+++ /dev/null
-// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
-// history.
-//
-// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
-// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
-// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
-// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
-// licenses.
-
-//! The logic to build claims and bump in-flight transactions until confirmations.
-//!
-//! OnchainTxHandler objects are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all
-//! building, tracking, bumping and notifications functions.
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
-
-use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
-
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
-use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use ln::PaymentPreimage;
-use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
-use ln::package;
-use ln::package::PackageTemplate;
-use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface};
-use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER};
-use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
-use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writer, Writeable, VecWriter};
-use util::byte_utils;
-
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use core::cmp;
-use core::ops::Deref;
-use core::mem::replace;
-
-const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-
-/// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
-/// transaction causing it.
-///
-/// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-struct OnchainEventEntry {
- txid: Txid,
- height: u32,
- event: OnchainEvent,
-}
-
-impl OnchainEventEntry {
- fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
- self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
- }
-
- fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
- height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
- }
-}
-
-/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
-/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-enum OnchainEvent {
- /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
- /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
- Claim {
- claim_request: Txid,
- },
- /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a counterparty party tx.
- /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
- /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
- ContentiousOutpoint {
- package: PackageTemplate,
- }
-}
-
-impl Readable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- match Readable::read(reader)? {
- 0u8 => Ok(None),
- 1u8 => {
- let vlen: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(vlen as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<Option<(usize, Signature)>>()));
- for _ in 0..vlen {
- ret.push(match Readable::read(reader)? {
- 0u8 => None,
- 1u8 => Some((<u64 as Readable>::read(reader)? as usize, Readable::read(reader)?)),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
- });
- }
- Ok(Some(ret))
- },
- _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl Writeable for Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>> {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- match self {
- &Some(ref vec) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- (vec.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for opt in vec.iter() {
- match opt {
- &Some((ref idx, ref sig)) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- (*idx as u64).write(writer)?;
- sig.write(writer)?;
- },
- &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
- }
- }
- },
- &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-
-/// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
-/// do RBF bumping if possible.
-pub struct OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner: Sign> {
- destination_script: Script,
- holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
- // holder_htlc_sigs and prev_holder_htlc_sigs are in the order as they appear in the commitment
- // transaction outputs (hence the Option<>s inside the Vec). The first usize is the index in
- // the set of HTLCs in the HolderCommitmentTransaction.
- holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
- prev_holder_commitment: Option<HolderCommitmentTransaction>,
- prev_holder_htlc_sigs: Option<Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>>>,
-
- pub(super) signer: ChannelSigner,
- pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
-
- // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
- // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
- // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
- // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
- // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
- // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
- // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
- // we need to regenerate new claim request with reduced set of still-claimable outpoints.
- // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
- // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
- // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
- #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
- pub(crate) pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Txid, PackageTemplate>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Txid, PackageTemplate>,
-
- // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
- // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
- // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
- // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
- // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
- // block with output gets disconnected.
- #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
- pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Txid, u32)>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Txid, u32)>,
-
- onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
-
- latest_height: u32,
-
- pub(super) secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
-}
-
-const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-
-impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
- pub(crate) fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
-
- self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
- self.holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
- self.prev_holder_commitment.write(writer)?;
- self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.write(writer)?;
-
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
-
- let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
- self.signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
- assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
- assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
- (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
- ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
- request.write(writer)?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
- outp.write(writer)?;
- claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
- claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
- for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
- entry.txid.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(entry.height))?;
- match entry.event {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- claim_request.write(writer)?;
- },
- OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref package } => {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- package.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- }
- self.latest_height.write(writer)?;
-
- write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl<'a, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for OnchainTxHandler<K::Signer> {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
-
- let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_holder_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
- while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
- // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
- let mut data = [0; 1024];
- let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
- reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
- keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
- }
- let signer = keys_manager.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
-
- let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
- pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
-
- let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
- let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
- claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
- }
- let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
- let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let event = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::Claim {
- claim_request
- }
- },
- 1 => {
- let package = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
- package
- }
- }
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry { txid, height, event });
- }
- let latest_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
-
- let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
-
- Ok(OnchainTxHandler {
- destination_script,
- holder_commitment,
- holder_htlc_sigs,
- prev_holder_commitment,
- prev_holder_htlc_sigs,
- signer,
- channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
- claimable_outpoints,
- pending_claim_requests,
- onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
- latest_height,
- secp_ctx,
- })
- }
-}
-
-impl<ChannelSigner: Sign> OnchainTxHandler<ChannelSigner> {
- pub(crate) fn new(destination_script: Script, signer: ChannelSigner, channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters, holder_commitment: HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Self {
- OnchainTxHandler {
- destination_script,
- holder_commitment,
- holder_htlc_sigs: None,
- prev_holder_commitment: None,
- prev_holder_htlc_sigs: None,
- signer,
- channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
- pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
- claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
- latest_height: 0,
-
- secp_ctx,
- }
- }
-
- /// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
- /// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
- /// height than once reached we should generate a new bumped "version" of the claim tx to be sure than we safely claim outputs before
- /// than our counterparty can do it too. If timelock expires soon, height timer is going to be scale down in consequence to increase
- /// frequency of the bump and so increase our bets of success.
- fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
- if timelock_expiration <= current_height + 3 {
- return current_height + 1
- } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
- return current_height + 3
- }
- current_height + 15
- }
-
- /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
- /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
- /// Panics if there are signing errors, because signing operations in reaction to on-chain events
- /// are not expected to fail, and if they do, we may lose funds.
- fn generate_claim_tx<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, cached_request: &PackageTemplate, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u64, Transaction)>
- where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- if cached_request.outpoints().len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
-
- // Compute new height timer to decide when we need to regenerate a new bumped version of the claim tx (if we
- // didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
- let new_timer = Some(Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_request.timelock()));
- let amt = cached_request.package_amount();
- if cached_request.is_malleable() {
- let predicted_weight = cached_request.package_weight(&self.destination_script);
- if let Some((output_value, new_feerate)) = package::compute_output_value(predicted_weight, amt, cached_request.feerate(), fee_estimator, logger) {
- assert!(new_feerate != 0);
-
- let transaction = cached_request.finalize_package(self, output_value, self.destination_script.clone(), logger).unwrap();
- log_trace!(logger, "...with timer {} and feerate {}", new_timer.unwrap(), new_feerate);
- assert!(predicted_weight >= transaction.get_weight());
- return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, transaction))
- }
- } else {
- // Note: Currently, amounts of holder outputs spending witnesses aren't used
- // as we can't malleate spending package to increase their feerate. This
- // should change with the remaining anchor output patchset.
- debug_assert!(amt == 0);
- if let Some(transaction) = cached_request.finalize_package(self, amt, self.destination_script.clone(), logger) {
- return Some((None, 0, transaction));
- }
- }
- None
- }
-
- /// Upon channelmonitor.block_connected(..) or upon provision of a preimage on the forward link
- /// for this channel, provide new relevant on-chain transactions and/or new claim requests.
- /// Formerly this was named `block_connected`, but it is now also used for claiming an HTLC output
- /// if we receive a preimage after force-close.
- pub(crate) fn update_claims_view<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], requests: Vec<PackageTemplate>, latest_height: Option<u32>, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let height = match latest_height {
- Some(h) => h,
- None => self.latest_height,
- };
- log_trace!(logger, "Updating claims view at height {} with {} matched transactions and {} claim requests", height, txn_matched.len(), requests.len());
- let mut preprocessed_requests = Vec::with_capacity(requests.len());
- let mut aggregated_request = None;
-
- // Try to aggregate outputs if their timelock expiration isn't imminent (package timelock
- // <= CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER) and they don't require an immediate nLockTime (aggregable).
- for req in requests {
- // Don't claim a outpoint twice that would be bad for privacy and may uselessly lock a CPFP input for a while
- if let Some(_) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(req.outpoints()[0]) { log_trace!(logger, "Bouncing off outpoint {}:{}, already registered its claiming request", req.outpoints()[0].txid, req.outpoints()[0].vout); } else {
- log_trace!(logger, "Test if outpoint can be aggregated with expiration {} against {}", req.timelock(), height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER);
- if req.timelock() <= height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER || !req.aggregable() {
- // Don't aggregate if outpoint package timelock is soon or marked as non-aggregable
- preprocessed_requests.push(req);
- } else if aggregated_request.is_none() {
- aggregated_request = Some(req);
- } else {
- aggregated_request.as_mut().unwrap().merge_package(req);
- }
- }
- }
- if let Some(req) = aggregated_request {
- preprocessed_requests.push(req);
- }
-
- // Generate claim transactions and track them to bump if necessary at
- // height timer expiration (i.e in how many blocks we're going to take action).
- for mut req in preprocessed_requests {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &req, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
- req.set_timer(new_timer);
- req.set_feerate(new_feerate);
- let txid = tx.txid();
- for k in req.outpoints() {
- log_trace!(logger, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout);
- self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (txid, height));
- }
- self.pending_claim_requests.insert(txid, req);
- log_trace!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- }
- }
-
- let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
- for tx in txn_matched {
- // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
- let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
- for inp in &tx.input {
- if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
- // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
- if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
- //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
- // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
- // by us.
- let mut set_equality = true;
- if request.outpoints().len() != tx.input.len() {
- set_equality = false;
- } else {
- for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in request.outpoints().iter().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
- if **claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
- set_equality = false;
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
- () => {
- let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
- txid: tx.txid(),
- height,
- event: OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() }
- };
- if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
- }
- }
- }
-
- // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
- // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
- // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
- if set_equality {
- clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
- } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
- let mut at_least_one_drop = false;
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if let Some(package) = request.split_package(&input.previous_output) {
- claimed_outputs_material.push(package);
- at_least_one_drop = true;
- }
- // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
- if request.outpoints().is_empty() {
- clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
- }
- }
- //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
- if at_least_one_drop {
- bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone(), request.clone());
- }
- }
- break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
- } else {
- panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
- }
- }
- }
- for package in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
- let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
- txid: tx.txid(),
- height,
- event: OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package },
- };
- if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.contains(&entry) {
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
- }
- }
- }
-
- // After security delay, either our claim tx got enough confs or outpoint is definetely out of reach
- let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
- for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
- if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(height) {
- match entry.event {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
- // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
- // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
- if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
- for outpoint in request.outpoints() {
- self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
- }
- }
- },
- OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
- self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&package.outpoints()[0]);
- }
- }
- } else {
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
- }
- }
-
- // Check if any pending claim request must be rescheduled
- for (first_claim_txid, ref request) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
- if let Some(h) = request.timer() {
- if height >= h {
- bump_candidates.insert(*first_claim_txid, (*request).clone());
- }
- }
- }
-
- // Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly
- log_trace!(logger, "Bumping {} candidates", bump_candidates.len());
- for (first_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.iter() {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &request, &*fee_estimator, &*logger) {
- log_trace!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
- if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
- request.set_timer(new_timer);
- request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self,
- txid: &Txid,
- broadcaster: B,
- fee_estimator: F,
- logger: L,
- ) where
- B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let mut height = None;
- for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
- if entry.txid == *txid {
- height = Some(entry.height);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(height) = height {
- self.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
- }
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
- where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
- F::Target: FeeEstimator,
- L::Target: Logger,
- {
- let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
- let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
- for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
- if entry.height >= height {
- //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
- //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
- match entry.event {
- OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { package } => {
- if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&package.outpoints()[0]) {
- if let Some(request) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
- request.merge_package(package);
- // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
- // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
- bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), request.clone());
- }
- }
- },
- _ => {},
- }
- } else {
- self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
- }
- }
- for (_, request) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &request, &&*fee_estimator, &&*logger) {
- request.set_timer(new_timer);
- request.set_feerate(new_feerate);
- log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
- }
- }
- for (ancestor_claim_txid, request) in bump_candidates.drain() {
- self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, request);
- }
- //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
- // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
- let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
- self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
- if v.1 >= height {
- remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
- false
- } else { true });
- for req in remove_request {
- self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
- }
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
- let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
- .iter()
- .map(|entry| entry.txid)
- .collect();
- txids.sort_unstable();
- txids.dedup();
- txids
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn provide_latest_holder_tx(&mut self, tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction) {
- self.prev_holder_commitment = Some(replace(&mut self.holder_commitment, tx));
- self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
- }
-
- // Normally holder HTLCs are signed at the same time as the holder commitment tx. However,
- // in some configurations, the holder commitment tx has been signed and broadcast by a
- // ChannelMonitor replica, so we handle that case here.
- fn sign_latest_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
- if self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
- let (_sig, sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
- self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, sigs));
- }
- }
-
- // Normally only the latest commitment tx and HTLCs need to be signed. However, in some
- // configurations we may have updated our holder commitment but a replica of the ChannelMonitor
- // broadcast the previous one before we sync with it. We handle that case here.
- fn sign_prev_holder_htlcs(&mut self) {
- if self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_none() {
- if let Some(ref holder_commitment) = self.prev_holder_commitment {
- let (_sig, sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign previous holder commitment");
- self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment, sigs));
- }
- }
- }
-
- fn extract_holder_sigs(holder_commitment: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, sigs: Vec<Signature>) -> Vec<Option<(usize, Signature)>> {
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- for (htlc_idx, (holder_sig, htlc)) in sigs.iter().zip(holder_commitment.htlcs().iter()).enumerate() {
- let tx_idx = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap();
- if ret.len() <= tx_idx as usize { ret.resize(tx_idx as usize + 1, None); }
- ret[tx_idx as usize] = Some((htlc_idx, holder_sig.clone()));
- }
- ret
- }
-
- //TODO: getting lastest holder transactions should be infallible and result in us "force-closing the channel", but we may
- // have empty holder commitment transaction if a ChannelMonitor is asked to force-close just after Channel::get_outbound_funding_created,
- // before providing a initial commitment transaction. For outbound channel, init ChannelMonitor at Channel::funding_signed, there is nothing
- // to monitor before.
- pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
- let (sig, htlc_sigs) = self.signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("signing holder commitment");
- self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
- self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
- }
-
- #[cfg(any(test, feature="unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script) -> Transaction {
- let (sig, htlc_sigs) = self.signer.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&self.holder_commitment, &self.secp_ctx).expect("sign holder commitment");
- self.holder_htlc_sigs = Some(Self::extract_holder_sigs(&self.holder_commitment, htlc_sigs));
- self.holder_commitment.add_holder_sig(funding_redeemscript, sig)
- }
-
- pub(crate) fn get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
- let mut htlc_tx = None;
- let commitment_txid = self.holder_commitment.trust().txid();
- // Check if the HTLC spends from the current holder commitment
- if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
- self.sign_latest_holder_htlcs();
- if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.holder_htlc_sigs {
- let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
- let trusted_tx = self.holder_commitment.trust();
- let counterparty_htlc_sig = self.holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[*htlc_idx];
- htlc_tx = Some(trusted_tx
- .get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), *htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, htlc_sig, preimage));
- }
- }
- // If the HTLC doesn't spend the current holder commitment, check if it spends the previous one
- if htlc_tx.is_none() && self.prev_holder_commitment.is_some() {
- let commitment_txid = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap().trust().txid();
- if commitment_txid == outp.txid {
- self.sign_prev_holder_htlcs();
- if let &Some(ref htlc_sigs) = &self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs {
- let &(ref htlc_idx, ref htlc_sig) = htlc_sigs[outp.vout as usize].as_ref().unwrap();
- let holder_commitment = self.prev_holder_commitment.as_ref().unwrap();
- let trusted_tx = holder_commitment.trust();
- let counterparty_htlc_sig = holder_commitment.counterparty_htlc_sigs[*htlc_idx];
- htlc_tx = Some(trusted_tx
- .get_signed_htlc_tx(&self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), *htlc_idx, &counterparty_htlc_sig, htlc_sig, preimage));
- }
- }
- }
- htlc_tx
- }
-
- #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
- pub(crate) fn unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, outp: &::bitcoin::OutPoint, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
- let latest_had_sigs = self.holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
- let prev_had_sigs = self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs.is_some();
- let ret = self.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outp, preimage);
- if !latest_had_sigs {
- self.holder_htlc_sigs = None;
- }
- if !prev_had_sigs {
- self.prev_holder_htlc_sigs = None;
- }
- ret
- }
-}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff