6 namespace org { namespace ldk { namespace structs {
10 * Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
11 * with our counterparty.
13 public class ChannelConfig : CommonBase {
14 internal ChannelConfig(object _dummy, long ptr) : base(ptr) { }
16 if (ptr != 0) { bindings.ChannelConfig_free(ptr); }
20 * Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
22 * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
23 * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
27 public int get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths() {
28 int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr);
34 * Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
36 * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
37 * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
41 public void set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(int val) {
42 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths(this.ptr, val);
48 * Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
49 * excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
50 * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
51 * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
53 * The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
54 * as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
57 * Default value: 1000.
59 * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
61 public int get_forwarding_fee_base_msat() {
62 int ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr);
68 * Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
69 * excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
70 * This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
71 * update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
73 * The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
74 * as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
77 * Default value: 1000.
79 * [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
81 public void set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(int val) {
82 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_forwarding_fee_base_msat(this.ptr, val);
88 * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
89 * the channel this config applies to.
91 * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
92 * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
93 * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
94 * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
96 * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
97 * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
98 * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
99 * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
100 * the spending transaction).
102 * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
103 * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
104 * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
106 * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
108 public short get_cltv_expiry_delta() {
109 short ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr);
115 * The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
116 * the channel this config applies to.
118 * This is analogous to [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] but applies to in-flight
119 * HTLC balance when a channel appears on-chain whereas
120 * [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`] applies to the remaining
121 * (non-HTLC-encumbered) balance.
123 * Thus, for HTLC-encumbered balances to be enforced on-chain when a channel is force-closed,
124 * we (or one of our watchtowers) MUST be online to check for broadcast of the current
125 * commitment transaction at least once per this many blocks (minus some margin to allow us
126 * enough time to broadcast and confirm a transaction, possibly with time in between to RBF
127 * the spending transaction).
129 * Default value: 72 (12 hours at an average of 6 blocks/hour).
130 * Minimum value: [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`], any values less than this will be treated as
131 * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`] instead.
133 * [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
135 public void set_cltv_expiry_delta(short val) {
136 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_cltv_expiry_delta(this.ptr, val);
142 * Limit our total exposure to potential loss to on-chain fees on close, including in-flight
143 * HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too small to claim on-chain and fees on
144 * commitment transaction(s) broadcasted by our counterparty in excess of our own fee estimate.
146 * # HTLC-based Dust Exposure
148 * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
149 * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
150 * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
151 * to such payments may be substantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
152 * channel is force-closed.
154 * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
155 * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
156 * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
157 * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
158 * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
159 * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
160 * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
162 * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
163 * exposure across all three types per-channel.
165 * # Transaction Fee Dust Exposure
167 * Further, counterparties broadcasting a commitment transaction in a force-close may result
168 * in other balance being burned to fees, and thus all fees on commitment and HTLC
169 * transactions in excess of our local fee estimates are included in the dust calculation.
171 * Because of this, another way to look at this limit is to divide it by 43,000 (or 218,750
172 * for non-anchor channels) and see it as the maximum feerate disagreement (in sats/vB) per
173 * non-dust HTLC we're allowed to have with our peers before risking a force-closure for
176 * Thus, for the default value of 10_000 * a current feerate estimate of 10 sat/vB (or 2,500
177 * sat/KW), we risk force-closure if we disagree with our peer by:
178 * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (483*2)` = 0.6 sat/vB for anchor channels with 483 HTLCs in
179 * both directions (the maximum),
180 * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (50*2)` = 5.8 sat/vB for anchor channels with 50 HTLCs in both
181 * directions (the LDK default max from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`])
182 * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (483*2)` = 0.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 483 HTLCs
183 * in both directions (the maximum),
184 * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (50*2)` = 1.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 50 HTLCs
185 * in both (the LDK default maximum from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`])
187 * Note that when using [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] this maximum disagreement
188 * will scale linearly with increases (or decreases) in the our feerate estimates. Further,
189 * for anchor channels we expect our counterparty to use a relatively low feerate estimate
190 * while we use [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`] (which should be relatively high) and
191 * feerate disagreement force-closures should only occur when theirs is higher than ours.
193 * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 10_000.
195 * [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep
197 public MaxDustHTLCExposure get_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
198 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr);
200 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
201 org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure ret_hu_conv = org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure.constr_from_ptr(ret);
202 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); };
207 * Limit our total exposure to potential loss to on-chain fees on close, including in-flight
208 * HTLCs which are burned to fees as they are too small to claim on-chain and fees on
209 * commitment transaction(s) broadcasted by our counterparty in excess of our own fee estimate.
211 * # HTLC-based Dust Exposure
213 * When an HTLC present in one of our channels is below a \"dust\" threshold, the HTLC will
214 * not be claimable on-chain, instead being turned into additional miner fees if either
215 * party force-closes the channel. Because the threshold is per-HTLC, our total exposure
216 * to such payments may be substantial if there are many dust HTLCs present when the
217 * channel is force-closed.
219 * The dust threshold for each HTLC is based on the `dust_limit_satoshis` for each party in a
220 * channel negotiated throughout the channel open process, along with the fees required to have
221 * a broadcastable HTLC spending transaction. When a channel supports anchor outputs
222 * (specifically the zero fee HTLC transaction variant), this threshold no longer takes into
223 * account the HTLC transaction fee as it is zero. Because of this, you may want to set this
224 * value to a fixed limit for channels using anchor outputs, while the fee rate multiplier
225 * variant is primarily intended for use with pre-anchor channels.
227 * The selected limit is applied for sent, forwarded, and received HTLCs and limits the total
228 * exposure across all three types per-channel.
230 * # Transaction Fee Dust Exposure
232 * Further, counterparties broadcasting a commitment transaction in a force-close may result
233 * in other balance being burned to fees, and thus all fees on commitment and HTLC
234 * transactions in excess of our local fee estimates are included in the dust calculation.
236 * Because of this, another way to look at this limit is to divide it by 43,000 (or 218,750
237 * for non-anchor channels) and see it as the maximum feerate disagreement (in sats/vB) per
238 * non-dust HTLC we're allowed to have with our peers before risking a force-closure for
241 * Thus, for the default value of 10_000 * a current feerate estimate of 10 sat/vB (or 2,500
242 * sat/KW), we risk force-closure if we disagree with our peer by:
243 * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (483*2)` = 0.6 sat/vB for anchor channels with 483 HTLCs in
244 * both directions (the maximum),
245 * `10_000 * 2_500 / 43_000 / (50*2)` = 5.8 sat/vB for anchor channels with 50 HTLCs in both
246 * directions (the LDK default max from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`])
247 * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (483*2)` = 0.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 483 HTLCs
248 * in both directions (the maximum),
249 * `10_000 * 2_500 / 218_750 / (50*2)` = 1.1 sat/vB for non-anchor channels with 50 HTLCs
250 * in both (the LDK default maximum from [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_max_accepted_htlcs`])
252 * Note that when using [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] this maximum disagreement
253 * will scale linearly with increases (or decreases) in the our feerate estimates. Further,
254 * for anchor channels we expect our counterparty to use a relatively low feerate estimate
255 * while we use [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`] (which should be relatively high) and
256 * feerate disagreement force-closures should only occur when theirs is higher than ours.
258 * Default value: [`MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier`] with a multiplier of 10_000.
260 * [`ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep
262 public void set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure val) {
263 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_max_dust_htlc_exposure(this.ptr, val.ptr);
266 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(val); };
270 * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
271 * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
273 * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
274 * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
277 * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
278 * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
279 * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
280 * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
281 * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
284 * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
285 * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
286 * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
288 * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
290 * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
291 * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
293 public long get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis() {
294 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr);
300 * The additional fee we're willing to pay to avoid waiting for the counterparty's
301 * `to_self_delay` to reclaim funds.
303 * When we close a channel cooperatively with our counterparty, we negotiate a fee for the
304 * closing transaction which both sides find acceptable, ultimately paid by the channel
307 * When we are the funder, because we have to pay the channel closing fee, we bound the
308 * acceptable fee by our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] fees, with the upper bound increased by
309 * this value. Because the on-chain fee we'd pay to force-close the channel is kept near our
310 * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`] feerate during normal operation, this value represents the additional fee we're
311 * willing to pay in order to avoid waiting for our counterparty's to_self_delay to reclaim our
314 * When we are not the funder, we require the closing transaction fee pay at least our
315 * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] fee estimate, but allow our counterparty to pay as much fee as they like.
316 * Thus, this value is ignored when we are not the funder.
318 * Default value: 1000 satoshis.
320 * [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
321 * [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
323 public void set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(long val) {
324 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis(this.ptr, val);
330 * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
331 * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
334 * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
335 * generated by this channel's counterparty.
336 * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
337 * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
338 * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
339 * actual forward amounts is their fee. See
340 * <https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/tree/main/LSPS2#flow-lsp-trusts-client-model>
341 * for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case.
344 * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
345 * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
346 * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
350 * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
351 * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
353 * Default value: false.
355 * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
356 * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
357 * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
358 * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
359 * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
360 * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
362 public bool get_accept_underpaying_htlcs() {
363 bool ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_get_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr);
369 * If set, allows this channel's counterparty to skim an additional fee off this node's inbound
370 * HTLCs. Useful for liquidity providers to offload on-chain channel costs to end users.
373 * - The payee will set this option and set its invoice route hints to use [intercept scids]
374 * generated by this channel's counterparty.
375 * - The counterparty will get an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event upon payment forward, and call
376 * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`] with less than the amount provided in
377 * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]. The difference between the expected and
378 * actual forward amounts is their fee. See
379 * <https://github.com/BitcoinAndLightningLayerSpecs/lsp/tree/main/LSPS2#flow-lsp-trusts-client-model>
380 * for how this feature may be used in the LSP use case.
383 * It's important for payee wallet software to verify that [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`] is
384 * as-expected if this feature is activated, otherwise they may lose money!
385 * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`] provides the fee taken by the
389 * Switching this config flag on may break compatibility with versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
390 * Unsetting this flag between restarts may lead to payment receive failures.
392 * Default value: false.
394 * [intercept scids]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid
395 * [`forward_intercepted_htlc`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc
396 * [`HTLCIntercepted`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
397 * [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
398 * [`PaymentClaimable::amount_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::amount_msat
399 * [`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat
401 public void set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(bool val) {
402 bindings.ChannelConfig_set_accept_underpaying_htlcs(this.ptr, val);
408 * Constructs a new ChannelConfig given each field
410 public static ChannelConfig of(int forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, int forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, short cltv_expiry_delta_arg, org.ldk.structs.MaxDustHTLCExposure max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg, long force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, bool accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg) {
411 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_new(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg, forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg, cltv_expiry_delta_arg, max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg.ptr, force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg, accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg);
412 GC.KeepAlive(forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths_arg);
413 GC.KeepAlive(forwarding_fee_base_msat_arg);
414 GC.KeepAlive(cltv_expiry_delta_arg);
415 GC.KeepAlive(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg);
416 GC.KeepAlive(force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis_arg);
417 GC.KeepAlive(accept_underpaying_htlcs_arg);
418 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
419 org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
420 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(ret_hu_conv); };
421 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(max_dust_htlc_exposure_arg); };
425 internal long clone_ptr() {
426 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
432 * Creates a copy of the ChannelConfig
434 public ChannelConfig clone() {
435 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_clone(this.ptr);
437 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
438 org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
439 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(this); };
444 * Checks if two ChannelConfigs contain equal inner contents.
445 * This ignores pointers and is_owned flags and looks at the values in fields.
446 * Two objects with NULL inner values will be considered "equal" here.
448 public bool eq(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig b) {
449 bool ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_eq(this.ptr, b.ptr);
452 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(b); };
456 public override bool Equals(object o) {
457 if (!(o is ChannelConfig)) return false;
458 return this.eq((ChannelConfig)o);
461 * Applies the given [`ChannelConfigUpdate`] as a partial update to the [`ChannelConfig`].
463 public void apply(org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfigUpdate update) {
464 bindings.ChannelConfig_apply(this.ptr, update.ptr);
466 GC.KeepAlive(update);
467 if (this != null) { this.ptrs_to.AddLast(update); };
471 * Creates a "default" ChannelConfig. See struct and individual field documentaiton for details on which values are used.
473 public static ChannelConfig with_default() {
474 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_default();
475 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
476 org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig ret_hu_conv = null; if (ret < 0 || ret > 4096) { ret_hu_conv = new org.ldk.structs.ChannelConfig(null, ret); }
477 if (ret_hu_conv != null) { ret_hu_conv.ptrs_to.AddLast(ret_hu_conv); };
482 * Serialize the ChannelConfig object into a byte array which can be read by ChannelConfig_read
484 public byte[] write() {
485 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_write(this.ptr);
487 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
488 byte[] ret_conv = InternalUtils.decodeUint8Array(ret);
493 * Read a ChannelConfig from a byte array, created by ChannelConfig_write
495 public static Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ read(byte[] ser) {
496 long ret = bindings.ChannelConfig_read(InternalUtils.encodeUint8Array(ser));
498 if (ret >= 0 && ret <= 4096) { return null; }
499 Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ ret_hu_conv = Result_ChannelConfigDecodeErrorZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);