From d82e6ba7a35f59157606a1d0e6c72832fa02beb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wilmer Paulino Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 12:12:54 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] Test preimage claim after reorg of counterparty commitment This test adds coverage for receiving a preimage after seeing a counterparty commitment confirm, followed by a reorg and the confirmation of a different commitment instead. The first test covers the case where a holder commitment confirms after the counterparty commitment reorg. The second test covers the case where a previous counterparty commitment confirms after the latest counterparty commitment reorg. --- lightning/src/ln/reorg_tests.rs | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 138 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/reorg_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/reorg_tests.rs index cb3471763..b745453a3 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/reorg_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/reorg_tests.rs @@ -9,10 +9,11 @@ //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations. +use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator; use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS}; use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; use crate::chain::Confirm; -use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination}; +use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent}; use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init}; use crate::util::test_utils; use crate::util::ser::Writeable; @@ -617,3 +618,139 @@ fn test_to_remote_after_local_detection() { do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip); do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen); } + +#[test] +fn test_htlc_preimage_claim_holder_commitment_after_counterparty_commitment_reorg() { + // We detect a counterparty commitment confirm onchain, followed by a reorg and a confirmation + // of a holder commitment. Then, if we learn of the preimage for an HTLC in both commitments, + // test that we only claim the currently confirmed commitment. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + // Route an HTLC which we will claim onchain with the preimage. + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000); + + // Force close with the latest counterparty commitment, confirm it, and reorg it with the latest + // holder commitment. + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let commitment_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx_a, funding_tx); + + let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let commitment_tx_b = txn.pop().unwrap(); + check_spends!(commitment_tx_b, funding_tx); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx_a); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx_a); + + disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1); + disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx_b); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx_b); + + // Provide the preimage now, such that we only claim from the holder commitment (since it's + // currently confirmed) and not the counterparty's. + get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage( + &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &nodes[1].tx_broadcaster, + &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger + ); + + let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let htlc_success_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + check_spends!(htlc_success_tx, commitment_tx_b); +} + +#[test] +fn test_htlc_preimage_claim_prev_counterparty_commitment_after_current_counterparty_commitment_reorg() { + // We detect a counterparty commitment confirm onchain, followed by a reorg and a + // confirmation of the previous (still unrevoked) counterparty commitment. Then, if we learn + // of the preimage for an HTLC in both commitments, test that we only claim the currently + // confirmed commitment. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs); + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); + let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + + // Route an HTLC which we will claim onchain with the preimage. + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000); + + // Obtain the current commitment, which will become the previous after a fee update. + let prev_commitment_a = &get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id)[0]; + + *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 4; + nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); + let mut msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); + assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1); + let (update_fee, commit_sig) = if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } = msg_events.pop().unwrap() { + assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + (updates.update_fee.take().unwrap(), updates.commitment_signed) + } else { + panic!("Unexpected message send event"); + }; + + // Handle the fee update on the other side, but don't send the last RAA such that the previous + // commitment is still valid (unrevoked). + nodes[1].node().handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee); + let _last_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commit_sig, false, true, false, true); + + // Force close with the latest commitment, confirm it, and reorg it with the previous commitment. + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + + let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let current_commitment_a = txn.pop().unwrap(); + assert_ne!(current_commitment_a.txid(), prev_commitment_a.txid()); + check_spends!(current_commitment_a, funding_tx); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], ¤t_commitment_a); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], ¤t_commitment_a); + + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + + disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1); + disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1); + + mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &prev_commitment_a); + mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &prev_commitment_a); + + // Provide the preimage now, such that we only claim from the previous commitment (since it's + // currently confirmed) and not the latest. + get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage( + &payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &nodes[1].tx_broadcaster, + &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger + ); + + let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast(); + assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1); + let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap(); + check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, prev_commitment_a); + // Make sure it was indeed a preimage claim and not a revocation claim since the previous + // commitment (still unrevoked) is the currently confirmed closing transaction. + assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].witness.second_to_last().unwrap(), &payment_preimage.0[..]); +} -- 2.39.5