From: Matt Corallo Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 22:43:29 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Remove unreachable `Err` cases when constructing `TxCreationKeys` X-Git-Tag: v0.0.113~18^2 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=2cfc1dbb44ef2b764f4f14abbc70d6757d4b12a4;p=rust-lightning Remove unreachable `Err` cases when constructing `TxCreationKeys` --- diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/package.rs b/lightning/src/chain/package.rs index 1307ad0eb..cf92df295 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/package.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/package.rs @@ -381,57 +381,53 @@ impl PackageSolvingData { fn finalize_input(&self, bumped_tx: &mut Transaction, i: usize, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler) -> bool { match self { PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => { - if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { - let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key); - //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ? - if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) { - let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); - ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1)); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes()); - } else { return false; } - } + let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint); + let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key); + //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ? + if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) { + let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); + ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1)); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes()); + } else { return false; } }, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { - if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { - let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key); - //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ? - if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) { - let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); - ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec()); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes()); - } else { return false; } - } + let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint); + let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key); + //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ? + if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) { + let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); + ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec()); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes()); + } else { return false; } }, PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { - if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { - let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key); - - if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) { - let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); - ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec()); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes()); - } + let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint); + let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key); + + if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) { + let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); + ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec()); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes()); } }, PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => { - if let Ok(chan_keys) = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint) { - let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key); - - bumped_tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry); // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation - if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) { - let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); - ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig); - // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay. - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]); - bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes()); - } + let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint); + let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key); + + bumped_tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry); // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation + if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) { + let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec(); + ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig); + // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay. + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]); + bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes()); } }, _ => { panic!("API Error!"); } diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs index 0b9381d2d..b5b9d2ee7 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ use crate::util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils}; use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar}; use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message}; -use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError; use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, secp256k1, Sequence, Witness}; use crate::io; @@ -483,19 +482,19 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, { impl TxCreationKeys { /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point. /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions. - pub fn derive_new(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result { - Ok(TxCreationKeys { + pub fn derive_new(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> TxCreationKeys { + TxCreationKeys { per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(), revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base), broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base), countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base), broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base), - }) + } } /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys. /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions. - pub fn from_channel_static_keys(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { + pub fn from_channel_static_keys(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> TxCreationKeys { TxCreationKeys::derive_new( &secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, @@ -1450,7 +1449,7 @@ impl CommitmentTransaction { pub fn verify(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1) -> Result { // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point; - let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap(); + let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx); if keys != self.keys { return Err(()); } @@ -1629,7 +1628,7 @@ mod tests { let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys(); let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys(); - let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap(); + let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint); let mut channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters { holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(), holder_selected_contest_delay: 0, diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index ef7c77f0b..dcbaa771f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -1749,27 +1749,27 @@ impl Channel { /// our counterparty!) /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction) /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this? - fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result { + fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys { let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx); let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint; let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys(); - Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned())) + TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint) } #[inline] /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we /// will sign and send to our counterparty. /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created) - fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result { + fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys { //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we //may see payments to it! let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint; let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys(); - Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned())) + TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint) } /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output @@ -2157,7 +2157,7 @@ impl Channel { fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); - let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?; + let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number); let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx; { let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust(); @@ -2171,7 +2171,7 @@ impl Channel { secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned()); } - let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?; + let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys(); let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx; let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); @@ -2285,7 +2285,7 @@ impl Channel { let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); - let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?; + let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys(); let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx; let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust(); let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction(); @@ -2293,7 +2293,7 @@ impl Channel { log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction)); - let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?; + let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number); let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx; { let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust(); @@ -2959,7 +2959,7 @@ impl Channel { let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript(); - let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?; + let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number); let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger); let commitment_txid = { @@ -3551,7 +3551,7 @@ impl Channel { // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee. let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw)); let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw)); - let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; }; + let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number); let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger); let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000; let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat; @@ -5221,7 +5221,7 @@ impl Channel { /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created) fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result where L::Target: Logger { - let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?; + let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys(); let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx; Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx) .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0) @@ -5522,7 +5522,7 @@ impl Channel { return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat))); } - let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?; + let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number); let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger); if !self.is_outbound() { // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC. @@ -5714,7 +5714,7 @@ impl Channel { /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state. fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger { - let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?; + let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys(); let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger); let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid(); let (signature, htlc_signatures); @@ -7309,7 +7309,7 @@ mod tests { let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret); let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint; - let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap(); + let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint); macro_rules! test_commitment { ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => { diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index d8dcb013e..d2f055dd5 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() { // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message. let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, - &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap(); + &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint); let res = { let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); @@ -1412,7 +1412,7 @@ fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() { // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message. let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, - &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap(); + &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint); // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the // signature for the commitment_signed message.