From: Matt Corallo Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 22:02:15 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Correct bogus references to `revocation_point` in `ChannelMonitor` X-Git-Tag: v0.0.107~17^2 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d443b79743abdac986d32bde376c953e33a86ace;p=rust-lightning Correct bogus references to `revocation_point` in `ChannelMonitor` The `ChannelMonitor` had a field for the counterparty's `cur_revocation_points`. Somewhat confusingly, this actually stored the counterparty's *per-commitment* points, not the (derived) revocation points. Here we correct this by simply renaming the references as appropriate. Note the update in `channel.rs` makes the variable names align correctly. --- diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index 7e721f630..62dc48607 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { commitment_txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, commitment_number: u64, - their_revocation_point: PublicKey, + their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, }, PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, @@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => { (0, commitment_txid, required), (2, commitment_number, required), - (4, their_revocation_point, required), + (4, their_per_commitment_point, required), (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type), }, (2, PaymentPreimage) => { @@ -619,8 +619,8 @@ pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl { counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, - // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points - their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option)>, + // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points + their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option)>, on_holder_tx_csv: u16, @@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl { self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params || self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript || self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis || - self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points || + self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points || self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv || self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets || self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints || @@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl { self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?; self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?; - match self.their_cur_revocation_points { + match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points { Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => { writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?; writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?; @@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { counterparty_commitment_params, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, - their_cur_revocation_points: None, + their_cur_per_commitment_points: None, on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay, @@ -1070,11 +1070,11 @@ impl ChannelMonitor { txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, commitment_number: u64, - their_revocation_point: PublicKey, + their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L, ) where L::Target: Logger { self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx( - txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger) + txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger) } #[cfg(test)] @@ -1762,7 +1762,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { Ok(()) } - pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { + pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger { // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close. // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of @@ -1777,22 +1777,22 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone()); self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number; //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff - match self.their_cur_revocation_points { + match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points { Some(old_points) => { if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point))); + self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point))); } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 { if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point))); + self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point))); } else { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None)); } } else { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None)); } }, None => { - self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None)); + self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None)); } } let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len()); @@ -1930,9 +1930,9 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { ret = Err(()); } } - ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } => { + ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => { log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info"); - self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_revocation_point, logger) + self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger) }, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => { log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage"); @@ -2121,18 +2121,18 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec { let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new(); if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) { - if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points { - let revocation_point_option = + if let Some(per_commitment_points) = self.their_cur_per_commitment_points { + let per_commitment_point_option = // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest // per-commitment point - if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) } - else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() { + if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&per_commitment_points.1) } + else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() { // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint) - if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None } + if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None } } else { None }; - if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option { + if let Some(per_commitment_point) = per_commitment_point_option { for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() { if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index { if let Some(transaction) = tx { @@ -2143,7 +2143,19 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { } let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None }; if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered { - let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) } else { PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*revocation_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, htlc.clone())) }; + let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered { + PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput( + CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point, + self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, + self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, + preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone())) + } else { + PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput( + CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point, + self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, + self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, + htlc.clone())) + }; let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true }; let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0); claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package); @@ -3095,7 +3107,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K> let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?; let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?; - let their_cur_revocation_points = { + let their_cur_per_commitment_points = { let first_idx = ::read(reader)?.0; if first_idx == 0 { None @@ -3284,7 +3296,7 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface> ReadableArgs<&'a K> counterparty_commitment_params, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, - their_cur_revocation_points, + their_cur_per_commitment_points, on_holder_tx_csv, diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs index 6c6104023..863cae462 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -5400,7 +5400,7 @@ impl Channel { commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(), commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, - their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap() + their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap() }] }; self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;