]> git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/commitdiff
Add bigger test for failing HTLCs claimed through revocation
authorMatt Corallo <git@bluematt.me>
Tue, 11 Dec 2018 03:53:54 +0000 (22:53 -0500)
committerMatt Corallo <git@bluematt.me>
Fri, 14 Dec 2018 22:00:22 +0000 (17:00 -0500)
src/ln/channelmanager.rs

index db1e57b2803d286f1b777ccb3e3bf89e2f8f09fc..47a310b202ad2795f07819269873ee53573837b7 100644 (file)
@@ -3388,7 +3388,7 @@ mod tests {
        use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
 
        use std::cell::RefCell;
-       use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
+       use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet};
        use std::default::Default;
        use std::rc::Rc;
        use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
@@ -6473,6 +6473,227 @@ mod tests {
                }
        }
 
+       fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool) {
+               // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
+               // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
+               // commitment transaction anymore.
+               // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
+               // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
+               // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
+               // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
+               // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
+               // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
+               // transactions:
+               // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
+               //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
+               // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
+               //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
+               //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
+               let mut nodes = create_network(3);
+
+               // Create some initial channels
+               create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+               let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
+
+               let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+               // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
+               let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+               // Revoke the old state
+               claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
+
+               let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+               let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+               let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
+
+               assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+               let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+               assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+               assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+               nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+               let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
+               // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
+
+               assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+               let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+               assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+               assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+               nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+               nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+               // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
+               let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+               nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+               assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown));
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+               let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+               assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+               assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+               nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+               // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
+               // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
+               nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap();
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+               // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
+               let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+               nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap();
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+               // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
+               // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
+               let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
+               let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
+               nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap();
+               assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+               assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+               check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+
+               if deliver_bs_raa {
+                       nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap();
+                       // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, one as we generate a commitment for
+                       // nodes[0] to fail first_payment_hash backwards.
+                       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
+               }
+
+               let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
+               assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+
+               let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
+               nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
+
+               let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+               assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+               match events[0] {
+                       Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+                               assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
+                       },
+                       _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+               }
+
+               if !deliver_bs_raa {
+                       // If we delivered the RAA already then we already failed first_payment_hash backwards.
+                       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+               }
+
+               let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+               assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 });
+               match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 0 }] {
+                       MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
+                       _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+               }
+               if deliver_bs_raa {
+                       match events[0] {
+                               MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
+                                       assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+                                       assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
+                                       assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+                                       assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
+                                       assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+                               },
+                               _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+                       }
+               }
+               // Due to the way backwards-failing occurs we do the updates in two steps.
+               let updates = match events[1] {
+                       MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
+                               assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+                               assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+                               assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+                               assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+                               assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
+
+                               nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+                               nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap();
+                               check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+                               let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+                               nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+                               check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+                               let bs_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+                               nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap();
+                               check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+                               let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+                               nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap();
+                               check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+
+                               if !deliver_bs_raa {
+                                       // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
+                                       // that we should update our routing table for.
+                                       let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+                                       assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+                                       match events[0] {
+                                               MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+                                               _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+                                       }
+                               }
+                               let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+                               assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+                               match events[0] {
+                                       Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+                                               assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(*payment_hash));
+                                       },
+                                       _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+                               }
+
+                               bs_second_update
+                       },
+                       _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+               };
+
+               assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
+               assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+               assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+               nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap();
+               nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap();
+               commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
+
+               let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+               assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+               for event in events {
+                       match event {
+                               MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+                               _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+                       }
+               }
+
+               let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
+               assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
+               match events[0] {
+                       Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+                               assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(*payment_hash));
+                       },
+                       _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+               }
+               match events[1] {
+                       Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
+                               assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(*payment_hash));
+                       },
+                       _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+               }
+
+               assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash));
+               assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash));
+               assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash));
+       }
+
+       #[test]
+       fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() {
+               do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false);
+               do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true);
+       }
+
        #[test]
        fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
                // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply