final bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner bindings_instance;
EcdsaChannelSigner(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
private EcdsaChannelSigner(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner arg, bindings.LDKChannelSigner ChannelSigner, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
- super(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(arg, ChannelSigner, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr()));
+ super(bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(arg, ChannelSigner, pubkeys.clone_ptr()));
this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
this.ptrs_to.add(ChannelSigner);
this.bindings_instance = arg;
* This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
*
* An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+ *
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
/**
* revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
* so).
+ *
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
/**
*
* `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
* (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
+ *
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
/**
* [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
* broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
*
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
* [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
* [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor);
/**
* detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
* channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
* BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
/**
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
* input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
+ *
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
/**
org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, inbound_htlc_preimages, outbound_htlc_preimages);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+ long result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_holder_commitment(long commitment_tx) {
org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+ long result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+ long result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+ long result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long htlc_descriptor) {
org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = null; if (htlc_descriptor < 0 || htlc_descriptor > 4096) { htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor(null, htlc_descriptor); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+ long result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+ long result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+ long result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+ long result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
@Override public long sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(long msg) {
org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg_hu_conv);
Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+ long result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
}
}, ChannelSigner.new_impl(ChannelSigner_impl, pubkeys).bindings_instance, pubkeys);
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*/
public Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] inbound_htlc_preimages, byte[][] outbound_htlc_preimages) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, inbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(inbound_htlc_preimages).map(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, outbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(outbound_htlc_preimages).map(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx.ptr, inbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(inbound_htlc_preimages).map(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null, outbound_htlc_preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(outbound_htlc_preimages).map(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(inbound_htlc_preimages);
* This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
*
* An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+ *
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
* revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
* so).
+ *
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
*
* `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
* (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
+ *
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
* [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
* broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
*
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
* [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
* [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, org.ldk.structs.HTLCDescriptor htlc_descriptor) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor == null ? 0 : htlc_descriptor.ptr);
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
* detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
* channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
* BIP 143 signature.
+ *
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
* chosen to forgo their output as dust.
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(closing_tx);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
* input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
+ *
+ * An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
+ * signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
+ * previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
+ * monitor.
+ *
+ * [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
* [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
*/
public Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
- long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
+ long ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, msg.ptr);
Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff