0 {
+ assert!(self.channel_outbound);
+ total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
+ } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
+ assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
+ total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
+ }
+
+ if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
+ value: value_to_remote as u64
+ }, ()));
+ }
+
+ if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ txouts.push((TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ value: value_to_self as u64
+ }, ()));
+ }
+
+ transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
+
+ let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
+ for out in txouts.drain(..) {
+ outputs.push(out.0);
+ }
+
+ (Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: txins,
+ output: outputs,
+ }, total_fee_satoshis)
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
+ /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
+ /// our counterparty!)
+ /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
+ /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
+ fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
+ let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
+
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
+ /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+ fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
+ //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
+ //may see payments to it!
+ let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key);
+ let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
+
+ Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
+ /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
+ /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
+ pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
+ let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
+ let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+ let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.expect("get_funding_redeemscript only allowed after accept_channel").serialize();
+ if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
+ builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
+ .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
+ } else {
+ builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
+ .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
+ }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
+ }
+
+ fn sign_commitment_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature) -> Signature {
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 {
+ panic!("Tried to sign commitment transaction that had input count != 1!");
+ }
+ if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
+ panic!("Tried to re-sign commitment transaction");
+ }
+
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
+
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+
+ let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize();
+ let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize();
+ if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ } else {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ }
+ tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.into_bytes());
+
+ our_sig
+ }
+
+ /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
+ /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
+ /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
+ fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+ }
+
+ fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 {
+ panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
+ }
+
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
+
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
+ let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
+ Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
+ }
+
+ /// Signs a transaction created by build_htlc_transaction. If the transaction is an
+ /// HTLC-Success transaction (ie htlc.offered is false), preimage must be set!
+ fn sign_htlc_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> {
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 {
+ panic!("Tried to sign HTLC transaction that had input count != 1!");
+ }
+ if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 {
+ panic!("Tried to re-sign HTLC transaction");
+ }
+
+ let (htlc_redeemscript, our_sig, local_tx) = self.create_htlc_tx_signature(tx, htlc, keys)?;
+
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
+
+ if local_tx { // b, then a
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ } else {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ }
+ tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+
+ if htlc.offered {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
+ } else {
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
+ }
+
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.into_bytes());
+
+ Ok(our_sig)
+ }
+
+ /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
+ /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
+ /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
+ fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
+ // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
+ // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
+ // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
+ // either.
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+
+ let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
+
+ // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+ // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+ // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+
+ let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+ assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ } else {
+ log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ }
+ return Ok((None, None));
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
+ }
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ //
+ // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
+ // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
+
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match pending_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ return Ok((None, None));
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
+ // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
+ return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ });
+ return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ }
+
+ {
+ let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
+ }
+
+ Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
+ }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
+ (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
+ let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
+ },
+ (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
+ (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
+ /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
+ /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
+ pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+
+ // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+ // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+ // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+
+ let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
+ return Ok(None);
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
+ }
+ }
+ if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match pending_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ err_packet,
+ });
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+
+ {
+ let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
+ }
+
+ Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ reason: err_packet
+ }))
+ }
+
+ // Message handlers:
+
+ pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_local_features: LocalFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ // Check sanity of message fields:
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
+ }
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
+ }
+ if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
+ }
+
+ // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
+ }
+ if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
+ }
+
+ let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
+ if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ Some(script.clone())
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
+ } else if script.len() == 0 {
+ None
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
+ }
+ },
+ // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
+ &OptionalField::Absent => {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
+ }
+ }
+ } else { None };
+
+ self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+
+ self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
+ self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
+ self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
+ self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
+ self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
+ self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
+ self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
+ self.their_funding_pubkey = Some(msg.funding_pubkey);
+ self.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(msg.revocation_basepoint);
+ self.their_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.payment_basepoint);
+ self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
+ self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
+ self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
+
+ let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
+ self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
+ self.channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
+
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, Transaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
+ let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
+
+ // ...and we sign it, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, sig);
+
+ let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
+ let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
+ Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), local_keys))
+ }
+
+ pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
+ // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
+ // channel.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ }
+
+ let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
+ let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
+
+ let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
+ return Err(e);
+ }
+ };
+
+ // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
+
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx.clone()];
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
+ self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ signature: our_signature
+ }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }
+
+ /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
+ /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
+ pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ }
+
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+ let mut local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
+ let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
+
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
+ self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
+ } else {
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast"))
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+
+ if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
+ // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
+ // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
+ (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
+ (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
+ if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
+ }
+ // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
+ return Ok(());
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
+ }
+
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
+ fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
+ let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
+ /// holding cell.
+ fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
+ let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+
+ let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
+ htlc_outbound_count += 1;
+ htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
+
+ (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
+ }
+
+ /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
+ /// Doesn't bother handling the
+ /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
+ /// corner case properly.
+ pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
+ // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
+ (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
+ cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
+ }
+
+ pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
+ }
+ if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
+ }
+
+ let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
+ if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
+ }
+ // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
+ if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value"));
+ }
+ // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
+ // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
+ // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
+ // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
+ // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
+ // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
+ // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
+ // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
+ // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
+ // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
+ // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
+ // transaction).
+ let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
+ if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
+ }
+ if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
+ }
+ if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
+ }
+
+ //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
+
+ if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
+ if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
+ panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
+ self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
+ state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
+ });
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
+ #[inline]
+ fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
+ match check_preimage {
+ None => {},
+ Some(payment_hash) =>
+ if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
+ }
+ };
+ match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
+ },
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
+ }
+ return Ok(&htlc.source);
+ }
+ }
+ Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
+ }
+
+ pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+
+ let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
+ }
+
+ pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+
+ self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
+ }
+
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
+
+ let mut update_fee = false;
+ let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+ update_fee = true;
+ self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
+ } else {
+ self.feerate_per_kw
+ };
+
+ let mut local_commitment_tx = {
+ let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
+ (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
+ };
+ let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
+ let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
+
+ //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
+ if update_fee {
+ let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
+ let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
+
+ if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
+ }
+
+ let mut new_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.1 + 1);
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature);
+ new_local_commitment_txn.push(local_commitment_tx.0.clone());
+
+ let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
+ for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
+ if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
+ log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
+ let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
+ let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
+ let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, &htlc, &local_keys)?;
+ new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
+ htlc_sig
+ } else {
+ self.create_htlc_tx_signature(&htlc_tx, &htlc, &local_keys)?.1
+ };
+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some((msg.htlc_signatures[idx], htlc_sig)), source));
+ } else {
+ htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
+ }
+ }
+
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
+ let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
+
+ // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
+ let mut need_our_commitment = false;
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
+ // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
+ // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
+ // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
+ need_our_commitment = true;
+ self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
+ Some(forward_info.clone())
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
+ need_our_commitment = true;
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
+ need_our_commitment = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
+ // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
+ // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
+ self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
+ // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
+ // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
+ // includes the right HTLCs.
+ // Note that this generates a monitor update that we ignore! This is OK since we
+ // won't actually send the commitment_signed that generated the update to the other
+ // side until the latest monitor has been pulled from us and stored.
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ }
+ // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
+ // re-send the message on restoration)
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
+ }
+
+ let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
+ // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
+ // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
+ let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ (Some(msg), monitor, None)
+ } else if !need_our_commitment {
+ (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
+ } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };
+
+ Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
+ }
+
+ /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
+ /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
+ fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
+ if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
+
+ let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
+ let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
+ let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
+ let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
+ let mut err = None;
+ for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
+ // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
+ // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
+ // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
+ // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
+ // to rebalance channels.
+ if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
+ } else {
+ match &htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
+ match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
+ Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
+ Err(e) => {
+ match e {
+ ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
+ },
+ _ => {
+ log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
+ },
+ }
+ err = Some(e);
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
+ Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
+ else {
+ panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
+ match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
+ Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
+ Err(e) => {
+ if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
+ else {
+ panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ if err.is_some() {
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
+ if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
+ // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
+ // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
+ err = None;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
+ //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
+ match err {
+ None => {
+ if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
+ // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
+ // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
+ // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+ let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
+ self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
+ Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
+ })
+ } else {
+ None
+ };
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs,
+ update_fulfill_htlcs,
+ update_fail_htlcs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fee: update_fee,
+ commitment_signed,
+ }, monitor_update)))
+ },
+ Some(e) => Err(e)
+ }
+ } else {
+ Ok(None)
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
+ /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
+ /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
+ /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
+ /// revoke_and_ack message.
+ pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
+ }
+
+ if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
+ if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
+ }
+ }
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
+ .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
+
+ // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
+ // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
+ // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
+ // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
+ self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
+ self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
+ let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
+ let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut require_commitment = false;
+ let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
+
+ {
+ // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
+ let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
+ let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
+ let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
+
+ // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
+ pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
+ revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
+ } else {
+ // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
+ value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
+ }
+ false
+ } else { true }
+ });
+ for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ true
+ } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ true
+ } else { false };
+ if swap {
+ let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
+
+ if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
+ require_commitment = true;
+ } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
+ match forward_info {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
+ require_commitment = true;
+ match fail_msg {
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
+ update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
+ },
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
+ to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ }
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
+ require_commitment = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
+
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
+ self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
+ // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
+ // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
+ // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
+ // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
+ if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
+ require_commitment = true;
+ self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
+ // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
+ // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
+ if require_commitment {
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
+ // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
+ // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
+ self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ }
+ self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
+ self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
+ return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
+ }
+
+ match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
+ Some(mut commitment_update) => {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
+ for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+ }
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
+ }
+ Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
+ },
+ None => {
+ if require_commitment {
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ update_fail_htlcs,
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed
+ }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
+ } else {
+ Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
+ /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
+ /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
+ fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
+ }
+ if !self.is_usable() {
+ panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
+ }
+ if !self.is_live() {
+ panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
+ }
+
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
+ self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
+
+ Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
+ })
+ }
+
+ pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
+ Some(update_fee) => {
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
+ },
+ None => Ok(None)
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
+ /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
+ /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
+ /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
+ /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
+ /// completed.
+ pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
+ let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
+
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ return outbound_drops;
+ }
+ // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
+ // will be retransmitted.
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
+
+ let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
+ self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
+ // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
+ // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
+ // this HTLC accordingly
+ inbound_drop_count += 1;
+ false
+ },
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
+ // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
+ // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
+ // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
+ true
+ },
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
+ // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
+ // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
+ // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
+ // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
+ true
+ },
+ }
+ });
+ self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
+ // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
+ // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
+ // the update upon reconnection.
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ }
+ }
+
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
+ false
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
+ }
+ });
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
+ log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ outbound_drops
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
+ /// updates are partially paused.
+ /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
+ /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
+ /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
+ /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
+ pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
+ assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
+ mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
+ assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
+ mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
+ }
+
+ /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
+ /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
+ /// to the remote side.
+ pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+ self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+
+ let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
+
+ // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
+ // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
+ // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
+ // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
+ // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
+ // monitor was persisted.
+ let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
+ assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ })
+ } else { None };
+
+ let mut forwards = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
+ let mut failures = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
+
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
+ }
+
+ let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
+ Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
+ } else { None };
+ let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
+ Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
+ } else { None };
+
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ let order = self.resend_order.clone();
+ log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
+ if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
+ if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
+ if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
+ match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
+ (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
+ }
+
+ pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
+ self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
+ let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
+ msgs::RevokeAndACK {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ per_commitment_secret,
+ next_per_commitment_point,
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
+ let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
+ update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+ onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
+ });
+ }
+ }
+
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
+ match reason {
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
+ update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ reason: err_packet.clone()
+ });
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
+ failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
+ });
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
+ update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
+ });
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
+ update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
+ update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
+ update_fee: None,
+ commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
+ /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
+ pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
+ // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
+ // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
+ // just close here instead of trying to recover.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
+ }
+
+ if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
+ match msg.data_loss_protect {
+ OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
+ if chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1) != data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided"));
+ }
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(data_loss.my_current_per_commitment_point);
+ return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting", update: Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())
+ });
+ }
+ },
+ OptionalField::Absent => {}
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
+ // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
+ self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+
+ let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
+ Some(msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ })
+ } else { None };
+
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
+ self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
+ }
+ // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
+ return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
+ }
+
+ // We have OurFundingLocked set!
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
+ }
+
+ let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
+ // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
+ None
+ } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
+ };
+
+ // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
+ // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
+ // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
+ // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
+ let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
+
+ let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
+ // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ })
+ } else { None };
+
+ if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
+ if required_revoke.is_some() {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ }
+
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
+ // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
+ // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
+ // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
+ // now!
+ match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
+ Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
+ Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
+ }
+ } else {
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ }
+ } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
+ if required_revoke.is_some() {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ }
+
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ }
+
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
+ if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
+ self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
+ proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
+ }
+ let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
+ let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
+
+ let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis));
+ Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
+ signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+ })
+ }
+
+ pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
+ // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
+ // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+
+ // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
+ // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
+ if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
+ }
+
+ //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
+ if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
+ }
+
+ if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
+ if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
+ }
+
+ // From here on out, we may not fail!
+
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+
+ // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
+ // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
+ // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
+ self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+ // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
+ // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
+ // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
+
+ let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ Some(msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ })
+ };
+
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
+ }
+
+ pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
+ if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
+ }
+ if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
+ }
+ if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
+ }
+
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
+ if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
+ }
+ let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()) {
+ Ok(_) => {},
+ Err(_e) => {
+ // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
+ // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
+ closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
+ sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
+ },
+ };
+
+ if let Some((_, last_fee)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
+ self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
+ ($new_feerate: expr) => {
+ let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
+ let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
+ sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
+ self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee));
+ return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
+ signature: our_sig,
+ }), None))
+ }
+ }
+
+ let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
+ if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
+ }
+ }
+ propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
+ }
+ } else {
+ let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
+ if let Some((last_feerate, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
+ }
+ }
+ propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let our_sig = self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature);
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+
+ Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
+ signature: our_sig,
+ }), Some(closing_tx)))
+ }
+
+ // Public utilities:
+
+ pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ self.channel_id
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
+ /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
+ pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.user_id
+ }
+
+ /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
+ pub fn channel_monitor(&self) -> ChannelMonitor {
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
+ panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
+ }
+ self.channel_monitor.clone()
+ }
+
+ /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
+ /// is_usable() returns true).
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.short_channel_id
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
+ /// get_outbound_funding_created.
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
+ self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
+ }
+
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.their_node_id
+ }
+
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
+ }
+
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.channel_value_satoshis
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.feerate_per_kw
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
+ &self.local_keys
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
+ ChannelValueStat {
+ value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
+ channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
+ channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
+ pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
+ holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
+ let mut res = 0;
+ for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match h {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
+ res += amount_msat;
+ }
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+ res
+ },
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.channel_update_count
+ }
+
+ pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
+ self.config.announced_channel
+ }
+
+ pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_outbound
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
+ // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
+ // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
+
+ // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
+ let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
+
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
+ res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
+ }
+
+ // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
+ res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
+
+ res as u32
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
+ pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
+ let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
+ (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
+ /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
+ self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
+ (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
+ pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
+ }
+
+ /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
+ /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
+ /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
+ pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
+ assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+ true
+ } else { false }
+ }
+
+ /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
+ /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
+ /// the channel_monitor.
+ /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
+ /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
+ /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
+ pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
+ self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
+ let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
+ } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+ } else {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
+ };
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
+
+ //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
+ //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
+ //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
+ //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
+ if need_commitment_update {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }));
+ } else {
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
+ if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
+ let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
+ if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
+ // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
+ // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
+ // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
+ // channel and move on.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
+ });
+ } else {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if input.witness.is_empty() {
+ // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
+ // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
+ #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+ panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
+ self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
+ ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
+ ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(None)
+ }
+
+ /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
+ /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
+ /// unconfirmation/reorg.
+ pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
+ }
+ self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
+ false
+ }
+
+ // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
+ // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
+
+ pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
+ }
+ if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
+ panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
+ }
+
+ if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
+ }
+
+ let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+
+ msgs::OpenChannel {
+ chain_hash: chain_hash,
+ temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
+ push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+ max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
+ funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+ revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+ payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+ htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+ first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
+ channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
+ }
+ if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
+ }
+ if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
+ }
+
+ let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+
+ msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
+ max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
+ funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
+ revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
+ payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.payment_base_key),
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
+ htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
+ first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+ fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
+ let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&remote_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+
+ // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
+ Ok((self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key), remote_initial_commitment_tx))
+ }
+
+ /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
+ /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
+ /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
+ /// or if called on an inbound channel.
+ /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
+ /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ if !self.channel_outbound {
+ panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
+ }
+ if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
+ }
+ if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ }
+
+ let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
+
+ let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
+ self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
+ return Err(e);
+ }
+ };
+
+ let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
+
+ // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
+ self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+
+ Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
+ temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
+ funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
+ funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
+ signature: our_signature
+ }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }
+
+ /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
+ /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
+ /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
+ /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
+ /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
+ /// closing).
+ /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
+ /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
+ pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
+ if !self.config.announced_channel {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
+ }
+
+ let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
+ let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
+
+ let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
+ features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(),
+ chain_hash: chain_hash,
+ short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
+ node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
+ bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() },
+ bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
+ excess_data: Vec::new(),
+ };
+
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
+
+ Ok((msg, sig))
+ }
+
+ /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
+ /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
+ pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+ let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ let remote_last_secret = self.channel_monitor.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
+ log_trace!(self, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
+ OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
+ your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
+ my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1))
+ })
+ } else {
+ log_debug!(self, "We don't seen yet any revoked secret, if this channnel has already been updated it means we are fallen-behind, you should wait for other peer closing");
+ OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
+ your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
+ my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number))
+ })
+ };
+ msgs::ChannelReestablish {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
+ // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
+ // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
+ // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
+ // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
+ // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
+
+ // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
+ // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
+ next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
+ // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
+ // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
+ // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
+ // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
+ // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
+ // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
+ // overflow here.
+ next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
+ data_loss_protect,
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ // Send stuff to our remote peers:
+
+ /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
+ /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
+ /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
+ /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
+ /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
+ /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
+ /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
+ pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
+ }
+
+ if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
+ }
+ if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
+ }
+
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
+ // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
+ // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
+ // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
+ // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
+ // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
+ // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
+ }
+
+ let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
+ if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
+ }
+ // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
+ if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"));
+ }
+
+ // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
+ // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
+ if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"));
+ }
+
+ //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ amount_msat: amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
+ source,
+ onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
+ });
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+
+ self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
+ amount_msat: amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
+ source,
+ });
+
+ let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
+ amount_msat: amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
+ onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
+ };
+ self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
+
+ Ok(Some(res))
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
+ /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
+ /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
+ /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
+ pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
+ }
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
+ }
+ let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ have_updates = true;
+ }
+ if have_updates { break; }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
+ have_updates = true;
+ }
+ if have_updates { break; }
+ }
+ if !have_updates {
+ panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
+ }
+ self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
+ }
+ /// Only fails in case of bad keys
+ fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
+ // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
+ // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
+ // is acceptable.
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
+ Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(state) = new_state {
+ htlc.state = state;
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
+ }
+ }
+ self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
+
+ let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
+ Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
+ // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
+ let htlcs_no_ref = htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
+ (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
+ },
+ Err(e) => return Err(e),
+ };
+
+ self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
+ Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
+ }
+
+ /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
+ /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
+ let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+
+ let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
+ if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ if self.channel_outbound {
+ feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
+ let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
+ let remote_commitment_txid = remote_commitment_tx.0.txid();
+ let remote_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&remote_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&remote_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
+ let our_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
+ log_trace!(self, "Signing remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(our_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
+
+ let mut htlc_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.1);
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
+ if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+ let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
+ let our_htlc_key = secp_check!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters");
+ htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
+ log_trace!(self, "Signing remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}", encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key).serialize()), log_bytes!(htlc_sigs.last().unwrap().serialize_compact()[..]));
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ signature: our_sig,
+ htlc_signatures: htlc_sigs,
+ }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
+ }
+
+ /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
+ /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
+ /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
+ /// more info.
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
+ match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
+ Some(update_add_htlc) => {
+ let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
+ Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
+ },
+ None => Ok(None)
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
+ /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
+ pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
+ }
+ }
+ if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
+ if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
+ }
+ else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
+ }
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
+ }
+
+ let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
+
+ // From here on out, we may not fail!
+ if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ } else {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ }
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+
+ // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
+ // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
+ self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+
+ Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
+ }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
+ /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
+ /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
+ /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
+ /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
+ assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+
+ // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
+ // return them to fail the payment.
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
+ match htlc_update {
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
+ }
+
+ for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
+ //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
+ //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
+ //which correspond)
+ }
+
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut res, &mut self.last_local_commitment_txn);
+ (res, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ }
+}
+
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
+impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ error_packet.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ onion_hash.write(writer)?;
+ err_code.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
+ 2u8.write(writer)?;
+ payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl Writeable for Channel {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
+ // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
+
+ writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+
+ self.user_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.config.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
+ self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+ self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
+
+ let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+ for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ match &htlc.state {
+ &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
+ &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_state.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
+ 2u8.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_state.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
+ 3u8.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
+ 4u8.write(writer)?;
+ removal_reason.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! write_option {
+ ($thing: expr) => {
+ match &$thing {
+ &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ &Some(ref v) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ v.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ htlc.source.write(writer)?;
+ match &htlc.state {
+ &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ onion_packet.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
+ 2u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
+ },
+ &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
+ 3u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
+ },
+ &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
+ 4u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ amount_msat.write(writer)?;
+ cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
+ payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ source.write(writer)?;
+ onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
+ 2u8.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ err_packet.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ match self.resend_order {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
+ }
+
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
+ self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
+ self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
+
+ (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
+ pending_forward.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ }
+
+ (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
+ htlc_source.write(writer)?;
+ payment_hash.write(writer)?;
+ fail_reason.write(writer)?;
+ }
+
+ write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
+ write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
+
+ self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
+ self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
+
+ (self.last_local_commitment_txn.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for tx in self.last_local_commitment_txn.iter() {
+ if let Err(e) = tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
+ match e {
+ encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
+ _ => panic!("last_local_commitment_txn must have been well-formed!"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ Some((feerate, fee)) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ feerate.write(writer)?;
+ fee.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ }
+
+ write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
+ write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
+
+ self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
+ self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
+
+ self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
+ self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
+ self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
+ self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
+
+ write_option!(self.their_funding_pubkey);
+ write_option!(self.their_revocation_basepoint);
+ write_option!(self.their_payment_basepoint);
+ write_option!(self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint);
+ write_option!(self.their_htlc_basepoint);
+ write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
+
+ write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
+ self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
+
+ write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
+
+ self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl<R : ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel {
+ fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
+ }
+
+ let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+ for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
+ pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ },
+ });
+ }
+
+ let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+ for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
+ pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ source: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ },
+ });
+ }
+
+ let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
+ for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ source: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ },
+ 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ },
+ 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
+ },
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ });
+ }
+
+ let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+ 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+ for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
+ monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ }
+
+ let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
+ for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
+ monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
+ }
+
+ let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let last_local_commitment_txn_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut last_local_commitment_txn = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(last_local_commitment_txn_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2 + 1));
+ for _ in 0..last_local_commitment_txn_count {
+ last_local_commitment_txn.push(match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
+ Ok(tx) => tx,
+ Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ });
+ }
+
+ let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+
+ let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let their_funding_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_htlc_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
+ // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
+ // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
+ if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
+ return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ }
+
+ Ok(Channel {
+ user_id,
+
+ config,
+ channel_id,
+ channel_state,
+ channel_outbound,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+
+ local_keys,
+ shutdown_pubkey,
+
+ cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
+ cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
+ value_to_self_msat,
+
+ pending_inbound_htlcs,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs,
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates,
+
+ resend_order,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
+ monitor_pending_forwards,
+ monitor_pending_failures,
+
+ pending_update_fee,
+ holding_cell_update_fee,
+ next_local_htlc_id,
+ next_remote_htlc_id,
+ channel_update_count,
+ feerate_per_kw,
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+
+ last_local_commitment_txn,
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee,
+
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in,
+ short_channel_id,
+ last_block_connected,
+ funding_tx_confirmations,
+
+ their_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ our_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ their_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ our_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ their_to_self_delay,
+ our_to_self_delay,
+ their_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ minimum_depth,
+
+ their_funding_pubkey,
+ their_revocation_basepoint,
+ their_payment_basepoint,
+ their_delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ their_htlc_basepoint,
+ their_cur_commitment_point,
+
+ their_prev_commitment_point,
+ their_node_id,
+
+ their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+
+ channel_monitor,
+
+ logger,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+ use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+ use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
+ use hex;
+ use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+ use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
+ use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
+ use ln::chan_utils;
+ use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
+ use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
+ use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+ use util::config::UserConfig;
+ use util::test_utils;
+ use util::logger::Logger;
+ use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
+ use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
+ use std::sync::Arc;
+
+ struct TestFeeEstimator {
+ fee_est: u64
+ }
+ impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
+ fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
+ self.fee_est
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
+ assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
+ "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
+ }
+
+ struct Keys {
+ chan_keys: ChannelKeys,
+ }
+ impl KeysInterface for Keys {
+ fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
+ fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
+ Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
+ }
+
+ fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
+ let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
+ }
+
+ fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool) -> ChannelKeys { self.chan_keys.clone() }
+ fn get_session_key(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
+ fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn outbound_commitment_test() {
+ // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
+ let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
+ let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
+ let chan_keys = ChannelKeys {
+ funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+
+ // These aren't set in the test vectors:
+ revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
+ commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
+ };
+ assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan_keys.funding_key).serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
+ let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
+
+ let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
+ let mut config = UserConfig::new();
+ config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
+ let mut chan = Channel::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
+ chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+
+ let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
+ chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
+
+ chan.their_payment_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ chan.their_funding_pubkey = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ chan.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()));
+ assert_eq!(chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ chan.their_revocation_basepoint = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+
+ // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
+ // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
+ // build_commitment_transaction.
+ let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+ let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
+ let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &chan.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &chan.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
+
+ macro_rules! test_commitment {
+ ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
+ unsigned_tx = {
+ let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
+ .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
+ .collect();
+ (res.0, htlcs)
+ };
+ let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &chan.get_funding_redeemscript(), chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
+ secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, &chan.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+ chan.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut unsigned_tx.0, &their_signature);
+
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&unsigned_tx.0)[..],
+ hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ };
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
+ ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
+ let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+
+ let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
+ let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
+ let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
+ secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
+
+ let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
+ if !htlc.offered {
+ for i in 0..5 {
+ let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
+ if out == htlc.payment_hash {
+ preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
+ }
+ }
+
+ assert!(preimage.is_some());
+ }
+
+ chan.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys).unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
+ hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
+ };
+ }
+
+ {
+ // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
+
+ test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
+ "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 0,
+ amount_msat: 1000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 500,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 1,
+ amount_msat: 2000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 501,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 2,
+ amount_msat: 2000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 502,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 3,
+ amount_msat: 3000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 503,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+ chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
+ htlc_id: 4,
+ amount_msat: 4000000,
+ cltv_expiry: 504,
+ payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
+ state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
+ };
+ out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
+ out
+ });
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
+
+ test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
+ "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
+ "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
+ "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
+ "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(3,
+ "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
+ "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(4,
+ "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
+ "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
+
+ test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
+ "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
+ "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
+ "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
+ "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(3,
+ "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
+ "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(4,
+ "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
+ "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
+
+ test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
+ "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
+ "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
+ "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
+ "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(3,
+ "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
+ "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
+
+ test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
+ "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
+ "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014ccf1af2f2aabee14bb40fa3851ab2301de84311077956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea01473044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
+ "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
+ "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
+ "02000000000101ca94a9ad516ebc0c4bdd7b6254871babfa978d5accafb554214137d398bfcf6a0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f401483045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
+ "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(3,
+ "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
+ "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
+
+ test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
+ "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
+ "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
+ "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
+ "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
+
+ test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
+ "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
+ "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
+ "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(2,
+ "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
+ "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
+
+ test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
+ "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
+ "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
+ "020000000001014e16c488fa158431c1a82e8f661240ec0a71ba0ce92f2721a6538c510226ad5c0000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc01483045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc70439001008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
+ "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
+
+ test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
+ "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
+ "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
+ "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");
+
+ test_htlc_output!(1,
+ "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
+ "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
+
+ test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
+ "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
+ "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
+
+ test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
+ "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
+
+ test_htlc_output!(0,
+ "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
+ "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
+ "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");
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
+
+ test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
+ "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
+
+ test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
+ "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
+
+ test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
+ "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
+ }
+
+ {
+ // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
+ chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
+
+ test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
+ "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
+ "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");
+
+ assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
+ // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
+
+ let mut seed = [0; 32];
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
+ hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 281474976710655),
+ hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
+ hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 0x555555555555),
+ hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(seed, 1),
+ hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_key_derivation() {
+ // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+
+ let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+ let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
+
+ let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
+ assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
+ assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
+ hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
+
+ assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
+ }
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff