]> git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/commitdiff
Expose the amount of funds available for claim in ChannelMonitor
authorMatt Corallo <git@bluematt.me>
Wed, 4 Aug 2021 16:10:38 +0000 (16:10 +0000)
committerMatt Corallo <git@bluematt.me>
Wed, 15 Sep 2021 18:07:34 +0000 (18:07 +0000)
In general, we should always allow users to query for how much is
currently in-flight being claimed on-chain at any time.

This does so by examining the confirmed claims on-chain and
breaking down what is left to be claimed into a new
`ClaimableBalance` enum.

Fixes #995.

lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

index b2ed3d99de7f39e26c590cecf5e75401d84f2921..30e2793dcb9c2145648e32beadab177d45d24f8d 100644 (file)
@@ -535,6 +535,59 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
        },
 );
 
+/// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
+///
+/// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
+/// be provided.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
+pub enum Balance {
+       /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
+       /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
+       /// force-closed now.
+       ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+               /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
+               /// required to do so.
+               claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+       },
+       /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
+       /// we consider it spendable.
+       ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+               /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
+               /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
+               claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+               /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
+               /// amount.
+               confirmation_height: u32,
+       },
+       /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
+       /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
+       /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
+       ///
+       /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
+       /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
+       /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
+       ContentiousClaimable {
+               /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
+               /// required to do so.
+               claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+               /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
+               /// done so.
+               timeout_height: u32,
+       },
+       /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
+       /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
+       /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
+       MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+               /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
+               /// required to do so.
+               claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
+               /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
+               /// done so.
+               claimable_height: u32,
+       },
+}
+
 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 #[derive(PartialEq)]
 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
@@ -1302,6 +1355,173 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
        pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
                self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
        }
+
+       /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
+       /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
+       /// confirmation).
+       ///
+       /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
+       /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
+       /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
+       /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
+       ///
+       /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
+       /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
+       // TODO, fix that ^
+       ///
+       /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
+       /// may be returned here and their meanings.
+       pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
+               let mut res = Vec::new();
+               let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
+
+               let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
+               let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
+               let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+                       if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
+                               Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
+                       } else { None }
+               });
+               if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
+                       debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
+                               "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
+                       confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
+                       pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
+               }
+
+               macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
+                       ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
+                               for htlc in $htlc_iter {
+                                       if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
+                                               if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
+                                                       assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
+                                               } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
+                                                       // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
+                                                       // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
+                                                       // and awaiting confirmations on it.
+                                                       let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+                                                               if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
+                                                                       if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
+                                                               } else { None }
+                                                       });
+                                                       if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
+                                                               res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                                                                       claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+                                                                       confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+                                                               });
+                                                       } else {
+                                                               res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                                                                       claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+                                                                       claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+                                                               });
+                                                       }
+                                               } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
+                                                       // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
+                                                       // we know the preimage.
+                                                       // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
+                                                       // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
+                                                       // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+                                                       let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+                                                               if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
+                                                                       if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
+                                                                               Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
+                                                                       } else { None }
+                                                               } else { None }
+                                                       });
+                                                       if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
+                                                               res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                                                                       claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+                                                                       confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+                                                               });
+                                                       } else {
+                                                               res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+                                                                       claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+                                                                       timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+                                                               });
+                                                       }
+                                               }
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+
+               if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
+                       let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
+                       if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
+                               walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
+                               if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+                                       if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
+                                               if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
+                                                       descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
+                                               } = &event.event {
+                                                       Some(descriptor.output.value)
+                                               } else { None }
+                                       }) {
+                                               res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                                                       claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
+                                                       confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+                                               });
+                                       } else {
+                                               // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
+                                               // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
+                                               // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
+                                       }
+                               }
+                               found_commitment_tx = true;
+                       } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
+                               walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+                               if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+                                       res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                                               claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
+                                               confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+                                       });
+                               }
+                               found_commitment_tx = true;
+                       } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
+                               if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
+                                       walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
+                                       if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+                                               res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                                                       claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
+                                                       confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+                                               });
+                                       }
+                                       found_commitment_tx = true;
+                               }
+                       }
+                       if !found_commitment_tx {
+                               if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
+                                       // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
+                                       // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
+                                       // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
+                                       res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                                               claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
+                                               confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
+                                       });
+                               }
+                       }
+                       // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
+                       // outputs.
+               } else {
+                       let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
+                       for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+                               if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
+                               if htlc.offered {
+                                       res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                                               claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
+                                               claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
+                                       });
+                               } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
+                                       claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
+                               }
+                       }
+                       res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+                               claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
+                       });
+               }
+
+               res
+       }
 }
 
 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
@@ -2488,7 +2708,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
                                                                        // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
                                                                        // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
                                                                        // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
-                                                                       // as a ClaimableBalance, something which we do not yet do.
+                                                                       // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
                                                                        // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
                                                                }
                                                                continue 'outer_loop;
index 8fdf28e578b835342c498ba39d4132ec5ab9bd0b..1a332fbb7fd907e96db3e13e3aa270e75cf5d1c5 100644 (file)
@@ -9,8 +9,10 @@
 
 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
 
-use chain::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
-use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
+use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
+use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
+use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HTLCFailChannelUpdate, ErrorAction};
 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
@@ -19,6 +21,10 @@ use routing::router::get_route;
 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
 
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+
 use prelude::*;
 
 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
@@ -79,3 +85,450 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
        expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
+       // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
+       // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
+       // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
+       // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
+       let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+       let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+       let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+       let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+       let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+               create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+       let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+       assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+       let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+
+       assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
+               }],
+               nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+       assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
+               nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+       nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
+       let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+       nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
+       let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+       nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
+
+       let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+       nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
+       let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+       nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
+       let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+       nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
+       let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+       assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
+
+       let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+       assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
+       assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
+
+       mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+       mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
+
+       assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+       assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+
+       assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+       assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+       assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
+                       confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+               }],
+               nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+       assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
+                       confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+               }],
+               nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+       assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+               nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+       assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+               nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+       let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
+       if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+               assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+               let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+                       Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+               check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
+       }
+
+       let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
+       if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+               assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+               let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+                       Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+               check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
+       }
+}
+
+fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
+       v.sort_unstable();
+       v
+}
+
+fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
+       // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
+       // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
+       // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
+       let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+       if prev_commitment_tx {
+               // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
+               // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
+               // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
+               // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
+               chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+       }
+       let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+       let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+       let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+       let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
+               create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+       let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
+       assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
+
+       // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
+       let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
+       // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
+       // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
+       let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
+       // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
+       let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
+
+       let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
+
+       let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
+
+       let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
+       // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
+       // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
+       assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
+                               (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+               }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }]),
+               sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+       assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+               }],
+               nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+       nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+       let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+       // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
+       // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
+       nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+       nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+       if prev_commitment_tx {
+               // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
+               nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
+               expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
+               nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+               let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+               nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
+               let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+               nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
+               let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+       }
+
+       // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
+       // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
+       let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
+                               4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
+                               3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
+                               1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
+                               3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
+                               // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
+                               chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
+                                                               if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
+                                                               channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+               }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }];
+       if !prev_commitment_tx {
+               a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               });
+       }
+       assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
+               sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+       assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
+               }],
+               nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+       // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
+       // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
+       let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+       mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
+       mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
+
+       let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+       assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
+       if prev_commitment_tx {
+               check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
+       } else {
+               assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
+               assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
+       }
+       // b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
+       check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
+       check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
+       assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+       assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+       assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
+       assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
+       check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
+
+       assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+       check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+       assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
+       check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+       assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+       assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+       // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
+       // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
+       // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
+       // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
+       assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+       assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+       assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
+                               (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
+                       confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+               }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }]),
+               sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+       // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
+       // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+       assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+                       confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+               },
+               // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
+               // long.
+               Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+                       timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }]),
+               sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+       expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+
+       // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
+       // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
+       assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }]),
+               sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+       assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+                       confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+               }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+                       timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }]),
+               sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+       let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
+       if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+               assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+               let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+                       Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+               check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
+       }
+
+       assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+       // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
+       // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
+       mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
+       if !prev_commitment_tx {
+               expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
+       }
+       assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }]),
+               sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+       assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }],
+               nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+       // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
+       let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+       assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
+       check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
+       assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
+       check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
+       assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+       check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
+       assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
+                  a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
+       // a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
+       assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
+       assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
+
+       // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
+       // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
+       mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+       assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+       assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
+               }],
+               nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+       // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
+       // balance entry.
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+       assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+               nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+       expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
+
+       let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
+       if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+               assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+               let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+                       Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+               check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+       } else { panic!(); }
+
+       // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
+       // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
+       // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
+       let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
+       mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
+
+       assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
+                       confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
+               }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+                       confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
+               }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }]),
+               sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+       // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
+       // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
+
+       let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
+       if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+               assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+               let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+                       Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+               check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
+       }
+
+       assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
+                       confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
+               }, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }]),
+               sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
+
+       // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
+       // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
+
+       let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+       assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
+       if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
+               assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
+               let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
+                       Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
+               check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
+       } else { panic!(); }
+
+       assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }],
+       nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+
+       // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
+       // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
+       // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
+       mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
+       assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
+                       claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
+                       timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
+               }],
+       nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
+       assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
+               nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
+       do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
+       do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
+}