X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/index.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=c_sharp%2Fsrc%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FBaseSign.cs;fp=c_sharp%2Fsrc%2Forg%2Fldk%2Fstructs%2FBaseSign.cs;h=9c908dfab715e6d518088d94f8e59f3a0dca2b29;hb=810f7404202e04f70db946ced7363b64ddaf4ce4;hp=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000;hpb=fa130da4108815a8b17c3c093a91fc3d83754a0f;p=ldk-java

diff --git a/c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/BaseSign.cs b/c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/BaseSign.cs
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+++ b/c_sharp/src/org/ldk/structs/BaseSign.cs
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+using org.ldk.impl;
+using org.ldk.enums;
+using org.ldk.util;
+using System;
+
+namespace org { namespace ldk { namespace structs {
+
+/**
+ * A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
+ * [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
+ * 
+ * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
+ * policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
+ * Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
+ * for an example of such policies.
+ */
+public class BaseSign : CommonBase {
+	internal readonly bindings.LDKBaseSign bindings_instance;
+	internal BaseSign(object _dummy, long ptr) : base(ptr) { bindings_instance = null; }
+	private BaseSign(bindings.LDKBaseSign arg, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) : base(bindings.LDKBaseSign_new(arg, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr())) {
+		this.ptrs_to.AddLast(arg);
+		this.bindings_instance = arg;
+	}
+	~BaseSign() {
+		if (ptr != 0) { bindings.BaseSign_free(ptr); }
+	}
+
+	public interface BaseSignInterface {
+		/**
+		 * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
+		 * 
+		 * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
+		 */
+		byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long _idx);
+		/**
+		 * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
+		 * 
+		 * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
+		 * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
+		 * 
+		 * May be called more than once for the same index.
+		 * 
+		 * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
+		 */
+		byte[] release_commitment_secret(long _idx);
+		/**
+		 * Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
+		 * 
+		 * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
+		 * secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
+		 * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
+		 * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+		 * 
+		 * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+		 * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+		 * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+		 * 
+		 * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+		 * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
+		 */
+		Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction _holder_tx, byte[][] _preimages);
+		/**
+		 * Returns an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
+		 * some [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`] types. This should be sufficient to identify this
+		 * [`BaseSign`] object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
+		 */
+		byte[] channel_keys_id();
+		/**
+		 * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
+		 * 
+		 * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
+		 * 
+		 * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
+		 * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+		 * 
+		 * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+		 * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+		 * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+		 * 
+		 * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+		 * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
+		 */
+		Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx, byte[][] _preimages);
+		/**
+		 * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
+		 * 
+		 * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
+		 * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
+		 */
+		Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, byte[] _secret);
+		/**
+		 * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+		 * 
+		 * This will be called
+		 * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
+		 * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
+		 * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
+		 * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
+		 * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
+		 * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
+		 * 
+		 * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
+		 * 
+		 * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+		 * 
+		 * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
+		 */
+		Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx);
+		/**
+		 * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
+		 * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+		 * 
+		 * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+		 * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+		 * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+		 * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+		 * 
+		 * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+		 * 
+		 * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+		 * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+		 * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
+		 * so).
+		 */
+		Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key);
+		/**
+		 * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
+		 * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+		 * 
+		 * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+		 * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+		 * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+		 * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+		 * 
+		 * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
+		 * signature.
+		 * 
+		 * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+		 * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+		 * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+		 * so).
+		 * 
+		 * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
+		 * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
+		 */
+		Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc);
+		/**
+		 * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
+		 * transaction, either offered or received.
+		 * 
+		 * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
+		 * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
+		 * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
+		 * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+		 * 
+		 * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
+		 * outputs.
+		 * 
+		 * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+		 * 
+		 * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
+		 * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
+		 * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
+		 * BIP 143 signature.
+		 */
+		Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc);
+		/**
+		 * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
+		 * 
+		 * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
+		 * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
+		 */
+		Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction _closing_tx);
+		/**
+		 * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
+		 * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
+		 */
+		Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] _anchor_tx, long _input);
+		/**
+		 * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka
+		 * node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants.
+		 * 
+		 * The first returned signature should be from our node secret key, the second from our
+		 * funding key.
+		 * 
+		 * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
+		 * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
+		 * protocol.
+		 */
+		Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement _msg);
+		/**
+		 * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
+		 * `counterparty_selected`/`holder_selected_contest_delay` and funding outpoint. Since these
+		 * are static channel data, they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set,
+		 * as LDK may call this method more than once.
+		 * 
+		 * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
+		 */
+		void provide_channel_parameters(ChannelTransactionParameters _channel_parameters);
+	}
+	private class LDKBaseSignHolder { internal BaseSign held; }
+	private class LDKBaseSignImpl : bindings.LDKBaseSign {
+		internal LDKBaseSignImpl(BaseSignInterface arg, LDKBaseSignHolder impl_holder) { this.arg = arg; this.impl_holder = impl_holder; }
+		private BaseSignInterface arg;
+		private LDKBaseSignHolder impl_holder;
+		public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long _idx) {
+			byte[] ret = arg.get_per_commitment_point(_idx);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 33);
+			return result;
+		}
+		public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long _idx) {
+			byte[] ret = arg.release_commitment_secret(_idx);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
+			return result;
+		}
+		public long validate_holder_commitment(long _holder_tx, byte[][] _preimages) {
+			org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction _holder_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_holder_tx < 0 || _holder_tx > 4096) { _holder_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, _holder_tx); }
+			Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_holder_commitment(_holder_tx_hu_conv, _preimages);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+			return result;
+		}
+		public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
+			byte[] ret = arg.channel_keys_id();
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
+			return result;
+		}
+		public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long _commitment_tx, byte[][] _preimages) {
+			org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); }
+			Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(_commitment_tx_hu_conv, _preimages);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+			return result;
+		}
+		public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long _idx, byte[] _secret) {
+			Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(_idx, _secret);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+			return result;
+		}
+		public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long _commitment_tx) {
+			org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction _commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_commitment_tx < 0 || _commitment_tx > 4096) { _commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, _commitment_tx); }
+			Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(_commitment_tx_hu_conv);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+			return result;
+		}
+		public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key) {
+			Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(_justice_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+			return result;
+		}
+		public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] _justice_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_key, long _htlc) {
+			org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc < 0 || _htlc > 4096) { _htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, _htlc); }
+			Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(_justice_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_key, _htlc_hu_conv);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+			return result;
+		}
+		public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] _htlc_tx, long _input, long _amount, byte[] _per_commitment_point, long _htlc) {
+			org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment _htlc_hu_conv = null; if (_htlc < 0 || _htlc > 4096) { _htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, _htlc); }
+			Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(_htlc_tx, _input, _amount, _per_commitment_point, _htlc_hu_conv);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+			return result;
+		}
+		public long sign_closing_transaction(long _closing_tx) {
+			org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction _closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (_closing_tx < 0 || _closing_tx > 4096) { _closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, _closing_tx); }
+			Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(_closing_tx_hu_conv);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+			return result;
+		}
+		public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] _anchor_tx, long _input) {
+			Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(_anchor_tx, _input);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+			return result;
+		}
+		public long sign_channel_announcement(long _msg) {
+			org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement _msg_hu_conv = null; if (_msg < 0 || _msg > 4096) { _msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, _msg); }
+			Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement(_msg_hu_conv);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+			long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
+			return result;
+		}
+		public void provide_channel_parameters(long _channel_parameters) {
+			org.ldk.structs.ChannelTransactionParameters _channel_parameters_hu_conv = null; if (_channel_parameters < 0 || _channel_parameters > 4096) { _channel_parameters_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelTransactionParameters(null, _channel_parameters); }
+			arg.provide_channel_parameters(_channel_parameters_hu_conv);
+				GC.KeepAlive(arg);
+		}
+	}
+	public static BaseSign new_impl(BaseSignInterface arg, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
+		LDKBaseSignHolder impl_holder = new LDKBaseSignHolder();
+		impl_holder.held = new BaseSign(new LDKBaseSignImpl(arg, impl_holder), pubkeys);
+		return impl_holder.held;
+	}
+	/**
+	 * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
+	 * 
+	 * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
+	 */
+	public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx) {
+		byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_get_per_commitment_point(this.ptr, idx);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(idx);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
+	 * 
+	 * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
+	 * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
+	 * 
+	 * May be called more than once for the same index.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
+	 */
+	public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx) {
+		byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_release_commitment_secret(this.ptr, idx);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(idx);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
+	 * 
+	 * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
+	 * secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
+	 * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
+	 * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+	 * 
+	 * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+	 * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+	 * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+	 * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_validate_holder_commitment(this.ptr, holder_tx == null ? 0 : holder_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? InternalUtils.mapArray(preimages, preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)) : null);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(holder_tx);
+		GC.KeepAlive(preimages);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(holder_tx); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Returns an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
+	 * some [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`] types. This should be sufficient to identify this
+	 * [`BaseSign`] object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
+	 */
+	public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
+		byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_channel_keys_id(this.ptr);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
+	 * 
+	 * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
+	 * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
+	 * 
+	 * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
+	 * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
+	 * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
+	 * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
+	 */
+	public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? InternalUtils.mapArray(preimages, preimages_conv_8 => InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)) : null);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx);
+		GC.KeepAlive(preimages);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
+	 * 
+	 * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
+	 * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
+	 */
+	public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(idx);
+		GC.KeepAlive(secret);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
+	 * 
+	 * This will be called
+	 * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
+	 * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
+	 * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
+	 * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
+	 * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
+	 * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
+	 * 
+	 * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
+	 * 
+	 * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
+	 * 
+	 * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
+	 */
+	public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(commitment_tx);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(commitment_tx); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
+	 * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+	 * 
+	 * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+	 * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+	 * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+	 * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+	 * 
+	 * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+	 * 
+	 * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+	 * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+	 * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
+	 * so).
+	 */
+	public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(justice_tx);
+		GC.KeepAlive(input);
+		GC.KeepAlive(amount);
+		GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_key);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
+	 * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
+	 * 
+	 * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
+	 * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
+	 * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
+	 * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+	 * 
+	 * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
+	 * signature.
+	 * 
+	 * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
+	 * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
+	 * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
+	 * so).
+	 * 
+	 * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
+	 * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
+	 */
+	public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(justice_tx);
+		GC.KeepAlive(input);
+		GC.KeepAlive(amount);
+		GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_key);
+		GC.KeepAlive(htlc);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
+	 * transaction, either offered or received.
+	 * 
+	 * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
+	 * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
+	 * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
+	 * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
+	 * 
+	 * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
+	 * outputs.
+	 * 
+	 * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
+	 * 
+	 * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
+	 * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
+	 * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
+	 * BIP 143 signature.
+	 */
+	public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(htlc_tx);
+		GC.KeepAlive(input);
+		GC.KeepAlive(amount);
+		GC.KeepAlive(per_commitment_point);
+		GC.KeepAlive(htlc);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(htlc); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
+	 * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
+	 */
+	public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(closing_tx);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(closing_tx); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
+	 * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
+	 */
+	public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(anchor_tx);
+		GC.KeepAlive(input);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka
+	 * node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants.
+	 * 
+	 * The first returned signature should be from our node secret key, the second from our
+	 * funding key.
+	 * 
+	 * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
+	 * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
+	 * protocol.
+	 */
+	public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_channel_announcement(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(msg);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(msg); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
+	 * `counterparty_selected`/`holder_selected_contest_delay` and funding outpoint. Since these
+	 * are static channel data, they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set,
+	 * as LDK may call this method more than once.
+	 * 
+	 * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
+	 */
+	public void provide_channel_parameters(org.ldk.structs.ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters) {
+		bindings.BaseSign_provide_channel_parameters(this.ptr, channel_parameters == null ? 0 : channel_parameters.ptr);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		GC.KeepAlive(channel_parameters);
+		if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(channel_parameters); };
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Frees any resources associated with this object given its this_arg pointer.
+	 * Does not need to free the outer struct containing function pointers and may be NULL is no resources need to be freed.
+	 */
+	public ChannelPublicKeys get_pubkeys() {
+		long ret = bindings.BaseSign_get_pubkeys(this.ptr);
+		GC.KeepAlive(this);
+		if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
+		org.ldk.structs.ChannelPublicKeys ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelPublicKeys(null, ret); }
+		if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); };
+		return ret_hu_conv;
+	}
+
+}
+} } }