From: Valentine Wallace Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2023 23:17:29 +0000 (-0400) Subject: Fix blinded recipient fail on Channel error X-Git-Tag: v0.0.119~9^2~8 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=85d3cb802c21c72b293db9eab45edf481548d697;p=rust-lightning Fix blinded recipient fail on Channel error If a blinded HTLC errors when added to a Channel, such as if the recipient has already sent a shutdown message, they should malformed-fail backwards with error code INVALID_ONION_BLINDING and a zeroed out onion hash per BOLT 4. --- diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/blinded_payment_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/blinded_payment_tests.rs index 72df4e158..8922506d2 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/blinded_payment_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/blinded_payment_tests.rs @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey}; use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath; use crate::blinded_path::payment::{ForwardNode, ForwardTlvs, PaymentConstraints, PaymentRelay, ReceiveTlvs}; -use crate::events::{HTLCDestination, MessageSendEventsProvider}; +use crate::events::{HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use crate::ln::PaymentSecret; use crate::ln::channelmanager; use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields}; @@ -459,6 +459,7 @@ fn two_hop_blinded_path_success() { claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage); } +#[derive(PartialEq)] enum ReceiveCheckFail { // The recipient fails the payment upon `PaymentClaimable`. RecipientFail, @@ -467,6 +468,9 @@ enum ReceiveCheckFail { // The incoming HTLC did not satisfy our requirements; in this case it underpaid us according to // the expected receive amount in the onion. ReceiveRequirements, + // The incoming HTLC errors when added to the Channel, in this case due to the HTLC being + // delivered out-of-order with a shutdown message. + ChannelCheck, } #[test] @@ -474,6 +478,7 @@ fn multi_hop_receiver_fail() { do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(ReceiveCheckFail::RecipientFail); do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(ReceiveCheckFail::OnionDecodeFail); do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(ReceiveCheckFail::ReceiveRequirements); + do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(ReceiveCheckFail::ChannelCheck); } fn do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(check: ReceiveCheckFail) { @@ -486,7 +491,12 @@ fn do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(check: ReceiveCheckFail) { let session_priv = [3; 32]; *nodes[0].keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some(session_priv); create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0); - let chan_upd_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1_000_000, 0).0.contents; + let (chan_upd_1_2, chan_id_1_2) = { + let (chan_upd, _, channel_id, ..) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value( + &nodes, 1, 2, 1_000_000, 0 + ); + (chan_upd.contents, channel_id) + }; let amt_msat = 5000; let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[2], Some(amt_msat), None); @@ -566,6 +576,19 @@ fn do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(check: ReceiveCheckFail) { check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0); do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &payment_event_1_2.commitment_msg, true, true); }, + ReceiveCheckFail::ChannelCheck => { + nodes[2].node.close_channel(&chan_id_1_2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + let node_2_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_2_shutdown); + let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1_2.msgs[0]); + nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1_2.commitment_msg); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + + nodes[2].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], (), false, true, false, false); + } } let updates_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); @@ -576,7 +599,20 @@ fn do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(check: ReceiveCheckFail) { nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), update_malformed); do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &updates_2_1.commitment_signed, true, false); - let updates_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + let updates_1_0 = if check == ReceiveCheckFail::ChannelCheck { + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + events.into_iter().find_map(|ev| { + match ev { + MessageSendEvent:: UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => { + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + return Some(updates) + }, + MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => None, + _ => panic!() + } + }).unwrap() + } else { get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()) }; assert_eq!(updates_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0]); do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &updates_1_0.commitment_signed, false, false); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 153e39911..e8b8f43da 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -6603,6 +6603,16 @@ where Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e) }; let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| { + if msg.blinding_point.is_some() { + return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed( + msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC { + channel_id: msg.channel_id, + htlc_id: msg.htlc_id, + sha256_of_onion: [0; 32], + failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, + } + )) + } // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close, // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.