From: practicalswift Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 22:38:52 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Fix typos X-Git-Tag: v0.0.12~426^2 X-Git-Url: http://git.bitcoin.ninja/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=e7d0d8af9f2a5d011c86edb694c315ec69f2ef21;p=rust-lightning Fix typos --- diff --git a/src/ln/channel.rs b/src/ln/channel.rs index acc8c4e91..a3b3289eb 100644 --- a/src/ln/channel.rs +++ b/src/ln/channel.rs @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ enum ChannelState { AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 7), } -// TODO: We should refactor this to be a Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking +// TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like // calling get_channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an // inbound channel. @@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ impl Channel { } /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end. - /// If this call is successfull, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!) + /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!) pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), HandleError> { if !self.channel_outbound { return Err(HandleError{err: "Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?", msg: None}); @@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ impl Channel { } //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us, - //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they cant revoke (well, kinda, + //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda, //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something. if self.their_cur_commitment_point != msg.next_per_commitment_point { @@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ impl Channel { self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = header.bitcoin_hash(); //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us, - //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they cant revoke (well, kinda, + //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda, //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something. let next_per_commitment_secret = match self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number) { @@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ impl Channel { /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice, /// or if called on an inbound channel. /// Note that channel_id changes during this call! - /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successfull funding_signed call! + /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call! pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) -> Result { if !self.channel_outbound { panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!"); @@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ mod tests { chan.local_keys.payment_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &hex_bytes("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(); - // chan.local_keys.commitment_seed isnt derived in the test vectors :( + // chan.local_keys.commitment_seed isn't derived in the test vectors :( chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0); diff --git a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 3d7840311..93b0f17e1 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { for (i, keys) in onion_keys.iter().enumerate() { if i == payloads.len() - 1 { continue; } let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&keys.rho, &[0u8; 8]); - chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We dont have a seek function :( + chacha.process(&ChannelManager::ZERO, &mut buf); // We don't have a seek function :( ChannelManager::xor_bufs(&mut res[0..(i + 1)*65], &buf[(20 - i)*65..21*65]); } res @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ impl ChannelManager { // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and // commitment_signed messages when we can. // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live() - // as we dont really want others relying on us relaying through + // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through // this channel currently :/. } } @@ -737,7 +737,7 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { } fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result { - //TODO: broke this - a node shouldnt be able to get their channel removed by sending a + //TODO: broke this - a node shouldn't be able to get their channel removed by sending a //funding_created a second time, or long after the first, or whatever (note this also //leaves the short_to_id map in a busted state. let chan = { @@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { } fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), msgs::HandleError> { - //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send a onion packet and + //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack. // @@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { let associated_data = Vec::new(); //TODO: What to put here? if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 { - //TODO: Spec doesnt indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other + //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way, //the hash doesn't really serve any purpuse - in the case of hashing all data, the //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the @@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ impl ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager { }); } - // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with a update_fulfill_htlc + // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed! diff --git a/src/ln/peer_handler.rs b/src/ln/peer_handler.rs index 1c8701a29..bddc87b99 100644 --- a/src/ln/peer_handler.rs +++ b/src/ln/peer_handler.rs @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ pub struct MessageHandler { /// Provides an object which can be used to send data to and which uniquely identifies a connection /// to a remote host. You will need to be able to generate multiple of these which meet Eq and /// implement Hash to meet the PeerManager API. -/// For effeciency, Clone should be relatively cheap for this type. +/// For efficiency, Clone should be relatively cheap for this type. /// You probably want to just extend an int and put a file descriptor in a struct and implement /// send_data. pub trait SocketDescriptor : cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + Clone { diff --git a/src/util/transaction_utils.rs b/src/util/transaction_utils.rs index d597b7754..8ecd78acc 100644 --- a/src/util/transaction_utils.rs +++ b/src/util/transaction_utils.rs @@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ pub fn sort_outputs(outputs: &mut Vec<(TxOut, T)>) { //TODO: Make static and Ordering::Less } else if b.0.value < a.0.value { Ordering::Greater - } else if a.0.script_pubkey[..] < b.0.script_pubkey[..] { //TODO: ordering of scripts shouldnt be len-based + } else if a.0.script_pubkey[..] < b.0.script_pubkey[..] { //TODO: ordering of scripts shouldn't be len-based Ordering::Less - } else if b.0.script_pubkey[..] < a.0.script_pubkey[..] { //TODO: ordering of scripts shouldnt be len-based + } else if b.0.script_pubkey[..] < a.0.script_pubkey[..] { //TODO: ordering of scripts shouldn't be len-based Ordering::Greater } else { Ordering::Equal