From 33c36d007ea67d17f8c0958ed1c5a2dd3e480de8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Corallo Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2023 04:48:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Avoid removing stale preimages when hashes collide in fuzzing --- lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs | 22 ++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index a664c7c79..9e3afec6f 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -2041,8 +2041,12 @@ impl ChannelMonitorImpl { // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs. if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() { - for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() { - *source = None; + if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid { + for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() { + *source_opt = None; + } + } else { + assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide"); } } @@ -4168,10 +4172,10 @@ mod tests { monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap(); let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid(); - monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger); - monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger); - monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger); - monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger); + monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"1").into_inner()), + preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger); + monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"2").into_inner()), + preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger); for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() { let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator); monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger); @@ -4185,6 +4189,9 @@ mod tests { test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor); + monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"3").into_inner()), + preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger); + // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap()); monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap(); @@ -4192,6 +4199,9 @@ mod tests { test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor); test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor); + monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"4").into_inner()), + preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger); + // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the // previous commitment tx's preimages too monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap(); -- 2.39.5