Merge pull request #1930 from arik-so/2022-12-remove-keysinterface

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / onion_message / blinded_path.rs

diff --git a/lightning/src/onion_message/blinded_path.rs b/lightning/src/onion_message/blinded_path.rs
index 49949bc0d5895fdf2b123f59e9f44e7c647c24b4..946e5e7cf8d74472e9fa56a719f2a8dd5e426ba5 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/onion_message/blinded_path.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/onion_message/blinded_path.rs
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, PublicKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
 
-use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, NodeSigner, Recipient};
+use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient};
 use super::packet::ControlTlvs;
 use super::utils;
 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ impl BlindedPath {
        ///
        /// Errors if less than two hops are provided or if `node_pk`(s) are invalid.
        //  TODO: make all payloads the same size with padding + add dummy hops
-       pub fn new<K: KeysInterface, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>
-               (node_pks: &[PublicKey], keys_manager: &K, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Self, ()>
+       pub fn new<ES: EntropySource, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>
+               (node_pks: &[PublicKey], entropy_source: &ES, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Self, ()>
        {
                if node_pks.len() < 2 { return Err(()) }
-               let blinding_secret_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
+               let blinding_secret_bytes = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
                let blinding_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&blinding_secret_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
                let introduction_node_id = node_pks[0];
 
@@ -79,11 +79,11 @@ impl BlindedPath {
        }
 
        // Advance the blinded path by one hop, so make the second hop into the new introduction node.
-       pub(super) fn advance_by_one<K: Deref, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>
-               (&mut self, keys_manager: &K, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), ()>
-               where K::Target: KeysInterface
+       pub(super) fn advance_by_one<NS: Deref, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>
+               (&mut self, node_signer: &NS, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), ()>
+               where NS::Target: NodeSigner
        {
-               let control_tlvs_ss = keys_manager.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &self.blinding_point, None)?;
+               let control_tlvs_ss = node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::Node, &self.blinding_point, None)?;
                let rho = onion_utils::gen_rho_from_shared_secret(&control_tlvs_ss.secret_bytes());
                let encrypted_control_tlvs = self.blinded_hops.remove(0).encrypted_payload;
                let mut s = Cursor::new(&encrypted_control_tlvs);