pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
+
+pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
+ const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
+ const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
+ if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(test))]
+const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+
+pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
+
+/// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
+/// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
+/// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
+/// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
+pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
+
+/// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
+/// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
+/// It's 2^24 - 1.
+pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
+
+/// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
+pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
+
+/// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
+/// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
+/// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
+/// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
+/// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
+pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
+
+/// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
+pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
+
+/// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
+/// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
+/// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
+/// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
+/// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
+/// standard.
+/// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
+pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
+
+// Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
+pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
+
+/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
+/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
+/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
+pub(super) enum ChannelError {
+ Ignore(String),
+ Warn(String),
+ Close(String),
+}
+
+impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ match self {
+ &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
+ &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
+ &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ match self {
+ &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
+ &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
+ &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+macro_rules! secp_check {
+ ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
+ match $res {
+ Ok(thing) => thing,
+ Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
+ }
+ };
+}
+
/// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
/// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
/// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
/// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
/// them.
///
-/// See [`Channel::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
+/// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
(2, blocked, required),
});
-// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
-// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
-// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
-// inbound channel.
-//
-// Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
-// Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
-pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
+/// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
+pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
config: LegacyChannelConfig,
// Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
}
-#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
-struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
- fee: u64,
- total_pending_htlcs: usize,
- next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
- next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
- feerate: u32,
-}
+impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
+ pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ }
-pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.update_time_counter
+ }
-pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
- const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
- const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
- if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
-}
+ pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id
+ }
-#[cfg(not(test))]
-const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
+ pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
+ self.config.announced_channel
+ }
-pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
+ pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
+ }
-/// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
-/// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
-/// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
-/// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
-pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
+ /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
+ }
-/// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
-/// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
-/// It's 2^24 - 1.
-pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
+ /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
+ pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
+ }
-/// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
-pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
+ /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
+ let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
+ (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
+ }
-/// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
-/// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
-/// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
-/// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
-/// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
-pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
+ /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
+ /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
+ self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
+ }
-/// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
-pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
+ // Public utilities:
-/// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
-/// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
-/// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
-/// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
-/// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
-/// standard.
-/// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
-pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
+ pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
+ self.channel_id
+ }
-// Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
-pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
+ // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
+ //
+ // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
+ pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
+ self.temporary_channel_id
+ }
-/// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
-/// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
-/// channel_id in ChannelManager.
-pub(super) enum ChannelError {
- Ignore(String),
- Warn(String),
- Close(String),
-}
+ pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
+ self.minimum_depth
+ }
-impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
- fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
- match self {
- &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
- &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
- &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
- }
+ /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
+ /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
+ pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
+ self.user_id
}
-}
-macro_rules! secp_check {
- ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
- match $res {
- Ok(thing) => thing,
- Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
- }
- };
-}
+ /// Gets the channel's type
+ pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ &self.channel_type
+ }
-impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
- /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
- /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
- ///
- /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
- ///
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
- fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
- let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
- 1
- } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
- 100
- } else {
- config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
- };
- channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
+ /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
+ /// is_usable() returns true).
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.short_channel_id
}
- /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
- /// required by us according to the configured or default
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
- ///
- /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
- ///
- /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
- /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
- pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
- let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
- cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
}
- /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
- /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
- /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
- /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
- pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
- let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
- cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.outbound_scid_alias
}
- pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
+ /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
+ /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
+ pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
+ assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
+ self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
}
- fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
- // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
- // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
- // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
- // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
- let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
- if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
- config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
- their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
- ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
- }
-
- // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
- // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
- // `only_static_remotekey`.
- #[cfg(anchors)]
- { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
- if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
- their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
- }
- }
-
- ret
+ /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
+ /// get_outbound_funding_created.
+ pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
}
- /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
- /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
- /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
- pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
- if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
- if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
- // We've exhausted our options
- return Err(());
- }
- // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
- // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
- // accepted one.
- //
- // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
- // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
- // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
- // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
- // whatever reason.
- if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
- assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
- } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
- self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
- } else {
- self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
- }
- Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
+ /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
+ pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
}
- // Constructors:
- pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
- fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
- channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
- outbound_scid_alias: u64
- ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
- where ES::Target: EntropySource,
- SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- {
- let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
- let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
- let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
- let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
-
- if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
- }
- if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
- }
- let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
- }
- if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
- }
- let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
- if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
- // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
+ /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
+ pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
+ return 0;
}
- let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
- debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
+ height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
+ }
- let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
+ }
- let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
- let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
- if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
- }
+ fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
+ }
- let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
+ pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
+ .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
+ }
- let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
- match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
- Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
- Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
- }
- } else { None };
+ fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
+ &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
+ }
- if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
- return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
- }
- }
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
+ self.counterparty_node_id
+ }
- let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
- Ok(script) => script,
- Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
- };
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
+ }
- let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
+ pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
+ }
- Ok(Channel {
- user_id,
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ return cmp::min(
+ // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
+ // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
+ // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
+ self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
- config: LegacyChannelConfig {
- options: config.channel_config.clone(),
- announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
- },
+ self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
+ );
+ }
- prev_config: None,
-
- inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
-
- channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
- temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
- channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
- announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
- secp_ctx,
- channel_value_satoshis,
-
- latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
-
- holder_signer,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- destination_script,
-
- cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- value_to_self_msat,
-
- pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
- pending_update_fee: None,
- holding_cell_update_fee: None,
- next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
- next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
- update_time_counter: 1,
-
- resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
-
- monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
- monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
- monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
- monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
- monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
- monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
-
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
-
- last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
- closing_fee_limits: None,
- target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
-
- inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
-
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
- funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
- short_channel_id: None,
- channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
-
- feerate_per_kw: feerate,
- counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
- counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
- holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
- counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
- holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
- holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
- counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
- holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
- minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
-
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
-
- channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
- holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
- holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
- is_outbound_from_holder: true,
- counterparty_parameters: None,
- funding_outpoint: None,
- opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
- opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
- },
- funding_transaction: None,
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
+ pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
+ }
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
- counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
- counterparty_node_id,
+ /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
+ pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
+ }
- counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
+ fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
+ self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
+ let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
+ cmp::min(
+ (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
+ party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
+ )
+ })
+ }
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+ pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.channel_value_satoshis
+ }
- channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
- closing_signed_in_flight: false,
+ pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ }
- announcement_sigs: None,
+ pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
+ cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
+ }
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
+ self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
+ }
- workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
- sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
+ /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
+ pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
+ self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
+ }
- latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
- outbound_scid_alias,
+ // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
+ pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
+ self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
+ }
- channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
- channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
+ // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
+ pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_pending_event_emitted
+ }
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
+ // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
+ pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
+ self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
+ }
- channel_type,
- channel_keys_id,
+ // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
+ pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
+ self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
+ }
- pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
- })
+ // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
+ pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
+ self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
}
- fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
- feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
- -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
- {
- // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
- // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
- // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
- // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
- let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
- fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
- if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
+ /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
+ /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
+ /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
+ pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
+ if self.prev_config.is_none() {
+ return;
}
- let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
- // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
- // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
- // sat/kw before the comparison here.
- if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
- if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
- if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
- log_warn!(logger,
- "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
- cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
- return Ok(());
- }
- }
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
+ let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
+ prev_config.1 += 1;
+ if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
+ self.prev_config = None;
}
- Ok(())
}
- /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
- /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
- pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
- fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
- counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
- their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
- current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
- ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
- where ES::Target: EntropySource,
- SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
+ /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
+ pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
+ self.config.options
+ }
- // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
- // support this channel type.
- let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
- if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
- }
-
- // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
- // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
- // `static_remote_key`.
- if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
- }
- // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
- if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
- }
- if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
- }
- channel_type.clone()
- } else {
- let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
- if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
- }
- channel_type
- };
- let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
-
- let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
- let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
- let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
- let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
- funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point: msg.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
- };
-
- if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
- }
-
- // Check sanity of message fields:
- if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
- }
- let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
- if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
- }
- Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
-
- let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
- if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
- }
-
- // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
- if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
- }
- if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
- }
-
- // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
-
- if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
- if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
- }
- }
-
- let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
- if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
- // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
- }
- if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
- msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
- }
- if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
- }
-
- // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
- // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
- let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
- let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
- if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
- }
-
- let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
- // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
- // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
- if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
- }
-
- let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
- match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- &Some(ref script) => {
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
- if script.len() == 0 {
- None
- } else {
- if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
- }
- Some(script.clone())
- }
- },
- // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
- &None => {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
- }
- }
- } else { None };
-
- let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
- match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
- Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
- Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
- }
- } else { None };
-
- if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
- }
+ /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
+ /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
+ pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
+ let did_channel_update =
+ self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
+ self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
+ self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
+ if did_channel_update {
+ self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
+ // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
+ // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
}
+ self.config.options = *config;
+ did_channel_update
+ }
- let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
- Ok(script) => script,
- Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
- };
-
- let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
- let chan = Channel {
- user_id,
-
- config: LegacyChannelConfig {
- options: config.channel_config.clone(),
- announced_channel,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
- },
-
- prev_config: None,
-
- inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
-
- channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
- temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
- channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
- announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
- secp_ctx,
-
- latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
-
- holder_signer,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- destination_script,
-
- cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
- value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
-
- pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
- holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
- pending_update_fee: None,
- holding_cell_update_fee: None,
- next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
- next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
- update_time_counter: 1,
-
- resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
-
- monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
- monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
- monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
- monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
- monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
- monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
-
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
-
- last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
- closing_fee_limits: None,
- target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
-
- inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
-
- funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
- funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
- short_channel_id: None,
- channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
-
- feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
- channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
- counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
- counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
- holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
- counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
- holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
- holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
- counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
- holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
- minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
-
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
-
- channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
- holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
- holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
- is_outbound_from_holder: false,
- counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
- selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
- pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
- }),
- funding_outpoint: None,
- opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
- opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
- },
- funding_transaction: None,
-
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
- counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
- counterparty_node_id,
-
- counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
-
- commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
-
- channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
- closing_signed_in_flight: false,
-
- announcement_sigs: None,
-
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
-
- workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
- sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
-
- latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
- outbound_scid_alias,
-
- channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
- channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
-
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
-
- channel_type,
- channel_keys_id,
-
- pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
- };
-
- Ok(chan)
+ /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
+ pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
+ self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
}
/// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
}
- let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
+ let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
(value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
}
#[inline]
- fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
- // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
- // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
- // outside of those situations will fail.
- self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
- }
+ /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
+ /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
+ /// our counterparty!)
+ /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
+ /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
+ fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
+ let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
- #[inline]
- fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
- let mut ret =
- (4 + // version
- 1 + // input count
- 36 + // prevout
- 1 + // script length (0)
- 4 + // sequence
- 1 + // output count
- 4 // lock time
- )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
- 2 + // witness marker and flag
- 1 + // witness element count
- 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
- self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
- 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
- if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
- ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
- spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
- }
- if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
- ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
- spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
- }
- ret
+ TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
}
#[inline]
- fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
- assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
- assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
-
- let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
- let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
- let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
+ /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
+ /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+ fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
+ //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
+ //may see payments to it!
+ let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
- if value_to_holder < 0 {
- assert!(self.is_outbound());
- total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
- } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
- assert!(!self.is_outbound());
- total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
- }
+ TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
+ }
- if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
- value_to_counterparty = 0;
- }
-
- if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
- value_to_holder = 0;
- }
-
- assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
- let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
- let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
- let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
-
- let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
- (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
+ /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
+ /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
+ /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
+ pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
+ make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
}
- fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
+ fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
+ &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
}
- #[inline]
- /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
- /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
- /// our counterparty!)
- /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
- /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
- fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
- let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
- let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
-
- TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
+ pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.feerate_per_kw
}
- #[inline]
- /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
- /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
- fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
- //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
- //may see payments to it!
- let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
- let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
- let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
-
- TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
+ pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
+ // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
+ // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
+ // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
+ // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
+ // which are near the dust limit.
+ let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
+ // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
+ // potential feerate updates coming soon.
+ if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
+ }
+ if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
+ feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
+ }
+ cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
}
- /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
- /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
- /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
- pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
- make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
+ /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
+ pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
+ self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
}
- /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
- /// entirely.
- ///
- /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
- /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
- ///
- /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
- /// disconnected).
- pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
- (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
- where L::Target: Logger {
- // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
- // (see equivalent if condition there).
- assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
- let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
- let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
- if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
- assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
- }
- }
+ /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
+ fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
+ let context = self;
+ let mut stats = HTLCStats {
+ pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
+ pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
+ on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
+ on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
+ holding_cell_msat: 0,
+ on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
+ };
- fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
- // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
- // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
- // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
- // either.
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
- panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
+ let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
+ (0, 0)
+ } else {
+ let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
+ (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
+ dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
+ };
+ let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
}
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ stats
+ }
- let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
+ /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
+ fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
+ let context = self;
+ let mut stats = HTLCStats {
+ pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
+ pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
+ on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
+ on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
+ holding_cell_msat: 0,
+ on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
+ };
- // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
- // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
- // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+ let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
+ (0, 0)
+ } else {
+ let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
+ (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
+ dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
+ };
+ let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
- let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
- let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
- for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
- if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
- match htlc.state {
- InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
- InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
- if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
- } else {
- log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
- }
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
- },
- _ => {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
- }
+ for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
+ stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
+ stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
+ stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
+ if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
+ }
+ if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
+ } else {
+ stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
}
- pending_idx = idx;
- htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
- break;
}
}
- if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
- // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
- debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
- }
+ stats
+ }
- // Now update local state:
- //
- // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
- // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
- }],
- };
+ /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
+ /// Doesn't bother handling the
+ /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
+ /// corner case properly.
+ pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
+ let context = &self;
+ // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
+ let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
- // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
- // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
- // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
- // do not not get into this branch.
- for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match pending_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
- self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
- }
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
- // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
- }
- },
- _ => {}
- }
+ let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
+ balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- });
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
}
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
+ balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
- {
- let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
- if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
+ let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
+ .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
+ .saturating_sub(
+ context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
+
+ let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
+
+ if context.is_outbound() {
+ // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
+ // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
+ //
+ // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
+ // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
+ // dependency.
+ // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
+ let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ if !context.opt_anchors() {
+ real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
- }
- UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
- monitor_update,
- htlc_value_msat,
- msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
- }),
- }
- }
+ let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
+ let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
- pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
- let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
- match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
- UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
- // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
- // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
- // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
- // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
- // update_ids of all the following monitors.
- let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
- let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
- // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
- // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
- monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
- self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
- });
- self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
- } else {
- let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
- .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
- let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
- .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
- monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
- self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
- });
- for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
- held_update.update.update_id += 1;
- }
- if msg.is_some() {
- debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
- let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
- self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update, blocked: true,
- });
- }
- insert_pos
- };
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
- monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
- .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
- htlc_value_msat,
- }
- },
- UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
- }
- }
-
- /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
- /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
- /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
- /// before we fail backwards.
- ///
- /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
- /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
- /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
- -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
- .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
- }
+ // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
+ // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
+ // match the value to right-below-dust.
+ let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
+ if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
+ let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
+ debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
+ capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
+ capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
+ available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
+ } else {
+ available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
+ // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
+ let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ if !context.opt_anchors() {
+ real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
+ }
- /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
- /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
- /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
- /// before we fail backwards.
- ///
- /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
- /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
- /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
- fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
- -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
- panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
- }
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
+ let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
- // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
- // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
- // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+ let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
+ let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
+ .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
- let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
- for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
- if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
- match htlc.state {
- InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
- InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
- if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
- } else {
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
- }
- return Ok(None);
- },
- _ => {
- debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
- }
- }
- pending_idx = idx;
+ if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
+ // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
+ // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
+ available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
}
}
- if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
- // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
- debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
- return Ok(None);
+
+ let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
+
+ // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
+ // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
+ // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
+ // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
+ let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
+ let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
+
+ let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
+ (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
+ } else {
+ let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
+ (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
+ context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
+ };
+ let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
+ if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
+ remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
+ Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
+ dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
- debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
- force_holding_cell = true;
+ let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
+ if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
+ remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
+ remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
+ context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
+ dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
}
- // Now update local state:
- if force_holding_cell {
- for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match pending_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
- return Ok(None);
- }
- },
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
- if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
- debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
- }
- },
- _ => {}
- }
+ if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
+ if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
+ available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
+ } else {
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- err_packet,
- });
- return Ok(None);
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- {
- let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
+ available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
+ context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
+
+ if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
+ available_capacity_msat = 0;
}
- Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
- reason: err_packet
- }))
+ AvailableBalances {
+ inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
+ - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
+ - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
+ - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
+ 0) as u64,
+ outbound_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
+ next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ balance_msat,
+ }
}
- // Message handlers:
+ pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
+ let context = &self;
+ (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
+ }
- pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
+ /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
+ /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
+ ///
+ /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
+ /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
+ ///
+ /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
+ /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
+ ///
+ /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
+ fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
+ let context = &self;
+ assert!(context.is_outbound());
- // Check sanity of message fields:
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
- msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
- }
- let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
- }
- let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
- if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
- }
+ let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
+ (0, 0)
+ } else {
+ (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
+ context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
+ };
+ let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
- }
- if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
- }
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
- }
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
- }
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
- }
- if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
+ let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
+ match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ }
}
- if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
- if *ty != self.channel_type {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
+ let mut included_htlcs = 0;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ continue
}
- } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
- // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
- } else {
- let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
- if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
+ // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
+ // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
+ included_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
+ // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
+ // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
+ _ => {},
}
- self.channel_type = channel_type;
}
- let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
- match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- &Some(ref script) => {
- // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
- if script.len() == 0 {
- None
- } else {
- if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
- }
- Some(script.clone())
+ for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match htlc {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
+ if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ continue
}
+ included_htlcs += 1
},
- // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
- &None => {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
- }
+ _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
+ // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
}
- } else { None };
-
- self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
- self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
- self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
- self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
- self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
-
- if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
- self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
- } else {
- self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
}
- let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
- funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point: msg.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
- };
+ let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
+ let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ {
+ let mut fee = res;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
+ fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
+ }
+ let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
+ + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
+ let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee,
+ total_pending_htlcs,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ },
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
+ },
+ feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
+ };
+ *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
+ }
+ res
+ }
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
- selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
- pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
- });
+ /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
+ /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
+ ///
+ /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
+ /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
+ ///
+ /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
+ /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
+ ///
+ /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
+ fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
+ let context = &self;
+ assert!(!context.is_outbound());
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
- self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
+ let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
+ (0, 0)
+ } else {
+ (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
+ context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
+ };
+ let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
- self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
+ let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
+ match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ },
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ addl_htlcs += 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
- Ok(())
- }
+ // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
+ // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
+ // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
+ let mut included_htlcs = 0;
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ included_htlcs += 1;
+ }
- fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
+ continue
+ }
+ // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
+ // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
+ match htlc.state {
+ OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
+ OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
- let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
- let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
+ let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
+ let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
{
- let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
- // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
- log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
- encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
- encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
+ let mut fee = res;
+ if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
+ fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
+ }
+ let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee,
+ total_pending_htlcs,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ },
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
+ HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
+ HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
+ },
+ feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
+ };
+ *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
}
-
- let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
-
- let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
-
- let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
-
- // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
- Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
- }
-
- fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
- &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
+ res
}
- pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
- where
- SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
- L::Target: Logger
- {
- if self.is_outbound() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
- // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
- // channel.
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
+ pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
+ self.funding_transaction.clone()
+ } else {
+ None
}
+ }
- let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
- // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
- // funding_created_signature may fail.
- self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
+ /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
+ /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
+ /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
+ /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
+ /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
+ pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
+ // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
+ // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
+ // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
+ // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
+ assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
- let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
- },
- Err(e) => {
- // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
- // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
- panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
+ // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
+ // return them to fail the payment.
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
+ match htlc_update {
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
+ },
+ _ => {}
}
- };
+ }
+ let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
+ // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
+ // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
+ // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
+ // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
+ // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
+ // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
+ self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
+ Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
+ }))
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None };
- let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
- initial_commitment_tx,
- msg.signature,
- Vec::new(),
- &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
- self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
- );
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
+ }
+}
- self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
+// Internal utility functions for channels
- // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
+/// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
+/// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
+///
+/// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
+///
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
+fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
+ let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
+ 1
+ } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
+ 100
+ } else {
+ config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
+ };
+ channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
+}
- let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
- let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
- let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
- monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
- shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
- &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
- funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- obscure_factor,
- holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
+/// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
+/// required by us according to the configured or default
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
+///
+/// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
+///
+/// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
+/// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
+pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
+ let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
+ cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
+}
- channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
+/// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
+/// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
+/// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
+/// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
+pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
+ let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
+ cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
+}
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
- self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+// Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
+// Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
+#[inline]
+fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
+ feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
+}
- log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+// Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
+// Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
+fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
+ // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
+ // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
+ (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
+}
- let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
+// has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
+// calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
+// inbound channel.
+//
+// Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
+// Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
+pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
+ pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
+}
- Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- signature,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
- }, channel_monitor))
- }
+#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
+ fee: u64,
+ total_pending_htlcs: usize,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
+ feerate: u32,
+}
- /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
- /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
- pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
- where
- SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
- L::Target: Logger
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
+ fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
+ feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
{
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
- }
- if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
+ // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
+ // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
+ // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
+ // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
+ let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
+ fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
+ if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
}
- if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
+ // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
+ // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
+ // sat/kw before the comparison here.
+ if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
+ if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
+ if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
+ log_warn!(logger,
+ "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
+ cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ }
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
}
+ Ok(())
+ }
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
-
- let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
- let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
-
- log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
+ // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
+ // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
+ // outside of those situations will fail.
+ self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
+ }
- let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
- let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
- {
- let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
- let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
- // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
- }
+ #[inline]
+ fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
+ let mut ret =
+ (4 + // version
+ 1 + // input count
+ 36 + // prevout
+ 1 + // script length (0)
+ 4 + // sequence
+ 1 + // output count
+ 4 // lock time
+ )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
+ 2 + // witness marker and flag
+ 1 + // witness element count
+ 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
+ self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
+ 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
+ if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
+ ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
+ spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
+ }
+ if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
+ ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
+ spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
}
+ ret
+ }
- let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
- initial_commitment_tx,
- msg.signature,
- Vec::new(),
- &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
- self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
- );
+ #[inline]
+ fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
+ assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
- self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
+ let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
+ let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
+ let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
+ if value_to_holder < 0 {
+ assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
+ total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
+ } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
+ assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
+ total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
+ }
- let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
- let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
- let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
- let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
- monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
- shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
- &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
- funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
- obscure_factor,
- holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
+ if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ value_to_counterparty = 0;
+ }
- channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
+ if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ value_to_holder = 0;
+ }
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
+ let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
+ let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
+ let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
- log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
+ (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
+ }
- let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- Ok(channel_monitor)
+ fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
}
- /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
- /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
- /// reply with.
- pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
- user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
- where
- NS::Target: NodeSigner,
- L::Target: Logger
- {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
- self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
+ /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
+ /// entirely.
+ ///
+ /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
+ /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
+ ///
+ /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
+ /// disconnected).
+ pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
+ (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
+ where L::Target: Logger {
+ // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
+ // (see equivalent if condition there).
+ assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
+ let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
+ let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
+ if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
+ assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
}
+ }
- if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
- if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
- // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
- // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
- // when routing outbound payments.
- self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
- }
+ fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
+ // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
+ // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
+ // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
+ // either.
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
- if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
- // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
- (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
- (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
- {
- // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
- // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
- let expected_point =
- if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
- // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
- // the current one.
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
- } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
- // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
- // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
- debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
- self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
- } else {
- // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
- // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
- Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
- &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
- ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
- };
- if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
+ // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+ // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+ // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
+
+ let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
+ let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+ assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ } else {
+ log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
+ }
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
+ }
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
+ htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
+ break;
}
- return Ok(None);
- } else {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
}
-
- self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
-
- log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
-
- Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
- }
-
- /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
- pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
- self.funding_transaction.clone()
- } else {
- None
+ if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
+ // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
+ debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
}
- }
-
- /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
- fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
- let mut stats = HTLCStats {
- pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
- pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
- on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
- on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
- holding_cell_msat: 0,
- on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
- };
- let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
- (0, 0)
- } else {
- let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
- (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
+ // Now update local state:
+ //
+ // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
+ // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
+ }],
};
- let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- }
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
- stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- }
- }
- stats
- }
- /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
- fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
- let mut stats = HTLCStats {
- pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
- pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
- on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
- on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
- holding_cell_msat: 0,
- on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
- };
-
- let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
- (0, 0)
- } else {
- let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
- (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
- };
- let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
- stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
+ // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
+ // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
+ // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
+ // do not not get into this branch.
+ for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match pending_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
+ // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
}
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ });
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
+ }
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
+
+ {
+ let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
}
+ log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
}
- for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
- stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
- stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
- stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
- if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
- stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
- }
- if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
+ UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
+ monitor_update,
+ htlc_value_msat,
+ msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
+ }),
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
+ let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
+ match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
+ UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
+ // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
+ // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
+ // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
+ // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
+ // update_ids of all the following monitors.
+ let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
+ let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
+ // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
+ });
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
} else {
- stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
+ let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
+ .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
+ let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
+ .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
+ monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
+ });
+ for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
+ held_update.update.update_id += 1;
+ }
+ if msg.is_some() {
+ debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
+ let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update, blocked: true,
+ });
+ }
+ insert_pos
+ };
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
+ monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
+ .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
+ htlc_value_msat,
}
- }
+ },
+ UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
}
- stats
}
- /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
- /// Doesn't bother handling the
- /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
- /// corner case properly.
- pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
- // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
- let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
+ /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
+ /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
+ /// before we fail backwards.
+ ///
+ /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
+ /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
+ /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
+ pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
+ .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
+ }
- let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
- balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
- }
+ /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
+ /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
+ /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
+ /// before we fail backwards.
+ ///
+ /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
+ /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
+ /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
+ fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
}
- balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- let outbound_capacity_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
- .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
- .saturating_sub(
- self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
-
- let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
+ // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
+ // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
+ // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
- if self.is_outbound() {
- // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
- // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
- //
- // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
- // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
- // dependency.
- // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
- let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- if !self.opt_anchors() {
- real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
+ let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
+ for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
+ if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
+ match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
+ InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
+ if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
+ } else {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
+ }
+ return Ok(None);
+ },
+ _ => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
+ }
+ }
+ pending_idx = idx;
}
+ }
+ if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
+ // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
+ debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
- let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
- let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
+ debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
+ force_holding_cell = true;
+ }
- // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
- // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
- // match the value to right-below-dust.
- let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
- if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
- let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
- debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
- capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
- capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
- available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
- } else {
- available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
- }
- } else {
- // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
- // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
- let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- if !self.opt_anchors() {
- real_dust_limit_success_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
+ // Now update local state:
+ if force_holding_cell {
+ for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ match pending_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+ },
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
+ if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {}
+ }
}
+ log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ err_packet,
+ });
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
- let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
-
- let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
- let remote_balance_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat)
- .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
-
- if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
- // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
- // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
- available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
- }
+ log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ {
+ let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
}
- let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
+ Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
+ htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
+ reason: err_packet
+ }))
+ }
- // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
- // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
- // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
- // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
- let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
- let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
+ // Message handlers:
- let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
- (self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
- } else {
- let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
- (self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
- };
- let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
- remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
- Some(self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
- dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
+ /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
+ /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
+ pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
+ where
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
+ L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
}
-
- let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
- remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
- remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
- self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
- dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
+ if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
}
-
- if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
- if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
- available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
- } else {
- next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
- }
+ if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
- self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
+ let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
- available_capacity_msat = 0;
- }
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- AvailableBalances {
- inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
- - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
- - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
- - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
- 0) as u64,
- outbound_capacity_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
- next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
- balance_msat,
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+
+ let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
+ }
}
- }
- pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
- (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
- }
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
- // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
- // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
- fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
- // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
- // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
- (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
- }
+ self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
- // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
- // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
- #[inline]
- fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
- feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
- }
- /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
- /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
- ///
- /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
- /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
- ///
- /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
- /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
- ///
- /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
- fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
- assert!(self.is_outbound());
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
+ let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
+ let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
+ monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
+ shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
+ &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
- let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
- (0, 0)
- } else {
- (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
- };
- let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
- let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
- if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
- match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- addl_htlcs += 1;
- }
- },
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
- addl_htlcs += 1;
- }
- }
- }
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- let mut included_htlcs = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
- continue
- }
- // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
- // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
- included_htlcs += 1;
- }
+ log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- continue
- }
- match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
- // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
- // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
- // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
- _ => {},
- }
- }
+ let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ Ok(channel_monitor)
+ }
- for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
- match htlc {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
- if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- continue
- }
- included_htlcs += 1
- },
- _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
- // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
- }
+ /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
+ /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
+ /// reply with.
+ pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
+ user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
+ where
+ NS::Target: NodeSigner,
+ L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
}
- let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
- let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- {
- let mut fee = res;
- if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
- fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
+ if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
+ if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
+ // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
+ // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
+ // when routing outbound payments.
+ self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
}
- let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
- + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
- let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
- fee,
- total_pending_htlcs,
- next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
- },
- next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
- },
- feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
- };
- *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
}
- res
- }
-
- /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
- /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
- ///
- /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
- /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
- ///
- /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
- /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
- ///
- /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
- fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
- assert!(!self.is_outbound());
- let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
- (0, 0)
- } else {
- (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
- self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
- };
- let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
- if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
- match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
- addl_htlcs += 1;
- }
- },
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- addl_htlcs += 1;
- }
+ if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
+ } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
+ // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
+ (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
+ (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
+ {
+ // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
+ // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
+ let expected_point =
+ if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
+ // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
+ // the current one.
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
+ } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
+ // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
+ // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
+ debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
+ self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
+ } else {
+ // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
+ // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
+ Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
+ &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
+ ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
+ };
+ if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
}
+ return Ok(None);
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
}
- // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
- // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
- // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
- let mut included_htlcs = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
- continue
- }
- included_htlcs += 1;
- }
+ self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
- continue
- }
- // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
- // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
- match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
- OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
- _ => {},
- }
- }
+ log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
- let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
- let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- {
- let mut fee = res;
- if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
- fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
- }
- let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
- let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
- fee,
- total_pending_htlcs,
- next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
- },
- next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
- HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
- HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
- },
- feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
- };
- *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
- }
- res
+ Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
}
pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
// We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
- let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
+ let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
if local_sent_shutdown {
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
}
// If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
- let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
+ let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
if remote_sent_shutdown {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
}
if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
+ if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
}
- let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
}
- if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
+ if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
}
// Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
// the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
// Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
// transaction).
let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
- for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
} else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
}
}
- let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
+ let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
(0, 0)
} else {
- let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
+ let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
(dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
};
- let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
- if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
- on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
+ on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
}
- let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
- if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
- on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
+ on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
}
let pending_value_to_self_msat =
- self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
+ self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
let pending_remote_value_msat =
- self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
+ self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
}
// Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
// feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
- let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
+ let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
+ self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
};
if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
};
- if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
+ if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
}
- if !self.is_outbound() {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
// `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
// the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
// receiver's side, only on the sender's.
// still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
// sensitive to fee spikes.
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
- if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
+ let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
+ if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
// Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
// the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
- log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
}
} else {
// Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
- if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
+ let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
}
}
- if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
+ if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
}
if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
}
}
// Now update local state:
- self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
- self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+ self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
+ self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
#[inline]
fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
let outcome = match check_preimage {
None => fail_reason.into(),
}
pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
}
pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
}
pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
where L::Target: Logger
{
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+ if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
}
- let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
- let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
+ let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
let commitment_txid = {
let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
- log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
- log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
+ log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
+ log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
bitcoin_tx.txid
// If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
// they can actually afford the new fee now.
- let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
} else { false };
if update_fee {
- debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
- let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
+ debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
+ let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
}
}
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
{
- if self.is_outbound() {
- let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
- *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
+ let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
+ *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
- let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
- + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
+ + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
- && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
- && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
- && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
+ && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
+ && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
+ && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
}
}
for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
- self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
+ self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
- let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
- let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
+ let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
+ let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
- encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
- if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
+ encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
}
if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
commitment_stats.tx,
msg.signature,
msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
- &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
- self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
- self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
+ self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
// Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
let mut need_commitment = false;
- if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
+ if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
*update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
need_commitment = true;
}
}
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
Some(forward_info.clone())
} else { None };
if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
need_commitment = true;
}
}
let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
- log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
// Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
}
}
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
}]
};
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
// Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
// build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
- self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
+ self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
// In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
// to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
- if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
// If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
// the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
// includes the right HTLCs.
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
// build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
}
log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
}
- let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
+ let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
// If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
// we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
// free_holding_cell_htlcs().
let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
// build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
true
} else { false };
log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
}
/// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
/// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
- (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
+ (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
} else { (None, Vec::new()) }
}
/// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
/// for our counterparty.
fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
- if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
- log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
- if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
+ if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
+ if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
updates: Vec::new(),
};
let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
+ mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
match e {
ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
- log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
// If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
// be failed backwards. Failing to send here
// indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
},
}
}
- if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
+ if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
}
- let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
+ let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
} else {
None
let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
// build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
// but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
where L::Target: Logger,
{
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
+ if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
}
let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
- if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
- if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
+ if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
+ if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
}
}
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
// Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
// haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
// take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
{
- *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
- *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
}
- self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
+ self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
&secret
).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
- self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
+ self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
- idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
+ idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
}],
};
// (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
// OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
// channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
- self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
- self.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
- self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
+ self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
+ self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
- self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
+ if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
+ self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
{
- // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
- let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
- let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
+ // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
+ let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
+ let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
}
}
}
- self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
+ self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
- if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
match update_state {
FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
- debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
+ debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
- self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
- self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
},
- FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
+ FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
- debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
+ debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
require_commitment = true;
- self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
- self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
},
}
}
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
// We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
// cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
if require_commitment {
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
// When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
// which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
// before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
// build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
}
- self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
- self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
- self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
- log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
+ self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
+ self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
}
match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
(Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
- let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
+ let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
// free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
// build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
// strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
} else {
- log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
}
/// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
/// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
- if !self.is_outbound() {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
}
- if !self.is_usable() {
+ if !self.context.is_usable() {
panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
}
- if !self.is_live() {
+ if !self.context.is_live() {
panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
}
// Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
- let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
- let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
- let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
- let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
- let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
+ let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
+ let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
+ let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
+ let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
- if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
+ if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
//TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
return None;
// Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
return None;
}
- if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
return None;
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
force_holding_cell = true;
}
if force_holding_cell {
- self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
+ self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
return None;
}
- debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
- self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
+ debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
feerate_per_kw,
})
}
/// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
/// completed.
pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
return;
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
// While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
// redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
return;
}
- if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
- self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
+ if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
+ self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
}
// Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
// will be retransmitted.
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
- self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
- self.closing_fee_limits = None;
+ self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
+ self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
+ self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
- self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
+ self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
match htlc.state {
InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
// They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
},
}
});
- self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
+ self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
- if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
- debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
- self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
}
}
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
// They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
// commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
}
}
- self.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
+ self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
- log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
+ log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
}
/// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
) {
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
- self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
- self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
- self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
- self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
+ self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
+ self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
}
/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
L::Target: Logger,
NS::Target: NodeSigner
{
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
- self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
+ self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
let mut found_blocked = false;
- self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
upd.blocked
// (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
// first received the funding_signed.
let mut funding_broadcastable =
- if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.funding_transaction.take()
+ if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.context.funding_transaction.take()
} else { None };
// That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
// minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
- if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
+ if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
funding_broadcastable = None;
}
// * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
// the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
// * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
- let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
- assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
+ let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
+ assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
"Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
- self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point,
- short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
+ short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
})
} else { None };
let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
+ mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
+ mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
+ mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
};
}
- let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
+ let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
} else { None };
- let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
+ let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
self.mark_awaiting_response();
Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
} else { None };
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
- let order = self.resend_order.clone();
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
+ let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
MonitorRestoreUpdates {
pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
- if self.is_outbound() {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
- let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
+ Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
+ let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
- self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
// If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
// `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
// won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
- let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
- if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
}
- if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
+ if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
}
}
fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
+ let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
msgs::RevokeAndACK {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
per_commitment_secret,
next_per_commitment_point,
#[cfg(taproot)]
let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
}
}
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
match reason {
&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
reason: err_packet.clone()
});
},
&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
},
&InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
});
}
}
- let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
+ let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
+ feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
})
} else { None };
log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
- log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
L::Target: Logger,
NS::Target: NodeSigner
{
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
// While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
// almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
// just close here instead of trying to recover.
}
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
- let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
- if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
+ if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
}
- if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
macro_rules! log_and_panic {
($err_msg: expr) => {
- log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
- panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
+ log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
+ panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
}
}
log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
// Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
// commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
- let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
+ let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
return Err(
ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
// Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
// remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
- self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
- self.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
+ self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
- let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
- assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
+ let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
+ assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
Some(msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
})
} else { None };
let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
// If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
- self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
+ self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
}
}
// We have OurChannelReady set!
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point,
- short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
+ short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
}),
raa: None, commitment_update: None,
order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
});
}
- let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
// Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
// Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
None
- } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
+ } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
None
} else {
Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
// revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
// AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
// the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
- let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
+ let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
self.mark_awaiting_response();
}
- let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
+ let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
- let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
+ let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
// We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
- let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
next_per_commitment_point,
- short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
+ short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
})
} else { None };
if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
} else {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
}
Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
raa: required_revoke,
commitment_update: None,
- order: self.resend_order.clone(),
+ order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
})
} else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
} else {
- log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
commitment_update: None, raa: None,
- order: self.resend_order.clone(),
+ order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
})
} else {
Ok(ReestablishResponses {
channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
raa: required_revoke,
commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
- order: self.resend_order.clone(),
+ order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
})
}
} else {
-> (u64, u64)
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
+ if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
// Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
// force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
// If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
+ let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
// The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
// channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
// very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
// some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
- if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
- let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
+ if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
+ let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
}
// come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
// relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
// if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
- let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
+ let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
- let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
+ let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
// We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
// feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
// target feerate-calculated fee.
- cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
+ cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
} else {
- self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
+ self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
};
- self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
- self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
+ self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
+ self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
}
/// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
/// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
/// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
- self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
- self.channel_state &
+ self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
+ self.context.channel_state &
(BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
== BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
- self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
+ self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
}
/// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
/// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
- if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
+ if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
} else {
- self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
+ self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
}
}
Ok(())
-> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
{
- if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
+ if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
return Ok((None, None));
}
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
}
return Ok((None, None));
let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
- assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
+ assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
- let sig = self.holder_signer
- .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let sig = self.context.holder_signer
+ .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
+ self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
signature: sig,
fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
// [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
// a reconnection.
fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
- self.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
+ self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
}
/// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
///
/// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
- let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
+ let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
ticks_elapsed
} else {
// Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
where SP::Target: SignerProvider
{
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
// Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
// are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
// can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
}
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
}
}
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
}
- if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
- if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
+ if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
+ if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
}
} else {
- self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
+ self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
}
// If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
// immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
// any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
- let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
- let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
Some(_) => false,
None => {
assert!(send_shutdown);
if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
}
- self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
+ self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
true
},
};
// From here on out, we may not fail!
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
}],
};
self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
- self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
} else { None }
} else { None };
let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
Some(msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
})
} else { None };
// We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
// remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
// cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
- self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
- let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
}
});
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
}
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
- let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
- let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
+ let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
+ let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
}
- tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
+ tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
tx
}
-> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
+ if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
}
- if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
}
if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
}
- if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
}
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
- self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
+ if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
+ self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
return Ok((None, None));
}
- let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
}
- let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
- match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
+ match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
Ok(_) => {},
Err(_e) => {
// The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
- let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
- secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
+ let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
+ secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
},
};
}
}
- assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
- if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
+ if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
}
}
self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
};
- let sig = self.holder_signer
- .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let sig = self.context.holder_signer
+ .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
Some(tx)
} else { None };
- self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
+ self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
fee_satoshis: used_fee,
signature: sig,
fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
}
- if !self.is_outbound() {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
// They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
// We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
- debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
+ debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
} else {
if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
} else {
// Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
// with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
- if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
+ if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
}
}
- // Public utilities:
-
- pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
- self.channel_id
- }
-
- // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
- //
- // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
- pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
- self.temporary_channel_id
- }
-
- pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
- self.minimum_depth
- }
-
- /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
- /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
- pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
- self.user_id
- }
-
- /// Gets the channel's type
- pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
- &self.channel_type
- }
-
- /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
- /// is_usable() returns true).
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.short_channel_id
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
- self.outbound_scid_alias
- }
- /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
- /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
- pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
- assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
- self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
- }
-
- /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
- /// get_outbound_funding_created.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
- }
-
- /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
- pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
- }
-
- /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
- pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
- // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
- return 0;
- }
-
- height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
- }
-
- fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
- }
-
- fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
- &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
- }
-
- pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
- .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
- }
-
- fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
- &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
- self.counterparty_node_id
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
- pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- return cmp::min(
- // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
- // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
- // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
- self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
-
- self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
- );
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
- }
-
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
- pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
- self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
- }
-
- fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
- self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
- let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
- cmp::min(
- (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
- party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
- )
- })
- }
-
- pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
- self.channel_value_satoshis
- }
-
- pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
- self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
- }
-
- pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
- cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
- }
-
- pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
- self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
- }
-
- /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
- pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
- self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
- }
-
- // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
- pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
- self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
- }
-
- // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
- pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_pending_event_emitted
- }
-
- // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
- pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
- self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
- }
-
- // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
- pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
- self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
- }
-
- // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
- pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
- self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
- }
-
- /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
- /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
- /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
- pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
- if self.prev_config.is_none() {
- return;
- }
- let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
- prev_config.1 += 1;
- if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
- self.prev_config = None;
- }
- }
-
- /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
- pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
- self.config.options
- }
-
- /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
- /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
- pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
- let did_channel_update =
- self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
- self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
- self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
- if did_channel_update {
- self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
- // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
- // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- }
- self.config.options = *config;
- did_channel_update
- }
-
fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
&self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
&self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
- self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
+ self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
.or_else(|err| {
- if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
+ if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
} else {
Err(err)
})
}
- pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
- self.feerate_per_kw
- }
-
- pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
- // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
- // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
- // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
- // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
- // which are near the dust limit.
- let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
- // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
- // potential feerate updates coming soon.
- if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
- feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
- }
- if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
- feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
- }
- cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
- }
-
pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
}
pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
}
pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
- &self.holder_signer
+ &self.context.holder_signer
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
ChannelValueStat {
- value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
- channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
- channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
- pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
- pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
+ value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
+ channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
+ channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
+ pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
let mut res = 0;
- for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match h {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
res += amount_msat;
}
res
},
- counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
}
}
+ /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
- self.update_time_counter
+ pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
+ (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
}
- pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
- self.latest_monitor_update_id
+ pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
+ if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
}
- pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
- self.config.announced_channel
+ /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
+ /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
+ pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
+ for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
+ if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
+ return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
+ }
+ }
+ None
}
- pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
- }
-
- /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
- self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
- }
-
- /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
- pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
- let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
- (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
- /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
- self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
- }
-
- /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
- /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
- (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
- }
-
- pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
- if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
- self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
- }
-
- /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
- /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
- pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
- for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
- if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
- self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
- return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
- self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
- }
- }
- None
- }
-
- /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
- /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
- fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
- let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
- self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update, blocked: !release_monitor
- });
- release_monitor
+ /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
+ /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
+ fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
+ let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update, blocked: !release_monitor
+ });
+ release_monitor
}
/// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
-> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
- if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
+ if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
}
pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
- self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
}
pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
- self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
false
}
pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
- self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
}
/// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
- self.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
.filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
}
- /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
- pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
- self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
- }
-
/// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
/// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
/// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
/// advanced state.
pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
- if self.channel_state &
+ if self.context.channel_state &
!(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
== ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
// If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
// FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
- debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
+ debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
return true;
}
- if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
+ if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
// If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
// waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
// transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
// Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
// funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
// we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
- if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
- assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
- assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
+ if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
+ assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
+ assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
return true;
}
false
/// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
- (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
+ (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
}
/// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
- (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
+ (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
}
/// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
- (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
+ (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
}
/// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
/// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
/// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
- assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+ if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
+ assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
true
} else { false }
}
pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
- self.channel_update_status
+ self.context.channel_update_status
}
pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- self.channel_update_status = status;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_update_status = status;
}
fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
// Called:
// * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
// * when funding is signed with a height of 0
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
return None;
}
- let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
+ let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
- self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
+ self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
}
- if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
+ if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
return None;
}
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
true
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
true
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
false
} else {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
// We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
// funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
// an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
- self.channel_state);
+ self.context.channel_state);
}
// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
false
};
if need_commitment_update {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
let next_per_commitment_point =
- self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
+ self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
next_per_commitment_point,
- short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
+ short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
});
}
} else {
- self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
}
}
None
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
L::Target: Logger
{
- if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
+ if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
// Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
// check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
- if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
- tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
- if self.is_outbound() {
+ if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
+ tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
// If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
// should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
// tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
}
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
} else {
- if self.is_outbound() {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
for input in tx.input.iter() {
if input.witness.is_empty() {
// We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
}
}
}
- self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
- self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
+ self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
+ self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
+ self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
}
// send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
// may have already happened for this block).
if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
}
}
for inp in tx.input.iter() {
if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
- log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
}
}
// forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
// ~now.
let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
match htlc_update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
}
});
- self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
+ self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
} else { None };
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
}
- let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
- let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
+ let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
// Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
// zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
// indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
// 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
// `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
// to.
- if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
+ if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
- self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
+ self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
}
- } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
- height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
- log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
+ } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
+ height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
+ log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
// If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
/// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
/// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
// We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
// below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
- let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
+ let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
// We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
// larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
// time we saw and it will be ignored.
- let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
+ let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
// Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
// something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
- pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
- }
- if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
- panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
- }
-
- if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
- }
-
- let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
-
- msgs::OpenChannel {
- chain_hash,
- temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
- funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
- push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
- dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
- feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
- to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
- funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point: keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
- first_per_commitment_point,
- channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
- None => Builder::new().into_script(),
- }),
- channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
- }
- }
-
- pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
- self.inbound_awaiting_accept
- }
-
- /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
- pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
- assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
- self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
- }
-
- /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
- /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
- ///
- /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
- pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
- if self.is_outbound() {
- panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
- }
- if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
- }
- if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
- }
- if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
- panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
- }
-
- self.user_id = user_id;
- self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
-
- self.generate_accept_channel_message()
- }
-
- /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
- /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
- /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
- ///
- /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
- fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
- let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
- let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
-
- msgs::AcceptChannel {
- temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
- dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
- max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
- minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
- to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
- max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
- funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
- revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
- payment_point: keys.payment_point,
- delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
- htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
- first_per_commitment_point,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
- None => Builder::new().into_script(),
- }),
- channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- next_local_nonce: None,
- }
- }
-
- /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
- /// inbound channel without accepting it.
- ///
- /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
- self.generate_accept_channel_message()
- }
-
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
- fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
- Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
- }
-
- /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
- /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
- /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
- /// or if called on an inbound channel.
- /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
- /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
- /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
- pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
- }
- if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
- panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
- }
- if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
- }
-
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
- self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
-
- let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(e) => {
- log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
- return Err(e);
- }
- };
-
- let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
-
- // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
-
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
- self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
- self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
-
- Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
- temporary_channel_id,
- funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
- funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
- signature,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
- #[cfg(taproot)]
- next_local_nonce: None,
- })
- }
-
/// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
/// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
/// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
&self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
- if !self.config.announced_channel {
+ if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
}
- if !self.is_usable() {
+ if !self.context.is_usable() {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
}
let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
- let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
+ let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
chain_hash,
- short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
- bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
- bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
+ bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
+ bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
NS::Target: NodeSigner,
L::Target: Logger
{
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
return None;
}
- if !self.is_usable() {
+ if !self.context.is_usable() {
return None;
}
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
+ if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
return None;
}
- if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
+ if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
return None;
}
- log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
Ok(a) => a,
Err(e) => {
},
Ok(v) => v
};
- let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
+ let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
Err(_) => {
log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
return None;
},
Ok(v) => v
};
- self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
+ self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
+ short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
node_signature: our_node_sig,
bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
})
fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
&self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
- if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
+ if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
- let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
+ let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
.map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
- if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
+ if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
"Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
- &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
+ &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
}
- if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
+ if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
"Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
- &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
+ &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
}
- self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
+ self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
"Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
}
pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
&self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
- if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
+ if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
return None;
}
let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
/// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
/// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
- assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
+ assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
// Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
// current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
// set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
// valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
- let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
- let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
- log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
remote_last_secret
} else {
- log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
[0;32]
};
self.mark_awaiting_response();
msgs::ChannelReestablish {
- channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
// The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
// transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
// index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
// next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
// receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
- next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
+ next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
// We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
// receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
// (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
// cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
// dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
// overflow here.
- next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
+ next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
// TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
-> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
}
- let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
+ let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
+ }
+
+ if amount_msat == 0 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
+ }
+
+ let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
+ if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
+ available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
+ }
+
+ if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
+ available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
+ }
+
+ if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
+ // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
+ // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
+ // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
+ // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
+ // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
+ // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
+ }
+
+ let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
+ log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
+ if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
+ else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
+ else { "to peer" });
+
+ if need_holding_cell {
+ force_holding_cell = true;
+ }
+
+ // Now update local state:
+ if force_holding_cell {
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
+ amount_msat,
+ payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry,
+ source,
+ onion_routing_packet,
+ });
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+
+ self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ amount_msat,
+ payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
+ cltv_expiry,
+ state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
+ source,
+ });
+
+ let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
+ amount_msat,
+ payment_hash,
+ cltv_expiry,
+ onion_routing_packet,
+ };
+ self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
+
+ Ok(Some(res))
+ }
+
+ fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
+ // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
+ // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
+ // is acceptable.
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
+ Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
+ } else { None };
+ if let Some(state) = new_state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ htlc.state = state;
+ }
+ }
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
+ // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
+ let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
+ mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
+ }
+ }
+ if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
+ if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
+ debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
+ self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
+ self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
+ }
+ }
+ self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
+
+ let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
+ let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
+ htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
+
+ if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
+ self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
+ }
+
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
+ commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
+ htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
+ commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
+ their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
+ }]
+ };
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
+ monitor_update
+ }
+
+ fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
+ let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
+ *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
+ if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
+ let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
+ if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
+ && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
+ && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
+ && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
+ let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
+ assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
+ }
+
+ /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
+ /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
+ fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
+
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
+ let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
+ let (signature, htlc_signatures);
+
+ {
+ let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
+ for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
+ htlcs.push(htlc);
+ }
+
+ let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
+ signature = res.0;
+ htlc_signatures = res.1;
+
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
+ encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
+ &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
+ log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+
+ for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
+ log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
+ encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
+ log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
+ log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ signature,
+ htlc_signatures,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
+ }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
+ }
+
+ /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
+ /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
+ ///
+ /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
+ /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
+ pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
+ if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
+ match send_res? {
+ Some(_) => {
+ let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
+ },
+ None => Ok(None)
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
+ }
+ self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+ fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
+ fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
+ });
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
+ /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
+ ///
+ /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
+ /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
+ pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
+ target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
+ -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
+ where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
+ }
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
+ if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
+ }
+ else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
+ }
+ }
+ if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
+ }
+ assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
+ if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
+ return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
+ }
+
+ // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
+ // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
+ let mut chan_closed = false;
+ if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ chan_closed = true;
+ }
+
+ let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ Some(_) => false,
+ None if !chan_closed => {
+ // use override shutdown script if provided
+ let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
+ Some(script) => script,
+ None => {
+ // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
+ match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
+ Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
+ Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
+ }
+ },
+ };
+ if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
+ return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
+ }
+ self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
+ true
+ },
+ None => false,
+ };
+
+ // From here on out, we may not fail!
+ self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
+ if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
+ } else {
+ self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
+ }
+ self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
+
+ let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
+ let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
+ update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
+ updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
+ scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ }],
+ };
+ self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
+ if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
+ self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
+ } else { None }
+ } else { None };
+ let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
+ channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
+ };
+
+ // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
+ // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
+ self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
+ let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
+ dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
+ false
+ },
+ _ => true
+ }
+ });
+
+ debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
+ "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
+
+ Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
+ }
+
+ pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
+ self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
+ .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
+ match htlc_update {
+ HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
+ => Some((source, payment_hash)),
+ _ => None,
+ }
+ })
+ .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
+ }
+}
+
+/// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
+pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
+ pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
+}
+
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
+ pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
+ channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
+ outbound_scid_alias: u64
+ ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
+ where ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ {
+ let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
+ let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
+ let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
+ let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
+
+ if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
+ }
+ if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
+ }
+ let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
+ }
+ if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
+ }
+ let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
+ // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
+ }
+
+ let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
+ debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
+
+ let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+
+ let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
+ let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
+ if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
+ }
+
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
+
+ let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
+ match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
+ Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
+ Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
+ }
+ } else { None };
+
+ if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
+ return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
+ }
+ }
+
+ let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
+ Ok(script) => script,
+ Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
+ };
+
+ let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
+
+ Ok(Self {
+ context: ChannelContext {
+ user_id,
+
+ config: LegacyChannelConfig {
+ options: config.channel_config.clone(),
+ announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
+ commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
+ },
+
+ prev_config: None,
+
+ inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
+
+ channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
+ temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
+ channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
+ announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
+ secp_ctx,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
+
+ latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
+
+ holder_signer,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+ destination_script,
+
+ cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ value_to_self_msat,
+
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
+ pending_update_fee: None,
+ holding_cell_update_fee: None,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
+ update_time_counter: 1,
+
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+
+ monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+ pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ closing_fee_limits: None,
+ target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
+
+ inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
+
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
+
+ feerate_per_kw: feerate,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
+ holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
+ holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
+ holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
+ counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
+ holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
+ minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
+
+ counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
+
+ channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: true,
+ counterparty_parameters: None,
+ funding_outpoint: None,
+ opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
+ },
+ funding_transaction: None,
+
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
+ counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
+ counterparty_node_id,
+
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
+
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
+
+ channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
+ closing_signed_in_flight: false,
+
+ announcement_sigs: None,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
+ sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
+
+ latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
+ outbound_scid_alias,
+
+ channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
+ channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
+
+ channel_type,
+ channel_keys_id,
+
+ pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
+ }
+ })
+ }
+
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
+ fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+ Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
+ }
+
+ /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
+ /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
+ /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
+ /// or if called on an inbound channel.
+ /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
+ /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
+ /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
+ pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
+ -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
+ }
+ if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
+ }
+
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
+
+ let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(e) => {
+ log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
+ return Err((self, e));
+ }
+ };
+
+ let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
+
+ // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
+
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
+ self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
+
+ let channel = Channel {
+ context: self.context,
+ };
+
+ Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
+ temporary_channel_id,
+ funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
+ funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
+ signature,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ next_local_nonce: None,
+ }))
+ }
+
+ fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
+ // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
+ // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
+ // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
+ // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
+ let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
+ if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
+ config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
+ their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
+ ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
+ }
+
+ // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
+ // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
+ // `only_static_remotekey`.
+ #[cfg(anchors)]
+ { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
+ if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
+ their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret
+ }
+
+ /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
+ /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
+ /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
+ pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
+ if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
+ // We've exhausted our options
+ return Err(());
+ }
+ // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
+ // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
+ // accepted one.
+ //
+ // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
+ // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
+ // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
+ // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
+ // whatever reason.
+ if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
+ assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
+ } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
+ self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
+ } else {
+ self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
+ }
+ Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
+ panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
+ }
+
+ if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
+ }
+
+ let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
+ let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
+
+ msgs::OpenChannel {
+ chain_hash,
+ temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
+ push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
+ to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point: keys.payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ first_per_commitment_point,
+ channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
+ None => Builder::new().into_script(),
+ }),
+ channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Message handlers
+ pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
+
+ // Check sanity of message fields:
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
+ msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
+ }
+ let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
+ }
+ let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+ if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
+ }
+
+ // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
+ }
+ if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
+ }
+ if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
+ if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
+ }
+ } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
+ // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
+ } else {
+ let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
+ if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
+ }
+ self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
+ }
+
+ let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ &Some(ref script) => {
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
+ if script.len() == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
+ }
+ Some(script.clone())
+ }
+ },
+ // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
+ &None => {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
+ }
+ }
+ } else { None };
+
+ self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
+ self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
+ self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
+ self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
+ self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
+
+ if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
+ self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
+ } else {
+ self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
+ }
+
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point: msg.payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ };
+
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
+ });
+
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
+ self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
+
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
+ self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+/// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
+pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
+ pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
+}
+
+impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
+ /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
+ /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
+ pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
+ counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
+ their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
+ current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
+ ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
+ where ES::Target: EntropySource,
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger,
+ {
+ let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
+
+ // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
+ // support this channel type.
+ let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
+ if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
+ }
+
+ // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
+ // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
+ // `static_remote_key`.
+ if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
+ }
+ // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
+ if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
+ }
+ channel_type.clone()
+ } else {
+ let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
+ if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
+ }
+ channel_type
+ };
+ let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
+
+ let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
+ let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
+ let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
+ let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
+ funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point: msg.payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
+ };
+
+ if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
+ }
+
+ // Check sanity of message fields:
+ if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
+ }
+ let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
+ if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
+ }
+ Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
+
+ let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
+ if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
}
- if amount_msat == 0 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
+ // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
+ if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
}
-
- let available_balances = self.get_available_balances();
- if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
- available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
}
-
- if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
- available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
+ if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
}
-
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
- // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
- // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
- // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
- // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
- // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
- // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
+ }
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
+ }
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
}
- let need_holding_cell = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
- log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
- if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
- else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
- else { "to peer" });
+ // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
- if need_holding_cell {
- force_holding_cell = true;
+ if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
+ if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
+ }
}
- // Now update local state:
- if force_holding_cell {
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
- amount_msat,
- payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry,
- source,
- onion_routing_packet,
- });
- return Ok(None);
+ let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
+ // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
+ }
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
+ }
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
+ log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
+ msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
+ }
+ if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
}
- self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
- htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
- amount_msat,
- payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
- cltv_expiry,
- state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
- source,
- });
-
- let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
- amount_msat,
- payment_hash,
- cltv_expiry,
- onion_routing_packet,
- };
- self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
+ // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
+ // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
+ let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
+ let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
+ if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
+ }
- Ok(Some(res))
- }
+ let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
+ // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
+ // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
+ if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
+ }
- fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
- log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
- // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
- // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
- // is acceptable.
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
- Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
- } else { None };
- if let Some(state) = new_state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- htlc.state = state;
+ let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ &Some(ref script) => {
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
+ if script.len() == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
+ }
+ Some(script.clone())
+ }
+ },
+ // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
+ &None => {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
+ }
}
- }
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
- let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
- mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
+ } else { None };
+
+ let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
+ match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
+ Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
+ Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
}
- }
- if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
- if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
- debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
- self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
- self.pending_update_fee = None;
+ } else { None };
+
+ if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
}
}
- self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
- let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
- let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
- htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
+ let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
+ Ok(script) => script,
+ Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
+ };
- if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
- self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
- }
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
- commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
- commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
- their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
- }]
- };
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
- monitor_update
- }
+ let chan = Self {
+ context: ChannelContext {
+ user_id,
- fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
- let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
- let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
+ config: LegacyChannelConfig {
+ options: config.channel_config.clone(),
+ announced_channel,
+ commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
+ },
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- {
- if !self.is_outbound() {
- let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
- *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
- if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
- let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
- if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
- && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
- && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
- && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
- let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
- assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
- }
- }
- }
- }
+ prev_config: None,
+
+ inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
+
+ temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
+ channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
+ channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
+ announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
+ secp_ctx,
+
+ latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
+
+ holder_signer,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+ destination_script,
+
+ cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
+ value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
+
+ pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
+ pending_update_fee: None,
+ holding_cell_update_fee: None,
+ next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
+ update_time_counter: 1,
+
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+
+ monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
+ monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
+
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+
+ last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+ pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ closing_fee_limits: None,
+ target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
+
+ inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
+
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
+ short_channel_id: None,
+ channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
+
+ feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
+ channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
+ holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
+ holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
+ counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
+ holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
+ minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
+
+ counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
+
+ channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
+ holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
+ holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
+ is_outbound_from_holder: false,
+ counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
+ selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
+ }),
+ funding_outpoint: None,
+ opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
+ opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
+ },
+ funding_transaction: None,
- (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
- }
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
+ counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
+ counterparty_node_id,
- /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
- /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
- fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
- let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
- let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
- let (signature, htlc_signatures);
+ commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
- {
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
- for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
- htlcs.push(htlc);
- }
+ channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
+ closing_signed_in_flight: false,
- let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
- .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
- signature = res.0;
- htlc_signatures = res.1;
+ announcement_sigs: None,
- log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
- encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
- &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
- log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
- for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
- log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
- encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
- encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
- log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
- log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
+ sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
+
+ latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
+ outbound_scid_alias,
+
+ channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
+ channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
+
+ channel_type,
+ channel_keys_id,
+
+ pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
}
+ };
+
+ Ok(chan)
+ }
+
+ pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
+ self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
+ }
+
+ /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
+ pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
+ assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
+ self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
+ }
+
+ /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
+ /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
+ ///
+ /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
+ pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
+ panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
+ }
+ if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
+ }
+ if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
+ }
+ if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
+ panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
}
- Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- signature,
- htlc_signatures,
+ self.context.user_id = user_id;
+ self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
+
+ self.generate_accept_channel_message()
+ }
+
+ /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
+ /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
+ /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
+ ///
+ /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
+ fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
+ let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
+
+ msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
+ dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
+ to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
+ revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
+ payment_point: keys.payment_point,
+ delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
+ htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
+ first_per_commitment_point,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
+ None => Builder::new().into_script(),
+ }),
+ channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
#[cfg(taproot)]
- partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
- }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
+ next_local_nonce: None,
+ }
}
- /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
- /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
+ /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
+ /// inbound channel without accepting it.
///
- /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
- /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
- pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
- let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
- if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
- match send_res? {
- Some(_) => {
- let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
- },
- None => Ok(None)
- }
+ /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
+ self.generate_accept_channel_message()
}
- /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
- pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
- self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
- }
+ fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
+ let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
- pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
+ let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
+ {
+ let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
+ // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
+ log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
+ log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
+ encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
+ secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
}
- self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
- fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
- fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
- cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
- });
- Ok(())
+ let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
+ let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
+
+ let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
+ let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
+ log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
+ log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
+
+ let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
+ .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
+
+ // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
+ Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
}
- /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
- /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
- ///
- /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
- /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
- pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
- target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
- -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
- where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
- }
+ pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
+ ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
+ where
+ SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
+ L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
}
- if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
- if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
- }
- else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
- }
+ if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
+ // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
+ // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
+ // channel.
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
}
- if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
- return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
+ if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
}
- assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
- return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
+ if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
+ panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
}
- // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
- // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
- let mut chan_closed = false;
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- chan_closed = true;
- }
+ let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
+ // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
+ // funding_created_signature may fail.
+ self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
- let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
- Some(_) => false,
- None if !chan_closed => {
- // use override shutdown script if provided
- let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
- Some(script) => script,
- None => {
- // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
- match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
- Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
- Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
- }
- },
- };
- if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
- return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
- }
- self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
- true
+ let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
},
- None => false,
+ Err(e) => {
+ // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
+ // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
+ panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
+ }
};
- // From here on out, we may not fail!
- self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
- if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- } else {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
- }
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
+ let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
+ initial_commitment_tx,
+ msg.signature,
+ Vec::new(),
+ &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ );
- let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
- self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
- let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
- scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
- }],
- };
- self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
- self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
- } else { None }
- } else { None };
- let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
- };
+ if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
+ return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
+ }
- // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
- // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
- self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
- let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
- match htlc_update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
- false
- },
- _ => true
- }
- });
+ // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
- debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
- "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
+ let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
+ let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
+ let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
+ let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
+ monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
+ let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
+ shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
+ &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
+ &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
+ funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
+ obscure_factor,
+ holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
- Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
- }
+ channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
- /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
- /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
- /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
- /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
- /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
- pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
- // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
- // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
- // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
- // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
- assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
+ self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
+ self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
- // return them to fail the payment.
- let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
- let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
- for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
- match htlc_update {
- HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
- dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
- },
- _ => {}
- }
- }
- let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
- // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
- // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
- // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
- // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
- // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
- // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
- // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
- self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
- Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
- update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
- updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
- }))
- } else { None }
- } else { None };
+ log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
- self.update_time_counter += 1;
- (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
- }
+ // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
+ // `ChannelMonitor`.
+ let mut channel = Channel {
+ context: self.context,
+ };
+ let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
+ let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
+ channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
- pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
- self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
- .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
- match htlc_update {
- HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
- => Some((source, payment_hash)),
- _ => None,
- }
- })
- .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
+ Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
+ channel_id,
+ signature,
+ #[cfg(taproot)]
+ partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
+ }, channel_monitor))
}
}
// `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
// versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
// the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
- let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
+ let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
user_id_low.write(writer)?;
// Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
// `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
- self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
- (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
- self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
+ self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
+ self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
(key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
// Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
// deserialized from that format.
- match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
+ match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
}
- self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
- self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
- self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
}
}
- (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
- for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
continue; // Drop
}
let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
- (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
}
}
- (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
+ (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match update {
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
}
}
- match self.resend_order {
+ match self.context.resend_order {
RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
}
- self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
- self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
- self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
- (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
+ (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
pending_forward.write(writer)?;
htlc_id.write(writer)?;
}
- (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
+ (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
htlc_source.write(writer)?;
payment_hash.write(writer)?;
fail_reason.write(writer)?;
}
- if self.is_outbound() {
- self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
- } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
+ self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
+ } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
} else {
// As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
// commitment_signed, drop it.
None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
}
- self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
- self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
- (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
- self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
- self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
+ (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
+ self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
// Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
// however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
// consider the stale state on reload.
0u8.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
- self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
// Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
- self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
// Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
- self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
+ self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
- match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
+ match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
Some(info) => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
None => 0u8.write(writer)?
}
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
- self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
- self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
- self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
+ self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
+ for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
htlc.write(writer)?;
}
// older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
// only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
// out at all.
- let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
- Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
+ let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
+ Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
// The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
// the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
// a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
// to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
- if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
- { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
+ if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
+ { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
- if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
- { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
+ if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
+ { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
- let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
- let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
+ let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
+ let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
// `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
// versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
// we write the high bytes as an option here.
- let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
+ let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
- let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
+ let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
- (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
+ (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
// minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
// default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
// them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
// here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
// and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
// override that.
- (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
+ (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
(2, chan_type, option),
- (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
+ (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
(4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
- (5, self.config, required),
+ (5, self.context.config, required),
(6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
- (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
- (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
- (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
- (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
+ (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
+ (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
+ (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
+ (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
(15, preimages, vec_type),
- (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
- (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
- (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
+ (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
+ (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
+ (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
(23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
(25, user_id_high_opt, option),
- (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
+ (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
(28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
- (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
+ (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
(31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
- (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
+ (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
});
Ok(())
let mut announcement_sigs = None;
let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
- let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
- let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
+ let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
+ let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
// Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
// only, so we default to that if none was written.
let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
Ok(Channel {
- user_id,
+ context: ChannelContext {
+ user_id,
- config: config.unwrap(),
+ config: config.unwrap(),
- prev_config: None,
+ prev_config: None,
- // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
- // channel data after the handshake has completed.
- inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
+ // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
+ // channel data after the handshake has completed.
+ inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
- channel_id,
- temporary_channel_id,
- channel_state,
- announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
- secp_ctx,
- channel_value_satoshis,
-
- latest_monitor_update_id,
-
- holder_signer,
- shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- destination_script,
-
- cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
- cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
- value_to_self_msat,
-
- holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
- pending_inbound_htlcs,
- pending_outbound_htlcs,
- holding_cell_htlc_updates,
-
- resend_order,
-
- monitor_pending_channel_ready,
- monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
- monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
- monitor_pending_forwards,
- monitor_pending_failures,
- monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
-
- pending_update_fee,
- holding_cell_update_fee,
- next_holder_htlc_id,
- next_counterparty_htlc_id,
- update_time_counter,
- feerate_per_kw,
+ channel_id,
+ temporary_channel_id,
+ channel_state,
+ announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
+ secp_ctx,
+ channel_value_satoshis,
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
- #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+ latest_monitor_update_id,
- last_sent_closing_fee: None,
- pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
- closing_fee_limits: None,
- target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
+ holder_signer,
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+ destination_script,
- inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
+ cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
+ cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
+ value_to_self_msat,
- funding_tx_confirmed_in,
- funding_tx_confirmation_height,
- short_channel_id,
- channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
+ holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ pending_inbound_htlcs,
+ pending_outbound_htlcs,
+ holding_cell_htlc_updates,
- counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
- holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
- counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
- holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
- counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
- holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
- counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
- holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
- counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
- minimum_depth,
+ resend_order,
- counterparty_forwarding_info,
+ monitor_pending_channel_ready,
+ monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
+ monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
+ monitor_pending_forwards,
+ monitor_pending_failures,
+ monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
- channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
- funding_transaction,
+ pending_update_fee,
+ holding_cell_update_fee,
+ next_holder_htlc_id,
+ next_counterparty_htlc_id,
+ update_time_counter,
+ feerate_per_kw,
- counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
- counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
- counterparty_node_id,
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+ #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
- counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
+ last_sent_closing_fee: None,
+ pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
+ closing_fee_limits: None,
+ target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
- commitment_secrets,
+ inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
- channel_update_status,
- closing_signed_in_flight: false,
+ funding_tx_confirmed_in,
+ funding_tx_confirmation_height,
+ short_channel_id,
+ channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
- announcement_sigs,
+ counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
+ counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
+ holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
+ counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
+ counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
+ minimum_depth,
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ counterparty_forwarding_info,
- workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
- sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
+ channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
+ funding_transaction,
- latest_inbound_scid_alias,
- // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
- outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
+ counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
+ counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
+ counterparty_node_id,
- channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
- channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
+ counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
- #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
- historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
+ commitment_secrets,
+
+ channel_update_status,
+ closing_signed_in_flight: false,
+
+ announcement_sigs,
+
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
+
+ workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
+ sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
+
+ latest_inbound_scid_alias,
+ // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
+ outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
+
+ channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
+ channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
- channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
- channel_keys_id,
+ #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
+ historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
- pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
+ channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
+ channel_keys_id,
+
+ pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
+ }
})
}
}
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
- use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
+ use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
+ match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
},
let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
// Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
// same as the old fee.
let network = Network::Testnet;
let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
// Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
// they have different dust limits.
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
// Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
- let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
- node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
+ node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
+
+ // Node A --> Node B: funding created
+ let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]};
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+
+ // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
// Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
- node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
+ node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: 0,
amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
});
- node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
+ node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
htlc_id: 1,
amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
// Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
// the dust limit check.
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
- let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
+ let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
// Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
// of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
- node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
- let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
+ node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
+ let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
}
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
- let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
+ let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
+ let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
// If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
// counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
- let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
// If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
- let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
- chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
+ chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
// If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
- let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
+ let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
- let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
// If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
- let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
+ let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
+ let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
}
// Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
// Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
- let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: accept channel
let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
// Node A --> Node B: funding created
- let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
}]};
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
- let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
- let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
+ let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
// Node B --> Node A: funding signed
- let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
// Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
// Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
- // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
+ // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
// which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
- let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
+ let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
// Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
- let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
+ let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
- // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
+ // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
// which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
- let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
+ let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
// Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
- let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
+ let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
- // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
+ // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
// if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
- let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
+ let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
- // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
+ // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
// (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
// than 100.
- let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
+ let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
- // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
+ // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
// if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
- let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
+ let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
- // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
+ // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
// (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
// than 100.
- let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
- let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
- assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
+ let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
+ assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
}
#[test]
fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
- // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
+ // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
// channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
- let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
- let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
- assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
+ let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
+ assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
- let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+ let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
- let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
+ let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
- assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
- assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
+ assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
+ assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
} else {
// Channel Negotiations failed
- let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
+ let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
}
#[test]
fn channel_update() {
let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let seed = [42; 32];
let network = Network::Testnet;
+ let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
- // Create a channel.
+ // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
- assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
- assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
- assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
+ let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
+
+ // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
+ // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
+ let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
+ let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
+ let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
+
+ // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
+ let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
+ accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
+ node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
+
+ // Node A --> Node B: funding created
+ let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
+ value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
+ }]};
+ let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+ let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+ let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
+
+ // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
+ let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
// Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
let update = ChannelUpdate {
// The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
// change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
- assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
- match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
+ assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
+ match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
Some(info) => {
assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
- let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
- chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
+ let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
};
- chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
+ chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
selected_contest_delay: 144
});
- chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
- signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
+ chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
+ signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
// We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
// derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
// build_commitment_transaction.
- let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
+ let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
- let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
+ let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
macro_rules! test_commitment {
( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
- chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
+ chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
};
}
macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
- chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
+ chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
};
}
$( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
} ) => { {
let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
- let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
+ let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
.filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
};
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
- let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
+ let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
- assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
+ assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
commitment_tx.clone(),
counterparty_signature,
counterparty_htlc_sigs,
- &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
- chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
+ &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
+ chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
- let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
- let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
- chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
+ chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
&htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
- let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
+ let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
"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", {});
// simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
"30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
"30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
"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", {});
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 0,
amount_msat: 1000000,
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 1,
amount_msat: 2000000,
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 2,
amount_msat: 2000000,
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 3,
amount_msat: 3000000,
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 4,
amount_msat: 4000000,
});
// commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
"304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
} );
// commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
"30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
} );
// commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
"3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
} );
// anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
"3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
} );
// commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
"3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
} );
// commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
"3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
} );
// commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
"3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
} );
// commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
"3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
} );
// anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
"3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
} );
// commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
"3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
} );
// commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
"304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
} );
// anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
"3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
} );
// commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
"3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
} );
// commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
"30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
"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", {});
// anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
"30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
"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", {});
// commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
"3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
"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", {});
// commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
"304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
"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", {});
// anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
"30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
"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", {});
// commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
- chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
+ chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
"304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
"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", {});
// commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
- chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
- chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
- chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
+ chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
+ chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
+ chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 1,
amount_msat: 2000000,
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 6,
amount_msat: 5000001,
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
});
- chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
+ chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
htlc_id: 5,
amount_msat: 5000000,
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let config = UserConfig::default();
- let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
+ let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
- let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
+ let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
assert!(res.is_ok());
// It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
// need to signal it.
- let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
+ let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
&config, 0, 42
).unwrap();
- assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
+ assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
- let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
+ let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
- let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
+ let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
&open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
- assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
+ assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
+ assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
}
#[cfg(anchors)]
let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
- let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
+ let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
).unwrap();
// Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
// `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
- let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
+ let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
&open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
// First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
// the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
// B as it's not supported by LDK.
- let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
+ let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
&channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
- let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
+ let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
&open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
// `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
// original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
// LDK.
- let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
+ let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
).unwrap();
let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
- let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
+ let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
&open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff