1 package org.ldk.structs;
3 import org.ldk.impl.bindings;
4 import org.ldk.enums.*;
6 import java.util.Arrays;
7 import java.lang.ref.Reference;
8 import javax.annotation.Nullable;
11 * A trait to sign lightning channel transactions as described in BOLT 3.
13 * Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet. In this case,
14 * the current Sign would be a front-end on top of a communication
15 * channel connected to your secure device and lightning key material wouldn't
16 * reside on a hot server. Nevertheless, a this deployment would still need
17 * to trust the ChannelManager to avoid loss of funds as this latest component
18 * could ask to sign commitment transaction with HTLCs paying to attacker pubkeys.
20 * A more secure iteration would be to use hashlock (or payment points) to pair
21 * invoice/incoming HTLCs with outgoing HTLCs to implement a no-trust-ChannelManager
22 * at the price of more state and computation on the hardware wallet side. In the future,
23 * we are looking forward to design such interface.
25 * In any case, ChannelMonitor or fallback watchtowers are always going to be trusted
26 * to act, as liveness and breach reply correctness are always going to be hard requirements
27 * of LN security model, orthogonal of key management issues.
29 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // We correctly assign various generic arrays
30 public class BaseSign extends CommonBase {
31 final bindings.LDKBaseSign bindings_instance;
32 BaseSign(Object _dummy, long ptr) { super(ptr); bindings_instance = null; }
33 private BaseSign(bindings.LDKBaseSign arg, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
34 super(bindings.LDKBaseSign_new(arg, pubkeys == null ? 0 : pubkeys.clone_ptr()));
35 this.ptrs_to.add(arg);
36 this.bindings_instance = arg;
38 @Override @SuppressWarnings("deprecation")
39 protected void finalize() throws Throwable {
40 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.BaseSign_free(ptr); } super.finalize();
43 public static interface BaseSignInterface {
45 * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
47 * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
49 byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx);
51 * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
53 * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
54 * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
56 * May be called more than once for the same index.
58 * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
60 byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx);
62 * Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
64 * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
65 * secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
66 * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
67 * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
69 Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx);
71 * Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
72 * some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
73 * Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
75 byte[] channel_keys_id();
77 * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
79 * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
81 * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
82 * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
84 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
86 * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
88 * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
89 * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
91 Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret);
93 * Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
94 * This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
95 * latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
96 * This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
97 * reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
99 * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
101 * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
103 * May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
105 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx);
107 * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
108 * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
110 * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
111 * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
112 * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
113 * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
115 * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
117 * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
118 * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
119 * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
122 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key);
124 * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
125 * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
127 * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
128 * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
129 * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
130 * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
132 * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
134 * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
135 * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
136 * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
139 * htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
140 * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
142 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
144 * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
145 * transaction, either offered or received.
147 * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
148 * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
149 * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
150 * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
152 * Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
155 * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
157 * Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
158 * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
159 * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
162 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc);
164 * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
166 * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
167 * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
169 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx);
171 * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
172 * of the channel participants.
174 * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
175 * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
178 Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg);
180 * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
181 * counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
182 * This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
183 * they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
185 * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
187 * We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
189 * Will be called before any signatures are applied.
191 void ready_channel(ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters);
193 private static class LDKBaseSignHolder { BaseSign held; }
194 public static BaseSign new_impl(BaseSignInterface arg, ChannelPublicKeys pubkeys) {
195 final LDKBaseSignHolder impl_holder = new LDKBaseSignHolder();
196 impl_holder.held = new BaseSign(new bindings.LDKBaseSign() {
197 @Override public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx) {
198 byte[] ret = arg.get_per_commitment_point(idx);
199 byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 33);
202 @Override public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx) {
203 byte[] ret = arg.release_commitment_secret(idx);
204 byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
207 @Override public long validate_holder_commitment(long holder_tx) {
208 HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx_hu_conv = null; if (holder_tx < 0 || holder_tx > 4096) { holder_tx_hu_conv = new HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, holder_tx); }
209 Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_holder_commitment(holder_tx_hu_conv);
210 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
213 @Override public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
214 byte[] ret = arg.channel_keys_id();
215 byte[] result = InternalUtils.check_arr_len(ret, 32);
218 @Override public long sign_counterparty_commitment(long commitment_tx) {
219 CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
220 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
221 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
224 @Override public long validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
225 Result_NoneNoneZ ret = arg.validate_counterparty_revocation(idx, secret);
226 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
229 @Override public long sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(long commitment_tx) {
230 HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx_hu_conv = null; if (commitment_tx < 0 || commitment_tx > 4096) { commitment_tx_hu_conv = new HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx); }
231 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
232 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
235 @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
236 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key);
237 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
240 @Override public long sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, long htlc) {
241 HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
242 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc_hu_conv);
243 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
246 @Override public long sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, long htlc) {
247 HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc_hu_conv = null; if (htlc < 0 || htlc > 4096) { htlc_hu_conv = new HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc); }
248 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc_hu_conv);
249 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
252 @Override public long sign_closing_transaction(long closing_tx) {
253 ClosingTransaction closing_tx_hu_conv = null; if (closing_tx < 0 || closing_tx > 4096) { closing_tx_hu_conv = new ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx); }
254 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
255 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
258 @Override public long sign_channel_announcement(long msg) {
259 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg_hu_conv = null; if (msg < 0 || msg > 4096) { msg_hu_conv = new UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg); }
260 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement(msg_hu_conv);
261 long result = ret == null ? 0 : ret.clone_ptr();
264 @Override public void ready_channel(long channel_parameters) {
265 ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters_hu_conv = null; if (channel_parameters < 0 || channel_parameters > 4096) { channel_parameters_hu_conv = new ChannelTransactionParameters(null, channel_parameters); }
266 arg.ready_channel(channel_parameters_hu_conv);
269 return impl_holder.held;
272 * Gets the per-commitment point for a specific commitment number
274 * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
276 public byte[] get_per_commitment_point(long idx) {
277 byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_get_per_commitment_point(this.ptr, idx);
278 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
279 Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
284 * Gets the commitment secret for a specific commitment number as part of the revocation process
286 * An external signer implementation should error here if the commitment was already signed
287 * and should refuse to sign it in the future.
289 * May be called more than once for the same index.
291 * Note that the commitment number starts at (1 << 48) - 1 and counts backwards.
293 public byte[] release_commitment_secret(long idx) {
294 byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_release_commitment_secret(this.ptr, idx);
295 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
296 Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
301 * Validate the counterparty's signatures on the holder commitment transaction and HTLCs.
303 * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that releasing a commitment
304 * secret won't leave us without a broadcastable holder transaction.
305 * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
306 * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
308 public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_holder_commitment(HolderCommitmentTransaction holder_tx) {
309 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_validate_holder_commitment(this.ptr, holder_tx == null ? 0 : holder_tx.ptr & ~1);
310 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
311 Reference.reachabilityFence(holder_tx);
312 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
313 Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
314 this.ptrs_to.add(holder_tx);
319 * Gets an arbitrary identifier describing the set of keys which are provided back to you in
320 * some SpendableOutputDescriptor types. This should be sufficient to identify this
321 * Sign object uniquely and lookup or re-derive its keys.
323 public byte[] channel_keys_id() {
324 byte[] ret = bindings.BaseSign_channel_keys_id(this.ptr);
325 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
330 * Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
332 * Note that if signing fails or is rejected, the channel will be force-closed.
334 * Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
335 * sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
337 public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_counterparty_commitment(CommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
338 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr & ~1);
339 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
340 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
341 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
342 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
343 this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx);
348 * Validate the counterparty's revocation.
350 * This is required in order for the signer to make sure that the state has moved
351 * forward and it is safe to sign the next counterparty commitment.
353 public Result_NoneNoneZ validate_counterparty_revocation(long idx, byte[] secret) {
354 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_validate_counterparty_revocation(this.ptr, idx, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(secret, 32));
355 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
356 Reference.reachabilityFence(idx);
357 Reference.reachabilityFence(secret);
358 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
359 Result_NoneNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_NoneNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
364 * Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
365 * This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
366 * latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
367 * This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
368 * reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
370 * This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
372 * An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
374 * May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
376 public Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(HolderCommitmentTransaction commitment_tx) {
377 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(this.ptr, commitment_tx == null ? 0 : commitment_tx.ptr & ~1);
378 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
379 Reference.reachabilityFence(commitment_tx);
380 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
381 Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_SignatureCVec_SignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
382 this.ptrs_to.add(commitment_tx);
387 * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
388 * or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
390 * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
391 * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
392 * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
393 * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
395 * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
397 * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
398 * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
399 * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
402 public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_output(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key) {
403 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32));
404 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
405 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
406 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
407 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
408 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
409 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
410 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
415 * Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
416 * HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
418 * A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
419 * similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
420 * It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
421 * to an upcoming timelock expiration.
423 * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
425 * per_commitment_key is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
426 * revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
427 * not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
430 * htlc holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
431 * (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
433 public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_justice_revoked_htlc(byte[] justice_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_key, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
434 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, justice_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_key, 32), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1);
435 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
436 Reference.reachabilityFence(justice_tx);
437 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
438 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
439 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_key);
440 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
441 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
442 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
443 this.ptrs_to.add(htlc);
448 * Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
449 * transaction, either offered or received.
451 * Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
452 * preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
453 * signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
454 * needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
456 * Witness_script is either a offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
459 * Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
461 * Per_commitment_point is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
462 * detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
463 * channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
466 public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(byte[] htlc_tx, long input, long amount, byte[] per_commitment_point, HTLCOutputInCommitment htlc) {
467 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, htlc_tx, input, amount, InternalUtils.check_arr_len(per_commitment_point, 33), htlc == null ? 0 : htlc.ptr & ~1);
468 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
469 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc_tx);
470 Reference.reachabilityFence(input);
471 Reference.reachabilityFence(amount);
472 Reference.reachabilityFence(per_commitment_point);
473 Reference.reachabilityFence(htlc);
474 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
475 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
476 this.ptrs_to.add(htlc);
481 * Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
483 * Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
484 * chosen to forgo their output as dust.
486 public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_closing_transaction(ClosingTransaction closing_tx) {
487 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, closing_tx == null ? 0 : closing_tx.ptr & ~1);
488 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
489 Reference.reachabilityFence(closing_tx);
490 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
491 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
492 this.ptrs_to.add(closing_tx);
497 * Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key, proving it comes from one
498 * of the channel participants.
500 * Note that if this fails or is rejected, the channel will not be publicly announced and
501 * our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on us for violating the
504 public Result_SignatureNoneZ sign_channel_announcement(UnsignedChannelAnnouncement msg) {
505 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_sign_channel_announcement(this.ptr, msg == null ? 0 : msg.ptr & ~1);
506 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
507 Reference.reachabilityFence(msg);
508 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
509 Result_SignatureNoneZ ret_hu_conv = Result_SignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
510 this.ptrs_to.add(msg);
515 * Set the counterparty static channel data, including basepoints,
516 * counterparty_selected/holder_selected_contest_delay and funding outpoint.
517 * This is done as soon as the funding outpoint is known. Since these are static channel data,
518 * they MUST NOT be allowed to change to different values once set.
520 * channel_parameters.is_populated() MUST be true.
522 * We bind holder_selected_contest_delay late here for API convenience.
524 * Will be called before any signatures are applied.
526 public void ready_channel(ChannelTransactionParameters channel_parameters) {
527 bindings.BaseSign_ready_channel(this.ptr, channel_parameters == null ? 0 : channel_parameters.ptr & ~1);
528 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
529 Reference.reachabilityFence(channel_parameters);
530 this.ptrs_to.add(channel_parameters);
534 * Frees any resources associated with this object given its this_arg pointer.
535 * Does not need to free the outer struct containing function pointers and may be NULL is no resources need to be freed.
537 public ChannelPublicKeys get_pubkeys() {
538 long ret = bindings.BaseSign_get_pubkeys(this.ptr);
539 Reference.reachabilityFence(this);
540 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
541 ChannelPublicKeys ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new ChannelPublicKeys(null, ret); }
542 ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.add(this);