/// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
/// confirmation depth.
pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
- /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
- ///
- /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
- /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
- /// and via the classic SCID.
- ///
- /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
- /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
- /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
- pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
/// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
/// failed/claimed by the user.
///
/// Locked *after* channel_state.
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
+ /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
+ ///
+ /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
+ /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
+ /// and via the classic SCID.
+ ///
+ /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
+ /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
+ #[cfg(test)]
+ pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
+ #[cfg(not(test))]
+ forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
+
/// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
/// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
/// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
by_id: HashMap::new(),
short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
- forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+ forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
- for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
+ let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
+
+ for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
if short_chan_id != 0 {
let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
};
let mut forward_event = None;
- if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
}
- match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
+ match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
},
entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
}
}
+ mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(time) = forward_event {
let mut forward_event = None;
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
}
for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
- match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
+ match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
}
}
- (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
+ let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
(pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for forward in pending_forwards {
channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
by_id,
short_to_chan_info,
- forward_htlcs,
claimable_htlcs,
pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
}),
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
+ forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
}, || {}, true, Some(17), None, None);
run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, &payment_secret, |_| {}, || {
- for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().iter_mut() {
for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
match f {
&mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } =>
run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, &payment_secret, |_| {}, || {
// violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat
- for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().iter_mut() {
for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
match f {
&mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } =>
// Modify the payload so the phantom hop's HMAC is bogus.
let sha256_of_onion = {
- let mut channel_state = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
- let mut pending_forward = channel_state.forward_htlcs.get_mut(&phantom_scid).unwrap();
+ let mut forward_htlcs = nodes[1].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ let mut pending_forward = forward_htlcs.get_mut(&phantom_scid).unwrap();
match pending_forward[0] {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
// Modify the onion packet to have an invalid payment amount.
- for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().iter_mut() {
for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
match f {
&mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
// Modify the payload so the phantom hop's HMAC is bogus.
- for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
+ for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().iter_mut() {
for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
match f {
&mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff