[Java] Update auto-generated Java bindings for 0.0.116
[ldk-java] / src / main / java / org / ldk / structs / CoinSelectionSource.java
diff --git a/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/CoinSelectionSource.java b/src/main/java/org/ldk/structs/CoinSelectionSource.java
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+package org.ldk.structs;
+
+import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
+import org.ldk.enums.*;
+import org.ldk.util.*;
+import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.lang.ref.Reference;
+import javax.annotation.Nullable;
+
+/**
+ * An abstraction over a bitcoin wallet that can perform coin selection over a set of UTXOs and can
+ * sign for them. The coin selection method aims to mimic Bitcoin Core's `fundrawtransaction` RPC,
+ * which most wallets should be able to satisfy. Otherwise, consider implementing [`WalletSource`],
+ * which can provide a default implementation of this trait when used with [`Wallet`].
+ */
+@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
+public class CoinSelectionSource extends CommonBase {
+       final bindings.LDKCoinSelectionSource bindings_instance;
+       CoinSelectionSource(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
+       private CoinSelectionSource(bindings.LDKCoinSelectionSource arg) {
+               super(bindings.LDKCoinSelectionSource_new(arg));
+               this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
+               this.bindings_instance = arg;
+       }
+       @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
+       protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
+               if (ptr != 0) { bindings.CoinSelectionSource_free(ptr); } super.finalize();
+       }
+       /**
+        * Destroys the object, freeing associated resources. After this call, any access
+        * to this object may result in a SEGFAULT or worse.
+        *
+        * You should generally NEVER call this method. You should let the garbage collector
+        * do this for you when it finalizes objects. However, it may be useful for types
+        * which represent locks and should be closed immediately to avoid holding locks
+        * until the GC runs.
+        */
+       public void destroy() {
+               if (ptr != 0) { bindings.CoinSelectionSource_free(ptr); }
+               ptr = 0;
+       }
+       public static interface CoinSelectionSourceInterface {
+               /**
+                * Performs coin selection of a set of UTXOs, with at least 1 confirmation each, that are
+                * available to spend. Implementations are free to pick their coin selection algorithm of
+                * choice, as long as the following requirements are met:
+                * 
+                * 1. `must_spend` contains a set of [`Input`]s that must be included in the transaction
+                * throughout coin selection, but must not be returned as part of the result.
+                * 2. `must_pay_to` contains a set of [`TxOut`]s that must be included in the transaction
+                * throughout coin selection. In some cases, like when funding an anchor transaction, this
+                * set is empty. Implementations should ensure they handle this correctly on their end,
+                * e.g., Bitcoin Core's `fundrawtransaction` RPC requires at least one output to be
+                * provided, in which case a zero-value empty OP_RETURN output can be used instead.
+                * 3. Enough inputs must be selected/contributed for the resulting transaction (including the
+                * inputs and outputs noted above) to meet `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`.
+                * 
+                * Implementations must take note that [`Input::satisfaction_weight`] only tracks the weight of
+                * the input's `script_sig` and `witness`. Some wallets, like Bitcoin Core's, may require
+                * providing the full input weight. Failing to do so may lead to underestimating fee bumps and
+                * delaying block inclusion.
+                * 
+                * The `claim_id` must map to the set of external UTXOs assigned to the claim, such that they
+                * can be re-used within new fee-bumped iterations of the original claiming transaction,
+                * ensuring that claims don't double spend each other. If a specific `claim_id` has never had a
+                * transaction associated with it, and all of the available UTXOs have already been assigned to
+                * other claims, implementations must be willing to double spend their UTXOs. The choice of
+                * which UTXOs to double spend is left to the implementation, but it must strive to keep the
+                * set of other claims being double spent to a minimum.
+                */
+               Result_CoinSelectionNoneZ select_confirmed_utxos(byte[] claim_id, Input[] must_spend, TxOut[] must_pay_to, int target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight);
+               /**
+                * Signs and provides the full witness for all inputs within the transaction known to the
+                * trait (i.e., any provided via [`CoinSelectionSource::select_confirmed_utxos`]).
+                */
+               Result_TransactionNoneZ sign_tx(byte[] tx);
+       }
+       private static class LDKCoinSelectionSourceHolder { CoinSelectionSource held; }
+       public static CoinSelectionSource new_impl(CoinSelectionSourceInterface arg) {
+               final LDKCoinSelectionSourceHolder impl_holder = new LDKCoinSelectionSourceHolder();
+               impl_holder.held = new CoinSelectionSource(new bindings.LDKCoinSelectionSource() {
+                       @Override public long select_confirmed_utxos(byte[] claim_id, long[] must_spend, long[] must_pay_to, int target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight) {
+                               int must_spend_conv_7_len = must_spend.length;
+                               Input[] must_spend_conv_7_arr = new Input[must_spend_conv_7_len];
+                               for (int h = 0; h < must_spend_conv_7_len; h++) {
+                                       long must_spend_conv_7 = must_spend[h];
+                                       org.ldk.structs.Input must_spend_conv_7_hu_conv = null; if (must_spend_conv_7 < 0 || must_spend_conv_7 > 4096) { must_spend_conv_7_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.Input(null, must_spend_conv_7); }
+                                       if (must_spend_conv_7_hu_conv != null) { must_spend_conv_7_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
+                                       must_spend_conv_7_arr[h] = must_spend_conv_7_hu_conv;
+                               }
+                               int must_pay_to_conv_7_len = must_pay_to.length;
+                               TxOut[] must_pay_to_conv_7_arr = new TxOut[must_pay_to_conv_7_len];
+                               for (int h = 0; h < must_pay_to_conv_7_len; h++) {
+                                       long must_pay_to_conv_7 = must_pay_to[h];
+                                       TxOut must_pay_to_conv_7_conv = new TxOut(null, must_pay_to_conv_7);
+                                       must_pay_to_conv_7_arr[h] = must_pay_to_conv_7_conv;
+                               }
+                               Result_CoinSelectionNoneZ ret = arg.select_confirmed_utxos(claim_id, must_spend_conv_7_arr, must_pay_to_conv_7_arr, target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight);
+                               Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
+                               long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+                               return result;
+                       }
+                       @Override public long sign_tx(byte[] tx) {
+                               Result_TransactionNoneZ ret = arg.sign_tx(tx);
+                               Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
+                               long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+                               return result;
+                       }
+               });
+               return impl_holder.held;
+       }
+       /**
+        * Performs coin selection of a set of UTXOs, with at least 1 confirmation each, that are
+        * available to spend. Implementations are free to pick their coin selection algorithm of
+        * choice, as long as the following requirements are met:
+        * 
+        * 1. `must_spend` contains a set of [`Input`]s that must be included in the transaction
+        * throughout coin selection, but must not be returned as part of the result.
+        * 2. `must_pay_to` contains a set of [`TxOut`]s that must be included in the transaction
+        * throughout coin selection. In some cases, like when funding an anchor transaction, this
+        * set is empty. Implementations should ensure they handle this correctly on their end,
+        * e.g., Bitcoin Core's `fundrawtransaction` RPC requires at least one output to be
+        * provided, in which case a zero-value empty OP_RETURN output can be used instead.
+        * 3. Enough inputs must be selected/contributed for the resulting transaction (including the
+        * inputs and outputs noted above) to meet `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`.
+        * 
+        * Implementations must take note that [`Input::satisfaction_weight`] only tracks the weight of
+        * the input's `script_sig` and `witness`. Some wallets, like Bitcoin Core's, may require
+        * providing the full input weight. Failing to do so may lead to underestimating fee bumps and
+        * delaying block inclusion.
+        * 
+        * The `claim_id` must map to the set of external UTXOs assigned to the claim, such that they
+        * can be re-used within new fee-bumped iterations of the original claiming transaction,
+        * ensuring that claims don't double spend each other. If a specific `claim_id` has never had a
+        * transaction associated with it, and all of the available UTXOs have already been assigned to
+        * other claims, implementations must be willing to double spend their UTXOs. The choice of
+        * which UTXOs to double spend is left to the implementation, but it must strive to keep the
+        * set of other claims being double spent to a minimum.
+        */
+       public Result_CoinSelectionNoneZ select_confirmed_utxos(byte[] claim_id, Input[] must_spend, TxOut[] must_pay_to, int target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight) {
+               long ret = bindings.CoinSelectionSource_select_confirmed_utxos(this.ptr, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(claim_id, 32), must_spend != null ? Arrays.stream(must_spend).mapToLong(must_spend_conv_7 -> must_spend_conv_7 == null ? 0 : must_spend_conv_7.ptr).toArray() : null, must_pay_to != null ? Arrays.stream(must_pay_to).mapToLong(must_pay_to_conv_7 -> must_pay_to_conv_7.ptr).toArray() : null, target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(claim_id);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(must_spend);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(must_pay_to);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight);
+               if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+               Result_CoinSelectionNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_CoinSelectionNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+               for (Input must_spend_conv_7: must_spend) { if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(must_spend_conv_7); }; };
+               return ret_hu_conv;
+       }
+
+       /**
+        * Signs and provides the full witness for all inputs within the transaction known to the
+        * trait (i.e., any provided via [`CoinSelectionSource::select_confirmed_utxos`]).
+        */
+       public Result_TransactionNoneZ sign_tx(byte[] tx) {
+               long ret = bindings.CoinSelectionSource_sign_tx(this.ptr, tx);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
+               Reference.reachabilityFence(tx);
+               if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+               Result_TransactionNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_TransactionNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+               return ret_hu_conv;
+       }
+
+}