+++ /dev/null
-package org.ldk.structs;
-
-import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
-import org.ldk.enums.*;
-import org.ldk.util.*;
-import java.util.Arrays;
-import java.lang.ref.Reference;
-import javax.annotation.Nullable;
-
-/**
- * A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
- * [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
- *
- * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
- * policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
- * Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
- * for an example of such policies.
- */
-@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
-public class BaseSign extends CommonBase {
- final bindings.LDKBaseSign bindings_instance;
- BaseSign(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
- private BaseSign(bindings.LDKBaseSign arg, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
- super(bindings.LDKBaseSign_new(arg, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr()));
- this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
- this.bindings_instance = arg;
- }
- @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
- protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
- if (ptr != 0) { bindings.BaseSign_free(ptr); } super.finalize();
- }
-
- public static interface BaseSignInterface {
- /**
- * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
- *
- * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
- */
- byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx);
- /**
- * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
- *
- * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
- * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
- *
- * May be called more than once for the same index.
- *
- * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
- */
- byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx);
- /**
- * Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
- *
- * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
- * secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
- * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
- * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
- *
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
- * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
- * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
- *
- * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
- * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
- */
- Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx, byte[][] preimages);
- /**
- * Returns an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
- * some [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`] types. This should be sufficient to identify this
- * [`BaseSign`] object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
- */
- byte[] channel_keys_id();
- /**
- * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
- *
- * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
- *
- * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
- * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
- *
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
- * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
- * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
- *
- * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
- * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
- */
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages);
- /**
- * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
- *
- * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
- * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
- */
- Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret);
- /**
- * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
- *
- * This will be called
- * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
- * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
- * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
- * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
- * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
- * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
- *
- * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
- *
- * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
- *
- * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
- */
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
- /**
- * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
- * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
- *
- * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
- * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
- * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- *
- * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
- * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
- * so).
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
- /**
- * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
- * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
- *
- * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
- * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
- * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
- * signature.
- *
- * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
- * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
- * so).
- *
- * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
- * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
- /**
- * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
- * transaction, either offered or received.
- *
- * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
- * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
- * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
- * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
- * outputs.
- *
- * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- *
- * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
- * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
- * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
- * BIP 143 signature.
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
- /**
- * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
- *
- * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
- * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
- /**
- * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
- * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
- */
- Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input);
- /**
- * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka
- * node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants.
- *
- * The first returned signature should be from our node secret key, the second from our
- * funding key.
- *
- * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
- * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
- * protocol.
- */
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
- /**
- * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
- * `counterparty_selected`/`holder_selected_contest_delay` and funding outpoint. Since these
- * are static channel data, they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set,
- * as LDK may call this method more than once.
- *
- * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
- */
- void provide_channel_parameters(ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters);
- }
- private static class LDKBaseSignHolder { BaseSign held; }
- public static BaseSign new_impl(BaseSignInterface arg, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
- final LDKBaseSignHolder impl_holder = new LDKBaseSignHolder();
- impl_holder.held = new BaseSign(new bindings.LDKBaseSign() {
- @Override public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx) {
- byte[] ret = arg.get_per_commitment_point(idx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 33);
- return result;
- }
- @Override public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx) {
- byte[] ret = arg.release_commitment_secret(idx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long validate_holder_commitment(long holder_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
- org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx_hu_conv = null; if (holder_tx < 0 || holder_tx > 4096) { holder_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, holder_tx); }
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_holder_commitment(holder_tx_hu_conv, preimages);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
- byte[] ret = arg.channel_keys_id();
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
- org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, preimages);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(idx, secret);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long commitment_tx) {
- org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
- org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
- org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
- org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public long sign_channel_announcement(long msg) {
- org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement(msg_hu_conv);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
- return result;
- }
- @Override public void provide_channel_parameters(long channel_parameters) {
- org.ldk.structs.ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters_hu_conv = null; if (channel_parameters < 0 || channel_parameters > 4096) { channel_parameters_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelTransactionParameters(null, channel_parameters); }
- arg.provide_channel_parameters(channel_parameters_hu_conv);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(arg);
- }
- }, pubkeys);
- return impl_holder.held;
- }
- /**
- * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
- *
- * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
- */
- public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx) {
- byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_get_per_commitment_point(this.ptr, idx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
- *
- * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
- * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
- *
- * May be called more than once for the same index.
- *
- * Note that the commitment number starts at `(1 << 48) - 1` and counts backwards.
- */
- public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx) {
- byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_release_commitment_secret(this.ptr, idx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
- *
- * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
- * secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
- * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
- * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
- *
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
- * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
- * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
- *
- * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
- * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
- */
- public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_validate_holder_commitment(this.ptr, holder_tx == null ? 0 : holder_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(preimages).map(preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(holder_tx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(preimages);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(holder_tx); };
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Returns an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
- * some [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`] types. This should be sufficient to identify this
- * [`BaseSign`] object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
- */
- public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
- byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_channel_keys_id(this.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /**
- * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
- *
- * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
- *
- * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
- * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
- *
- * The preimages of outgoing HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment are provided.
- * A validating signer should ensure that an HTLC output is removed only when the matching
- * preimage is provided, or when the value to holder is restored.
- *
- * Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
- * irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
- */
- public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(org.ldk.structs.CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx, byte[][] preimages) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr, preimages != null ? Arrays.stream(preimages).map(preimages_conv_8 -> InternalUtils.check_arr_len(preimages_conv_8, 32)).toArray(byte[][]::new) : null);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(preimages);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
- *
- * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
- * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
- */
- public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(secret);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
- *
- * This will be called
- * - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
- * - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
- * - with the previous `commitment_tx`, just to get claiming HTLC
- * signatures, if we are reacting to a [`ChannelMonitor`]
- * [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
- * that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest `commitment_tx`.
- *
- * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
- *
- * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
- *
- * [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
- */
- public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(org.ldk.structs.HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx); };
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
- * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
- *
- * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
- * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
- * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- *
- * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
- * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
- * so).
- */
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
- * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
- *
- * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
- * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
- * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
- * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
- * signature.
- *
- * `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
- * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
- * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
- * so).
- *
- * `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
- * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
- */
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
- * transaction, either offered or received.
- *
- * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
- * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
- * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
- * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
- *
- * `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
- * outputs.
- *
- * `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
- *
- * `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
- * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
- * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
- * BIP 143 signature.
- */
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, org.ldk.structs.HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(htlc); };
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
- *
- * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
- * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
- */
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(org.ldk.structs.ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(closing_tx);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(closing_tx); };
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
- * input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
- */
- public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_holder_anchor_input(byte[] anchor_tx, long input) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, anchor_tx, input);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(anchor_tx);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key and our node secret key (aka
- * node_id or network_key), proving it comes from one of the channel participants.
- *
- * The first returned signature should be from our node secret key, the second from our
- * funding key.
- *
- * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
- * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
- * protocol.
- */
- public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(org.ldk.structs.UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_channel_announcement(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureSignatureZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
- if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(msg); };
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
- /**
- * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
- * `counterparty_selected`/`holder_selected_contest_delay` and funding outpoint. Since these
- * are static channel data, they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set,
- * as LDK may call this method more than once.
- *
- * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
- */
- public void provide_channel_parameters(org.ldk.structs.ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters) {
- bindings.BaseSign_provide_channel_parameters(this.ptr, channel_parameters == null ? 0 : channel_parameters.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_parameters);
- if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.add(channel_parameters); };
- }
-
- /**
- * Frees any resources associated with this object given its this_arg pointer.
- * Does not need to free the outer struct containing function pointers and may be NULL is no resources need to be freed.
- */
- public ChannelPublicKeys get_pubkeys() {
- long ret = bindings.BaseSign_get_pubkeys(this.ptr);
- Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
- if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
- org.ldk.structs.ChannelPublicKeys ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelPublicKeys(null, ret); }
- if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this); };
- return ret_hu_conv;
- }
-
-}
projects / ldk-java / blobdiff