use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Encodable, Decodable};
use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
use secp256k1;
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField};
+use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, LocalFeatures};
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
-use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT,HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
use ln::chan_utils;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use std;
use std::default::Default;
use std::{cmp,mem};
-use std::time::Instant;
use std::sync::{Arc};
#[cfg(test)]
Committed,
/// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
/// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
- RemoteRemoved,
+ RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
/// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
/// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
/// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
/// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
/// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
/// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
/// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
- AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
+ AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
}
struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
state: OutboundHTLCState,
source: HTLCSource,
- /// If we're in a removed state, set if they failed, otherwise None
- fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>,
}
/// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
- AddHTLC {
+ AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
// always outbound
amount_msat: u64,
cltv_expiry: u32,
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
source: HTLCSource,
onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
- time_created: Instant, //TODO: Some kind of timeout thing-a-majig
},
ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
/// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
/// dance.
PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
- /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating the user has told us they
- /// failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound
- /// messages until they've managed to do so.
+ /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
+ /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
+ /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
/// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
/// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
- /// Upon receipt of a channel_reestablish we have to figure out whether to send a
- /// revoke_and_ack first or a commitment update first. Generally, we prefer to send
- /// revoke_and_ack first, but if we had a pending commitment update of our own waiting on a
- /// remote revoke when we received the latest commitment update from the remote we have to make
- /// sure that commitment update gets resent first.
- received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: bool,
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
+ /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
+ /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
+ /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
+ /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
+ /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
+ /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
+ /// send it first.
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
- monitor_pending_order: Option<RAACommitmentOrder>,
monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
their_to_self_delay: u16,
- //implied by BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: our_to_self_delay: u16,
+ our_to_self_delay: u16,
#[cfg(test)]
pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
#[cfg(not(test))]
/// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
/// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
-/// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
-/// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
-#[cfg(not(test))]
-const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
-/// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
-const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 14;
/// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
1000 // TODO
}
- fn derive_minimum_depth(_channel_value_satoshis_msat: u64, _value_to_self_msat: u64) -> u32 {
- // Note that in order to comply with BOLT 7 announcement_signatures requirements this must
- // be at least 6.
- const CONF_TARGET: u32 = 12; //TODO: Should be much higher
- CONF_TARGET
- }
-
// Constructors:
pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, APIError> {
let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false);
if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
}
+ if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
+ }
let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
- &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
Ok(Channel {
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
- received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
channel_update_count: 1,
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
- monitor_pending_order: None,
monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
their_to_self_delay: 0,
+ our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
/// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
/// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
- pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
+ pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_local_features: LocalFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel, ChannelError> {
let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true);
let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
+ if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
+ }
+
// Check sanity of message fields:
if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
}
Channel::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
- if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
}
// Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
- if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
+ if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
}
// Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
- if config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
+ if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
}
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&chan_keys.revocation_base_key, &chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key,
- &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+ &chan_keys.htlc_base_key, &chan_keys.payment_base_key, &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
channel_monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(msg.to_self_delay);
+ let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
+ if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ Some(script.clone())
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
+ } else if script.len() == 0 {
+ None
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
+ }
+ },
+ // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
+ &OptionalField::Absent => {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
+ }
+ }
+ } else { None };
+
let mut chan = Channel {
user_id: user_id,
config: local_config,
cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
- received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa: false,
pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
channel_update_count: 1,
+ resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
- monitor_pending_order: None,
monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
+ our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
- minimum_depth: Channel::derive_minimum_depth(msg.funding_satoshis*1000, msg.push_msat),
+ minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
their_funding_pubkey: Some(msg.funding_pubkey),
their_revocation_basepoint: Some(msg.revocation_basepoint),
their_prev_commitment_point: None,
their_node_id: their_node_id,
- their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
+ their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
};
if include {
} else {
log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
match htlc.state {
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
- if htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
- value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
- }
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
+ value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
},
- OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
- if !generated_by_local && htlc.fail_reason.is_none() {
+ OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
+ if !generated_by_local {
value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
}
},
}
}
-
let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
- let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat - remote_htlc_total_msat) as i64 - value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
+ // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
+ // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
+ // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
+ // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
+ let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
+ assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
{
// Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
// channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
- // TODO: This should happen after fee calculation, but we don't handle that correctly
- // yet!
let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
} else {
let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
txouts.push((TxOut {
script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
- if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT },
+ if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
&keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
value: value_to_a as u64
}, None));
}
if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
+ log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
txouts.push((TxOut {
script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
.push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
}, None));
}
- transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
+ transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
+ if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
+ if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
+ a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
+ // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
+ // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
+ // may fail)!
+ .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
+ // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
+ // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
+ } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
+ } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
+ });
let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
}, ()));
}
- transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts);
+ transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
for out in txouts.drain(..) {
/// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
/// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
- chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
+ chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
}
fn create_htlc_tx_signature(&self, tx: &Transaction, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Result<(Script, Signature, bool), ChannelError> {
// Message handlers:
- pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
+ pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_local_features: LocalFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
// Check sanity of message fields:
if !self.channel_outbound {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
}
- if msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
+ if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
}
if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
}
// Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
- if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
+ if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
+ if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
+ if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
+ if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.channel_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.channel_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
+ if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
}
- if msg.minimum_depth > config.channel_limits.max_minimum_depth {
+ if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
}
+ let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_local_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
+ &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
+ if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
+ Some(script.clone())
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
+ } else if script.len() == 0 {
+ None
+ // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
+ } else {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
+ }
+ },
+ // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
+ &OptionalField::Absent => {
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
+ }
+ }
+ } else { None };
+
self.channel_monitor.set_their_base_keys(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint = Some(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint);
self.their_htlc_basepoint = Some(msg.htlc_basepoint);
self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
+ self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
self.channel_monitor.set_commitment_obscure_factor(obscure_factor);
if !self.channel_outbound {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
}
- if self.channel_state != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
+ if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
}
if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
self.last_local_commitment_txn = vec![local_initial_commitment_tx];
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
+ } else {
+ Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast"))
+ }
}
pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
self.channel_update_count += 1;
- } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
- // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
- self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
- self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
+ } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
+ // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
+ self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
+ self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
+ // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
+ (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
+ (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
}
(htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
}
+ /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
+ /// Doesn't bother handling the
+ /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
+ /// corner case properly.
+ pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
+ // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
+ (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
+ cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
+ }
+
pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
}
- //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
// Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
- return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight"));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value"));
}
// Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
// the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
// something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
- if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 {
+ // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
+ // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
+ // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
+ // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
+ // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
+ // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
+ // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
+ // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
+ // transaction).
+ let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
+ if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
}
if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved;
- htlc.fail_reason = fail_reason;
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
},
- OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved =>
+ OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
}
return Ok(&htlc.source);
}
}
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
- // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
- self.monitor_pending_order = None;
- }
-
self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_commitment_tx.0, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
}
}
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove;
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
need_our_commitment = true;
}
}
self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
- self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) != 0;
+ // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
+ // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
+ self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
// In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
// to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
- if !self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
- self.monitor_pending_order = Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst);
- }
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
// If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
+
let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
- self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = false;
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- // This is a response to our post-monitor-failed unfreeze messages, so we can clear the
- // monitor_pending_order requirement as we won't re-send the monitor_pending messages.
- self.monitor_pending_order = None;
- }
log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
} else { true }
});
pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke = htlc.state {
+ if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
+ if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
} else {
// They fulfilled, so we sent them money
if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
- } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
+ }
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
require_commitment = true;
}
}
// When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
// which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
// before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
+ self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
}
self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved = htlc.state {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
// They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
// commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
// the update upon reconnection.
/// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
/// updates are partially paused.
/// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
- /// which failed, with the order argument set to the type of call it represented (ie a
- /// commitment update or a revoke_and_ack generation). The messages which were generated from
- /// that original call must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead have been
- /// dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
- pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, order: RAACommitmentOrder, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
+ /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
+ /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
+ /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
+ pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
- self.monitor_pending_order = Some(order);
assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
/// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
/// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
/// to the remote side.
- pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
+ pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
+ let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
+
+ // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
+ // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
+ // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
+ // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
+ // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
+ // monitor was persisted.
+ let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
+ assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id(),
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ })
+ } else { None };
+
let mut forwards = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
let mut failures = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
- // Leave monitor_pending_order so we can order our channel_reestablish responses
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
- return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures);
+ return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
}
let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
- (raa, commitment_update, self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap(), forwards, failures)
+ let order = self.resend_order.clone();
+ log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
+ if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
+ if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
+ if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
+ match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
+ (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
}
pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
- update_fee: None, //TODO: We need to support re-generating any update_fees in the last commitment_signed!
+ update_fee: None,
commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
}
}
} else { None };
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- if self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 == 0 {
+ // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
+ self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
}
})
} else { None };
- let order = self.monitor_pending_order.clone().unwrap_or(if self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa {
- RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
- } else {
- RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
- });
-
if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
}
- if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 &&
- self.monitor_pending_order.is_none() { // monitor_pending_order indicates we're waiting on a response to a unfreeze
+ if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
// We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
// channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
// have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
- Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), order, shutdown_msg)),
- Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg)),
+ Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
+ Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
}
} else {
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
}
} else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
if required_revoke.is_some() {
if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, order, shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
}
- return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, order, shutdown_msg));
+ return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
} else {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
}
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
}
- //TODO: Testing purpose only, should be changed in another way after #81
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChannelKeys {
&self.local_keys
//they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
//a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
if need_commitment_update {
- let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
- return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- }));
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }));
+ } else {
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
}
}
}
channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
- to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Absent
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
}
}
channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
- to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
+ to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.funding_key),
revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key),
delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key),
htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key),
first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
- shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Absent
+ shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
}
}
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
- let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
+ let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.local_keys.funding_key);
Ok((msg, sig))
if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
}
- //TODO: Spec is unclear if this is per-direction or in total (I assume per direction):
// Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight"));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"));
}
// Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
// reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
- return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the reserve value"));
+ return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"));
}
//TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
source,
onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
- time_created: Instant::now(),
});
return Ok(None);
}
cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
source,
- fail_reason: None,
});
let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
}
}
for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove = htlc.state {
- htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
+ if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
+ Some(fail_reason.take())
+ } else { None } {
+ htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
}
}
+ self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa.write(writer)?;
-
let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
htlc.source.write(writer)?;
- write_option!(htlc.fail_reason);
match &htlc.state {
&OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
&OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
},
- &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved => {
+ &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
2u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
},
- &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => {
+ &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
},
- &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => {
+ &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4u8.write(writer)?;
+ write_option!(*fail_reason);
},
}
}
(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
match update {
- &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, time_created: _ } => {
+ &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
0u8.write(writer)?;
amount_msat.write(writer)?;
cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
payment_hash.write(writer)?;
source.write(writer)?;
onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
- // time_created is not serialized - we re-init the timeout upon deserialization
},
&HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ match self.resend_order {
+ RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
+ }
+
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
- match self.monitor_pending_order {
- None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
- Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
- Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst) => 2u8.write(writer)?,
- }
(self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
+ self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
source: Readable::read(reader)?,
- fail_reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
- 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved,
- 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove,
- 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
+ 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
},
});
payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
source: Readable::read(reader)?,
onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
- time_created: Instant::now(),
},
1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
});
}
- let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
-
- let monitor_pending_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
- 0 => None,
- 1 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst),
- 2 => Some(RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst),
+ let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
+ 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
+ let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
value_to_self_msat,
- received_commitment_while_awaiting_raa,
pending_inbound_htlcs,
pending_outbound_htlcs,
holding_cell_htlc_updates,
+ resend_order,
+
+ monitor_pending_funding_locked,
monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
- monitor_pending_order,
monitor_pending_forwards,
monitor_pending_failures,
their_htlc_minimum_msat,
our_htlc_minimum_msat,
their_to_self_delay,
+ our_to_self_delay,
their_max_accepted_htlcs,
minimum_depth,
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use bitcoin::util::hash::{Sha256dHash, Hash160};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
use hex;
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+ use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
use std::sync::Arc;
fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
- let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::from_data(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
+ let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
}
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
- fail_reason: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
- fail_reason: None,
};
out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
out
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface};
-use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
-use chain::keysinterface;
-use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
-use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor};
-use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
+use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor, KeysManager};
+use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
+use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
+use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, Channel, ChannelError};
use ln::onion_utils;
use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate, LocalFeatures, ErrorAction};
use util::test_utils;
use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::errors::APIError;
use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
use util::config::UserConfig;
-use util::rng;
-use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash};
+use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin::util::address::Address;
use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey};
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType, OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use std::default::Default;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
-use std::time::Instant;
use std::mem;
+use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
+
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
#[test]
fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
// balancing
fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
// Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
// crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
// balancing
#[test]
fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
// A B
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id);
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
let channel_value = 1888;
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
let feerate = 260;
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
// balancing
#[test]
fn test_update_fee() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_id = chan.2;
// A B
#[test]
fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() {
// Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]);
#[test]
fn updates_shutdown_wait() {
// Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
#[test]
fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() {
// Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) {
// Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of
// messages delivered prior to disconnect
- let nodes = create_network(3);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000);
fn fake_network_test() {
// Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
// tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
- let nodes = create_network(4);
+ let nodes = create_network(4, &[None, None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
// Add a new channel that skips 3
- let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
+ let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
// Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
- let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
+ let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Send some payments across both channels
let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
// Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
// to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
// commitment dance rounds.
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let mut payments = Vec::new();
for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
// Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
// claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
- let mut nodes = create_network(6);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(6, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
}
fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) {
- use util::rng;
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use ln::msgs::HandleError;
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
match err {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight"),
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"),
_ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
}
}
let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1);
let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap();
match err {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the reserve value"),
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
_ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
}
}
{
let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1);
match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the reserve value"),
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
_ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
}
}
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&{
let mut session_key = [0; 32];
- rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
session_key
}).expect("RNG is bad!");
{
let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1);
match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() {
- APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the reserve value"),
+ APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"),
_ => panic!("Unknown error variants"),
}
}
do_channel_reserve_test(true);
}
+#[test]
+fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
+ // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
+ // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
+ // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
+ // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
+ // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
+ // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
+ // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
+ // To test this we:
+ // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
+ // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
+ // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
+ // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
+ // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
+ // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
+ // * deliver the first fulfill from B
+ // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
+ // claim,
+ // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
+ // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
+ // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
+ // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
+ // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
+ // Route the first two HTLCs.
+ let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
+ let (payment_preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
+
+ // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
+ let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+ let send_1 = {
+ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+
+ // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
+ // initial fulfill/CS.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
+ // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
+ // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
+ // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
+ // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
+ // on-chain as necessary).
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, 100000);
+
+ // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
+ // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
+ // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
+ let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]);
+ let send_2 = {
+ let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 10000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
+ };
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
+ expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, 10000);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
+}
+
#[test]
fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
// Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
// tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
- let nodes = create_network(5);
+ let nodes = create_network(5, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
- let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
{
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
- for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 {
+ for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1 {
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}
fn test_justice_tx() {
// Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let mut alice_config = UserConfig::new();
+ alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
+ let mut bob_config = UserConfig::new();
+ bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
// Create some new channels:
- let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
// We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
// Create some new channels:
- let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
fn revoked_output_claim() {
// Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
// transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
#[test]
fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
// Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
// Create some new channel:
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
#[test]
fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
// Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
}
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 22); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + 5 * (1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx)
assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcasted by ChannelManger
assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
+ for i in 12..22 {
+ if i % 2 == 0 { assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[i]); } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[i]); }
+ }
+
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
// the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
// PaymentSent event).
- let nodes = create_network(3);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
// \ \
// B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
- let nodes = create_network(3);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
// Create some intial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
}
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
// Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
// and fail backward accordingly.
- let nodes = create_network(3);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
// * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
// and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
// commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
// Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 });
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
}
- nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
// Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
// ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id);
#[test]
fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
// Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap();
// Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
{
let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
- monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap()
+ monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), 0)).unwrap()
.provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage);
}
nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]);
#[test]
fn test_unconf_chan() {
// After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1);
header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
headers.push(header.clone());
}
+ let mut height = 99;
while !headers.is_empty() {
- nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap());
+ nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap(), height);
+ height -= 1;
}
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
#[test]
fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
// Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
- let nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) {
// Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
if messages_delivered == 0 {
- create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
+ create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
} else {
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
}
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
#[test]
fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
// Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
// Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
// commitment_updates when we disconnect.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() {
//Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
+ let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
macro_rules! sign_msg {
($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
- let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
+ let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key);
let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!();
- unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
+ unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]);
sign_msg!(unsigned_msg);
assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
let config = UserConfig::new();
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
#[test]
fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = {
let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor);
#[test]
fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
// Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
- let mut nodes = create_network(4);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
- let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(4, &[None, None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
}
- nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 })));
let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
let mut read = &serialized[..];
}
let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
+ let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())));
let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: UserConfig::new(),
keys_manager,
};
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key);
- let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
+ let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&::bitcoin::PublicKey{compressed: true, key: remotepubkey}, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key);
spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der().to_vec());
let secret = {
match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) {
Ok(master_key) => {
- match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) {
+ match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx).expect("key space exhausted")) {
Ok(key) => key,
Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"),
}
let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key;
let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey();
let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap();
- let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key);
+ let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.private_key.key);
spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
+ spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.key.serialize().to_vec());
txn.push(spend_tx);
},
}
#[test]
fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
// Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
// to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
// Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
// to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
// Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
// gets broadcast.
- let nodes = create_network(3);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
// Topology : A --> B --> C
// We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
- let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
*nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 200, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
#[test]
fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
// - C - D -
// B / \ F
// And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
- let nodes = create_network(6);
+ let nodes = create_network(6, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Rebalance and check output sanity...
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
} else {
nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
}
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[2].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
#[test]
fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
// Create some initial channels
- let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
#[test]
fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
}
fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
}
fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
// to "time out" the HTLC.
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+ for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
}
}
fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
- let nodes = create_network(3);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
// Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
// in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
}
let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
+ for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 {
nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new());
header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash();
}
macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward {
($node: expr) => {{
expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable);
- $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now();
$node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
}}
}
msgs::ChannelUpdate {
signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()),
contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
- chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]),
+ chain_hash: Sha256dHash::hash(&vec![0u8][..]),
short_channel_id: 0,
timestamp: 0,
flags: 0,
const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
for node in nodes.iter() {
*node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&[3; 32]).unwrap());
}
- let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2)];
+ let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new()), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new())];
let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
// positve case
}, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()}));
}, false, Some(PERM|15), None);
run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
- let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1;
+ let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1;
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]);
}, || {}, true, Some(17), None);
#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
//Force duplicate channel ids
for node in nodes.iter() {
*node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
let push_msat=10001;
nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).unwrap();
let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
- nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel).unwrap();
//Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42).is_err());
#[test]
fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
- let nodes = create_network(2);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
// BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
//BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
//BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let mut route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
//BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
//It is enforced when constructing a route.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 0);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000000, 500000001).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
//BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
//BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
//BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().their_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
//BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
let channel_value = 100000;
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash);
if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight");
+ assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept");
} else {
assert!(false);
}
#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
//BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
{
let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
//BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let their_channel_reserve = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).channel_reserve_msat;
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
//BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
//BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&{
let mut session_key = [0; 32];
- rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
+ let mut rng = thread_rng();
+ rng.fill_bytes(&mut session_key);
session_key
}).expect("RNG is bad!");
#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
//OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err {
- assert_eq!(err,"Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight");
+ assert_eq!(err,"Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value");
} else {
assert!(false);
}
#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
//BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
//BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
// We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
// after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
//BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
//BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
//BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
//BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
//BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
- let nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
//BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
- let mut nodes = create_network(2);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap();
//BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
// * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
- let mut nodes = create_network(3);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
- create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
+
+fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
+ // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
+ // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
+ // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+ let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
+ let as_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+ // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
+ let as_last_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
+ // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ if announce_latest {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ } else {
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ }
+
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ // Only 2 PaymentFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let mut first_failed = false;
+ for event in events {
+ match event {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
+ assert!(!first_failed);
+ first_failed = true;
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
+ }
+ }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+ do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
+ do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_no_failure_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
+ // Transaction filters for failing back dust htlc based on local commitment txn infos has been
+ // prone to error, we test here that a dummy transaction don't fail them.
+
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ // Rebalance a bit
+ send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
+
+ let as_dust_limit = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
+ let (preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (preimage_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], as_dust_limit*1000);
+
+ // Build a dummy invalid transaction trying to spend a commitment tx
+ let input = TxIn {
+ previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ };
+
+ let outp = TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
+ value: 10000,
+ };
+
+ let dummy_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: vec![input],
+ output: vec![outp]
+ };
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.block_connected(&header, 1, &[&dummy_tx], &[1;1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
+ // We broadcast a few more block to check everything is all right
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, 20, 1, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 0);
+
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], preimage_1);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], preimage_2);
+}
+
+fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
+ // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
+ // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
+
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, None, None]);
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+
+ let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis;
+
+ let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
+ let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+
+ let as_commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+ let bs_commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+
+ // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
+ if revoked {
+ let (payment_preimage_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
+ }
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
+ if local {
+ // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&as_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
+ let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
+ let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&bs_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
+ let parent_hash = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 2, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let header_2 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: parent_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ if !revoked {
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
+ nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header_2, 7, &[&timeout_tx[0]], &[1; 1]);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
+ let header_3 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_2.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1, 8, true, header_3.bitcoin_hash());
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else {
+ // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
+ // commitment tx
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ let first;
+ match events[0] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
+ else { first = false; }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
+ if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
+ else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
+ do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_upfront_shutdown_script() {
+ // BOLT 2 : Option upfront shutdown script, if peer commit its closing_script at channel opening
+ // enforce it at shutdown message
+
+ let mut config = UserConfig::new();
+ config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = false;
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &[None, Some(config), None]);
+
+ // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it changes at closing, we refuse to sign
+ let flags = LocalFeatures::new();
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ // Test we enforce upfront_scriptpbukey if by providing a diffrent one at closing that we disconnect peer
+ if let Err(error) = nodes[2].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {
+ if let Some(error) = error.action {
+ match error {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data,"Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey");
+ },
+ _ => { assert!(false); }
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it doesn't change at closing, we sign
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ // We test that in case of peer committing upfront to a script, if it oesn't change at closing, we sign
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[2].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // We test that if case of peer non-signaling we don't enforce committed script at channel opening
+ let mut flags_no = LocalFeatures::new();
+ flags_no.unset_upfront_shutdown_script();
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, flags_no, flags.clone());
+ nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_1_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ // We test that if user opt-out, we provide a zero-length script at channel opening and we are able to close
+ // channel smoothly, opt-out is from channel initiator here
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 0, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+
+ //// We test that if user opt-out, we provide a zero-length script at channel opening and we are able to close
+ //// channel smoothly
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, flags.clone(), flags.clone());
+ nodes[1].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap();
+ let mut node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ node_0_shutdown.scriptpubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script().to_p2sh();
+ if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown) {}
+ else { assert!(false) }
+ let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+ match events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ match events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { node_id, .. } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
+ // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
+
+ let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::new();
+ low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
+ let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::new();
+ high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &[Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None]);
+
+ // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
+ let keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface> = Arc::new(KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), 10, 20));
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &low_our_to_self_config) {
+ match error {
+ APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert_eq!(err, "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false) }
+
+ // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &low_our_to_self_config) {
+ match error {
+ ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert_eq!(err, "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+
+ // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
+ nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+ nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap();
+ let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ if let Err(error) = nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &accept_channel) {
+ if let Some(error) = error.action {
+ match error {
+ ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.data,"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period");
+ },
+ _ => { assert!(false); }
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+
+ // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42).unwrap();
+ let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), LocalFeatures::new(), &open_channel, 0, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), &high_their_to_self_config) {
+ match error {
+ ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert_eq!(err, "They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"); },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ } else { assert!(false); }
+}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff