1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Test that monitor update failures don't get our channel state out of sync.
11 //! One of the biggest concern with the monitor update failure handling code is that messages
12 //! resent after monitor updating is restored are delivered out-of-order, resulting in
13 //! commitment_signed messages having "invalid signatures".
14 //! To test this we stand up a network of three nodes and read bytes from the fuzz input to denote
15 //! actions such as sending payments, handling events, or changing monitor update return values on
16 //! a per-node basis. This should allow it to find any cases where the ordering of actions results
17 //! in us getting out of sync with ourselves, and, assuming at least one of our recieve- or
18 //! send-side handling is correct, other peers. We consider it a failure if any action results in a
19 //! channel being force-closed.
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
26 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
33 use lightning::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
36 use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, MonitorEvent};
37 use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use lightning::sign::{KeyMaterial, InMemorySigner, Recipient, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
40 use lightning::events;
41 use lightning::events::MessageSendEventsProvider;
42 use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
44 use lightning::ln::channel::FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
45 use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
46 use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
47 use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
48 use lightning::offers::invoice::UnsignedBolt12Invoice;
49 use lightning::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
50 use lightning::onion_message::{Destination, MessageRouter, OnionMessagePath};
51 use lightning::util::test_channel_signer::{TestChannelSigner, EnforcementState};
52 use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
53 use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
54 use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
55 use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
56 use lightning::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, Path, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
58 use crate::utils::test_logger::{self, Output};
59 use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
61 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, self};
62 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
63 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
64 use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
67 use std::cmp::{self, Ordering};
68 use hashbrown::{HashSet, hash_map, HashMap};
69 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
70 use std::sync::atomic;
72 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
74 const MAX_FEE: u32 = 10_000;
75 struct FuzzEstimator {
76 ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32,
78 impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
79 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
80 // We force-close channels if our counterparty sends us a feerate which is a small multiple
81 // of our HighPriority fee estimate or smaller than our Background fee estimate. Thus, we
82 // always return a HighPriority feerate here which is >= the maximum Normal feerate and a
83 // Background feerate which is <= the minimum Normal feerate.
85 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep => MAX_FEE,
86 ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum|ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee|ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee => 253,
87 ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee => cmp::min(self.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire), MAX_FEE),
94 impl Router for FuzzRouter {
96 &self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
97 _inflight_htlcs: InFlightHtlcs
98 ) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
99 Err(msgs::LightningError {
100 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
101 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
106 impl MessageRouter for FuzzRouter {
108 &self, _sender: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _destination: Destination
109 ) -> Result<OnionMessagePath, ()> {
113 fn create_blinded_paths<
114 ES: EntropySource + ?Sized, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification
116 &self, _recipient: PublicKey, _peers: Vec<PublicKey>, _entropy_source: &ES,
117 _secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>
118 ) -> Result<Vec<BlindedPath>, ()> {
123 pub struct TestBroadcaster {}
124 impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
125 fn broadcast_transactions(&self, _txs: &[&Transaction]) { }
128 pub struct VecWriter(pub Vec<u8>);
129 impl Writer for VecWriter {
130 fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
131 self.0.extend_from_slice(buf);
136 struct TestChainMonitor {
137 pub logger: Arc<dyn Logger>,
138 pub keys: Arc<KeyProvider>,
139 pub persister: Arc<TestPersister>,
140 pub chain_monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<TestChannelSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
141 // If we reload a node with an old copy of ChannelMonitors, the ChannelManager deserialization
142 // logic will automatically force-close our channels for us (as we don't have an up-to-date
143 // monitor implying we are not able to punish misbehaving counterparties). Because this test
144 // "fails" if we ever force-close a channel, we avoid doing so, always saving the latest
145 // fully-serialized monitor state here, as well as the corresponding update_id.
146 pub latest_monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, (u64, Vec<u8>)>>,
148 impl TestChainMonitor {
149 pub fn new(broadcaster: Arc<TestBroadcaster>, logger: Arc<dyn Logger>, feeest: Arc<FuzzEstimator>, persister: Arc<TestPersister>, keys: Arc<KeyProvider>) -> Self {
151 chain_monitor: Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcaster, logger.clone(), feeest, Arc::clone(&persister))),
155 latest_monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
159 impl chain::Watch<TestChannelSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
160 fn watch_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>) -> Result<chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, ()> {
161 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
162 monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
163 if let Some(_) = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(funding_txo, (monitor.get_latest_update_id(), ser.0)) {
164 panic!("Already had monitor pre-watch_channel");
166 self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, monitor)
169 fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
170 let mut map_lock = self.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
171 let mut map_entry = match map_lock.entry(funding_txo) {
172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
175 let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::
176 read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), (&*self.keys, &*self.keys)).unwrap().1;
177 deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) }, &self.logger).unwrap();
178 let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
179 deserialized_monitor.write(&mut ser).unwrap();
180 map_entry.insert((update.update_id, ser.0));
181 self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update)
184 fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<(OutPoint, Vec<MonitorEvent>, Option<PublicKey>)> {
185 return self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
190 node_secret: SecretKey,
191 rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32,
192 enforcement_states: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>>>,
195 impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
196 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
197 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
198 let mut res = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, self.node_secret[31]];
199 res[30-4..30].copy_from_slice(&id.to_le_bytes());
204 impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
205 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
206 let node_secret = match recipient {
207 Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
208 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
210 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
213 fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
214 let mut node_secret = match recipient {
215 Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
216 Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
218 if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
219 node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
221 Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
224 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
225 KeyMaterial([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, self.node_secret[31]])
228 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
232 fn sign_bolt12_invoice_request(
233 &self, _invoice_request: &UnsignedInvoiceRequest
234 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
238 fn sign_bolt12_invoice(
239 &self, _invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice,
240 ) -> Result<schnorr::Signature, ()> {
244 fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
245 let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
246 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
247 Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
251 impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
252 type EcdsaSigner = TestChannelSigner;
254 type TaprootSigner = TestChannelSigner;
256 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
257 let id = self.rand_bytes_id.fetch_add(1, atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
261 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
262 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
263 let id = channel_keys_id[0];
264 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
266 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
267 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
268 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
269 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
270 SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap(),
271 [id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, self.node_secret[31]],
272 channel_value_satoshis,
276 let revoked_commitment = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
277 TestChannelSigner::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
280 fn read_chan_signer(&self, buffer: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> {
281 let mut reader = std::io::Cursor::new(buffer);
283 let inner: InMemorySigner = ReadableArgs::read(&mut reader, self)?;
284 let state = self.make_enforcement_state_cell(inner.commitment_seed);
286 Ok(TestChannelSigner {
289 disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
290 available: Arc::new(Mutex::new(true)),
294 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
295 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
296 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
297 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
298 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
301 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
302 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
303 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, self.node_secret[31]]).unwrap();
304 let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
305 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash))
310 fn make_enforcement_state_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>> {
311 let mut revoked_commitments = self.enforcement_states.lock().unwrap();
312 if !revoked_commitments.contains_key(&commitment_seed) {
313 revoked_commitments.insert(commitment_seed, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new())));
315 let cell = revoked_commitments.get(&commitment_seed).unwrap();
321 fn check_api_err(api_err: APIError, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
323 APIError::APIMisuseError { .. } => panic!("We can't misuse the API"),
324 APIError::FeeRateTooHigh { .. } => panic!("We can't send too much fee?"),
325 APIError::InvalidRoute { .. } => panic!("Our routes should work"),
326 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } => {
327 // Test the error against a list of errors we can hit, and reject
328 // all others. If you hit this panic, the list of acceptable errors
329 // is probably just stale and you should add new messages here.
331 "Peer for first hop currently disconnected" => {},
332 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - ") => {},
333 _ if err.starts_with("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - ") => {},
334 _ => panic!("{}", err),
336 assert!(sendable_bounds_violated);
338 APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress => {
339 // We can (obviously) temp-fail a monitor update
341 APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { .. } => panic!("Cannot send an incompatible shutdown script"),
345 fn check_payment_err(send_err: PaymentSendFailure, sendable_bounds_violated: bool) {
347 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(api_err) => check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated),
348 PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(per_path_results) => {
349 for res in per_path_results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
351 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(per_path_results) => {
352 for api_err in per_path_results { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); }
354 PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure { results, .. } => {
355 for res in results { if let Err(api_err) = res { check_api_err(api_err, sendable_bounds_violated); } }
357 PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment => panic!(),
361 type ChanMan<'a> = ChannelManager<Arc<TestChainMonitor>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
364 fn get_payment_secret_hash(dest: &ChanMan, payment_id: &mut u8) -> Option<(PaymentSecret, PaymentHash)> {
365 let mut payment_hash;
367 payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[*payment_id; 1]).to_byte_array());
368 if let Ok(payment_secret) = dest.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 3600, None) {
369 return Some((payment_secret, payment_hash));
371 *payment_id = payment_id.wrapping_add(1);
377 fn send_payment(source: &ChanMan, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
378 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
379 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
380 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
381 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
383 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
384 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(dest_chan_id))
386 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
388 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
389 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
390 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
391 node_features: dest.node_features(),
392 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
393 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
395 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
396 maybe_announced_channel: true,
397 }], blinded_tail: None }],
399 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
400 check_payment_err(err, amt > max_value_sendable || amt < min_value_sendable);
403 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
404 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
405 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
406 assert!(amt <= max_value_sendable);
411 fn send_hop_payment(source: &ChanMan, middle: &ChanMan, middle_chan_id: u64, dest: &ChanMan, dest_chan_id: u64, amt: u64, payment_id: &mut u8, payment_idx: &mut u64) -> bool {
412 let (payment_secret, payment_hash) =
413 if let Some((secret, hash)) = get_payment_secret_hash(dest, payment_id) { (secret, hash) } else { return true; };
414 let mut payment_id = [0; 32];
415 payment_id[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_idx.to_ne_bytes());
417 let (min_value_sendable, max_value_sendable) = source.list_usable_channels()
418 .iter().find(|chan| chan.short_channel_id == Some(middle_chan_id))
420 (chan.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, chan.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat))
422 let first_hop_fee = 50_000;
423 if let Err(err) = source.send_payment_with_route(&Route {
424 paths: vec![Path { hops: vec![RouteHop {
425 pubkey: middle.get_our_node_id(),
426 node_features: middle.node_features(),
427 short_channel_id: middle_chan_id,
428 channel_features: middle.channel_features(),
429 fee_msat: first_hop_fee,
430 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
431 maybe_announced_channel: true,
433 pubkey: dest.get_our_node_id(),
434 node_features: dest.node_features(),
435 short_channel_id: dest_chan_id,
436 channel_features: dest.channel_features(),
438 cltv_expiry_delta: 200,
439 maybe_announced_channel: true,
440 }], blinded_tail: None }],
442 }, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_id)) {
443 let sent_amt = amt + first_hop_fee;
444 check_payment_err(err, sent_amt < min_value_sendable || sent_amt > max_value_sendable);
447 // Note that while the max is a strict upper-bound, we can occasionally send substantially
448 // below the minimum, with some gap which is unusable immediately below the minimum. Thus,
449 // we don't check against min_value_sendable here.
450 assert!(amt + first_hop_fee <= max_value_sendable);
456 pub fn do_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], underlying_out: Out, anchors: bool) {
457 let out = SearchingOutput::new(underlying_out);
458 let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{});
459 let router = FuzzRouter {};
461 macro_rules! make_node {
462 ($node_id: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
463 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
464 let node_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, $node_id]).unwrap();
465 let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret, rand_bytes_id: atomic::AtomicU32::new(0), enforcement_states: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
466 let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
467 Arc::new(TestPersister {
468 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
469 }), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
471 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
472 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
473 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
475 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
476 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
478 let network = Network::Bitcoin;
479 let best_block_timestamp = genesis_block(network).header.time;
480 let params = ChainParameters {
482 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
484 (ChannelManager::new($fee_estimator.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params, best_block_timestamp),
485 monitor, keys_manager)
489 macro_rules! reload_node {
490 ($ser: expr, $node_id: expr, $old_monitors: expr, $keys_manager: expr, $fee_estimator: expr) => { {
491 let keys_manager = Arc::clone(& $keys_manager);
492 let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new($node_id.to_string(), out.clone()));
493 let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), $fee_estimator.clone(),
494 Arc::new(TestPersister {
495 update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed)
496 }), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
498 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
499 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
500 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
502 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
503 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
506 let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
507 let mut old_monitors = $old_monitors.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap();
508 for (outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser)) in old_monitors.drain() {
509 monitors.insert(outpoint, <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&monitor_ser), (&*$keys_manager, &*$keys_manager)).expect("Failed to read monitor").1);
510 chain_monitor.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().insert(outpoint, (update_id, monitor_ser));
512 let mut monitor_refs = HashMap::new();
513 for (outpoint, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
514 monitor_refs.insert(*outpoint, monitor);
517 let read_args = ChannelManagerReadArgs {
518 entropy_source: keys_manager.clone(),
519 node_signer: keys_manager.clone(),
520 signer_provider: keys_manager.clone(),
521 fee_estimator: $fee_estimator.clone(),
522 chain_monitor: chain_monitor.clone(),
523 tx_broadcaster: broadcast.clone(),
526 default_config: config,
527 channel_monitors: monitor_refs,
530 let res = (<(BlockHash, ChanMan)>::read(&mut Cursor::new(&$ser.0), read_args).expect("Failed to read manager").1, chain_monitor.clone());
531 for (funding_txo, mon) in monitors.drain() {
532 assert_eq!(chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_txo, mon),
533 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
539 let mut channel_txn = Vec::new();
540 macro_rules! make_channel {
541 ($source: expr, $dest: expr, $dest_keys_manager: expr, $chan_id: expr) => { {
542 $source.peer_connected(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
543 features: $dest.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
545 $dest.peer_connected(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
546 features: $source.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
549 $source.create_channel($dest.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42, 0, None, None).unwrap();
551 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
552 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
553 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
555 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
558 $dest.handle_open_channel(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
559 let accept_channel = {
561 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
562 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
563 if let events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
564 ref temporary_channel_id, ref counterparty_node_id, ..
566 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
567 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&$dest_keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
568 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
569 $dest.accept_inbound_channel(
570 temporary_channel_id,
571 counterparty_node_id,
574 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
576 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
578 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
580 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
583 $source.handle_accept_channel(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
586 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
587 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
588 if let events::Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } = events[0] {
589 let tx = Transaction { version: $chan_id, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
590 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
592 funding_output = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
593 $source.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
594 channel_txn.push(tx);
595 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
598 let funding_created = {
599 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
600 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
601 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
603 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
605 $dest.handle_funding_created(&$source.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
607 let funding_signed = {
608 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
609 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
610 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref msg, .. } = events[0] {
612 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
614 let events = $dest.get_and_clear_pending_events();
615 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
616 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
617 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$source.get_our_node_id());
618 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
620 $source.handle_funding_signed(&$dest.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
621 let events = $source.get_and_clear_pending_events();
622 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
623 if let events::Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } = events[0] {
624 assert_eq!(counterparty_node_id, &$dest.get_our_node_id());
625 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
631 macro_rules! confirm_txn {
633 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash();
634 let mut header = create_dummy_header(chain_hash, 42);
635 let txdata: Vec<_> = channel_txn.iter().enumerate().map(|(i, tx)| (i + 1, tx)).collect();
636 $node.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, 1);
638 header = create_dummy_header(header.block_hash(), 42);
640 $node.best_block_updated(&header, 99);
644 macro_rules! lock_fundings {
645 ($nodes: expr) => { {
646 let mut node_events = Vec::new();
647 for node in $nodes.iter() {
648 node_events.push(node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events());
650 for (idx, node_event) in node_events.iter().enumerate() {
651 for event in node_event {
652 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } = event {
653 for node in $nodes.iter() {
654 if node.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
655 node.handle_channel_ready(&$nodes[idx].get_our_node_id(), msg);
658 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
662 for node in $nodes.iter() {
663 let events = node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
664 for event in events {
665 if let events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = event {
666 } else { panic!("Wrong event type"); }
672 let fee_est_a = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
673 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_a = 253;
674 let fee_est_b = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
675 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_b = 253;
676 let fee_est_c = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator { ret_val: atomic::AtomicU32::new(253) });
677 let mut last_htlc_clear_fee_c = 253;
679 // 3 nodes is enough to hit all the possible cases, notably unknown-source-unknown-dest
681 let (node_a, mut monitor_a, keys_manager_a) = make_node!(0, fee_est_a);
682 let (node_b, mut monitor_b, keys_manager_b) = make_node!(1, fee_est_b);
683 let (node_c, mut monitor_c, keys_manager_c) = make_node!(2, fee_est_c);
685 let mut nodes = [node_a, node_b, node_c];
687 let chan_1_funding = make_channel!(nodes[0], nodes[1], keys_manager_b, 0);
688 let chan_2_funding = make_channel!(nodes[1], nodes[2], keys_manager_c, 1);
690 for node in nodes.iter() {
694 lock_fundings!(nodes);
696 let chan_a = nodes[0].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
697 let chan_b = nodes[2].list_usable_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap();
699 let mut payment_id: u8 = 0;
700 let mut payment_idx: u64 = 0;
702 let mut chan_a_disconnected = false;
703 let mut chan_b_disconnected = false;
704 let mut ab_events = Vec::new();
705 let mut ba_events = Vec::new();
706 let mut bc_events = Vec::new();
707 let mut cb_events = Vec::new();
709 let mut node_a_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
710 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
711 let mut node_b_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
712 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
713 let mut node_c_ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());
714 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
716 macro_rules! test_return {
718 assert_eq!(nodes[0].list_channels().len(), 1);
719 assert_eq!(nodes[1].list_channels().len(), 2);
720 assert_eq!(nodes[2].list_channels().len(), 1);
725 let mut read_pos = 0;
726 macro_rules! get_slice {
729 let slice_len = $len as usize;
730 if data.len() < read_pos + slice_len {
733 read_pos += slice_len;
734 &data[read_pos - slice_len..read_pos]
740 // Push any events from Node B onto ba_events and bc_events
741 macro_rules! push_excess_b_events {
742 ($excess_events: expr, $expect_drop_node: expr) => { {
743 let a_id = nodes[0].get_our_node_id();
744 let expect_drop_node: Option<usize> = $expect_drop_node;
745 let expect_drop_id = if let Some(id) = expect_drop_node { Some(nodes[id].get_our_node_id()) } else { None };
746 for event in $excess_events {
747 let push_a = match event {
748 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
749 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
752 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => {
753 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
756 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => {
757 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
760 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => continue,
761 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
762 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
763 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
764 if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
767 _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
769 if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
774 // While delivering messages, we select across three possible message selection processes
775 // to ensure we get as much coverage as possible. See the individual enum variants for more
778 enum ProcessMessages {
779 /// Deliver all available messages, including fetching any new messages from
780 /// `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (which may have side effects).
782 /// Call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` first, and then deliver up to one
783 /// message (which may already be queued).
785 /// Deliver up to one already-queued message. This avoids any potential side-effects
786 /// of `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()` (eg freeing the HTLC holding cell), which
787 /// provides potentially more coverage.
791 macro_rules! process_msg_events {
792 ($node: expr, $corrupt_forward: expr, $limit_events: expr) => { {
793 let mut events = if $node == 1 {
794 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
795 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ba_events);
796 new_events.extend_from_slice(&bc_events[..]);
799 } else if $node == 0 {
800 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
801 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut ab_events);
804 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
805 mem::swap(&mut new_events, &mut cb_events);
808 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
809 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage {
810 new_events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
812 let mut had_events = false;
813 let mut events_iter = events.drain(..).chain(new_events.drain(..));
814 let mut extra_ev = None;
815 for event in &mut events_iter {
818 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee, commitment_signed } } => {
819 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
820 if dest.get_our_node_id() == node_id {
821 for update_add in update_add_htlcs.iter() {
822 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_add_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
823 if !$corrupt_forward {
824 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_add);
826 // Corrupt the update_add_htlc message so that its HMAC
827 // check will fail and we generate a
828 // update_fail_malformed_htlc instead of an
829 // update_fail_htlc as we do when we reject a payment.
830 let mut msg_ser = update_add.encode();
831 msg_ser[1000] ^= 0xff;
832 let new_msg = UpdateAddHTLC::read(&mut Cursor::new(&msg_ser)).unwrap();
833 dest.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &new_msg);
836 for update_fulfill in update_fulfill_htlcs.iter() {
837 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fulfill_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
838 dest.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fulfill);
840 for update_fail in update_fail_htlcs.iter() {
841 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
842 dest.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail);
844 for update_fail_malformed in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.iter() {
845 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fail_malformed_htlc to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
846 dest.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), update_fail_malformed);
848 if let Some(msg) = update_fee {
849 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering update_fee to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
850 dest.handle_update_fee(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &msg);
852 let processed_change = !update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() ||
853 !update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() || !update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty();
854 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages && processed_change {
855 // If we only want to process some messages, don't deliver the CS until later.
856 extra_ev = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates: CommitmentUpdate {
857 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
858 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
859 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
860 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
866 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering commitment_signed to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
867 dest.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
872 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
873 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
874 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
875 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering revoke_and_ack to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
876 dest.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
880 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
881 for (idx, dest) in nodes.iter().enumerate() {
882 if dest.get_our_node_id() == *node_id {
883 out.locked_write(format!("Delivering channel_reestablish to node {}.\n", idx).as_bytes());
884 dest.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[$node].get_our_node_id(), msg);
888 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {
889 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
891 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {
892 // Can be generated as a reestablish response
894 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
895 // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
896 // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
897 // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
898 // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
899 // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
900 // force-close which we should detect as an error).
901 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
903 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
906 panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event)
909 if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
914 push_excess_b_events!(extra_ev.into_iter().chain(events_iter), None);
915 } else if $node == 0 {
916 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { ab_events.push(ev); }
917 for event in events_iter { ab_events.push(event); }
919 if let Some(ev) = extra_ev { cb_events.push(ev); }
920 for event in events_iter { cb_events.push(event); }
926 macro_rules! drain_msg_events_on_disconnect {
927 ($counterparty_id: expr) => { {
928 if $counterparty_id == 0 {
929 for event in nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
931 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
932 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
933 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
934 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
935 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
936 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
937 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
939 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
942 panic!("Unhandled message event")
946 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
950 for event in nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
952 events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
953 events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => {},
954 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => {},
955 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => {},
956 events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
957 events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
958 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
960 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
963 panic!("Unhandled message event")
967 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
974 macro_rules! process_events {
975 ($node: expr, $fail: expr) => { {
976 // In case we get 256 payments we may have a hash collision, resulting in the
977 // second claim/fail call not finding the duplicate-hash HTLC, so we have to
978 // deduplicate the calls here.
979 let mut claim_set = HashSet::new();
980 let mut events = nodes[$node].get_and_clear_pending_events();
981 // Sort events so that PendingHTLCsForwardable get processed last. This avoids a
982 // case where we first process a PendingHTLCsForwardable, then claim/fail on a
983 // PaymentClaimable, claiming/failing two HTLCs, but leaving a just-generated
984 // PaymentClaimable event for the second HTLC in our pending_events (and breaking
985 // our claim_set deduplication).
986 events.sort_by(|a, b| {
987 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = a {
988 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = b {
990 } else { Ordering::Equal }
991 } else if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = a {
992 if let events::Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } = b {
994 } else { Ordering::Equal }
995 } else { Ordering::Equal }
997 let had_events = !events.is_empty();
998 for event in events.drain(..) {
1000 events::Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
1001 if claim_set.insert(payment_hash.0) {
1003 nodes[$node].fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
1005 nodes[$node].claim_funds(PaymentPreimage(payment_hash.0));
1009 events::Event::PaymentSent { .. } => {},
1010 events::Event::PaymentClaimed { .. } => {},
1011 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
1012 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } => {},
1013 events::Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {},
1014 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful { .. } | events::Event::ProbeFailed { .. } => {
1015 // Even though we don't explicitly send probes, because probes are
1016 // detected based on hashing the payment hash+preimage, its rather
1017 // trivial for the fuzzer to build payments that accidentally end up
1018 // looking like probes.
1020 events::Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } if $node == 1 => {},
1021 events::Event::ChannelReady { .. } => {},
1022 events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {
1023 nodes[$node].process_pending_htlc_forwards();
1025 events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => {},
1026 _ => if out.may_fail.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire) {
1029 panic!("Unhandled event")
1037 let v = get_slice!(1)[0];
1038 out.locked_write(format!("READ A BYTE! HANDLING INPUT {:x}...........\n", v).as_bytes());
1040 // In general, we keep related message groups close together in binary form, allowing
1041 // bit-twiddling mutations to have similar effects. This is probably overkill, but no
1042 // harm in doing so.
1044 0x00 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1045 0x01 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1046 0x02 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress,
1047 0x04 => *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1048 0x05 => *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1049 0x06 => *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
1052 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1053 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1054 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1058 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1059 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1060 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1064 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1065 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1066 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1070 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1071 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1072 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1077 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1078 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1079 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1080 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1081 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(0);
1085 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1086 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1087 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1088 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1089 drain_msg_events_on_disconnect!(2);
1093 if chan_a_disconnected {
1094 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1095 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1097 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1098 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1100 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1104 if chan_b_disconnected {
1105 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1106 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1108 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1109 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1111 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1115 0x10 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1116 0x11 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1117 0x12 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1118 0x13 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1119 0x14 => { process_msg_events!(0, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1120 0x15 => { process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1122 0x16 => { process_events!(0, true); },
1123 0x17 => { process_events!(0, false); },
1125 0x18 => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1126 0x19 => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1127 0x1a => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1128 0x1b => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1129 0x1c => { process_msg_events!(1, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1130 0x1d => { process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1132 0x1e => { process_events!(1, true); },
1133 0x1f => { process_events!(1, false); },
1135 0x20 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1136 0x21 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages); },
1137 0x22 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1138 0x23 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OneMessage); },
1139 0x24 => { process_msg_events!(2, true, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1140 0x25 => { process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::OnePendingMessage); },
1142 0x26 => { process_events!(2, true); },
1143 0x27 => { process_events!(2, false); },
1146 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1147 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id());
1148 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1149 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(0));
1153 let (new_node_a, new_monitor_a) = reload_node!(node_a_ser, 0, monitor_a, keys_manager_a, fee_est_a);
1154 nodes[0] = new_node_a;
1155 monitor_a = new_monitor_a;
1158 if !chan_a_disconnected {
1159 nodes[0].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1160 chan_a_disconnected = true;
1161 nodes[0].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1165 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1166 nodes[2].peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id());
1167 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1168 nodes[2].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1172 let (new_node_b, new_monitor_b) = reload_node!(node_b_ser, 1, monitor_b, keys_manager_b, fee_est_b);
1173 nodes[1] = new_node_b;
1174 monitor_b = new_monitor_b;
1177 if !chan_b_disconnected {
1178 nodes[1].peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id());
1179 chan_b_disconnected = true;
1180 push_excess_b_events!(nodes[1].get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().drain(..), Some(2));
1184 let (new_node_c, new_monitor_c) = reload_node!(node_c_ser, 2, monitor_c, keys_manager_c, fee_est_c);
1185 nodes[2] = new_node_c;
1186 monitor_c = new_monitor_c;
1189 // 1/10th the channel size:
1190 0x30 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1191 0x31 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1192 0x32 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1193 0x33 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1194 0x34 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1195 0x35 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1197 0x38 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1198 0x39 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1199 0x3a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1200 0x3b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1201 0x3c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1202 0x3d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1204 0x40 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1205 0x41 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1206 0x42 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1207 0x43 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1208 0x44 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1209 0x45 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1211 0x48 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1212 0x49 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1213 0x4a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1214 0x4b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1215 0x4c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1216 0x4d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1218 0x50 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1219 0x51 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1220 0x52 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1221 0x53 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1222 0x54 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1223 0x55 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1225 0x58 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1226 0x59 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1227 0x5a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1228 0x5b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1229 0x5c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1230 0x5d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 100, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1232 0x60 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1233 0x61 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1234 0x62 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1235 0x63 => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1236 0x64 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1237 0x65 => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 10, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1239 0x68 => { send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1240 0x69 => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1241 0x6a => { send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1242 0x6b => { send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1243 0x6c => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, &nodes[2], chan_b, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1244 0x6d => { send_hop_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, &nodes[0], chan_a, 1, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx); },
1247 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_a;
1249 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1251 if fee_est_a.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1252 fee_est_a.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1254 nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1256 0x81 => { fee_est_a.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[0].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1259 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_b;
1261 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1263 if fee_est_b.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1264 fee_est_b.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1266 nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1268 0x85 => { fee_est_b.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[1].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1271 let mut max_feerate = last_htlc_clear_fee_c;
1273 max_feerate *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE as u32;
1275 if fee_est_c.ret_val.fetch_add(250, atomic::Ordering::AcqRel) + 250 > max_feerate {
1276 fee_est_c.ret_val.store(max_feerate, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1278 nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees();
1280 0x89 => { fee_est_c.ret_val.store(253, atomic::Ordering::Release); nodes[2].maybe_update_chan_fees(); },
1283 // Test that no channel is in a stuck state where neither party can send funds even
1284 // after we resolve all pending events.
1285 // First make sure there are no pending monitor updates, resetting the error state
1286 // and calling force_channel_monitor_updated for each monitor.
1287 *monitor_a.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1288 *monitor_b.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1289 *monitor_c.persister.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed;
1291 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_a.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1292 monitor_a.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1293 nodes[0].process_monitor_events();
1295 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1_funding) {
1296 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_1_funding, *id);
1297 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1299 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_b.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1300 monitor_b.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1301 nodes[1].process_monitor_events();
1303 if let Some((id, _)) = monitor_c.latest_monitors.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_2_funding) {
1304 monitor_c.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(chan_2_funding, *id);
1305 nodes[2].process_monitor_events();
1308 // Next, make sure peers are all connected to each other
1309 if chan_a_disconnected {
1310 nodes[0].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1311 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1313 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[0].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1314 features: nodes[0].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1316 chan_a_disconnected = false;
1318 if chan_b_disconnected {
1319 nodes[1].peer_connected(&nodes[2].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1320 features: nodes[2].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1322 nodes[2].peer_connected(&nodes[1].get_our_node_id(), &Init {
1323 features: nodes[1].init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
1325 chan_b_disconnected = false;
1328 for i in 0..std::usize::MAX {
1329 if i == 100 { panic!("It may take may iterations to settle the state, but it should not take forever"); }
1330 // Then, make sure any current forwards make their way to their destination
1331 if process_msg_events!(0, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1332 if process_msg_events!(1, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1333 if process_msg_events!(2, false, ProcessMessages::AllMessages) { continue; }
1334 // ...making sure any pending PendingHTLCsForwardable events are handled and
1335 // payments claimed.
1336 if process_events!(0, false) { continue; }
1337 if process_events!(1, false) { continue; }
1338 if process_events!(2, false) { continue; }
1342 // Finally, make sure that at least one end of each channel can make a substantial payment
1344 send_payment(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1345 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], chan_a, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1347 send_payment(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx) ||
1348 send_payment(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], chan_b, 10_000_000, &mut payment_id, &mut payment_idx));
1350 last_htlc_clear_fee_a = fee_est_a.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1351 last_htlc_clear_fee_b = fee_est_b.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1352 last_htlc_clear_fee_c = fee_est_c.ret_val.load(atomic::Ordering::Acquire);
1354 _ => test_return!(),
1357 if nodes[0].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1358 node_a_ser.0.clear();
1359 nodes[0].write(&mut node_a_ser).unwrap();
1361 if nodes[1].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1362 node_b_ser.0.clear();
1363 nodes[1].write(&mut node_b_ser).unwrap();
1365 if nodes[2].get_and_clear_needs_persistence() == true {
1366 node_c_ser.0.clear();
1367 nodes[2].write(&mut node_c_ser).unwrap();
1372 /// We actually have different behavior based on if a certain log string has been seen, so we have
1373 /// to do a bit more tracking.
1375 struct SearchingOutput<O: Output> {
1377 may_fail: Arc<atomic::AtomicBool>,
1379 impl<O: Output> Output for SearchingOutput<O> {
1380 fn locked_write(&self, data: &[u8]) {
1381 // We hit a design limitation of LN state machine (see CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER)
1382 if std::str::from_utf8(data).unwrap().contains("Outbound update_fee HTLC buffer overflow - counterparty should force-close this channel") {
1383 self.may_fail.store(true, atomic::Ordering::Release);
1385 self.output.locked_write(data)
1388 impl<O: Output> SearchingOutput<O> {
1389 pub fn new(output: O) -> Self {
1390 Self { output, may_fail: Arc::new(atomic::AtomicBool::new(false)) }
1394 pub fn chanmon_consistency_test<Out: Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
1395 do_test(data, out.clone(), false);
1396 do_test(data, out, true);
1400 pub extern "C" fn chanmon_consistency_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
1401 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, false);
1402 do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, test_logger::DevNull{}, true);