//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
-use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
-use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
-use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
+use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
+use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
use util::{byte_utils, events};
-use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
+use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
use std::ops::Deref;
/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
-const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
+pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
/// HTLC-Success transaction.
/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
}
-#[derive(PartialEq)]
-enum InputDescriptors {
- RevokedOfferedHTLC,
- RevokedReceivedHTLC,
- OfferedHTLC,
- ReceivedHTLC,
- RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
-}
-
/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum InputMaterial {
+pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
Revoked {
script: Script,
pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum OnchainEvent {
- /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
- /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
- Claim {
- claim_request: Sha256dHash,
- },
/// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
/// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
/// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
HTLCUpdate {
htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
},
- /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
- /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
- /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
- ContentiousOutpoint {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
- input_material: InputMaterial,
- }
-}
-
-/// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
- // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
- // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
- height_timer: u32,
- // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
- feerate_previous: u64,
- // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
- // a priority of not feerate
- soonest_timelock: u32,
- // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
- per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
-}
-
-impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
- for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
- outp.write(writer)?;
- tx_material.write(writer)?;
- }
- Ok(())
- }
-}
-
-impl Readable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
- fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
- let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
- per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
- }
- Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
- }
}
const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
- destination_script: Script,
// Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
// back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
// scan every commitment transaction for that
to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
- // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
- // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
- // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
- // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
- // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
- // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
- // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
- // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
- // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
- // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
- // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
- #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
- pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
-
- // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
- // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
- // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
- // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
- // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
- // block with output gets disconnected.
- #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
- pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
- #[cfg(not(test))]
- claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
-
// Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
// we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
// actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
// Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler,
+
// We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
// consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
// (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
-macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
- ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
- {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
- let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
- if $value <= fee {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
- fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
- if $value <= fee {
- $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
- fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
- if $value <= fee {
- log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
- fee, $value);
- false
- } else {
- log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
- $value);
- $value -= fee;
- true
- }
- } else {
- log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
- $value);
- $value -= fee;
- true
- }
- } else {
- $value -= fee;
- true
- }
- }
- }
-}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
- self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
- self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
- self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch
{
}
self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
- self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
}
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
- ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
- claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
- outp.write(writer)?;
- claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
- claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
- }
-
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
for ev in events.iter() {
match *ev {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- claim_request.write(writer)?;
- },
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
},
- OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
- writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
- outpoint.write(writer)?;
- input_material.write(writer)?;
- }
}
}
}
script.write(writer)?;
}
}
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
pending_events: Vec::new(),
- destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
to_remote_rescue: None,
- pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
-
- claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
-
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
+ onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), logger.clone()),
+
last_block_hash: Default::default(),
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
logger,
}
}
- fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
- let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
- for inp in inputs {
- // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
- tx_weight += match inp {
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
- },
- // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
- &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
- 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
- },
- };
- }
- tx_weight
- }
-
- fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
- if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
- return current_height + 1
- } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
- return current_height + 3
- }
- current_height + 15
- }
-
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
/// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
/// revoked remote commitment tx
- fn check_spend_remote_transaction<F: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: F) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>)
- where F::Target: FeeEstimator
- {
+ fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<(u32, bool, BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial)>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
- let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
+ let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
+ Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
}
};
}
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
- let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+ let (revocation_pubkey, revocation_key, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref keys, ref revocation_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key)),
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)),
Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
},
- Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
- None)
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
+ unimplemented!()
},
};
let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
+ None => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
} else { None };
- let mut total_value = 0;
- let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
-
+ // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
- inputs.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: idx as u32,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
- inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
- total_value += outp.value;
+ claimable_outpoints.push((height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, true, BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value }));
} else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
}
}
- macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
- {
- let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
- chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
- };
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
- let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
- $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
- } else {
- $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
- }
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
- (redeemscript, revocation_key)
- }
- }
- }
-
+ // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
- inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
-
- for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
- }
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
- inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
- total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
- assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
- log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
- let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
- per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
- match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
- }
- match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
- }
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
- }
+ return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
+ claimable_outpoints.push((htlc.cltv_expiry, true, BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value }));
}
}
}
- if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
+ // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
+ if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
- log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
+ log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
return htlc_update.0 != **source
},
- _ => return true
}
});
e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
}
// No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
}
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
-
- let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: total_value,
- });
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: inputs,
- output: outputs,
- };
-
- let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
-
- let mut used_feerate;
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
- }
-
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
-
- let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
- let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
- for info in inputs_info.iter() {
- if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
- soonest_timelock = info.2;
- }
- }
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
- let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
- for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
- let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
- log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
- per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
- match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
- }
- }
- match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
- }
-
- assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
-
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
return htlc_update.0 != **source
},
- _ => return true
}
});
e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
} else { None };
if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
- let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
+ let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, htlc_privkey) = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref keys, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)))
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
},
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!() }
};
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
- None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
+ None => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
};
+ // First, mark as spendable our to_remote output
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
match self.key_storage {
}
}
- let mut total_value = 0;
- let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
- let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
-
- macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => {
- {
- let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0;
- let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
- let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- $input.witness.push($preimage);
- $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
- (redeemscript, htlc_key)
- }
- }
- }
-
- for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
+ // Then, try to find htlc outputs
+ for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
+ return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
}
- if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
- if htlc.offered {
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
- inputs.push(input);
- inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
- inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx));
- total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
- } else {
- let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx);
- assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
- let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
- per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
- match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
- }
- match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
- }
- txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
- }
- }
- }
+ let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
+ let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
+ if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
+ claimable_outpoints.push((htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry }));
}
- if !htlc.offered {
- // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
- // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
- let input = TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: commitment_txid,
- vout: transaction_output_index,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- };
- let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
- input: vec![input],
- output: vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
- }),
- };
- let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx);
- assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
- //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
- log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
- let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
- per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
- match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
- }
- match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
- }
- }
- txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
- }
- }
- }
-
- if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
-
- let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: total_value
- });
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: inputs,
- output: outputs,
- };
-
- let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
-
- let mut used_feerate;
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
- return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
- }
-
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
-
- let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
- let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
- for info in inputs_info.iter() {
- if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
- soonest_timelock = info.2;
}
}
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
- let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
- for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3);
- log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
- per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
- match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
- }
- }
- match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
- }
- assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
- spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
- outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
- output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
- });
- txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
}
}
} else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
}
}
}
-
- (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
+ (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
}
/// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
- fn check_spend_remote_htlc<F: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: F) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>)
- where F::Target: FeeEstimator
- {
+ fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32) -> Vec<(u32, bool, BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial)> {
//TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
- if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
- return (None, None)
+ if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
+ return Vec::new()
}
macro_rules! ignore_error {
( $thing : expr ) => {
match $thing {
Ok(a) => a,
- Err(_) => return (None, None)
+ Err(_) => return Vec::new()
}
};
}
- let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
+ let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return Vec::new(); };
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint))
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
+ let (revocation_pubkey, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref keys, ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, revocation_base_key)))
},
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { unimplemented!() }
};
let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
- None => return (None, None),
+ None => return Vec::new(),
Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
};
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
- let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
- let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- let mut amount = 0;
-
- if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
- inputs.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
- txid: htlc_txid,
- vout: 0,
- },
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- amount = tx.output[0].value;
- }
-
- if !inputs.is_empty() {
- let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: amount
- });
-
- let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: inputs,
- output: outputs,
- };
- let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
- let mut used_feerate;
- if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
- return (None, None);
- }
-
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
-
- let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
- let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
- (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
- }
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
- unimplemented!();
- }
- };
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
- spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
-
- assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
- let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
- let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32);
- log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
- let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
- per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
- match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
- }
- match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
- }
- (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
- } else { (None, None) }
+ log_trace!(self, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
+ let claimable_outpoints = vec!((height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, true, BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }));
+ claimable_outpoints
}
- fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
+ fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>) {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
- let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
};
add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
//TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
- log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
- pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
+ log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid);
res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
} else {
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
};
add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
- let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
//TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
- log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
- pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
+ log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid);
res.push(htlc_success_tx);
}
}
}
}
- (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
+ (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs)
}
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
return htlc_update.0 != $source
},
- _ => return true
}
});
e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
- for claim in $updates.3 {
- match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
- }
- }
}
}
assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
+ let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key);
append_onchain_update!(res);
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
- let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
+ let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key);
append_onchain_update!(res);
},
Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()];
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
- res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0);
+ res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key).0);
// We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
// The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
},
log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
- let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
+ let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
for tx in txn_matched {
if tx.input.len() == 1 {
// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
// which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
// filters.
let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
- let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
funding_info.clone()
};
if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
- let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, &*fee_estimator);
- txn = remote_txn;
+ let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height);
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
- if txn.is_empty() {
+ if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
- txn = local_txn;
+ for tx in local_txn.iter() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
+ }
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
}
}
+ claimable_outpoints.push(new_outpoints);
}
- if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
+ if !funding_txo.is_none() && claimable_outpoints.is_empty() {
if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
}
}
} else {
if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
- let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &*fee_estimator);
- if let Some(tx) = tx {
- txn.push(tx);
- }
- if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
- spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
- }
+ let mut new_outpoints = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height);
+ claimable_outpoints.push(new_outpoints);
}
}
- for tx in txn.iter() {
- log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
- }
}
// While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
// can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
// we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
-
- // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
- let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
- for inp in &tx.input {
- if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
- // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
- if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
- //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
- // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
- // by us.
- let mut set_equality = true;
- if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
- set_equality = false;
- } else {
- for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
- if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
- set_equality = false;
- }
- }
- }
-
- macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
- () => {
- let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
- entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
- }
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
- // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
- // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
- if set_equality {
- clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
- } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
- for input in tx.input.iter() {
- if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
- claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
- }
- // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
- if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
- clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
- }
- }
- //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
- bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
- }
- break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
- } else {
- panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
- }
- }
- }
- for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
- let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
- match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
- hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
- if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
- entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
- }
- },
- hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
- entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
- }
- }
- }
}
let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
self.would_broadcast_at_height(height)
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness());
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
- let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
+ let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key);
spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
for ev in events {
match ev {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
- // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
- // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
- if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
- for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
- self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
- }
- }
- },
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
source: htlc_update.0,
});
},
- OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
- self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
- }
}
}
}
- for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
- if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
- bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
- }
- }
- for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
- if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) {
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
- Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
- } else { None }
- } else { unreachable!(); }
- } {
- if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
- claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
- claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
- } else { unreachable!(); }
- }
- }
+ let mut spendable_output = self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, broadcaster, &*fee_estimator);
+ spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
+
self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
- let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
- if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
+ if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
//We may discard:
//- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
- //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
- //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
- for ev in events {
- match ev {
- OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
- if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
- if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
- claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
- // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
- // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
- bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
- }
- }
- },
- _ => {},
- }
- }
- }
- for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
- if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) {
- claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
- claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
- broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
- }
- }
- for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
- self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
- }
- //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
- // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
- let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
- self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
- if v.1 == height {
- remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
- false
- } else { true });
- for req in remove_request {
- self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
}
+
+ self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator);
+
self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
}
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
return htlc_update.0 != source
},
- _ => return true
}
});
e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
}
}
}
-
- /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
- /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
- fn bump_claim_tx<F: Deref>(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: F) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)>
- where F::Target: FeeEstimator
- {
- if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
- let mut inputs = Vec::new();
- for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
- inputs.push(TxIn {
- previous_output: *outp,
- script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: 0xfffffffd,
- witness: Vec::new(),
- });
- }
- let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
- version: 2,
- lock_time: 0,
- input: inputs,
- output: vec![TxOut {
- script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
- value: 0
- }],
- };
-
- macro_rules! RBF_bump {
- ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
- {
- let mut used_feerate;
- // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
- let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
- let mut value = $amount;
- if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
- // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
- $amount - value
- } else {
- log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
- return None;
- }
- // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
- } else {
- let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
- if $amount <= fee {
- log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
- return None;
- }
- fee
- };
-
- let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
- let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
- // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
- // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
- // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
- let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
- new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
- } else {
- new_fee
- };
- Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
- }
- }
- }
-
- let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
- let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
- let mut amt = 0;
- for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
- match per_outp_material {
- &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
- inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
- amt += *amount;
- },
- &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
- inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
- amt += *amount;
- },
- &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
- }
- }
-
- let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
- let new_feerate;
- if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
- // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
- if new_fee > amt {
- bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
- } else {
- bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
- }
- new_feerate = feerate;
- } else {
- return None;
- }
- assert!(new_feerate != 0);
-
- for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
- match per_outp_material {
- &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- if *is_htlc {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
- } else {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
- }
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
- log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
- },
- &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
- if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
- let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
- let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
- let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
- if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
- } else {
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
- }
- bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
- log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
- },
- &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
- //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
- // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
- // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
- return None;
- }
- }
- }
- assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
- Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
- }
}
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> ReadableArgs<Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
($key: expr) => {
match $key {
}
let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => None,
1 => {
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
- let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
- pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
- }
-
- let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
- for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
- let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
- claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
- }
-
let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
for _ in 0..events_len {
let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => {
- let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::Claim {
- claim_request
- }
- },
- 1 => {
let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
}
},
- 2 => {
- let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
- OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
- outpoint,
- input_material
- }
- }
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
events.push(ev);
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
+ let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
latest_update_id,
pending_htlcs_updated,
pending_events,
- destination_script,
to_remote_rescue,
- pending_claim_requests,
-
- claimable_outpoints,
-
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
outputs_to_watch,
+ onchain_tx_handler,
+
last_block_hash,
- secp_ctx,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
logger,
}))
}
-
}
#[cfg(test)]
use hex;
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
+ use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
+ use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
claim_tx.input.clear();
for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
claim_tx.input.clear();
for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
}
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 26);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 21);
// ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
// ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
- // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx * 7 (7), after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore
- // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (14)
-
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[7]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[9]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[14]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[17]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[20]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[23]);
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[8]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[10]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[15]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[18]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[21]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[24]);
-
+ // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx (4), after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore
+ // ChannelMonito r: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (14)
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[9]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[13]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[15]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[17]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[19]);
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[10]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[14]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[16]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[18]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[20]);
+
+
+ // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration and present 8 times (rebroadcast at every block from 200 to 206)
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
+ // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
fn get_txout(out_point: &BitcoinOutPoint, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<TxOut> {
if out_point.txid == tx.txid() {
tx.output.get(out_point.vout as usize).cloned()
None
}
}
- node_txn[0].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
- node_txn[1].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
node_txn[2].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
+ node_txn[3].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
+ node_txn[4].verify(|out|get_txout(out, &revoked_local_txn[0])).unwrap();
let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
- witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
+ witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone());
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
- let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid());
- assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid);
- assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid);
}
get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout) * 2 (block-rescan), timeout tx
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[6]);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
- timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone());
+ check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+
+ timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
node_txn.clear();
}
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx
check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone());
}
check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
}
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
}
// Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[2].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone());
}
#[test]
// Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5);
+ assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4);
assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
- check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
}
#[test]
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
- let mut received = ::std::usize::MAX;
- let mut offered = ::std::usize::MAX;
let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 6);
if revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- received = 0;
- offered = 1;
} else if revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT {
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- received = 1;
- offered = 0;
}
// Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
- let header_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 128, 0, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
+ let header_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 128, 0, true, header.bitcoin_hash());
let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] }, 129);
let first;
- let second;
let feerate_1;
- let feerate_2;
+ let penalty_txn;
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 2 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
// Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
+ if node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[1].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
+ } else if node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[1].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
+ } else {
+ panic!();
+ }
first = node_txn[4].txid();
- assert_eq!(node_txn[5].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[5].output.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[5], revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone());
- second = node_txn[5].txid();
// Store both feerates for later comparison
- let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
+ let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
- let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[5].output[0].value;
- feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[5].get_weight() as u64;
+ penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
}
// Connect three more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
- let header_132 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 3, 129, true, header_129.bitcoin_hash());
- let penalty_local_tx;
+ let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn }, 130);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 bumped penalty txn on offered/received HTLC outputs of revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tx on to_local of revoked commitment tx + 2 bumped penalty tx on revoked HTLC txn
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
-
- penalty_local_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
node_txn.clear();
};
- // Few more blocks to broadcast and confirm penalty_local_tx
- let header_133 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_132, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
- nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_133, txdata: vec![penalty_local_tx] }, 133);
- let header_135 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 2, 133, true, header_133.bitcoin_hash());
+
+ // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
+ let header_135 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 5, 130, true, header_130.bitcoin_hash());
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
node_txn.clear();
}
let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 9, 135, true, header_135);
let node_txn = {
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
-
- let mut penalty_offered = ::std::usize::MAX;
- let mut penalty_received = ::std::usize::MAX;
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- {
- for (i, tx) in node_txn.iter().enumerate() {
- if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[offered].txid() {
- penalty_offered = i;
- } else if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[received].txid() {
- penalty_received = i;
- }
- }
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
+ if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
+ } else if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
+ } else {
+ panic!();
}
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].output.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_offered].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_offered].output.len(), 1);
- // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
- check_spends!(node_txn[penalty_offered], revoked_htlc_txn[offered].clone());
- assert_ne!(first, node_txn[penalty_offered].txid());
- let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[offered].output[0].value - node_txn[penalty_offered].output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[penalty_offered].get_weight() as u64;
- assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
-
- check_spends!(node_txn[penalty_received], revoked_htlc_txn[received].clone());
- assert_ne!(second, node_txn[penalty_received].txid());
- let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[received].output[0].value - node_txn[penalty_received].output[0].value;
- let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[penalty_received].get_weight() as u64;
- assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_2 * 125);
- let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()];
+ //// Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
+ assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
+ let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
+ let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
+ assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
+ let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
node_txn.clear();
txn
};
connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 20, 145, true, header_145.bitcoin_hash());
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //TODO: fix check_spend_remote_htlc lack of watch output
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); //TODO: fix check_spend_remote_htlc lack of watch output
node_txn.clear();
}
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
{
let monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(monitor) = monitors.get(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0)) {
- assert!(monitor.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
- assert!(monitor.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
+ assert!(monitor.onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
+ assert!(monitor.onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
}
}
}
--- /dev/null
+//! The logic to build claims and bump in-flight transactions until confirmations.
+//!
+//! OnchainTxHandler objetcs are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all
+//! building, tracking, bumping and notifications functions.
+
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
+use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
+use bitcoin::util::bip143;
+
+use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
+
+use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
+use secp256k1;
+
+use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
+use ln::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER, InputMaterial};
+use ln::chan_utils::HTLCType;
+use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
+use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
+use util::logger::Logger;
+use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable};
+use util::byte_utils;
+
+use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::cmp;
+use std::ops::Deref;
+
+const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
+
+/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
+/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum OnchainEvent {
+ /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
+ /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
+ Claim {
+ claim_request: Sha256dHash,
+ },
+ /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
+ /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
+ /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
+ ContentiousOutpoint {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
+ input_material: InputMaterial,
+ }
+}
+
+/// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
+ // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
+ // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
+ height_timer: u32,
+ // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
+ feerate_previous: u64,
+ // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
+ // a priority of not feerate
+ soonest_timelock: u32,
+ // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
+ per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
+}
+
+impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
+ for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
+ outp.write(writer)?;
+ tx_material.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl Readable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
+ let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
+ }
+ Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq)]
+pub(super) enum InputDescriptors {
+ RevokedOfferedHTLC,
+ RevokedReceivedHTLC,
+ OfferedHTLC,
+ ReceivedHTLC,
+ RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
+}
+
+macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
+ ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
+ {
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
+ let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ if $value <= fee {
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
+ fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ if $value <= fee {
+ $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
+ fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
+ if $value <= fee {
+ log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+ fee, $value);
+ false
+ } else {
+ log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+ $value);
+ $value -= fee;
+ true
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
+ $value);
+ $value -= fee;
+ true
+ }
+ } else {
+ $value -= fee;
+ true
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
+/// do RBF bumping if possible.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct OnchainTxHandler {
+ destination_script: Script,
+
+ // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
+ // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
+ // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
+ // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
+ // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
+ // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
+ // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
+ // we need to regenerate new claim request with reduced set of still-claimable outpoints.
+ // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
+ // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
+ // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
+ #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
+ pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
+
+ // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
+ // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
+ // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
+ // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
+ // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
+ // block with output gets disconnected.
+ #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
+ pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
+
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
+
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
+ logger: Arc<Logger>
+}
+
+impl Writeable for OnchainTxHandler {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
+ ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
+ claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ outp.write(writer)?;
+ claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
+ claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
+ for ev in events.iter() {
+ match *ev {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ claim_request.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ outpoint.write(writer)?;
+ input_material.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+impl ReadableArgs<Arc<Logger>> for OnchainTxHandler {
+ fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
+ pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
+ }
+
+ let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
+ let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
+ }
+ let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
+ let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
+ for _ in 0..events_len {
+ let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
+ 0 => {
+ let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ OnchainEvent::Claim {
+ claim_request
+ }
+ },
+ 1 => {
+ let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
+ outpoint,
+ input_material
+ }
+ }
+ _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
+ };
+ events.push(ev);
+ }
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
+ }
+
+ Ok(OnchainTxHandler {
+ destination_script,
+ claimable_outpoints,
+ pending_claim_requests,
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ logger,
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+impl OnchainTxHandler {
+ pub(super) fn new(destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Self {
+ OnchainTxHandler {
+ destination_script,
+ pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
+ claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
+ onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
+
+ secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
+ logger,
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
+ let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
+ for inp in inputs {
+ // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
+ tx_weight += match inp {
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
+ },
+ // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
+ &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
+ 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
+ },
+ };
+ }
+ tx_weight
+ }
+
+ fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
+ if timelock_expiration <= current_height + 3 {
+ return current_height + 1
+ } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
+ return current_height + 3
+ }
+ current_height + 15
+ }
+
+ /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
+ /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
+ fn generate_claim_tx<F: Deref>(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: F) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)>
+ where F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
+ let mut inputs = Vec::new();
+ for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{}", outp.txid, outp.vout);
+ inputs.push(TxIn {
+ previous_output: *outp,
+ script_sig: Script::new(),
+ sequence: 0xfffffffd,
+ witness: Vec::new(),
+ });
+ }
+ let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
+ version: 2,
+ lock_time: 0,
+ input: inputs,
+ output: vec![TxOut {
+ script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
+ value: 0
+ }],
+ };
+
+ macro_rules! RBF_bump {
+ ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
+ {
+ let mut used_feerate;
+ // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
+ let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
+ let mut value = $amount;
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
+ // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
+ $amount - value
+ } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
+ return None;
+ }
+ // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
+ } else {
+ let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
+ if $amount <= fee {
+ log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
+ return None;
+ }
+ fee
+ };
+
+ let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
+ let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
+ // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
+ // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
+ // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
+ let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
+ new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
+ } else {
+ new_fee
+ };
+ Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
+ let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
+ let mut amt = 0;
+ for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
+ match per_outp_material {
+ &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
+ inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
+ amt += *amount;
+ },
+ &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
+ inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
+ amt += *amount;
+ },
+ &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
+ let mut new_feerate;
+ // If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation
+ if cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous != 0 {
+ if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
+ // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
+ if new_fee > amt {
+ bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
+ } else {
+ bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
+ }
+ new_feerate = feerate;
+ } else { return None; }
+ } else {
+ if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, amt, predicted_weight, new_feerate) {
+ bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt;
+ } else { return None; }
+ }
+ assert!(new_feerate != 0);
+
+ for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
+ match per_outp_material {
+ &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ if *is_htlc {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
+ } else {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
+ }
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
+ log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
+ },
+ &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
+ if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime }; // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
+ let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
+ let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
+ let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
+ if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
+ } else {
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
+ }
+ bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
+ log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
+ },
+ &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
+ //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
+ // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
+ // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
+ return None;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "...with timer {}", new_timer);
+ assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
+ Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], claimable_outpoints: Vec<Vec<(u32, bool, BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial)>>, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>
+ where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ let mut new_claims = Vec::new();
+ let mut aggregated_claim = HashMap::new();
+ let mut aggregated_soonest = ::std::u32::MAX;
+ let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
+
+ // Try to aggregate outputs if they're 1) belong to same parent tx, 2) their
+ // timelock expiration isn't imminent (<= CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER).
+ for siblings_outpoints in claimable_outpoints {
+ for outp in siblings_outpoints {
+ // Don't claim a outpoint twice that would be bad for privacy and may uselessly lock a CPFP input for a while
+ if let Some(_) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outp.2) { log_trace!(self, "Bouncing off outpoint {}:{}, already registered its claiming request", outp.2.txid, outp.2.vout); } else {
+ log_trace!(self, "Test if outpoint can be aggregated with expiration {} against {}", outp.0, height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER);
+ if outp.0 <= height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER || !outp.1 { // Don't aggregate if outpoint absolute timelock is soon or marked as non-aggregable
+ let mut single_input = HashMap::new();
+ single_input.insert(outp.2, outp.3);
+ new_claims.push((outp.0, single_input));
+ } else {
+ aggregated_claim.insert(outp.2, outp.3);
+ if outp.0 < aggregated_soonest {
+ aggregated_soonest = outp.0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ new_claims.push((aggregated_soonest, aggregated_claim));
+
+ // Generate claim transactions and track them to bump if necessary at
+ // height timer expiration (i.e in how many blocks we're going to take action).
+ for claim in new_claims {
+ let mut claim_material = ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer: 0, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: claim.0, per_input_material: claim.1.clone() };
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) {
+ claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
+ claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
+ let txid = tx.txid();
+ self.pending_claim_requests.insert(txid, claim_material);
+ for k in claim.1.keys() {
+ log_trace!(self, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout);
+ self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (txid, height));
+ }
+ log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
+ spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
+ outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
+ output: tx.output[0].clone(),
+ });
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
+ for tx in txn_matched {
+ // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
+ let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
+ for inp in &tx.input {
+ if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
+ // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
+ if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
+ //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
+ // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
+ // by us.
+ let mut set_equality = true;
+ if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
+ set_equality = false;
+ } else {
+ for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
+ if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
+ set_equality = false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
+ () => {
+ let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
+ entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
+ }
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
+ // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
+ // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
+ if set_equality {
+ clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
+ } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
+ for input in tx.input.iter() {
+ if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
+ claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
+ }
+ // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+ if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
+ clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
+ }
+ }
+ //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
+ bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
+ }
+ break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
+ } else {
+ panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
+ let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
+ match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
+ if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
+ entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
+ }
+ },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
+ entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // After security delay, either our claim tx got enough confs or outpoint is definetely out of reach
+ if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
+ for ev in events {
+ match ev {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
+ // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
+ // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
+ if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
+ for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
+ self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
+ self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Check if any pending claim request must be rescheduled
+ for (first_claim_txid, ref claim_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
+ if claim_data.height_timer == height {
+ bump_candidates.insert(*first_claim_txid);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly
+ for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
+ if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) {
+ log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
+ } else { None }
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ } {
+ if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
+ claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
+ claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
+ } else { unreachable!(); }
+ }
+ }
+
+ spendable_outputs
+ }
+
+ pub(super) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)
+ where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator
+ {
+ let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
+ if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
+ //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
+ //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
+ for ev in events {
+ match ev {
+ OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
+ if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
+ if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
+ claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
+ // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
+ // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
+ bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
+ if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) {
+ claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
+ claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
+ broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
+ }
+ }
+ for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
+ self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
+ }
+ //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
+ // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
+ let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
+ self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
+ if v.1 == height {
+ remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
+ false
+ } else { true });
+ for req in remove_request {
+ self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
+ }
+ }
+}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff