/// Configuration we set when applicable.
///
-/// Default::default() provides sane defaults.
+/// `Default::default()` provides sane defaults.
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
/// Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
- /// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
+ /// Applied only for inbound channels (see [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`] for the
/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
///
- /// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+ /// A lower-bound of `1` is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
/// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
///
- /// Default value: 6.
+ /// Default value: `6`
///
/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
/// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
/// our channel.
///
- /// Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`], we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
- /// can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
+ /// Default value: [`BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT`] (We enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you
+ /// can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.)
pub our_to_self_delay: u16,
/// Set to the smallest value HTLC we will accept to process.
///
/// This value is sent to our counterparty on channel-open and we close the channel any time
/// our counterparty misbehaves by sending us an HTLC with a value smaller than this.
///
- /// Default value: 1. If the value is less than 1, it is ignored and set to 1, as is required
- /// by the protocol.
+ /// Default value: `1` (If the value is less than `1`, it is ignored and set to `1`, as is
+ /// required by the protocol.
pub our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
/// Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
/// HTLCs to.
/// channel value in whole percentages.
///
/// Note that:
- /// * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
+ /// * If configured to another value than the default value `10`, any new channels created with
/// the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
/// `ChannelManager`.
///
/// See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
/// for more information.
///
- /// Default value: 10.
- /// Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
- /// Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
+ /// Default value: `10`
+ ///
+ /// Minimum value: `1` (Any values less will be treated as `1` instead.)
+ ///
+ /// Maximum value: `100` (Any values larger will be treated as `100` instead.)
pub max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel: u8,
/// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
/// BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
/// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
///
- /// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+ /// Default value: `false` (This value is likely to change to `true` in the future.)
///
/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
/// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
///
- /// Default value: false.
+ /// Default value: `false`
pub announced_channel: bool,
/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
///
/// The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
///
- /// Default value: true.
+ /// Default value: `true`
///
/// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
pub commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: bool,
/// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
/// other than the default value.
///
- /// Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
- /// Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
- /// as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
- /// Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
- /// instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
+ /// Default value: `10_000` millionths (i.e., 1% of channel value)
+ ///
+ /// Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than `1000` sats, it will be
+ /// treated as `1000` sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower
+ /// bound.
+ ///
+ /// Maximum value: `1_000_000` (i.e., 100% of channel value. Any values larger than one million
+ /// will be treated as one million instead, although channel negotiations will
+ /// fail in that case.)
pub their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths: u32,
/// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future
/// channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump
/// vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee
/// Considered Harmful`] mailing list post.
///
- /// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+ /// Default value: `false` (This value is likely to change to `true` in the future.)
///
/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
/// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration
/// other than the default value.
///
- /// Default value: 50
- /// Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483.
- /// This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.
+ /// Default value: `50`
+ ///
+ /// Maximum value: `483` (Any values larger will be treated as `483`. This is the BOLT #2 spec
+ /// limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.)
pub our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
}
///
/// These limits are only applied to our counterparty's limits, not our own.
///
-/// Use 0/`<type>::max_value()` as appropriate to skip checking.
+/// Use `0` or `<type>::max_value()` as appropriate to skip checking.
///
/// Provides sane defaults for most configurations.
///
/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
/// only applies to inbound channels.
///
- /// Default value: 0.
+ /// Default value: `0`
pub min_funding_satoshis: u64,
/// Maximum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
/// only applies to inbound channels.
///
- /// Default value: 2^24 - 1.
+ /// Default value: `2^24 - 1`
pub max_funding_satoshis: u64,
/// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
/// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
///
- /// Default value: u64::max_value.
+ /// Default value: `u64::max_value`
pub max_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
/// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum value of pending HTLCs to them at any given
/// time to limit their funds exposure to HTLCs. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
///
- /// Default value: 0.
+ /// Default value: `0`
pub min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
/// The remote node will require we keep a certain amount in direct payment to ourselves at all
/// time, ensuring that we are able to be punished if we broadcast an old state. This allows to
/// you limit the amount which we will have to keep to ourselves (and cannot use for HTLCs).
///
- /// Default value: u64::max_value.
+ /// Default value: `u64::max_value`.
pub max_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
/// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum number of pending HTLCs to them at any given
/// time. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
///
- /// Default value: 0.
+ /// Default value: `0`
pub min_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
/// Before a channel is usable the funding transaction will need to be confirmed by at least a
/// certain number of blocks, specified by the node which is not the funder (as the funder can
/// assume they aren't going to double-spend themselves).
/// This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait.
///
- /// Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
+ /// Default value: `144`, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels
pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
/// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
/// channels to not be double-spent.
/// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
/// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
///
- /// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
- /// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
+ /// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to `0`, and we
+ /// always trust our own funding transaction at `1` confirmation irrespective of this value.
/// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
- /// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
+ /// `true` (`0`) and `false` (`1`).
///
- /// Default value: true
+ /// Default value: `true`
pub trust_own_funding_0conf: bool,
/// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`].
/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
/// channels will ever be opened.
///
- /// Default value: true.
+ /// Default value: `true`
pub force_announced_channel_preference: bool,
/// Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us.
///
/// Not checking this value would be a security issue, as our peer would be able to set it to
/// max relative lock-time (a year) and we would "lose" money as it would be locked for a long time.
///
- /// Default value: 2016, which we also enforce as a maximum value so you can tweak config to
+ /// Default value: `2016`, which we also enforce as a maximum value so you can tweak config to
/// reduce the loss of having useless locked funds (if your peer accepts)
pub their_to_self_delay: u16
}
/// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
/// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
///
- /// Default value: 0.
+ /// Default value: `0`
pub forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
/// Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
/// excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
/// as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
/// this node.
///
- /// Default value: 1000.
+ /// Default value: `1000`
///
/// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
pub forwarding_fee_base_msat: u32,
/// enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
/// the spending transaction).
///
- /// Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
- /// Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
- /// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
+ /// Default value: `72` (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour)
+ ///
+ /// Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] (Any values less than this will be treated as
+ /// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.)
///
/// [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
/// while we use [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`] (which should be relatively high) and
/// feerate disagreement force-closures should only occur when theirs is higher than ours.
///
- /// Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 10_000.
+ /// Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of `10_000`
///
/// [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep
pub max_dust_htlc_exposure: MaxDustHTLCExposure,
/// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
/// Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
///
- /// Default value: 1000 satoshis.
+ /// Default value: `1000`
///
/// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
/// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
/// Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
/// Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
///
- /// Default value: false.
+ /// Default value: `false`
///
/// [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
/// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
/// Top-level config which holds ChannelHandshakeLimits and ChannelConfig.
///
-/// Default::default() provides sane defaults for most configurations
-/// (but currently with 0 relay fees!)
+/// `Default::default()` provides sane defaults for most configurations
+/// (but currently with zero relay fees!)
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct UserConfig {
/// Channel handshake config that we propose to our counterparty.
pub channel_handshake_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits,
/// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
pub channel_config: ChannelConfig,
- /// If this is set to false, we will reject any HTLCs which were to be forwarded over private
+ /// If this is set to `false`, we will reject any HTLCs which were to be forwarded over private
/// channels. This prevents us from taking on HTLC-forwarding risk when we intend to run as a
/// node which is not online reliably.
///
/// For nodes which are not online reliably, you should set all channels to *not* be announced
/// (using [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
- /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`]) and set this to false to
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`]) and set this to `false` to
/// ensure you are not exposed to any forwarding risk.
///
/// Note that because you cannot change a channel's announced state after creation, there is no
/// all your channels and open new ones. For privacy, you should also change your node_id
/// (swapping all private and public key material for new ones) at that time.
///
- /// Default value: false.
+ /// Default value: `false`
pub accept_forwards_to_priv_channels: bool,
- /// If this is set to false, we do not accept inbound requests to open a new channel.
- /// Default value: true.
+ /// If this is set to `false`, we do not accept inbound requests to open a new channel.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: `true`
pub accept_inbound_channels: bool,
- /// If this is set to true, the user needs to manually accept inbound requests to open a new
+ /// If this is set to `true`, the user needs to manually accept inbound requests to open a new
/// channel.
///
- /// When set to true, [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] will be triggered once a request to open a
+ /// When set to `true`, [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] will be triggered once a request to open a
/// new inbound channel is received through a [`msgs::OpenChannel`] message. In that case, a
/// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message will not be sent back to the counterparty node unless the
/// user explicitly chooses to accept the request.
///
- /// Default value: false.
+ /// Default value: `false`
///
/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
/// [`msgs::OpenChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::OpenChannel
/// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
pub manually_accept_inbound_channels: bool,
- /// If this is set to true, LDK will intercept HTLCs that are attempting to be forwarded over
+ /// If this is set to `true`, LDK will intercept HTLCs that are attempting to be forwarded over
/// fake short channel ids generated via [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]. Upon HTLC
/// intercept, LDK will generate an [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`] which MUST be handled by the user.
///
- /// Setting this to true may break backwards compatibility with LDK versions < 0.0.113.
+ /// Setting this to `true` may break backwards compatibility with LDK versions < 0.0.113.
///
- /// Default value: false.
+ /// Default value: `false`
///
/// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
/// [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
pub accept_intercept_htlcs: bool,
- /// If this is set to false, when receiving a keysend payment we'll fail it if it has multiple
- /// parts. If this is set to true, we'll accept the payment.
+ /// If this is set to `false`, when receiving a keysend payment we'll fail it if it has multiple
+ /// parts. If this is set to `true`, we'll accept the payment.
///
- /// Setting this to true will break backwards compatibility upon downgrading to an LDK
- /// version < 0.0.116 while receiving an MPP keysend. If we have already received an MPP
+ /// Setting this to `true` will break backwards compatibility upon downgrading to an LDK
+ /// version prior to 0.0.116 while receiving an MPP keysend. If we have already received an MPP
/// keysend, downgrading will cause us to fail to deserialize [`ChannelManager`].
///
- /// Default value: false.
+ /// Default value: `false`
///
/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
pub accept_mpp_keysend: bool,
- /// If this is set to true, the user needs to manually pay [`Bolt12Invoice`]s when received.
+ /// If this is set to `true`, the user needs to manually pay [`Bolt12Invoice`]s when received.
///
- /// When set to true, [`Event::InvoiceReceived`] will be generated for each received
+ /// When set to `true`, [`Event::InvoiceReceived`] will be generated for each received
/// [`Bolt12Invoice`] instead of being automatically paid after verification.
///
- /// Default value: false.
+ /// Default value: `false`
///
/// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
/// [`Event::InvoiceReceived`]: crate::events::Event::InvoiceReceived
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff