&self, path: OnionMessagePath, message: OnionMessageContents<T>,
reply_path: Option<BlindedPath>
) -> Result<(), SendError> {
+ let (introduction_node_id, onion_msg) = Self::create_onion_message(
+ &self.entropy_source,
+ &self.node_signer,
+ &self.secp_ctx,
+ path,
+ message,
+ reply_path
+ )?;
+
+ let mut pending_per_peer_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ if outbound_buffer_full(&introduction_node_id, &pending_per_peer_msgs) { return Err(SendError::BufferFull) }
+ match pending_per_peer_msgs.entry(introduction_node_id) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(SendError::InvalidFirstHop),
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
+ e.get_mut().push_back(onion_msg);
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Create an onion message with contents `message` to the destination of `path`.
+ /// Returns (introduction_node_id, onion_msg)
+ pub fn create_onion_message<T: CustomOnionMessageContents>(
+ entropy_source: &ES,
+ node_signer: &NS,
+ secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ path: OnionMessagePath,
+ message: OnionMessageContents<T>,
+ reply_path: Option<BlindedPath>,
+ ) -> Result<(PublicKey, msgs::OnionMessage), SendError> {
let OnionMessagePath { intermediate_nodes, mut destination } = path;
if let Destination::BlindedPath(BlindedPath { ref blinded_hops, .. }) = destination {
if blinded_hops.len() < 2 {
// advance the blinded path by 1 hop so the second hop is the new introduction node.
if intermediate_nodes.len() == 0 {
if let Destination::BlindedPath(ref mut blinded_path) = destination {
- let our_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
+ let our_node_id = node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
.map_err(|()| SendError::GetNodeIdFailed)?;
if blinded_path.introduction_node_id == our_node_id {
- advance_path_by_one(blinded_path, &self.node_signer, &self.secp_ctx)
+ advance_path_by_one(blinded_path, node_signer, &secp_ctx)
.map_err(|()| SendError::BlindedPathAdvanceFailed)?;
}
}
}
- let blinding_secret_bytes = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let blinding_secret_bytes = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let blinding_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&blinding_secret_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
let (introduction_node_id, blinding_point) = if intermediate_nodes.len() != 0 {
- (intermediate_nodes[0], PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_secret))
+ (intermediate_nodes[0], PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &blinding_secret))
} else {
match destination {
- Destination::Node(pk) => (pk, PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_secret)),
+ Destination::Node(pk) => (pk, PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &blinding_secret)),
Destination::BlindedPath(BlindedPath { introduction_node_id, blinding_point, .. }) =>
(introduction_node_id, blinding_point),
}
};
let (packet_payloads, packet_keys) = packet_payloads_and_keys(
- &self.secp_ctx, &intermediate_nodes, destination, message, reply_path, &blinding_secret)
+ &secp_ctx, &intermediate_nodes, destination, message, reply_path, &blinding_secret)
.map_err(|e| SendError::Secp256k1(e))?;
- let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
+ let prng_seed = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
let onion_routing_packet = construct_onion_message_packet(
packet_payloads, packet_keys, prng_seed).map_err(|()| SendError::TooBigPacket)?;
- let mut pending_per_peer_msgs = self.pending_messages.lock().unwrap();
- if outbound_buffer_full(&introduction_node_id, &pending_per_peer_msgs) { return Err(SendError::BufferFull) }
- match pending_per_peer_msgs.entry(introduction_node_id) {
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(SendError::InvalidFirstHop),
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
- e.get_mut().push_back(msgs::OnionMessage { blinding_point, onion_routing_packet });
- Ok(())
- }
- }
+ Ok((introduction_node_id, msgs::OnionMessage {
+ blinding_point,
+ onion_routing_packet
+ }))
}
fn respond_with_onion_message<T: CustomOnionMessageContents>(
pub(super) const SMALL_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN: usize = 1300;
pub(super) const BIG_PACKET_HOP_DATA_LEN: usize = 32768;
+/// Packet of hop data for next peer
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub(crate) struct Packet {
- pub(super) version: u8,
- pub(super) public_key: PublicKey,
+pub struct Packet {
+ /// Bolt 04 version number
+ pub version: u8,
+ /// A random sepc256k1 point, used to build the ECDH shared secret to decrypt hop_data
+ pub public_key: PublicKey,
+ /// Encrypted payload for the next hop
+ //
// Unlike the onion packets used for payments, onion message packets can have payloads greater
// than 1300 bytes.
// TODO: if 1300 ends up being the most common size, optimize this to be:
// enum { ThirteenHundred([u8; 1300]), VarLen(Vec<u8>) }
- pub(super) hop_data: Vec<u8>,
- pub(super) hmac: [u8; 32],
+ pub hop_data: Vec<u8>,
+ /// HMAC to verify the integrity of hop_data
+ pub hmac: [u8; 32],
}
impl onion_utils::Packet for Packet {