pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
- self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
- self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
- if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
- let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
- self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
- self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
- self.channel_update_count += 1;
- true
- } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
- panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
- } else {
- // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
- // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
- false
- };
- self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
-
- //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
- //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
- //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
- //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
- if need_commitment_update {
- if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
- let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
- let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
- return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
- channel_id: self.channel_id,
- next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
- }));
- } else {
- self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
- return Ok(None);
- }
- }
- }
}
}
if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
}
}
}
+ if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
+ self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
+ self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
+ if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
+ let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
+ self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
+ self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
+ self.channel_update_count += 1;
+ true
+ } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
+ } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
+ panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
+ } else {
+ // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
+ // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
+ false
+ };
+ self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
+
+ //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
+ //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
+ //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
+ //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
+ if need_commitment_update {
+ if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
+ let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
+ return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
+ channel_id: self.channel_id,
+ next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
+ }));
+ } else {
+ self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
+ return Ok(None);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
Ok(None)
}
}
fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
- if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
+ if !chan.should_announce() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
+ return None
+ }
let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
Ok(res) => res,
}
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
+ log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
// If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
// announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
// funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
msg: funding_locked,
});
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
+ log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
});
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
} else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_1_conf_open() {
+ // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
+ // tests that we properly send one in that case.
+ let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
+ alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
+ alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
+ bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
+ bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::supported(), InitFeatures::supported());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.does_match_tx(&tx));
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.does_match_tx(&tx));
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[tx.version; 1]);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[tx.version; 1]);
+ let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
+ let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
+
+ for node in nodes {
+ assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ }
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2);
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff