+++ /dev/null
-//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
-//! here.
-//!
-//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
-//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
-//! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
-//!
-//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
-//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
-//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
-//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
-//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
-
-use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
-use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
-
-use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
-use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
-use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
-
-use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
-use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
-use secp256k1;
-
-use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
-use ln::chan_utils;
-use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
-use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
-use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
-use util::logger::Logger;
-use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
-use util::{byte_utils, events};
-
-use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
-use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
-use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
-
-/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
- /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
- /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
- ///
- /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
- /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
- /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
- /// the channel to an operational state.
- ///
- /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
- /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
- /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
- ///
- /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
- /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
- /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
- /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
- /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
- /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
- /// been "frozen".
- ///
- /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
- /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
- /// channel operation.
- ///
- /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
- /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
- /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
- TemporaryFailure,
- /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
- /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
- /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
- ///
- /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
- PermanentFailure,
-}
-
-/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
-/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
-/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
-/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
-/// Contains a human-readable error message.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
-
-/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
-/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
-pub struct HTLCUpdate {
- pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
- pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- pub(super) source: HTLCSource
-}
-
-/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
-/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
-/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
-/// server(s).
-///
-/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
-/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
-/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
-/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
-pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
- /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
- ///
- /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
- /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
- /// any spends of it.
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
-
- /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
- /// with success or failure backward
- fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
-}
-
-/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
-/// watchtower or watch our own channels.
-///
-/// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
-///
-/// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
-/// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
-/// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
-///
-/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
-/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
-pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
- pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
- chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
- broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
- pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
- pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
- fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
-}
-
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
- let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
- let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
- if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
- new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
- outputs: spendable_outputs,
- });
- }
-
- for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
- for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
- }
- }
- htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
- }
- }
- {
- // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
- let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
- for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
- match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
- // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
- // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
- // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
- let mut existing_claim = false;
- e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
- if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
- if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
- existing_claim = true;
- true
- } else { false }
- } else { true }
- });
- if !existing_claim {
- e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
- }
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
- e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
- }
-
- fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
- let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
- monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
- /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
- let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
- monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- chain_monitor,
- broadcaster,
- pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
- pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
- logger,
- fee_estimator: feeest,
- });
- let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
- res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
- res
- }
-
- /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
- pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
- Some(orig_monitor) => {
- log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
- return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
- },
- None => {}
- };
- match monitor.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
- match funding_info {
- &None => {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
- },
- &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
- log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
- self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
- },
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
- }
- }
- monitors.insert(key, monitor);
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
- match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
- Ok(_) => Ok(()),
- Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
- }
- }
-
- fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
- let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
- let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
- for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
- for htlc_data in v {
- pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
- payment_hash: k,
- payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
- source: htlc_data.0,
- });
- }
- }
- pending_htlcs_updated
- }
-}
-
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
- fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
- let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
- let mut ret = Vec::new();
- mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
- ret
- }
-}
-
-/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
-/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
-const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
-/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
-/// HTLC-Success transaction.
-/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
-/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
-pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
-/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
-/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
-/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
-/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
-/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
-/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
-/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
-/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
-/// accurate block height.
-/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
-/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
-/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
-pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
-/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
-/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
-/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
-/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
-/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
-/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
-pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
-
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum Storage {
- Local {
- revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
- htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
- delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- payment_base_key: SecretKey,
- shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
- prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
- latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
- funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
- current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
- prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
- },
- Watchtower {
- revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
- htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
- }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-struct LocalSignedTx {
- /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
- txid: Sha256dHash,
- tx: Transaction,
- revocation_key: PublicKey,
- a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
- delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
- feerate_per_kw: u64,
- htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
-}
-
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-enum InputDescriptors {
- RevokedOfferedHTLC,
- RevokedReceivedHTLC,
- OfferedHTLC,
- ReceivedHTLC,
- RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
-}
-
-/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
-/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
-/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum TxMaterial {
- Revoked {
- script: Script,
- pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
- key: SecretKey,
- is_htlc: bool,
- amount: u64,
- },
- RemoteHTLC {
- script: Script,
- key: SecretKey,
- preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- amount: u64,
- },
- LocalHTLC {
- script: Script,
- sigs: (Signature, Signature),
- preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
- amount: u64,
- }
-}
-
-/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
-/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum OnchainEvent {
- /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
- /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
- Claim {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
- },
- /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
- /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
- /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
- HTLCUpdate {
- htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
- },
-}
-
-const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
-
-/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
-/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
-///
-/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
-/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
-#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct ChannelMonitor {
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
-
- key_storage: Storage,
- their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
- their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
- // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
- their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
-
- our_to_self_delay: u16,
- their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
-
- old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
- /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
- /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
- /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
- /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
- /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
- /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
- /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
- /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
- /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
- remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
-
- // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
- // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
- // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
- // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
-
- // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
- // deserialization
- current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
-
- payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
-
- destination_script: Script,
- // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
- // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
- // scan every commitment transaction for that
- to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
-
- // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
- // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
- // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
- // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay.
- // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker
- // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height.
- our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32)>,
-
- // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
- // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
- // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
-
- // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
- // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
- // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
- // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
- // the full block_connected).
- pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
- logger: Arc<Logger>,
-}
-
-macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
- ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
- {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
- let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
- if $value <= fee {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
- if $value <= fee {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
- if $value <= fee {
- log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
- $spent_txid, fee, $value);
- false
- } else {
- log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
- $spent_txid, $value);
- $value -= fee;
- true
- }
- } else {
- log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
- $spent_txid, $value);
- $value -= fee;
- true
- }
- } else {
- $value -= fee;
- true
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
-/// underlying object
-impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
- fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
- if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
- self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
- self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
- self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
- self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
- self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
- self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
- self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
- self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
- self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
- self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
- self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
- self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
- self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
- self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
- self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
- {
- false
- } else {
- for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
- if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
- return false
- }
- }
- true
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl ChannelMonitor {
- pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
- ChannelMonitor {
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
-
- key_storage: Storage::Local {
- revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
- htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
- delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
- payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
- shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
- prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
- latest_per_commitment_point: None,
- funding_info: None,
- current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
- prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
- },
- their_htlc_base_key: None,
- their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
- their_cur_revocation_points: None,
-
- our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
- their_to_self_delay: None,
-
- old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
- remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
- remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
-
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
- current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
-
- payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
- destination_script: destination_script,
- to_remote_rescue: None,
-
- our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
-
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
-
- last_block_hash: Default::default(),
- secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
- logger,
- }
- }
-
- fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
- let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
- for inp in inputs {
- // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
- tx_weight += match inp {
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
- },
- };
- }
- tx_weight
- }
-
- fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
- if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
- return current_height + 1
- } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
- return current_height + 3
- }
- current_height + 15
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
- for i in 0..48 {
- if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
- return i
- }
- }
- 48
- }
-
- #[inline]
- fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
- let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
- for i in 0..bits {
- let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
- if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
- res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
- res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
- }
- }
- res
- }
-
- /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
- /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
- /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
- pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
- for i in 0..pos {
- let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
- if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
- }
- }
- if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
- return Ok(());
- }
- self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
-
- // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
- // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
- // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
- if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
- for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
- *source = None;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
- let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
- let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
- let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
- let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
-
- self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
- if k == htlc.payment_hash {
- return true
- }
- }
- if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if k == htlc.payment_hash {
- return true
- }
- }
- }
- let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
- if *cn < min_idx {
- return true
- }
- true
- } else { false };
- if contains {
- remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
- }
- false
- });
- }
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
- /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
- /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
- /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
- // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
- // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
- // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
- // timeouts)
- for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
- self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
- }
-
- let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
- log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
- log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
- if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
- *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
- }
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
- self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
- //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some(old_points) => {
- if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
- } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
- if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- } else {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- },
- None => {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
- }
- }
- }
-
- pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
- if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
- let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
- .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
- .into_script();
- if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
- self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
- }
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
- }
- }
-
- /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
- /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
- /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
- /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
- /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
- /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
- /// case of onchain HTLC tx
- pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
- assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
- self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
- self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
- txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
- tx: signed_commitment_tx,
- revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
- a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
- b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
- delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
- feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs,
- });
-
- if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
- *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
- } else {
- panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
- }
- }
-
- /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
- /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
- self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
- }
-
- /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
- /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
- /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
- pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
- if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
- let our_funding_info = funding_info;
- if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
- if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
- // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
- // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
- if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
- }
- } else {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
- unimplemented!();
- } else {
- return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
- }
- },
- }
- let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
- let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
- if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
- self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
- }
- if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
- self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
- }
- }
- }
- // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
- // local transactions to decide how to merge
- if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
- self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
- for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
- self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
- }
- if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
- }
- if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
- }
- self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
- self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
- }
-
- self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
- pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
- assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
- self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
- }
-
- /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
- /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
- /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
- /// provides slightly better privacy.
- /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
- /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
- pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
- *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
- pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
- self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
- self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
- }
-
- pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
- self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
- }
-
- pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
- *funding_info = None;
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
- },
- }
- }
-
- /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
- pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
- match funding_info {
- &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
- &None => None
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- return None;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
- /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
- /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
- /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
- pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
- for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
- }
- }
- res
- }
-
- /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
- //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
-
- // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
- U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
-
- macro_rules! write_option {
- ($thing: expr) => {
- match $thing {
- &Some(ref t) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- t.write(writer)?;
- },
- &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
- }
- }
- }
-
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
- prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
- match funding_info {
- &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
- writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
- script.write(writer)?;
- },
- &None => {
- debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
- },
- }
- current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
-
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
- writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
- match second_option {
- Some(second_pubkey) => {
- writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
- },
- None => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
- },
- }
- },
- None => {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
- },
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
-
- for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
- writer.write_all(secret)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
- }
-
- macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
- ($htlc_output: expr) => {
- writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
- writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
- $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- write_option!(htlc_source);
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
- (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for script in txouts.iter() {
- script.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- if for_local_storage {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
- }
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
- }
-
- macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
- ($local_tx: expr) => {
- if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
- match e {
- encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
- _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
- writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
- } else {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- }
- write_option!(htlc_source);
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- if for_local_storage {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
- for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
- writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
- }
-
- self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
- self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
- local_key.write(writer)?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
- outpoint.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
- match claim_tx_data.1 {
- TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- script.write(writer)?;
- pubkey.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
- if *is_htlc {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- }
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- },
- TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- script.write(writer)?;
- key.write(writer)?;
- preimage.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- },
- TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
- writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
- script.write(writer)?;
- sigs.0.write(writer)?;
- sigs.1.write(writer)?;
- preimage.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
- }
- }
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
- for ev in events.iter() {
- match *ev {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- outpoint.write(writer)?;
- },
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
- htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
- ///
- /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
- /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
- /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
- /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
- /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.write(writer, true)
- }
-
- /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
- ///
- /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
- /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
- /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
- /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
- /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.write(writer, false)
- }
-
- /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
- pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
- for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
- if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
- return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
- }
- }
- assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
- None
- }
-
- pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
- //TODO This can be optimized?
- let mut min = 1 << 48;
- for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
- if idx < min {
- min = idx;
- }
- }
- min
- }
-
- pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- self.current_remote_commitment_number
- }
-
- pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
- } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
- /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
- /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
- /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
- /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
- /// revoked remote commitment tx
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
- // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
- // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
- let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
-
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
- let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
-
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
- }
- };
- }
-
- let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
- if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
- let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
- Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
- None)
- },
- };
- let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
- let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
- Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
- };
-
- let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
- let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
-
- let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
- // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
- // script_pubkey version.
- let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
- Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
- } else { None };
-
- let mut total_value = 0;
- let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
-
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- inputs.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: idx as u32,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
- inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
- total_value += outp.value;
- } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
- key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
- {
- let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
- chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
- };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
- let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
- $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
- } else {
- $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
- }
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
- (redeemscript, revocation_key)
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
-
- for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
- inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
- total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
- assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
- }
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
- // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
- log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
- ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
- if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != **source
- },
- _ => return true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
- }
- if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
- }
- }
- // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
- }
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
-
- let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: total_value,
- });
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: inputs,
- output: outputs,
- };
-
- let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
-
- let mut used_feerate;
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
- }
-
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
-
- for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
- let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); }
- }
- }
- assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
-
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
- } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
- // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
- // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
- // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
- // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
- // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
- // insert it here.
- watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
- self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
-
- log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
- ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
- if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
- $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
- // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
- // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
- // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
- // payment_preimage.
- // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
- // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
- // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
- // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
- // need to here.
- for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
- if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
- continue $id;
- }
- }
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != **source
- },
- _ => return true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
- }
- if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- let revocation_point_option =
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
- else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
- if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
- } else { None };
- if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
- let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
- },
- };
- let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
- Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
- };
-
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
- if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
- key: local_key,
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
- }
- break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
- }
- }
-
- let mut total_value = 0;
- let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
-
- macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
- {
- let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
- let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- $input.witness.push($preimage);
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
- (redeemscript, htlc_key)
- }
- }
- }
-
- for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
- tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- if htlc.offered {
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
- inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
- total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
- }
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if !htlc.offered {
- // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
- // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
- assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
- //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
- }
- }
- txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
- }
- }
- }
-
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
-
- let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: total_value
- });
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: inputs,
- output: outputs,
- };
-
- let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
-
- let mut used_feerate;
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
- }
-
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
-
- for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); }
- }
- }
- assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
- }
- }
- } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
- for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
- key: local_key.clone(),
- output: outp.clone(),
- });
- }
- }
- }
-
- (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
- if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
- return (None, None)
- }
-
- macro_rules! ignore_error {
- ( $thing : expr ) => {
- match $thing {
- Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (None, None)
- }
- };
- }
-
- let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
- let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
- },
- };
- let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
- None => return (None, None),
- Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
- };
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
- let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
-
- let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut amount = 0;
-
- if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
- inputs.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: htlc_txid,
- vout: 0,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- amount = tx.output[0].value;
- }
-
- if !inputs.is_empty() {
- let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: amount
- });
-
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: inputs,
- output: outputs,
- };
- let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
- return (None, None);
- }
-
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
-
- let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
- let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
- }
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
-
- assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
- let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
- let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); }
- }
- (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
- } else { (None, None) }
- }
-
- fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) {
- let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
-
- macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
- ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
- if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
- if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
- if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
- key: local_delayedkey,
- witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
- to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
- output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
- });
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
-
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
- let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
- for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
- if htlc.offered {
- log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
- let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
-
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
-
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
- let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
- htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
-
- add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
- res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
- } else {
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
- let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
-
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
-
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
-
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
- let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
- htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
-
- add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
- res.push(htlc_success_tx);
- }
- }
- watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
- } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
- }
- }
-
- (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
- }
-
- /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
- /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
- /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
- fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
- let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
- let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
- let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
-
- macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
- ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
- log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != $source
- },
- _ => return true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
- ($updates: expr) => {
- local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
- watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
- for claim in $updates.3 {
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
- let mut is_local_tx = false;
-
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_local_tx = true;
- log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
- is_local_tx = true;
- log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
- ($local_tx: expr) => {
- for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
- if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
- if let &Some(ref source) = source {
- wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if is_local_tx {
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
- }
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
- }
- }
-
- (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
- }
-
- /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
- fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
- if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
- let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
- let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
- for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
- if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
- return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
- output: output.clone(),
- });
- }
- }
- }
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
- // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
- }
- }
- }
- None
- }
-
- /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
- /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
- /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
- /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
- /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
- /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
- /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
- /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
- /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
- pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
- if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
- // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
- // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
- },
- _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
- };
- res
- } else {
- Vec::new()
- }
- }
-
- fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
- let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
- for tx in txn_matched {
- if tx.input.len() == 1 {
- // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
- // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
- // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
- // filters.
- let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
- let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
- let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
- funding_info.clone()
- }
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
- if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
- let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
- txn = remote_txn;
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- if txn.is_empty() {
- let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
- txn = local_txn;
- if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
- }
- }
- }
- if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
- if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
- spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
- }
- }
- } else {
- if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
- if let Some(tx) = tx {
- txn.push(tx);
- }
- if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
- spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
- }
- }
- }
- for tx in txn.iter() {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
- }
- }
- // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
- // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
- // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
- let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
- if updated.len() > 0 {
- htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
- }
- for inp in &tx.input {
- if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
- return outpoint != inp.previous_output
- },
- _ => return true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
- if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
- let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
- pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
- }
- for tx in txs {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- }
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
- spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
- pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
- if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
- watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
- }
- for tx in txs {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- for claim in pending_claims {
- match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
- }
- }
- if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
- for ev in events {
- match ev {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
- self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
- },
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
- log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
- htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
- },
- }
- }
- }
- //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
- (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
- }
-
- fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
- if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
- //We may discard:
- //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
- //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
- }
- self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true });
- self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
- }
-
- pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
- // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
- // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
- // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
- // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
- // broadcast if we go on-chain.
- // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
- // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
- // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
- // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
- // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
- for ref htlc in $htlcs {
- // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
- // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
- // time out the HTLC first.
- // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
- // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
- // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
- // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
- // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
- // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
- // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
- // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
- // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
- // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
- // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
- // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
- // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
- // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
- // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
- // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
- // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
- // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
- let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
- if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
- (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
- log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- return true;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
- }
-
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
- }
- }
- if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
- }
- }
- }
-
- false
- }
-
- /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
- /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
- fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
- let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
-
- 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
- let mut payment_data = None;
- let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
- || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
- let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
- let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
-
- macro_rules! log_claim {
- ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
- // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
- // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
- // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
- // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
- let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
- if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
- (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
- log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
- $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
- } else {
- log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
- $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
- if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
- if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
- ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
- if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
- for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
- if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
- if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
- log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
- payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! scan_commitment {
- ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
- for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
- if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
- if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
- // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
- // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
- // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
- // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
- // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
- payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
- } else if !$local_tx {
- if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
- }
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
- check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
- }
- }
- }
- if payment_data.is_none() {
- log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
- continue 'outer_loop;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our latest local commitment tx", true);
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
- scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
- "our previous local commitment tx", true);
- }
- }
- if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
- scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
- "remote commitment tx", false);
- }
-
- // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
- // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
- if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
- let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- if accepted_preimage_claim {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
- htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
- } else if offered_preimage_claim {
- payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
- htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
- } else {
- log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- let e = entry.get_mut();
- e.retain(|ref event| {
- match **event {
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- return htlc_update.0 != source
- },
- _ => return true
- }
- });
- e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
- }
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- }
- htlc_updated
- }
-}
-
-const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
- fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
- ($key: expr) => {
- match $key {
- Ok(res) => res,
- Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- }
- }
- }
-
- let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
- return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
- }
-
- let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
-
- let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
- // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
- let outpoint = OutPoint {
- txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
- index: Readable::read(reader)?,
- };
- let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
- let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Storage::Local {
- revocation_base_key,
- htlc_base_key,
- delayed_payment_base_key,
- payment_base_key,
- shutdown_pubkey,
- prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
- latest_per_commitment_point,
- funding_info,
- current_remote_commitment_txid,
- prev_remote_commitment_txid,
- }
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
-
- let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
- let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
-
- let their_cur_revocation_points = {
- let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
- if first_idx == 0 {
- None
- } else {
- let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
- if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
- } else {
- Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
- }
- }
- };
-
- let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
-
- let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
- for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
- *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
- *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
- }
-
- macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
- () => {
- {
- let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
- for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
- let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
- htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
- }
- if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
- let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
- let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
- let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
- for _ in 0..outputs_count {
- outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
- if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
- let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
- if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! read_local_tx {
- () => {
- {
- let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
- Ok(tx) => tx,
- Err(e) => match e {
- encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- },
- };
-
- if tx.input.is_empty() {
- // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
-
- let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
- let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
- let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
- }
-
- LocalSignedTx {
- txid: tx.txid(),
- tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
- htlc_outputs: htlcs
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(read_local_tx!())
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
-
- let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- Some(read_local_tx!())
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
-
- let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
-
- let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
- for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
- let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
- }
- }
-
- let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => {
- let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
- }
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
-
- let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
- let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => true,
- 1 => false,
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- TxMaterial::Revoked {
- script,
- pubkey,
- key,
- is_htlc,
- amount
- }
- },
- 1 => {
- let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
- script,
- key,
- preimage,
- amount
- }
- },
- 2 => {
- let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
- TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
- script,
- sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
- preimage,
- amount
- }
- }
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
- our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height));
- }
-
- let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
- let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..events_len {
- let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => {
- let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::Claim {
- outpoint
- }
- },
- 1 => {
- let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
- htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
- }
- },
- _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
- };
- events.push(ev);
- }
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
- }
-
- Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
- commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
-
- key_storage,
- their_htlc_base_key,
- their_delayed_payment_base_key,
- their_cur_revocation_points,
-
- our_to_self_delay,
- their_to_self_delay,
-
- old_secrets,
- remote_claimable_outpoints,
- remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
- remote_hash_commitment_number,
-
- prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
- current_remote_commitment_number,
-
- payment_preimages,
-
- destination_script,
- to_remote_rescue,
-
- our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
-
- onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
-
- last_block_hash,
- secp_ctx,
- logger,
- }))
- }
-
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
- use bitcoin::util::bip143;
- use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
- use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
- use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
- use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
- use hex;
- use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
- use ln::chan_utils;
- use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
- use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
- use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
- use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
- use std::sync::Arc;
-
- #[test]
- fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
- // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
- let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
- let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
-
- macro_rules! test_secrets {
- () => {
- let mut idx = 281474976710655;
- for secret in secrets.iter() {
- assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
- idx -= 1;
- }
- assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
- assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
- };
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret correct sequence
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #1 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #3 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #5 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #7 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
-
- {
- // insert_secret #8 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- secrets.clear();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
- test_secrets!();
-
- secrets.push([0; 32]);
- secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
- assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
- "Previous secret did not match new one");
- }
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_prune_preimages() {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
-
- let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
- macro_rules! dummy_keys {
- () => {
- {
- TxCreationKeys {
- per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
- revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
- }
- }
- }
- }
- let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
-
- let mut preimages = Vec::new();
- {
- let mut rng = thread_rng();
- for _ in 0..20 {
- let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
- rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
- let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
- preimages.push((preimage, hash));
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
- ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut res = Vec::new();
- for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
- res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: true,
- amount_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry: 0,
- payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
- transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
- }, None));
- }
- res
- }
- }
- }
- macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
- ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
- {
- let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
- let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
- res
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
- ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
- for preimage in $preimages_slice {
- assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
- }
- }
- }
-
- // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
- // old state.
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
- monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
-
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
- monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
- for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
- monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
- }
-
- // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
- let mut secret = [0; 32];
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
-
- // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
-
- // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
- // previous commitment tx's preimages too
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
-
- // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
- monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
- secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
- monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
- assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
- test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
- }
-
- #[test]
- fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
- // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
- // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
-
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
- let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
-
- macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
- let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
- offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
- amount_msat: 0,
- cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
- payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
- transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
- };
- let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
- let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
- if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
- $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
- } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
- $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
- } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
- $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
- } else {
- $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
- }
- $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
- println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
- println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
- println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
- }
- }
-
- let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
- let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
-
- // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
- let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
- for i in 0..4 {
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: i,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- }
- claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
- value: 0,
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
- for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
- // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- for i in 0..4 {
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: i,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- }
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
- for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
-
- // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
- claim_tx.input.clear();
- sum_actual_sigs = 0;
- claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid,
- vout: 0,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
- let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
- for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
- sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
- }
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
- }
-
- // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
-}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff