From: Wilmer Paulino Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2022 19:54:28 +0000 (-0700) Subject: Avoid generating redundant claims after initial confirmation X-Git-Tag: v0.0.113~62^2 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a0891368eee2fc5d5735de6caff3420211b0861b;p=rust-lightning Avoid generating redundant claims after initial confirmation These claims will never be valid as a previous claim has already confirmed. If a previous claim is reorged out of the chain, a new claim will be generated bypassing the new behavior. While this doesn't change much for our existing transaction-based claims, as broadcasting an already confirmed transaction acts as a NOP, it prevents us from yielding redundant event-based claims, which will be introduced as part of the anchors patchset. --- diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs b/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs index 18679f0aa..9cfa9d288 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/onchaintx.rs @@ -430,7 +430,43 @@ impl OnchainTxHandler { where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger, { - if cached_request.outpoints().len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs + let request_outpoints = cached_request.outpoints(); + if request_outpoints.is_empty() { + // Don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs. Untractable + // packages cannot be aggregated and will never be split, so we cannot end up with an + // empty claim. + debug_assert!(cached_request.is_malleable()); + return None; + } + // If we've seen transaction inclusion in the chain for all outpoints in our request, we + // don't need to continue generating more claims. We'll keep tracking the request to fully + // remove it once it reaches the confirmation threshold, or to generate a new claim if the + // transaction is reorged out. + let mut all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = true; + for outpoint in &request_outpoints { + if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(outpoint) { + // We check for outpoint spends within claims individually rather than as a set + // since requests can have outpoints split off. + if !self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() + .any(|event_entry| if let OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } = event_entry.event { + first_claim_txid_height.0 == claim_request + } else { + // The onchain event is not a claim, keep seeking until we find one. + false + }) + { + // Either we had no `OnchainEvent::Claim`, or we did but none matched the + // outpoint's registered spend. + all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = false; + } + } else { + // The request's outpoint spend does not exist yet. + all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend = false; + } + } + if all_inputs_have_confirmed_spend { + return None; + } // Compute new height timer to decide when we need to regenerate a new bumped version of the claim tx (if we // didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it). diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index eb6d7032f..a2e59b58c 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -2951,26 +2951,8 @@ fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) { mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); - { - // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here. - let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); - check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); - } connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1); - { - // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against - // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the - // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really - // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not. - let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); - if node_txn.len() == 1 { - check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3); - } else { - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0); - } - } expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); @@ -8001,22 +7983,6 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() { connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn }); let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() }); - { - let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); - assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx - - check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); - check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]); - // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129: - if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output { - assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output); - } else { - assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output); - assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output); - } - - node_txn.clear(); - }; // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);