From: Matt Corallo Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2018 02:39:04 +0000 (-0400) Subject: Handle partial-response UTXO impls or reorgs in chan_announcements X-Git-Tag: v0.0.12~328^2 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=227c1d21bcc81513cea3cde9ee7fe2995d98e2dc;p=rust-lightning Handle partial-response UTXO impls or reorgs in chan_announcements Mostly to add a big comment noting why we aren't "spec-compliant" --- diff --git a/src/ln/router.rs b/src/ln/router.rs index e91e0c2ac..6b20d541e 100644 --- a/src/ln/router.rs +++ b/src/ln/router.rs @@ -102,7 +102,21 @@ struct NetworkMap { our_node_id: PublicKey, nodes: HashMap, } - +struct MutNetworkMap<'a> { + #[cfg(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing")] + channels: &'a mut HashMap<(u64, Sha256dHash), ChannelInfo>, + #[cfg(not(feature = "non_bitcoin_chain_hash_routing"))] + channels: &'a mut HashMap, + nodes: &'a mut HashMap, +} +impl NetworkMap { + fn borrow_parts(&mut self) -> MutNetworkMap { + MutNetworkMap { + channels: &mut self.channels, + nodes: &mut self.nodes, + } + } +} impl std::fmt::Display for NetworkMap { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> { write!(f, "Node id {} network map\n[Channels]\n", log_pubkey!(self.our_node_id))?; @@ -213,7 +227,7 @@ impl RoutingMessageHandler for Router { panic!("Unknown-required-features ChannelAnnouncements should never deserialize!"); } - match self.chain_monitor.get_chain_utxo(msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) { + let checked_utxo = match self.chain_monitor.get_chain_utxo(msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) { Ok((script_pubkey, _value)) => { let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_PUSHNUM_2) .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1.serialize()) @@ -224,9 +238,11 @@ impl RoutingMessageHandler for Router { } //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update + true }, Err(ChainError::NotSupported) => { // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks + false }, Err(ChainError::NotWatched) => { return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel announced on an unknown chain", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}); @@ -234,39 +250,55 @@ impl RoutingMessageHandler for Router { Err(ChainError::UnknownTx) => { return Err(HandleError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}); }, - } + }; - let mut network = self.network_map.write().unwrap(); + let mut network_lock = self.network_map.write().unwrap(); + let network = network_lock.borrow_parts(); + + let chan_info = ChannelInfo { + features: msg.contents.features.clone(), + one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo { + src_node_id: msg.contents.node_id_1.clone(), + last_update: 0, + enabled: false, + cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(), + htlc_minimum_msat: u64::max_value(), + fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(), + fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(), + }, + two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo { + src_node_id: msg.contents.node_id_2.clone(), + last_update: 0, + enabled: false, + cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(), + htlc_minimum_msat: u64::max_value(), + fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(), + fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(), + } + }; match network.channels.entry(NetworkMap::get_key(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.chain_hash)) { - Entry::Occupied(_) => { + Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => { //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though its unclear //exactly how... - return Err(HandleError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}) + if checked_utxo { + // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider + // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note + // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't + // do that because + // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results. + // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they + // get reorg'd out. + // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk. + Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(network.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.contents.short_channel_id); + *entry.get_mut() = chan_info; + } else { + return Err(HandleError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel", action: Some(ErrorAction::IgnoreError)}) + } }, Entry::Vacant(entry) => { - entry.insert(ChannelInfo { - features: msg.contents.features.clone(), - one_to_two: DirectionalChannelInfo { - src_node_id: msg.contents.node_id_1.clone(), - last_update: 0, - enabled: false, - cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(), - htlc_minimum_msat: u64::max_value(), - fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(), - fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(), - }, - two_to_one: DirectionalChannelInfo { - src_node_id: msg.contents.node_id_2.clone(), - last_update: 0, - enabled: false, - cltv_expiry_delta: u16::max_value(), - htlc_minimum_msat: u64::max_value(), - fee_base_msat: u32::max_value(), - fee_proportional_millionths: u32::max_value(), - } - }); + entry.insert(chan_info); } };