use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+use bitcoin::network::serialize;
use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use util::sha2::Sha256;
+use util::byte_utils;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
/// HTLC-Success transaction.
const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum KeyStorage {
PrivMode {
revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
}
}
-#[derive(Clone)]
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
struct LocalSignedTx {
+ /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
txid: Sha256dHash,
tx: Transaction,
revocation_key: PublicKey,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
}
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+
pub struct ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
- remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
- //hash to commitment number mapping use to determine the state of transaction owning it
- // (revoked/non-revoked) and so lightnen pruning
+ /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
+ /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
+ /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
+ /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
+ /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
+ /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
+ /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
+ /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
+ /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
// We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
- remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
}
}
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
+/// underlying object
+impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
+ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
+ self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
+ self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
+ self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
+ self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
+ self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
+ self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
+ self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
+ self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
+ self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
+ self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
+ self.destination_script != other.destination_script
+ {
+ false
+ } else {
+ for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
+ if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
+ return false
+ }
+ }
+ let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+ let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+ *us == *them
+ }
+ }
+}
+
impl ChannelMonitor {
pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
ChannelMonitor {
old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
- remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
/// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
- pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
+ pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
for i in 0..pos {
let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
- pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
- pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
- pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
+ pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
}
}
/// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
- pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
+ pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
}
/// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
/// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
/// provides slightly better privacy.
- pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) {
+ pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) {
self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
}
- pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
+ pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
}
- pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
+ pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
}
- pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
+ pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
self.funding_txo = None;
}
self.funding_txo
}
+ /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
+ fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
+ let mut res = Vec::new();
+ res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+ res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+
+ match self.funding_txo {
+ Some(outpoint) => {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
+ },
+ None => {
+ // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
+ // not much to give them.
+ return res;
+ },
+ }
+
+ // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
+
+ match self.key_storage {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
+ res.push(0);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
+ },
+ KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
+ }
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
+ res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
+
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
+ match second_option {
+ Some(second_pubkey) => {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
+ },
+ None => {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
+ },
+ }
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
+
+ for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
+ res.extend_from_slice(secret);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
+ ($htlc_output: expr) => {
+ res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
+ }
+ }
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
+ for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
+ for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
+ for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if for_local_storage {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
+ for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
+ res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
+ }
+ } else {
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
+ ($local_tx: expr) => {
+ let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
+ res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
+ res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
+ res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ res.push(1);
+ serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
+ } else {
+ res.push(0);
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ res.push(1);
+ serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
+ } else {
+ res.push(0);
+ }
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
+ for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
+ res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
+ }
+
+ res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
+ res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
+
+ res
+ }
+
+ /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
+ pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+ self.serialize(true)
+ }
+
+ /// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
+ pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+ self.serialize(false)
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
+ pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
+ let mut read_pos = 0;
+ macro_rules! read_bytes {
+ ($byte_count: expr) => {
+ {
+ if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
+ return None;
+ }
+ read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
+ &data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
+ ($key: expr) => {
+ match $key {
+ Ok(res) => res,
+ Err(_) => return None,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
+ let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
+ if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
+ return None;
+ }
+
+ // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
+ // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
+ let funding_txo = Some(OutPoint {
+ txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
+ index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
+ });
+ let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+
+ let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => {
+ KeyStorage::PrivMode {
+ revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
+ htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
+ }
+ },
+ _ => return None,
+ };
+
+ let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
+
+ let their_cur_revocation_points = {
+ let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ if first_idx == 0 {
+ None
+ } else {
+ let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
+ if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
+ } else {
+ Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
+ }
+ }
+ };
+
+ let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
+ let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
+
+ let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
+ for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
+ secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ *idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => false, 1 => true,
+ _ => return None,
+ };
+ let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
+ let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
+ payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
+
+ HTLCOutputInCommitment {
+ offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
+ let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
+ let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
+ let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 * 32 { return None; }
+ let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
+ for _ in 0..outputs_count {
+ outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
+ }
+ if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
+ let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
+ let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
+ let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
+ let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
+ let mut txid = [0; 32];
+ txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
+ if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! read_local_tx {
+ () => {
+ {
+ let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(read_bytes!(tx_len)));
+
+ let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
+ let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+
+ let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
+ let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
+ for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
+ htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
+ unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
+ unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
+ }
+
+ LocalSignedTx {
+ txid: tx.txid(),
+ tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_local_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return None,
+ };
+
+ let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
+ 0 => None,
+ 1 => {
+ Some(read_local_tx!())
+ },
+ _ => return None,
+ };
+
+ let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
+ let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
+ let mut sha = Sha256::new();
+ for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
+ let mut preimage = [0; 32];
+ preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
+ sha.reset();
+ sha.input(&preimage);
+ let mut hash = [0; 32];
+ sha.result(&mut hash);
+ if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
+ let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
+
+ Some(ChannelMonitor {
+ funding_txo,
+ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
+
+ key_storage,
+ delayed_payment_base_key,
+ their_htlc_base_key,
+ their_cur_revocation_points,
+
+ our_to_self_delay,
+ their_to_self_delay,
+
+ old_secrets,
+ remote_claimable_outpoints,
+ remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
+ remote_hash_commitment_number,
+
+ prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+ current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
+
+ payment_preimages,
+
+ destination_script,
+ secp_ctx,
+ })
+ }
+
//TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
//we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
}
}
- if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
+ if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
// TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
- self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
}
if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
+ // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
+ // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
+ // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
+ // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
+ // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
+ // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
+ // insert it here.
+ self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
+
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
}
}
} else {
- //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
+ //TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
}
txn_to_broadcast
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff