+++ /dev/null
-//! Various user-configurable channel limits and settings which ChannelManager
-//! applies for you.
-
-use ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-
-/// Top-level config which holds ChannelHandshakeLimits and ChannelConfig.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct UserConfig {
- /// Channel config that we propose to our counterparty.
- pub own_channel_config: ChannelHandshakeConfig,
- /// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel config settings.
- pub peer_channel_config_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits,
- /// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
- pub channel_options: ChannelConfig,
-}
-
-impl UserConfig {
- /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations (but with 0 relay fees!)
- pub fn new() -> Self{
- UserConfig {
- own_channel_config: ChannelHandshakeConfig::new(),
- peer_channel_config_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits::new(),
- channel_options: ChannelConfig::new(),
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// Configuration we set when applicable.
-#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- /// Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
- /// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
- /// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
- pub minimum_depth: u32,
- /// Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
- ///
- /// It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
- /// be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
- /// at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
- /// Default is BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you can
- /// tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
- ///
- /// Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
- /// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
- /// our channel.
- pub our_to_self_delay: u16,
-}
-
-impl ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- /// Provides sane defaults for `ChannelHandshakeConfig`
- pub fn new() -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- minimum_depth: 6,
- our_to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// Optional channel limits which are applied during channel creation.
-///
-/// These limits are only applied to our counterparty's limits, not our own.
-///
-/// Use 0/<type>::max_value() as appropriate to skip checking.
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct ChannelHandshakeLimits {
- /// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded, this is supplied by the sender and so
- /// only applies to inbound channels.
- pub min_funding_satoshis: u64,
- /// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
- /// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
- pub max_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
- /// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum value of pending HTLCs to them at any given
- /// time to limit their funds exposure to HTLCs. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
- pub min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
- /// The remote node will require we keep a certain amount in direct payment to ourselves at all
- /// time, ensuring that we are able to be punished if we broadcast an old state. This allows to
- /// you limit the amount which we will have to keep to ourselves (and cannot use for HTLCs).
- pub max_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
- /// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum number of pending HTLCs to them at any given
- /// time. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
- pub min_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- /// Outputs below a certain value will not be added to on-chain transactions. The dust value is
- /// required to always be higher than this value so this only applies to HTLC outputs (and
- /// potentially to-self outputs before any payments have been made).
- /// Thus, HTLCs below this amount plus HTLC transaction fees are not enforceable on-chain.
- /// This setting allows you to set a minimum dust limit for their commitment transactions,
- /// reflecting the reality that tiny outputs are not considered standard transactions and will
- /// not propagate through the Bitcoin network.
- /// Defaults to 546, or the current dust limit on the Bitcoin network.
- pub min_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- /// Maximum allowed threshold above which outputs will not be generated in their commitment
- /// transactions.
- /// HTLCs below this amount plus HTLC transaction fees are not enforceable on-chain.
- pub max_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
- /// Before a channel is usable the funding transaction will need to be confirmed by at least a
- /// certain number of blocks, specified by the node which is not the funder (as the funder can
- /// assume they aren't going to double-spend themselves).
- /// This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait. Defaults to
- /// 144 blocks or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
- pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
- /// Set to force the incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
- /// ChannelConfig.
- /// Defaults to true to make the default that no announced channels are possible (which is
- /// appropriate for any nodes which are not online very reliably).
- pub force_announced_channel_preference: bool,
- /// Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us.
- ///
- /// Not checking this value would be a security issue, as our peer would be able to set it to
- /// max relative lock-time (a year) and we would "lose" money as it would be locked for a long time.
- /// Default is MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, which we also enforce as a maximum value
- /// so you can tweak config to reduce the loss of having useless locked funds (if your peer accepts)
- pub their_to_self_delay: u16
-}
-
-impl ChannelHandshakeLimits {
- /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations.
- ///
- /// Most additional limits are disabled except those with which specify a default in individual
- /// field documentation. Note that this may result in barely-usable channels, but since they
- /// are applied mostly only to incoming channels that's not much of a problem.
- pub fn new() -> Self {
- ChannelHandshakeLimits {
- min_funding_satoshis: 0,
- max_htlc_minimum_msat: <u64>::max_value(),
- min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
- max_channel_reserve_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
- min_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
- min_dust_limit_satoshis: 546,
- max_dust_limit_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
- max_minimum_depth: 144,
- force_announced_channel_preference: true,
- their_to_self_delay: MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
- }
- }
-}
-
-/// Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
-/// with our counterparty.
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
-pub struct ChannelConfig {
- /// Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
- /// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
- /// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
- pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
- /// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
- /// channel.
- ///
- /// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
- ///
- /// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
- /// channels unless ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preferences is set.
- ///
- /// This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
- pub announced_channel: bool,
- /// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
- /// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
- /// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
- ///
- /// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
- /// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
- /// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
- ///
- /// This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
- pub commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: bool
-}
-
-impl ChannelConfig {
- /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations (but with zero relay fees!).
- pub fn new() -> Self {
- ChannelConfig {
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
- announced_channel: false,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: true,
- }
- }
-}
-
-//Add write and readable traits to channelconfig
-impl_writeable!(ChannelConfig, 8+1+1, {
- fee_proportional_millionths,
- announced_channel,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey
-});
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff