//! applies for you.
use alloc::str::FromStr;
+use alloc::string::String;
use core::ffi::c_void;
use core::convert::Infallible;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
- unsafe { let _ = Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig); }
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig) };
}
#[allow(unused)]
impl ChannelHandshakeConfig {
/// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
///
+/// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+/// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
+/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
+///
/// Default value: 6.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u32 {
let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().minimum_depth;
/// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
///
+/// A lower-bound of 1 is applied, requiring all channels to have a confirmed commitment
+/// transaction before operation. If you wish to accept channels with zero confirmations, see
+/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`].
+///
/// Default value: 6.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u32) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.minimum_depth = val;
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_htlc_minimum_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u64) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.our_htlc_minimum_msat = val;
}
+/// Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
+/// HTLCs to.
+///
+/// This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
+/// channel value in whole percentages.
+///
+/// Note that:
+/// * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
+/// the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
+/// `ChannelManager`.
+///
+/// * This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
+/// no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
+///
+/// * The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
+/// are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
+/// restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
+/// See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
+/// for more information.
+///
+/// Default value: 10.
+/// Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
+/// Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u8 {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// Sets the percentage of the channel value we will cap the total value of outstanding inbound
+/// HTLCs to.
+///
+/// This can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value corresponds to the percent of the
+/// channel value in whole percentages.
+///
+/// Note that:
+/// * If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new channels created with
+/// the non default value will cause versions of LDK prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the
+/// `ChannelManager`.
+///
+/// * This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and there's currently
+/// no way to configure the cap for the total value of outbound HTLCs in-flight.
+///
+/// * The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of HTLC-encumbered funds
+/// are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds. This makes this an important knob to
+/// restrict exposure to loss due to being offline for too long.
+/// See [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] and [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
+/// for more information.
+///
+/// Default value: 10.
+/// Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
+/// Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100 instead.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u8) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = val;
+}
+/// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+/// BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+/// our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+/// relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+///
+/// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+/// prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+///
+/// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+/// counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+/// private channel without that option.
+///
+/// Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+///
+/// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_scid_privacy(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().negotiate_scid_privacy;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `scid_privacy` (referred to as `scid_alias` in the
+/// BOLTs) option for outbound private channels. This provides better privacy by not including
+/// our real on-chain channel UTXO in each invoice and requiring that our counterparty only
+/// relay HTLCs to us using the channel's SCID alias.
+///
+/// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+/// prior to 0.0.106, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+///
+/// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+/// counterparties that do not support the `scid_alias` option; we will simply fall back to a
+/// private channel without that option.
+///
+/// Ignored if the channel is negotiated to be announced, see
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] for more.
+///
+/// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_scid_privacy(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.negotiate_scid_privacy = val;
+}
+/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+/// channel.
+///
+/// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+///
+/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+/// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_announced_channel(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().announced_channel;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
+/// channel.
+///
+/// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
+///
+/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
+/// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_announced_channel(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.announced_channel = val;
+}
+/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+/// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+///
+/// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+/// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+/// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+///
+/// The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
+///
+/// Default value: true.
+///
+/// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
+/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
+/// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
+///
+/// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
+/// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
+/// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
+///
+/// The upfront key committed is provided from [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`].
+///
+/// Default value: true.
+///
+/// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]: crate::sign::SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = val;
+}
+/// The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
+/// i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
+///
+/// `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
+/// on their side, at all times.
+/// This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
+/// claiming at least this value on chain.
+///
+/// Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
+/// amount can never be used for payments.
+/// Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
+/// channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
+/// will fail.
+///
+/// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
+/// other than the default value.
+///
+/// Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
+/// Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
+/// as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
+/// Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
+/// instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u32 {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// The Proportion of the channel value to configure as counterparty's channel reserve,
+/// i.e., `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` for both outbound and inbound channels.
+///
+/// `their_channel_reserve_satoshis` is the minimum balance that the other node has to maintain
+/// on their side, at all times.
+/// This ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
+/// claiming at least this value on chain.
+///
+/// Channel reserve values greater than 30% could be considered highly unreasonable, since that
+/// amount can never be used for payments.
+/// Also, if our selected channel reserve for counterparty and counterparty's selected
+/// channel reserve for us sum up to equal or greater than channel value, channel negotiations
+/// will fail.
+///
+/// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.104 will fail to read channels with any channel reserve
+/// other than the default value.
+///
+/// Default value: 1% of channel value, i.e., configured as 10,000 millionths.
+/// Minimum value: If the calculated proportional value is less than 1000 sats, it will be treated
+/// as 1000 sats instead, which is a safe implementation-specific lower bound.
+/// Maximum value: 1,000,000, any values larger than 1 Million will be treated as 1 Million (or 100%)
+/// instead, although channel negotiations will fail in that case.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u32) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = val;
+}
+/// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future
+/// channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump
+/// transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds.
+///
+/// Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable
+/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check
+/// whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new
+/// channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close.
+///
+/// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+/// prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+///
+/// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+/// counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply
+/// fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel.
+///
+/// LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered
+/// vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee
+/// Considered Harmful`] mailing list post.
+///
+/// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+/// [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// If set, we attempt to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`option for all future
+/// channels. This feature requires having a reserve of onchain funds readily available to bump
+/// transactions in the event of a channel force close to avoid the possibility of losing funds.
+///
+/// Note that if you wish accept inbound channels with anchor outputs, you must enable
+/// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] and manually accept them with
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]. This is done to give you the chance to check
+/// whether your reserve of onchain funds is enough to cover the fees for all existing and new
+/// channels featuring anchor outputs in the event of a force close.
+///
+/// If this option is set, channels may be created that will not be readable by LDK versions
+/// prior to 0.0.116, causing [`ChannelManager`]'s read method to return a
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`].
+///
+/// Note that setting this to true does *not* prevent us from opening channels with
+/// counterparties that do not support the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option; we will simply
+/// fall back to a `static_remote_key` channel.
+///
+/// LDK will not support the legacy `option_anchors` commitment version due to a discovered
+/// vulnerability after its deployment. For more context, see the [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee
+/// Considered Harmful`] mailing list post.
+///
+/// Default value: false. This value is likely to change to true in the future.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+/// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
+/// [`DecodeError::InvalidValue`]: crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue
+/// [`SIGHASH_SINGLE + update_fee Considered Harmful`]: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = val;
+}
+/// The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time.
+///
+/// Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in
+/// routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage.
+///
+/// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration
+/// other than the default value.
+///
+/// Default value: 50
+/// Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483.
+/// This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_get_our_max_accepted_htlcs(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u16 {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().our_max_accepted_htlcs;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// The maximum number of HTLCs in-flight from our counterparty towards us at the same time.
+///
+/// Increasing the value can help improve liquidity and stability in
+/// routing at the cost of higher long term disk / DB usage.
+///
+/// Note: Versions of LDK earlier than v0.0.115 will fail to read channels with a configuration
+/// other than the default value.
+///
+/// Default value: 50
+/// Maximum value: 483, any values larger will be treated as 483.
+/// This is the BOLT #2 spec limit on `max_accepted_htlcs`.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_set_our_max_accepted_htlcs(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut val: u16) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.our_max_accepted_htlcs = val;
+}
/// Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeConfig given each field
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(mut minimum_depth_arg: u32, mut our_to_self_delay_arg: u16, mut our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg: u64) -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_new(mut minimum_depth_arg: u32, mut our_to_self_delay_arg: u16, mut our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg: u64, mut max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg: u8, mut negotiate_scid_privacy_arg: bool, mut announced_channel_arg: bool, mut commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg: bool, mut their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg: u32, mut negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg: bool, mut our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg: u16) -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
ChannelHandshakeConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelHandshakeConfig {
minimum_depth: minimum_depth_arg,
our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay_arg,
our_htlc_minimum_msat: our_htlc_minimum_msat_arg,
+ max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel: max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel_arg,
+ negotiate_scid_privacy: negotiate_scid_privacy_arg,
+ announced_channel: announced_channel_arg,
+ commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg,
+ their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths: their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths_arg,
+ negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx: negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_arg,
+ our_max_accepted_htlcs: our_max_accepted_htlcs_arg,
}), is_owned: true }
}
impl Clone for ChannelHandshakeConfig {
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone_void(this_ptr: *const c_void) -> *mut c_void {
- Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeConfig)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
+ Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *const nativeChannelHandshakeConfig)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
}
#[no_mangle]
/// Creates a copy of the ChannelHandshakeConfig
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_clone(orig: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
orig.clone()
}
+/// Get a string which allows debug introspection of a ChannelHandshakeConfig object
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeConfig_debug_str_void(o: *const c_void) -> Str {
+ alloc::format!("{:?}", unsafe { o as *const crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig }).into()}
/// Creates a "default" ChannelHandshakeConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
///
/// These limits are only applied to our counterparty's limits, not our own.
///
-/// Use 0/<type>::max_value() as appropriate to skip checking.
+/// Use 0/`<type>::max_value()` as appropriate to skip checking.
///
/// Provides sane defaults for most configurations.
///
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
- unsafe { let _ = Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits); }
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits) };
}
#[allow(unused)]
impl ChannelHandshakeLimits {
ret
}
}
-/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded, this is supplied by the sender and so
+/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
/// only applies to inbound channels.
///
/// Default value: 0.
let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().min_funding_satoshis;
*inner_val
}
-/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded, this is supplied by the sender and so
+/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
/// only applies to inbound channels.
///
/// Default value: 0.
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_min_funding_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u64) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.min_funding_satoshis = val;
}
+/// Maximum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
+/// only applies to inbound channels.
+///
+/// Default value: 2^24 - 1.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_max_funding_satoshis(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> u64 {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_funding_satoshis;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// Maximum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded. This is supplied by the sender and so
+/// only applies to inbound channels.
+///
+/// Default value: 2^24 - 1.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_funding_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u64) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_funding_satoshis = val;
+}
/// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
/// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
///
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_max_minimum_depth(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: u32) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_minimum_depth = val;
}
+/// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
+/// channels to not be double-spent.
+///
+/// If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and
+/// thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable
+/// assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole
+/// control of the signing keys).
+///
+/// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
+/// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
+///
+/// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
+/// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
+/// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
+/// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
+///
+/// Default value: true
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_get_trust_own_funding_0conf(this_ptr: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().trust_own_funding_0conf;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// Whether we implicitly trust funding transactions generated by us for our own outbound
+/// channels to not be double-spent.
+///
+/// If this is set, we assume that our own funding transactions are *never* double-spent, and
+/// thus we can trust them without any confirmations. This is generally a reasonable
+/// assumption, given we're the only ones who could ever double-spend it (assuming we have sole
+/// control of the signing keys).
+///
+/// You may wish to un-set this if you allow the user to (or do in an automated fashion)
+/// double-spend the funding transaction to RBF with an alternative channel open.
+///
+/// This only applies if our counterparty set their confirmations-required value to 0, and we
+/// always trust our own funding transaction at 1 confirmation irrespective of this value.
+/// Thus, this effectively acts as a `min_minimum_depth`, with the only possible values being
+/// `true` (0) and `false` (1).
+///
+/// Default value: true
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_set_trust_own_funding_0conf(this_ptr: &mut ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.trust_own_funding_0conf = val;
+}
/// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
-/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`].
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`].
///
/// For a node which is not online reliably, this should be set to true and
-/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
/// channels will ever be opened.
///
/// Default value: true.
*inner_val
}
/// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
-/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`].
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`].
///
/// For a node which is not online reliably, this should be set to true and
-/// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
+/// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
/// channels will ever be opened.
///
/// Default value: true.
/// Constructs a new ChannelHandshakeLimits given each field
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_new(mut min_funding_satoshis_arg: u64, mut max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg: u64, mut min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg: u64, mut max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg: u64, mut min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg: u16, mut max_minimum_depth_arg: u32, mut force_announced_channel_preference_arg: bool, mut their_to_self_delay_arg: u16) -> ChannelHandshakeLimits {
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_new(mut min_funding_satoshis_arg: u64, mut max_funding_satoshis_arg: u64, mut max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg: u64, mut min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg: u64, mut max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg: u64, mut min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg: u16, mut max_minimum_depth_arg: u32, mut trust_own_funding_0conf_arg: bool, mut force_announced_channel_preference_arg: bool, mut their_to_self_delay_arg: u16) -> ChannelHandshakeLimits {
ChannelHandshakeLimits { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelHandshakeLimits {
min_funding_satoshis: min_funding_satoshis_arg,
+ max_funding_satoshis: max_funding_satoshis_arg,
max_htlc_minimum_msat: max_htlc_minimum_msat_arg,
min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat_arg,
max_channel_reserve_satoshis: max_channel_reserve_satoshis_arg,
min_max_accepted_htlcs: min_max_accepted_htlcs_arg,
max_minimum_depth: max_minimum_depth_arg,
+ trust_own_funding_0conf: trust_own_funding_0conf_arg,
force_announced_channel_preference: force_announced_channel_preference_arg,
their_to_self_delay: their_to_self_delay_arg,
}), is_owned: true }
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_clone_void(this_ptr: *const c_void) -> *mut c_void {
- Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelHandshakeLimits)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
+ Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *const nativeChannelHandshakeLimits)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
}
#[no_mangle]
/// Creates a copy of the ChannelHandshakeLimits
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_clone(orig: &ChannelHandshakeLimits) -> ChannelHandshakeLimits {
orig.clone()
}
+/// Get a string which allows debug introspection of a ChannelHandshakeLimits object
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_debug_str_void(o: *const c_void) -> Str {
+ alloc::format!("{:?}", unsafe { o as *const crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits }).into()}
/// Creates a "default" ChannelHandshakeLimits. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn ChannelHandshakeLimits_default() -> ChannelHandshakeLimits {
ChannelHandshakeLimits { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(Default::default()), is_owned: true }
}
+/// Options for how to set the max dust HTLC exposure allowed on a channel. See
+/// [`ChannelConfig::max_dust_htlc_exposure`] for details.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+#[must_use]
+#[repr(C)]
+pub enum MaxDustHTLCExposure {
+ /// This sets a fixed limit on the total dust exposure in millisatoshis. Setting this too low
+ /// may prevent the sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, however this
+ /// limit is very important to prevent stealing of large amounts of dust HTLCs by miners
+ /// through [fee griefing
+ /// attacks](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-May/002714.html).
+ ///
+ /// Note that if the feerate increases significantly, without a manual increase
+ /// to this maximum the channel may be unable to send/receive HTLCs between the maximum dust
+ /// exposure and the new minimum value for HTLCs to be economically viable to claim.
+ FixedLimitMsat(
+ u64),
+ /// This sets a multiplier on the estimated high priority feerate (sats/KW, as obtained from
+ /// [`FeeEstimator`]) to determine the maximum allowed dust exposure. If this variant is used
+ /// then the maximum dust exposure in millisatoshis is calculated as:
+ /// `high_priority_feerate_per_kw * value`. For example, with our default value
+ /// `FeeRateMultiplier(5000)`:
+ ///
+ /// - For the minimum fee rate of 1 sat/vByte (250 sat/KW, although the minimum
+ /// defaults to 253 sats/KW for rounding, see [`FeeEstimator`]), the max dust exposure would
+ /// be 253 * 5000 = 1,265,000 msats.
+ /// - For a fee rate of 30 sat/vByte (7500 sat/KW), the max dust exposure would be
+ /// 7500 * 5000 = 37,500,000 msats.
+ ///
+ /// This allows the maximum dust exposure to automatically scale with fee rate changes.
+ ///
+ /// Note, if you're using a third-party fee estimator, this may leave you more exposed to a
+ /// fee griefing attack, where your fee estimator may purposely overestimate the fee rate,
+ /// causing you to accept more dust HTLCs than you would otherwise.
+ ///
+ /// This variant is primarily meant to serve pre-anchor channels, as HTLC fees being included
+ /// on HTLC outputs means your channel may be subject to more dust exposure in the event of
+ /// increases in fee rate.
+ ///
+ /// # Backwards Compatibility
+ /// This variant only became available in LDK 0.0.116, so if you downgrade to a prior version
+ /// by default this will be set to a [`Self::FixedLimitMsat`] of 5,000,000 msat.
+ ///
+ /// [`FeeEstimator`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator
+ FeeRateMultiplier(
+ u64),
+}
+use lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure as MaxDustHTLCExposureImport;
+pub(crate) type nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure = MaxDustHTLCExposureImport;
+
+impl MaxDustHTLCExposure {
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ pub(crate) fn to_native(&self) -> nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure {
+ match self {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (ref a, ) => {
+ let mut a_nonref = Clone::clone(a);
+ nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (
+ a_nonref,
+ )
+ },
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (ref a, ) => {
+ let mut a_nonref = Clone::clone(a);
+ nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (
+ a_nonref,
+ )
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ pub(crate) fn into_native(self) -> nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure {
+ match self {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (mut a, ) => {
+ nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (
+ a,
+ )
+ },
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (mut a, ) => {
+ nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (
+ a,
+ )
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ pub(crate) fn from_native(native: &MaxDustHTLCExposureImport) -> Self {
+ let native = unsafe { &*(native as *const _ as *const c_void as *const nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure) };
+ match native {
+ nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (ref a, ) => {
+ let mut a_nonref = Clone::clone(a);
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (
+ a_nonref,
+ )
+ },
+ nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (ref a, ) => {
+ let mut a_nonref = Clone::clone(a);
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (
+ a_nonref,
+ )
+ },
+ }
+ }
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ pub(crate) fn native_into(native: nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure) -> Self {
+ match native {
+ nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (mut a, ) => {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat (
+ a,
+ )
+ },
+ nativeMaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (mut a, ) => {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier (
+ a,
+ )
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+/// Frees any resources used by the MaxDustHTLCExposure
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_free(this_ptr: MaxDustHTLCExposure) { }
+/// Creates a copy of the MaxDustHTLCExposure
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_clone(orig: &MaxDustHTLCExposure) -> MaxDustHTLCExposure {
+ orig.clone()
+}
+#[allow(unused)]
+/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
+pub(crate) extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_clone_void(this_ptr: *const c_void) -> *mut c_void {
+ Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *const MaxDustHTLCExposure)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
+}
+#[allow(unused)]
+/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
+pub(crate) extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut MaxDustHTLCExposure) };
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+/// Utility method to constructs a new FixedLimitMsat-variant MaxDustHTLCExposure
+pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_fixed_limit_msat(a: u64) -> MaxDustHTLCExposure {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(a, )
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+/// Utility method to constructs a new FeeRateMultiplier-variant MaxDustHTLCExposure
+pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_fee_rate_multiplier(a: u64) -> MaxDustHTLCExposure {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(a, )
+}
+/// Get a string which allows debug introspection of a MaxDustHTLCExposure object
+pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_debug_str_void(o: *const c_void) -> Str {
+ alloc::format!("{:?}", unsafe { o as *const crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure }).into()}
+/// Checks if two MaxDustHTLCExposures contain equal inner contents.
+/// This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_eq(a: &MaxDustHTLCExposure, b: &MaxDustHTLCExposure) -> bool {
+ if &a.to_native() == &b.to_native() { true } else { false }
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+/// Serialize the MaxDustHTLCExposure object into a byte array which can be read by MaxDustHTLCExposure_read
+pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_write(obj: &crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
+ crate::c_types::serialize_obj(&unsafe { &*obj }.to_native())
+}
+#[allow(unused)]
+pub(crate) extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_write_void(obj: *const c_void) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
+ MaxDustHTLCExposure_write(unsafe { &*(obj as *const MaxDustHTLCExposure) })
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+/// Read a MaxDustHTLCExposure from a byte array, created by MaxDustHTLCExposure_write
+pub extern "C" fn MaxDustHTLCExposure_read(ser: crate::c_types::u8slice) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_MaxDustHTLCExposureDecodeErrorZ {
+ let res: Result<lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure, lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::c_types::deserialize_obj(ser);
+ let mut local_res = match res { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure::native_into(o) }).into(), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError::native_into(e) }).into() };
+ local_res
+}
use lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig as nativeChannelConfigImport;
pub(crate) type nativeChannelConfig = nativeChannelConfigImport;
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
- unsafe { let _ = Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelConfig); }
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelConfig) };
}
#[allow(unused)]
impl ChannelConfig {
pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: u16) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.cltv_expiry_delta = val;
}
-/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
-/// channel.
-///
-/// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
-///
-/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
-/// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
-///
-/// This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
-///
-/// Default value: false.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_announced_channel(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().announced_channel;
- *inner_val
-}
-/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
-/// channel.
-///
-/// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
-///
-/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
-/// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
-///
-/// This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
-///
-/// Default value: false.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_announced_channel(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: bool) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.announced_channel = val;
-}
-/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
-/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
-/// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
-///
-/// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
-/// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
-/// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
-///
-/// This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
-///
-/// Default value: true.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey;
- *inner_val
-}
-/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
-/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
-/// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
-///
-/// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
-/// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
-/// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
-///
-/// This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
-///
-/// Default value: true.
-#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: bool) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = val;
-}
/// Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
/// small to claim on-chain.
///
/// to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
/// channel is force-closed.
///
-/// This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
-/// exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
-/// sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
-/// important to prevent stealing of dust HTLCs by miners.
+/// The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
+/// channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
+/// a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
+/// (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
+/// account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
+/// value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
+/// variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
///
-/// Default value: 5_000_000 msat.
+/// The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
+/// exposure across all three types per-channel.
+///
+/// Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> u64 {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat;
- *inner_val
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_dust_htlc_exposure;
+ crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure::from_native(inner_val)
}
/// Limit our total exposure to in-flight HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too
/// small to claim on-chain.
/// to such payments may be sustantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
/// channel is force-closed.
///
-/// This limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
-/// exposure across all three types per-channel. Setting this too low may prevent the
-/// sending or receipt of low-value HTLCs on high-traffic nodes, and this limit is very
-/// important to prevent stealing of dust HTLCs by miners.
+/// The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
+/// channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
+/// a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
+/// (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
+/// account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
+/// value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
+/// variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
+///
+/// The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
+/// exposure across all three types per-channel.
///
-/// Default value: 5_000_000 msat.
+/// Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 5000.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: u64) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = val;
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_dust_htlc_exposure = val.into_native();
}
/// The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
/// `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
/// funder/initiator.
///
/// When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
-/// acceptable fee by our [`Background`] and [`Normal`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
+/// acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
/// this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
-/// [`Normal`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
+/// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
/// willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
/// funds.
///
/// When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
-/// [`Background`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
+/// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
/// Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
///
/// Default value: 1000 satoshis.
///
-/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
-/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+/// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
+/// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> u64 {
let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis;
/// funder/initiator.
///
/// When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
-/// acceptable fee by our [`Background`] and [`Normal`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
+/// acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
/// this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
-/// [`Normal`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
+/// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
/// willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
/// funds.
///
/// When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
-/// [`Background`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
+/// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
/// Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
///
/// Default value: 1000 satoshis.
///
-/// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
-/// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
+/// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
+/// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
#[no_mangle]
pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: u64) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis = val;
}
+/// If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
+/// HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
+///
+/// Usage:
+/// - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
+/// generated by this channel's counterparty.
+/// - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
+/// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
+/// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
+/// actual forward amounts is their fee. See
+/// <https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/tree/main/LSPS2#flow-lsp-trusts-client-model>
+/// for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case.
+///
+/// # Note
+/// It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
+/// as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
+/// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
+/// counterparty.
+///
+/// # Note
+/// Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
+/// Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
+/// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
+/// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+/// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
+/// [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
+/// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_get_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this_ptr: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
+/// HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
+///
+/// Usage:
+/// - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
+/// generated by this channel's counterparty.
+/// - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
+/// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
+/// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
+/// actual forward amounts is their fee. See
+/// <https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/tree/main/LSPS2#flow-lsp-trusts-client-model>
+/// for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case.
+///
+/// # Note
+/// It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
+/// as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
+/// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
+/// counterparty.
+///
+/// # Note
+/// Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
+/// Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
+/// [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
+/// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+/// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
+/// [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
+/// [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_underpaying_htlcs = val;
+}
/// Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_new(mut forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg: u32, mut forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg: u32, mut cltv_expiry_delta_arg: u16, mut announced_channel_arg: bool, mut commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg: bool, mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg: u64, mut force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg: u64) -> ChannelConfig {
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_new(mut forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg: u32, mut forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg: u32, mut cltv_expiry_delta_arg: u16, mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure, mut force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg: u64, mut accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg: bool) -> ChannelConfig {
ChannelConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelConfig {
forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg,
forwarding_fee_base_msat: forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg,
cltv_expiry_delta: cltv_expiry_delta_arg,
- announced_channel: announced_channel_arg,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey_arg,
- max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat: max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg,
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure: max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg.into_native(),
force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg,
+ accept_underpaying_htlcs: accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg,
}), is_owned: true }
}
impl Clone for ChannelConfig {
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_clone_void(this_ptr: *const c_void) -> *mut c_void {
- Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelConfig)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
+ Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *const nativeChannelConfig)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
}
#[no_mangle]
/// Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig
pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_clone(orig: &ChannelConfig) -> ChannelConfig {
orig.clone()
}
+/// Get a string which allows debug introspection of a ChannelConfig object
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_debug_str_void(o: *const c_void) -> Str {
+ alloc::format!("{:?}", unsafe { o as *const crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig }).into()}
+/// Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents.
+/// This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
+/// Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_eq(a: &ChannelConfig, b: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
+ if a.inner == b.inner { return true; }
+ if a.inner.is_null() || b.inner.is_null() { return false; }
+ if a.get_native_ref() == b.get_native_ref() { true } else { false }
+}
+/// Applies the given [`ChannelConfigUpdate`] as a partial update to the [`ChannelConfig`].
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_apply(this_arg: &mut crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig, update: &crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfigUpdate) {
+ unsafe { &mut (*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_arg.inner as *mut crate::lightning::util::config::nativeChannelConfig)) }.apply(update.get_native_ref())
+}
+
/// Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
}
#[no_mangle]
/// Serialize the ChannelConfig object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelConfig_read
-pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_write(obj: &ChannelConfig) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_write(obj: &crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
crate::c_types::serialize_obj(unsafe { &*obj }.get_native_ref())
}
-#[no_mangle]
+#[allow(unused)]
pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_write_void(obj: *const c_void) -> crate::c_types::derived::CVec_u8Z {
crate::c_types::serialize_obj(unsafe { &*(obj as *const nativeChannelConfig) })
}
/// Read a ChannelConfig from a byte array, created by ChannelConfig_write
pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfig_read(ser: crate::c_types::u8slice) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ {
let res: Result<lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig, lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> = crate::c_types::deserialize_obj(ser);
- let mut local_res = match res { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(o), is_owned: true } }).into(), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(e), is_owned: true } }).into() };
+ let mut local_res = match res { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(o), is_owned: true } }).into(), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError::native_into(e) }).into() };
local_res
}
+use lightning::util::config::ChannelConfigUpdate as nativeChannelConfigUpdateImport;
+pub(crate) type nativeChannelConfigUpdate = nativeChannelConfigUpdateImport;
+
+/// A parallel struct to [`ChannelConfig`] to define partial updates.
+#[must_use]
+#[repr(C)]
+pub struct ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ /// A pointer to the opaque Rust object.
+
+ /// Nearly everywhere, inner must be non-null, however in places where
+ /// the Rust equivalent takes an Option, it may be set to null to indicate None.
+ pub inner: *mut nativeChannelConfigUpdate,
+ /// Indicates that this is the only struct which contains the same pointer.
+
+ /// Rust functions which take ownership of an object provided via an argument require
+ /// this to be true and invalidate the object pointed to by inner.
+ pub is_owned: bool,
+}
+
+impl Drop for ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ fn drop(&mut self) {
+ if self.is_owned && !<*mut nativeChannelConfigUpdate>::is_null(self.inner) {
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner)) };
+ }
+ }
+}
+/// Frees any resources used by the ChannelConfigUpdate, if is_owned is set and inner is non-NULL.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_free(this_obj: ChannelConfigUpdate) { }
+#[allow(unused)]
+/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
+pub(crate) extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeChannelConfigUpdate) };
+}
+#[allow(unused)]
+impl ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ pub(crate) fn get_native_ref(&self) -> &'static nativeChannelConfigUpdate {
+ unsafe { &*ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
+ }
+ pub(crate) fn get_native_mut_ref(&self) -> &'static mut nativeChannelConfigUpdate {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner) }
+ }
+ /// When moving out of the pointer, we have to ensure we aren't a reference, this makes that easy
+ pub(crate) fn take_inner(mut self) -> *mut nativeChannelConfigUpdate {
+ assert!(self.is_owned);
+ let ret = ObjOps::untweak_ptr(self.inner);
+ self.inner = core::ptr::null_mut();
+ ret
+ }
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &ChannelConfigUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
+ let mut local_inner_val = if inner_val.is_none() { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z::None } else { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z::Some( { inner_val.unwrap() }) };
+ local_inner_val
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfigUpdate, mut val: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z) {
+ let mut local_val = if val.is_some() { Some( { val.take() }) } else { None };
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = local_val;
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this_ptr: &ChannelConfigUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().forwarding_fee_base_msat;
+ let mut local_inner_val = if inner_val.is_none() { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z::None } else { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z::Some( { inner_val.unwrap() }) };
+ local_inner_val
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfigUpdate, mut val: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z) {
+ let mut local_val = if val.is_some() { Some( { val.take() }) } else { None };
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.forwarding_fee_base_msat = local_val;
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this_ptr: &ChannelConfigUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::COption_u16Z {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().cltv_expiry_delta;
+ let mut local_inner_val = if inner_val.is_none() { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u16Z::None } else { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u16Z::Some( { inner_val.unwrap() }) };
+ local_inner_val
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfigUpdate, mut val: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u16Z) {
+ let mut local_val = if val.is_some() { Some( { val.take() }) } else { None };
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.cltv_expiry_delta = local_val;
+}
+///
+/// Returns a copy of the field.
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this_ptr: &ChannelConfigUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::COption_MaxDustHTLCExposureZ {
+ let mut inner_val = this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.clone();
+ let mut local_inner_val = if inner_val.is_none() { crate::c_types::derived::COption_MaxDustHTLCExposureZ::None } else { crate::c_types::derived::COption_MaxDustHTLCExposureZ::Some( { crate::lightning::util::config::MaxDustHTLCExposure::native_into(inner_val.unwrap()) }) };
+ local_inner_val
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfigUpdate, mut val: crate::c_types::derived::COption_MaxDustHTLCExposureZ) {
+ let mut local_val = { /*val*/ let val_opt = val; if val_opt.is_none() { None } else { Some({ { { val_opt.take() }.into_native() }})} };
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = local_val;
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this_ptr: &ChannelConfigUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::COption_u64Z {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis;
+ let mut local_inner_val = if inner_val.is_none() { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u64Z::None } else { crate::c_types::derived::COption_u64Z::Some( { inner_val.unwrap() }) };
+ local_inner_val
+}
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this_ptr: &mut ChannelConfigUpdate, mut val: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u64Z) {
+ let mut local_val = if val.is_some() { Some( { val.take() }) } else { None };
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis = local_val;
+}
+/// Constructs a new ChannelConfigUpdate given each field
+#[must_use]
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_new(mut forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z, mut forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u32Z, mut cltv_expiry_delta_arg: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u16Z, mut max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg: crate::c_types::derived::COption_MaxDustHTLCExposureZ, mut force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg: crate::c_types::derived::COption_u64Z) -> ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ let mut local_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg = if forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg.is_some() { Some( { forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg.take() }) } else { None };
+ let mut local_forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg = if forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg.is_some() { Some( { forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg.take() }) } else { None };
+ let mut local_cltv_expiry_delta_arg = if cltv_expiry_delta_arg.is_some() { Some( { cltv_expiry_delta_arg.take() }) } else { None };
+ let mut local_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg = { /*max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg*/ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg_opt = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg; if max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg_opt.is_none() { None } else { Some({ { { max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg_opt.take() }.into_native() }})} };
+ let mut local_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg = if force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg.is_some() { Some( { force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg.take() }) } else { None };
+ ChannelConfigUpdate { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeChannelConfigUpdate {
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: local_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg,
+ forwarding_fee_base_msat: local_forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: local_cltv_expiry_delta_arg,
+ max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat: local_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat_arg,
+ force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis: local_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg,
+ }), is_owned: true }
+}
+/// Creates a "default" ChannelConfigUpdate. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
+#[must_use]
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn ChannelConfigUpdate_default() -> ChannelConfigUpdate {
+ ChannelConfigUpdate { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(Default::default()), is_owned: true }
+}
+
use lightning::util::config::UserConfig as nativeUserConfigImport;
pub(crate) type nativeUserConfig = nativeUserConfigImport;
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn UserConfig_free_void(this_ptr: *mut c_void) {
- unsafe { let _ = Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeUserConfig); }
+ let _ = unsafe { Box::from_raw(this_ptr as *mut nativeUserConfig) };
}
#[allow(unused)]
impl UserConfig {
ret
}
}
-/// Channel config that we propose to our counterparty.
+/// Channel handshake config that we propose to our counterparty.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_own_channel_config(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().own_channel_config;
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_handshake_config(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_handshake_config;
crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig { inner: unsafe { ObjOps::nonnull_ptr_to_inner((inner_val as *const lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig<>) as *mut _) }, is_owned: false }
}
-/// Channel config that we propose to our counterparty.
+/// Channel handshake config that we propose to our counterparty.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_own_channel_config(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.own_channel_config = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_handshake_config(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_handshake_config = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
}
-/// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel config settings.
+/// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel handshake config settings.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_peer_channel_config_limits(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().peer_channel_config_limits;
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_handshake_limits(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_handshake_limits;
crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits { inner: unsafe { ObjOps::nonnull_ptr_to_inner((inner_val as *const lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits<>) as *mut _) }, is_owned: false }
}
-/// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel config settings.
+/// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel handshake config settings.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_peer_channel_config_limits(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.peer_channel_config_limits = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_handshake_limits(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_handshake_limits = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
}
/// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_options(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig {
- let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_options;
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_channel_config(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().channel_config;
crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig { inner: unsafe { ObjOps::nonnull_ptr_to_inner((inner_val as *const lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig<>) as *mut _) }, is_owned: false }
}
/// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_options(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig) {
- unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_options = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_channel_config(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.channel_config = *unsafe { Box::from_raw(val.take_inner()) };
}
/// If this is set to false, we will reject any HTLCs which were to be forwarded over private
/// channels. This prevents us from taking on HTLC-forwarding risk when we intend to run as a
/// node which is not online reliably.
///
/// For nodes which are not online reliably, you should set all channels to *not* be announced
-/// (using [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+/// (using [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
/// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`]) and set this to false to
/// ensure you are not exposed to any forwarding risk.
///
/// node which is not online reliably.
///
/// For nodes which are not online reliably, you should set all channels to *not* be announced
-/// (using [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+/// (using [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::announced_channel`] and
/// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`]) and set this to false to
/// ensure you are not exposed to any forwarding risk.
///
pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_inbound_channels = val;
}
+/// If this is set to true, the user needs to manually accept inbound requests to open a new
+/// channel.
+///
+/// When set to true, [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] will be triggered once a request to open a
+/// new inbound channel is received through a [`msgs::OpenChannel`] message. In that case, a
+/// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message will not be sent back to the counterparty node unless the
+/// user explicitly chooses to accept the request.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+/// [`msgs::OpenChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::OpenChannel
+/// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_manually_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().manually_accept_inbound_channels;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// If this is set to true, the user needs to manually accept inbound requests to open a new
+/// channel.
+///
+/// When set to true, [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] will be triggered once a request to open a
+/// new inbound channel is received through a [`msgs::OpenChannel`] message. In that case, a
+/// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message will not be sent back to the counterparty node unless the
+/// user explicitly chooses to accept the request.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
+/// [`msgs::OpenChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::OpenChannel
+/// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_manually_accept_inbound_channels(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.manually_accept_inbound_channels = val;
+}
+/// If this is set to true, LDK will intercept HTLCs that are attempting to be forwarded over
+/// fake short channel ids generated via [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]. Upon HTLC
+/// intercept, LDK will generate an [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`] which MUST be handled by the user.
+///
+/// Setting this to true may break backwards compatibility with LDK versions < 0.0.113.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
+/// [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_accept_intercept_htlcs(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().accept_intercept_htlcs;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// If this is set to true, LDK will intercept HTLCs that are attempting to be forwarded over
+/// fake short channel ids generated via [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]. Upon HTLC
+/// intercept, LDK will generate an [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`] which MUST be handled by the user.
+///
+/// Setting this to true may break backwards compatibility with LDK versions < 0.0.113.
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
+/// [`Event::HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_accept_intercept_htlcs(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_intercept_htlcs = val;
+}
+/// If this is set to false, when receiving a keysend payment we'll fail it if it has multiple
+/// parts. If this is set to true, we'll accept the payment.
+///
+/// Setting this to true will break backwards compatibility upon downgrading to an LDK
+/// version < 0.0.116 while receiving an MPP keysend. If we have already received an MPP
+/// keysend, downgrading will cause us to fail to deserialize [`ChannelManager`].
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_get_accept_mpp_keysend(this_ptr: &UserConfig) -> bool {
+ let mut inner_val = &mut this_ptr.get_native_mut_ref().accept_mpp_keysend;
+ *inner_val
+}
+/// If this is set to false, when receiving a keysend payment we'll fail it if it has multiple
+/// parts. If this is set to true, we'll accept the payment.
+///
+/// Setting this to true will break backwards compatibility upon downgrading to an LDK
+/// version < 0.0.116 while receiving an MPP keysend. If we have already received an MPP
+/// keysend, downgrading will cause us to fail to deserialize [`ChannelManager`].
+///
+/// Default value: false.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_set_accept_mpp_keysend(this_ptr: &mut UserConfig, mut val: bool) {
+ unsafe { &mut *ObjOps::untweak_ptr(this_ptr.inner) }.accept_mpp_keysend = val;
+}
/// Constructs a new UserConfig given each field
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
-pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_new(mut own_channel_config_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut peer_channel_config_limits_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut channel_options_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig, mut accept_forwards_to_priv_channels_arg: bool, mut accept_inbound_channels_arg: bool) -> UserConfig {
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_new(mut channel_handshake_config_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig, mut channel_handshake_limits_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits, mut channel_config_arg: crate::lightning::util::config::ChannelConfig, mut accept_forwards_to_priv_channels_arg: bool, mut accept_inbound_channels_arg: bool, mut manually_accept_inbound_channels_arg: bool, mut accept_intercept_htlcs_arg: bool, mut accept_mpp_keysend_arg: bool) -> UserConfig {
UserConfig { inner: ObjOps::heap_alloc(nativeUserConfig {
- own_channel_config: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(own_channel_config_arg.take_inner()) },
- peer_channel_config_limits: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(peer_channel_config_limits_arg.take_inner()) },
- channel_options: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_options_arg.take_inner()) },
+ channel_handshake_config: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_handshake_config_arg.take_inner()) },
+ channel_handshake_limits: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_handshake_limits_arg.take_inner()) },
+ channel_config: *unsafe { Box::from_raw(channel_config_arg.take_inner()) },
accept_forwards_to_priv_channels: accept_forwards_to_priv_channels_arg,
accept_inbound_channels: accept_inbound_channels_arg,
+ manually_accept_inbound_channels: manually_accept_inbound_channels_arg,
+ accept_intercept_htlcs: accept_intercept_htlcs_arg,
+ accept_mpp_keysend: accept_mpp_keysend_arg,
}), is_owned: true }
}
impl Clone for UserConfig {
#[allow(unused)]
/// Used only if an object of this type is returned as a trait impl by a method
pub(crate) extern "C" fn UserConfig_clone_void(this_ptr: *const c_void) -> *mut c_void {
- Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *mut nativeUserConfig)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
+ Box::into_raw(Box::new(unsafe { (*(this_ptr as *const nativeUserConfig)).clone() })) as *mut c_void
}
#[no_mangle]
/// Creates a copy of the UserConfig
pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_clone(orig: &UserConfig) -> UserConfig {
orig.clone()
}
+/// Get a string which allows debug introspection of a UserConfig object
+pub extern "C" fn UserConfig_debug_str_void(o: *const c_void) -> Str {
+ alloc::format!("{:?}", unsafe { o as *const crate::lightning::util::config::UserConfig }).into()}
/// Creates a "default" UserConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
#[must_use]
#[no_mangle]
projects / ldk-c-bindings / blobdiff