From 0e9ac1144b99446136d1f1f8a5a379b6dd9f7dcb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antoine Riard Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 14:25:31 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] Add test for failing/fulfilling HTLCs from on-chain actions Including detection of timeout claims, fulfill claims, and failing all current HTLCs in case of revoked-commitment broadcast. --- src/ln/channelmanager.rs | 554 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 554 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index 70db90923..db1e57b28 100644 --- a/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -6139,6 +6139,340 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); } + #[test] + fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { + // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to + // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is + // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path. + // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage) + // First, C should claim the HTLC output via HTLC-Success when its own latest local + // commitment transaction was broadcast. + // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards + // towards B. + // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx. + // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim + // the HTLC output via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a + // PaymentSent event). + + let nodes = create_network(3); + + // Create some initial channels + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + + let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; + + // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain + // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain + let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1); + check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); + + // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + { + let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + { + // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate + // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transaction, as well as a + // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success. + let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0); + node_txn.clear(); + } + + // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain + // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain + let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone()); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); + // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as + // we already checked the same situation with A. + + // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); + assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0); + } + + #[test] + fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() { + // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to + // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is + // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path. + // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout) + // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx + // \ \ + // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx + + let nodes = create_network(3); + + // Create some intial channels + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels... + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + + let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; + + // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain + let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, PaymentFailReason::PreimageUnknown); + { + let mut added_monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); + added_monitors.clear(); + } + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx) + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); + + // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain + // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200); + let timeout_tx; + { + let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone(); + node_txn.clear(); + } + + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0); + + // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain + let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone()); + + nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + } + + #[test] + fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() { + // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx + // and fail backward accordingly. + + let nodes = create_network(3); + + // Create some initial channels + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000); + // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2] + let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + // Revoke the old state + claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage); + + route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000); + + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true); + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + #[test] fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() { // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply @@ -8555,6 +8889,226 @@ mod tests { check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx } + #[test] + fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { + // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to + // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx. + // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction. + // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B + // channel. + // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction + // gets broadcast. + + let nodes = create_network(3); + + // Create some initial channels + let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ... + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); + + let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; + let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx) + assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3); + assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]); + assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]); + check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone()); + assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); + assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx + + // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1); + { + let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4); + assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]); + check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager + check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager + assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output + assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx + check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan + assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx + b_txn.clear(); + } + let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + match msg_events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match msg_events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { + assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + }; + // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx + let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); + let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3); + check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager + assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan + check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment + assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx + let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + match msg_events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + + #[test] + fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() { + // Topology : A --> B --> C + // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim + let mut nodes = create_network(3); + + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); + + let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000); + *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1; + assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash); + + let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); + assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone()); + + let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + let htlc_timeout_tx; + { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction + let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); + assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]); + check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone()); + assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]); + check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone()); + check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone()); + htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone(); + } + + let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexepected event"), + } + + nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage); + nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2); + let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + match events[1] { + MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!("Unexepected event"), + } + let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); + check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone()); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); + assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]); + check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone()); + check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone()); + + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200); + let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1); + assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + { + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true); + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); + match events[0] { + MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => { + }, + _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); } + } + } + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { + assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + + // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C + nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); + let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); + assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0); + assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); + commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false); + + let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + match events[0] { + Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { + assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); + } + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } + } + #[test] fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() { let nodes = create_network(2); -- 2.39.5