use ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
/// Top-level config which holds ChannelHandshakeLimits and ChannelConfig.
+///
+/// Default::default() provides sane defaults for most configurations
+/// (but currently with 0 relay fees!)
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct UserConfig {
/// Channel config that we propose to our counterparty.
}
impl Default for UserConfig {
- /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations (but with 0 relay fees!)
fn default() -> Self {
UserConfig {
own_channel_config: ChannelHandshakeConfig::default(),
}
/// Configuration we set when applicable.
+///
+/// Default::default() provides sane defaults.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
/// Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
/// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 6.
pub minimum_depth: u32,
/// Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
///
/// It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
/// be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
/// at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
- /// Default is BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, we enforce it as a minimum at channel opening so you can
- /// tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
///
/// Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
/// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
/// our channel.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT (currently 144), we enforce it as a minimum at channel
+ /// opening so you can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
pub our_to_self_delay: u16,
}
impl Default for ChannelHandshakeConfig {
- /// Provides sane defaults for `ChannelHandshakeConfig`
fn default() -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
ChannelHandshakeConfig {
minimum_depth: 6,
/// These limits are only applied to our counterparty's limits, not our own.
///
/// Use 0/<type>::max_value() as appropriate to skip checking.
+///
+/// Provides sane defaults for most configurations.
+///
+/// Most additional limits are disabled except those with which specify a default in individual
+/// field documentation. Note that this may result in barely-usable channels, but since they
+/// are applied mostly only to incoming channels that's not much of a problem.
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChannelHandshakeLimits {
/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded, this is supplied by the sender and so
/// only applies to inbound channels.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 0.
pub min_funding_satoshis: u64,
/// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
/// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: u64::max_value.
pub max_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
/// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum value of pending HTLCs to them at any given
/// time to limit their funds exposure to HTLCs. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 0.
pub min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
/// The remote node will require we keep a certain amount in direct payment to ourselves at all
/// time, ensuring that we are able to be punished if we broadcast an old state. This allows to
/// you limit the amount which we will have to keep to ourselves (and cannot use for HTLCs).
+ ///
+ /// Default value: u64::max_value.
pub max_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
/// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum number of pending HTLCs to them at any given
/// time. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 0.
pub min_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
/// Outputs below a certain value will not be added to on-chain transactions. The dust value is
/// required to always be higher than this value so this only applies to HTLC outputs (and
/// This setting allows you to set a minimum dust limit for their commitment transactions,
/// reflecting the reality that tiny outputs are not considered standard transactions and will
/// not propagate through the Bitcoin network.
- /// Defaults to 546, or the current dust limit on the Bitcoin network.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 546, the current dust limit on the Bitcoin network.
pub min_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
/// Maximum allowed threshold above which outputs will not be generated in their commitment
/// transactions.
/// HTLCs below this amount plus HTLC transaction fees are not enforceable on-chain.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: u64::max_value.
pub max_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
/// Before a channel is usable the funding transaction will need to be confirmed by at least a
/// certain number of blocks, specified by the node which is not the funder (as the funder can
/// assume they aren't going to double-spend themselves).
- /// This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait. Defaults to
- /// 144 blocks or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
+ /// This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
/// Set to force the incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
/// ChannelConfig.
- /// Defaults to true to make the default that no announced channels are possible (which is
+ ///
+ /// Default value: true, to make the default that no announced channels are possible (which is
/// appropriate for any nodes which are not online very reliably).
pub force_announced_channel_preference: bool,
/// Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us.
///
/// Not checking this value would be a security issue, as our peer would be able to set it to
/// max relative lock-time (a year) and we would "lose" money as it would be locked for a long time.
- /// Default is MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, which we also enforce as a maximum value
+ ///
+ /// Default value: MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT (1008), which we also enforce as a maximum value
/// so you can tweak config to reduce the loss of having useless locked funds (if your peer accepts)
pub their_to_self_delay: u16
}
impl Default for ChannelHandshakeLimits {
- /// Provides sane defaults for most configurations.
- ///
- /// Most additional limits are disabled except those with which specify a default in individual
- /// field documentation. Note that this may result in barely-usable channels, but since they
- /// are applied mostly only to incoming channels that's not much of a problem.
fn default() -> Self {
ChannelHandshakeLimits {
min_funding_satoshis: 0,
/// Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
/// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
/// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 0.
pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
/// channel.
/// channels unless ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preferences is set.
///
/// This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: false.
pub announced_channel: bool,
/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
/// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
///
/// This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: true.
pub commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: bool
}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff