1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
37 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
38 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
40 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
41 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
43 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use crate::sign::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler};
48 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use crate::chain::Filter;
50 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
51 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
52 use crate::util::byte_utils;
53 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
54 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{ChannelDerivationParameters, AnchorDescriptor, HTLCDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
56 use crate::prelude::*;
58 use crate::io::{self, Error};
59 use core::convert::TryInto;
61 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
63 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
64 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
66 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
67 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
68 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
69 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
70 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
75 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
76 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
78 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
79 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
80 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
82 /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
83 /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
84 /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
85 /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
86 /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
88 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
92 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
94 /// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
95 /// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
96 /// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
97 /// commitment transaction.
99 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
100 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
102 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
104 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 self.update_id.write(w)?;
106 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
107 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
108 update_step.write(w)?;
110 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
114 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
115 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
116 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
117 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
118 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
119 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
121 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
125 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
126 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
130 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
131 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
132 pub enum MonitorEvent {
133 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
134 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
136 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
137 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
139 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
140 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
142 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
144 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
145 funding_txo: OutPoint,
146 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
147 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
149 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
150 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
151 monitor_update_id: u64,
154 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
155 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
157 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
158 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
160 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
161 // Note that Completed and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
162 // generated only in ChainMonitor
164 (0, funding_txo, required),
165 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
169 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
173 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
174 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
175 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
176 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
178 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
179 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
180 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
181 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
183 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
184 (0, payment_hash, required),
185 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
186 (2, source, required),
187 (4, payment_preimage, option),
190 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
191 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
192 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
193 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
194 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
195 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
196 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
197 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
198 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
199 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
200 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
201 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
202 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
203 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
204 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
205 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
206 /// accurate block height.
207 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
208 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
209 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
210 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
211 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
212 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
215 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
216 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
217 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
218 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
219 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
220 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
221 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
222 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
223 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
224 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
226 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
227 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
228 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
230 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
231 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
233 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
234 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
236 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
237 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
238 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
239 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
241 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
242 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
243 struct HolderSignedTx {
244 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
246 revocation_key: PublicKey,
247 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
248 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
249 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
250 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
251 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
252 to_self_value_sat: u64,
255 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
257 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
258 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
259 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
260 (2, revocation_key, required),
261 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
262 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
263 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
264 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
265 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
266 (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
269 impl HolderSignedTx {
270 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
271 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
272 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
282 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
283 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
284 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
285 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
286 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
287 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
288 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
291 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
292 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
293 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
294 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
295 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
296 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
297 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
302 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
303 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
304 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
305 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
306 // used. Read it for compatibility.
307 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
308 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
309 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
310 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
311 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
312 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
316 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
317 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
318 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
319 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
320 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
321 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
322 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
324 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
325 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
326 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
327 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
330 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
334 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
335 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
337 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
338 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
339 struct OnchainEventEntry {
342 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
344 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
347 impl OnchainEventEntry {
348 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
349 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
351 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
352 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
354 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
355 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
356 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
358 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
359 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
360 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
361 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
362 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
369 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
370 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
374 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
376 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
377 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
379 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
380 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
381 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
383 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
384 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
385 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
386 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
387 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
388 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
391 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
392 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
393 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
394 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
395 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
397 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
398 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
400 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
402 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
404 FundingSpendConfirmation {
405 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
406 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
407 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
408 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
409 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
411 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
412 /// counterparty output.
413 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
415 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
416 /// is constructed. This is used when
417 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
418 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
419 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
420 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
421 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
423 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
424 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
426 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
427 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
428 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
429 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
430 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
431 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
432 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
433 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
437 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
438 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
439 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
440 (0, self.txid, required),
441 (1, self.transaction, option),
442 (2, self.height, required),
443 (3, self.block_hash, option),
444 (4, self.event, required),
450 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
451 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
452 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
453 let mut transaction = None;
454 let mut block_hash = None;
456 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
457 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
459 (1, transaction, option),
460 (2, height, required),
461 (3, block_hash, option),
462 (4, event, upgradable_required),
464 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
470 (0, source, required),
471 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
472 (2, payment_hash, required),
473 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
475 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
476 (0, descriptor, required),
478 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
479 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
480 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
482 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
483 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
484 (2, preimage, option),
485 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
490 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
491 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
492 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
493 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
494 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
495 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
496 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
497 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
498 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
499 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
501 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
502 commitment_txid: Txid,
503 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
504 commitment_number: u64,
505 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
506 feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
507 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
508 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
511 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
517 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
518 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
520 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
521 /// think we've fallen behind!
522 should_broadcast: bool,
525 scriptpubkey: Script,
529 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
530 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
532 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
533 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
534 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
535 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
536 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
537 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
542 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
543 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
544 (0, commitment_tx, required),
545 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
546 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
547 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
549 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
550 (0, commitment_txid, required),
551 (1, feerate_per_kw, option),
552 (2, commitment_number, required),
553 (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
554 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
555 (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
556 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
558 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
559 (0, payment_preimage, required),
561 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
563 (2, secret, required),
565 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
566 (0, should_broadcast, required),
568 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
569 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
573 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
575 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
577 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
578 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
580 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
581 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
582 /// force-closed now.
583 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
584 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
585 /// required to do so.
586 amount_satoshis: u64,
588 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
589 /// we consider it spendable.
590 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
591 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
592 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
593 amount_satoshis: u64,
594 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
596 confirmation_height: u32,
598 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
599 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
600 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
602 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
603 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
604 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
605 ContentiousClaimable {
606 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
607 /// required to do so.
608 amount_satoshis: u64,
609 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
612 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
613 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
614 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
615 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
617 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
618 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
619 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
620 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
621 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
622 /// which will be required to do so.
623 amount_satoshis: u64,
624 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
626 claimable_height: u32,
627 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
628 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
630 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
631 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
632 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
633 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
634 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
635 /// which will be required to do so.
636 amount_satoshis: u64,
637 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
638 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
640 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
641 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
643 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
646 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
647 /// following amount.
648 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
649 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
651 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
652 /// were already spent.
653 amount_satoshis: u64,
658 /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
659 /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
660 /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
661 /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
663 /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
664 pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
666 Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
667 Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
668 Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
669 Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
671 Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
672 Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
678 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
679 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
680 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
681 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
682 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
683 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
685 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
686 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
687 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
688 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
691 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
692 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
693 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
694 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
695 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
696 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
697 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
698 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
699 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
700 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
701 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
702 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
708 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
709 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
710 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
711 let mut resolving_txid = None;
712 let mut payment_preimage = None;
713 let mut resolving_tx = None;
714 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
715 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
716 (1, resolving_txid, option),
717 (2, payment_preimage, option),
718 (3, resolving_tx, option),
721 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
729 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
730 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
732 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
733 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
735 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
736 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
737 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
738 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
739 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
740 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
742 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
744 pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
747 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
748 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
749 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
750 ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
754 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
755 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
756 latest_update_id: u64,
757 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
759 destination_script: Script,
760 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
761 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
762 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
764 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
765 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
766 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
767 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
768 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
770 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
771 funding_redeemscript: Script,
772 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
773 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
774 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
776 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
778 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
779 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
780 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
781 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
782 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
783 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
784 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
785 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
786 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
787 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
788 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
789 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
790 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
791 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
792 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
793 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
795 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
797 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
798 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
799 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
800 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
801 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
802 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
804 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
806 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
807 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
809 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
811 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
812 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
813 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
815 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
817 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
818 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
819 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
820 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
821 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
822 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
823 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
824 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
825 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
826 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
828 pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
829 pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
831 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
832 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
833 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
834 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
836 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
837 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
838 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
839 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
840 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
843 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
845 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
847 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
848 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
849 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
850 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
852 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
853 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
854 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
856 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
857 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
858 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
859 holder_tx_signed: bool,
861 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
862 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
863 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
864 funding_spend_seen: bool,
866 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
867 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
868 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
870 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
871 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
872 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
873 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
874 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
876 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
877 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
878 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
879 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
880 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
881 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
883 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
884 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
885 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
886 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
887 // the full block_connected).
888 best_block: BestBlock,
890 /// The node_id of our counterparty
891 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
893 /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
894 /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
895 /// monitors created after 0.0.117.
897 /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
898 /// to_countersignatory_sats)
899 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,
902 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
903 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
905 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
906 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
907 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
908 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
910 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
911 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
912 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
917 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
918 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
919 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
923 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
924 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
925 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
927 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
928 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
929 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
931 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
933 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
934 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
936 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
937 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
938 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
939 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
940 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
941 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
943 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
946 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
947 match &self.shutdown_script {
948 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
949 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
952 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
953 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
954 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
955 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
956 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
957 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
958 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
960 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
961 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
962 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
964 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
965 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
966 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
967 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
968 match second_option {
969 Some(second_pubkey) => {
970 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
973 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
978 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
982 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
984 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
986 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
987 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
988 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
989 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
990 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
991 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
992 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
996 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
997 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
998 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
999 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1000 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1001 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
1002 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
1003 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
1004 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1005 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1009 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1010 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1011 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1012 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1015 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1016 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1017 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1018 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1021 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1022 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1023 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1025 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1028 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1030 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1031 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1033 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1034 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1035 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1038 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1039 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1040 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
1042 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1043 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1045 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1049 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1050 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1054 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1055 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1056 event.write(writer)?;
1059 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1060 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
1062 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1063 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1064 entry.write(writer)?;
1067 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1068 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1069 txid.write(writer)?;
1070 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1071 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1073 script.write(writer)?;
1076 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1078 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1079 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1081 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1082 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1083 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1084 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1085 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1086 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1087 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1088 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1089 (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1090 (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
1097 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1098 ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1100 let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1101 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1102 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1103 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1106 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1108 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1109 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1111 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1113 for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1114 $event_to_handle = event;
1118 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1119 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1120 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1121 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1122 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1123 // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1131 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1133 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1134 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1135 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1136 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1137 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1138 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1141 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
1142 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1143 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1144 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1145 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1146 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1147 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1149 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1150 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
1151 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1153 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1154 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1155 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1156 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1158 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1159 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1161 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1162 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1163 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1164 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1166 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1167 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1169 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1170 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1171 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1172 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1173 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1174 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1175 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1176 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1178 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1181 let onchain_tx_handler =
1182 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1183 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
1185 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1186 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1188 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1189 latest_update_id: 0,
1190 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1192 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1193 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1194 counterparty_payment_script,
1198 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1200 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1201 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1203 counterparty_commitment_params,
1204 funding_redeemscript,
1205 channel_value_satoshis,
1206 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1208 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1210 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1211 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1212 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1213 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1214 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1216 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1217 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1218 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1219 current_holder_commitment_number,
1221 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1222 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1223 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1224 is_processing_pending_events: false,
1226 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1231 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1232 holder_tx_signed: false,
1233 funding_spend_seen: false,
1234 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1235 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1236 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1237 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1240 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1241 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
1246 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1247 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1250 /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
1251 /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
1252 /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
1255 /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
1256 /// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
1257 pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1258 &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1259 commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
1260 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
1262 where L::Target: Logger
1264 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
1265 htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
1266 to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, logger);
1269 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1270 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1271 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1272 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1274 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1277 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1278 commitment_number: u64,
1279 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1281 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1282 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1283 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1287 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1288 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1289 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1290 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1291 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1294 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1295 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1296 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1298 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1299 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1301 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1304 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1305 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1308 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1309 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1312 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1315 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1316 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1318 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1324 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1325 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1328 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1331 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1333 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1334 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1337 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1338 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1339 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1342 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1343 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1344 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1345 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1346 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1349 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1350 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1351 /// have been registered.
1352 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1353 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1354 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1355 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1356 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1357 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1358 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1360 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1361 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1367 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1368 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1369 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1370 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1373 /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1375 /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1376 /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1377 /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1378 /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1379 /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1381 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1382 /// order to handle these events.
1384 /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1385 /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1386 pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1388 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1391 /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1393 /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1394 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1398 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1402 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1403 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1404 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1405 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1406 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1410 /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
1411 /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
1412 /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
1413 /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
1415 /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
1416 /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
1418 /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
1419 /// to LDK 0.0.117+.
1421 /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
1422 pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
1423 self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
1426 /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
1427 /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
1428 /// commitment transactions are unsigned.
1430 /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
1431 /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
1432 /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
1433 /// with a monitor and an update.
1435 /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
1436 /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
1437 /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
1438 /// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
1440 /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
1441 /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
1442 /// may have been created prior to upgrading.
1444 /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
1445 pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
1446 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
1449 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1450 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1453 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1454 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1457 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1458 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1461 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1463 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1465 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1466 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1469 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1470 /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1472 /// You may also use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1473 /// a monitor update failed with [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`] or because we've
1474 /// fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our counterparty side knows a revocation
1475 /// secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1477 /// Broadcasting these transactions in the second case is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1478 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1479 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1480 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1481 /// to you. In any-case, the choice is up to you.
1483 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure
1484 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1485 where L::Target: Logger {
1486 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1489 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1490 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1491 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1492 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1493 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1494 where L::Target: Logger {
1495 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1498 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1499 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1500 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1501 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1502 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1503 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1505 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1506 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1508 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1509 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1511 header: &BlockHeader,
1512 txdata: &TransactionData,
1517 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1519 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1520 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1523 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1524 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1527 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1529 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1531 header: &BlockHeader,
1537 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1538 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1541 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1542 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1545 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1546 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1548 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1549 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1551 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1552 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1554 header: &BlockHeader,
1555 txdata: &TransactionData,
1560 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1562 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1563 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1566 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1567 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1568 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1571 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1573 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1574 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1576 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1577 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1584 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1585 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1588 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1589 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1590 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
1593 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1594 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1596 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1597 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1599 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1600 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1602 header: &BlockHeader,
1607 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1609 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1610 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1613 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1614 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1615 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
1618 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1619 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1620 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1621 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1623 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.block_hash))
1624 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1626 txids.sort_unstable();
1631 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1632 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1633 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1634 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1637 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1638 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1639 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1640 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1641 /// connections, like on mobile.
1642 pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1643 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L,
1646 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1647 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1650 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1651 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1652 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1653 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1654 current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1659 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1660 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1661 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1662 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1663 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1664 -> Option<Balance> {
1665 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1666 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1668 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1669 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1670 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1671 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1672 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1673 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1675 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1676 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1677 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1678 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1679 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1680 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1681 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1682 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1683 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1685 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1686 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1687 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1688 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1689 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1690 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1691 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1692 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1694 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1695 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1696 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1697 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1698 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1703 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1704 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1705 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1706 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1707 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1708 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1711 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1713 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1714 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1715 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1716 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1717 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1718 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1719 // in the commitment.
1720 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1721 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1722 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1723 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1724 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1725 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1727 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1728 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1731 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1733 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1735 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1736 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1737 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1738 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1739 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1741 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1742 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1743 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1744 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1745 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1746 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1747 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1748 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1749 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1750 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1751 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1753 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1754 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1755 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1757 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1758 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1760 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1765 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1766 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1767 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1768 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1769 // need to do so again here.
1771 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1772 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1773 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1774 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1775 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1776 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1779 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1780 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1781 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1782 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1783 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1784 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1785 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1786 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1789 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1790 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1791 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1792 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1795 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1796 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1797 // we know the preimage.
1798 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1799 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1800 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1801 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1802 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1803 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1804 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1805 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1808 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1809 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1810 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1811 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1812 payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
1815 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1816 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1817 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1818 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1819 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1826 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1827 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1828 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1831 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1832 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1833 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1834 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1836 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
1837 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, balances may not be fully captured if our counterparty broadcasted
1838 /// a revoked state.
1840 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1841 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1842 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1843 let mut res = Vec::new();
1844 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1846 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1847 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
1848 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1849 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1850 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
1853 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
1854 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1857 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1858 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1859 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1860 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1861 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1864 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1865 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1866 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1867 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1869 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
1877 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1878 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1879 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
1880 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
1881 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1882 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1883 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1884 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1886 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1889 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1890 amount_satoshis: value,
1891 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1894 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1895 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1896 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1899 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1900 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1902 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1903 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
1904 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
1905 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
1906 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
1907 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
1908 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1909 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1910 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
1912 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1913 amount_satoshis: output.value,
1914 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
1916 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
1917 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
1918 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
1919 ).unwrap_or(false) {
1920 spent_counterparty_output = true;
1926 if spent_counterparty_output {
1927 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
1928 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
1929 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
1930 if output_spendable {
1931 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1932 amount_satoshis: amt,
1936 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
1937 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
1940 found_commitment_tx = true;
1941 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1942 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1943 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1944 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1945 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1946 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1949 found_commitment_tx = true;
1950 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1951 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1952 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1953 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1954 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1955 amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1956 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1959 found_commitment_tx = true;
1962 if !found_commitment_tx {
1963 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1964 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1965 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1966 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1967 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1968 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1969 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1974 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1975 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1976 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1978 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1979 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1980 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1981 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1983 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1984 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1986 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
1987 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
1988 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1989 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1990 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1991 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1995 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1996 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
2003 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
2004 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
2005 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
2007 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
2008 /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
2009 /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
2010 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2011 let mut res = HashMap::new();
2012 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
2013 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
2014 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2015 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
2017 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2018 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2019 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2020 res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
2021 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
2027 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2028 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2030 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2031 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2036 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
2037 /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
2039 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
2041 /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
2042 /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
2043 pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2044 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2045 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
2046 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
2047 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
2048 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2049 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2050 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
2056 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
2057 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
2058 // closed), just get the full set.
2060 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
2063 let mut res = HashMap::new();
2064 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2065 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2066 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
2067 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
2068 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
2069 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
2071 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
2072 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
2073 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
2074 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2075 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2076 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2077 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2078 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2079 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2080 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2081 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2082 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2083 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2084 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2085 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2086 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2088 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2091 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2092 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2093 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2094 res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2101 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2102 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2103 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2104 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2105 Some((a, &**source))
2108 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2109 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2110 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2112 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2113 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2114 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2115 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2123 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2124 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2128 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2129 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2130 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2132 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2133 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2134 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2135 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2136 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2137 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2139 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2140 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2141 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2142 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2143 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2144 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2145 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2146 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2148 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2149 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
2150 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2151 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2152 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2153 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2154 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2155 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2156 // payment_preimage.
2157 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2158 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2159 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2160 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2162 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2164 let mut matched_htlc = false;
2165 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2166 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2167 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2168 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2169 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2170 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2171 matched_htlc = true;
2175 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2176 if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2179 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2180 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2182 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2183 *update_source != **source
2188 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2189 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2190 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2191 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2192 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2193 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2194 source: (**source).clone(),
2195 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2196 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2197 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2200 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2201 &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2202 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2203 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2209 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2210 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2212 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2213 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2218 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2219 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2220 // in-line tests later.
2223 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2224 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2225 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2226 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2227 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2228 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2229 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2234 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2235 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2238 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2239 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2240 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2241 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2242 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2243 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2244 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2247 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2248 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2249 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2250 if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2251 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2252 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2253 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2254 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2255 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2256 .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2258 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2262 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2266 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2270 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2271 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2272 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2273 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2274 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2276 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2277 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2278 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2282 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2283 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2284 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2289 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2296 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2305 pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2306 &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2307 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2308 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &L
2310 where L::Target: Logger
2312 self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
2313 feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));
2315 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2316 let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
2317 debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
2320 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
2321 their_per_commitment_point, logger);
2324 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2325 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2326 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2327 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2329 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2330 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2333 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2334 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2335 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2336 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2337 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2338 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2339 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2340 Some(old_points) => {
2341 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2342 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2343 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2344 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2345 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2347 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2350 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2354 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2357 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2358 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2359 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2365 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2366 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2367 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2368 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2369 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2370 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2371 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2372 // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2373 // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2374 // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2375 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2376 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2377 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2379 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2380 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2381 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2383 debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2385 // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2386 // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2387 // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2388 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2390 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2391 assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2392 prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2395 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2396 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2397 debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2399 let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2401 for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2402 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2405 let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2406 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2407 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2409 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2411 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2414 debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2417 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2418 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2419 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2420 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2421 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2423 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2424 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2425 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2426 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2427 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2429 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2430 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2432 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2433 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2434 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2435 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2436 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2437 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2438 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2439 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2440 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2441 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2445 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2447 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2448 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2453 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2454 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2455 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2456 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2457 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
2458 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2459 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2462 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2464 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2465 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2466 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2467 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2468 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2469 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2472 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2473 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2474 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2478 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2479 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2480 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2485 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2486 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2487 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2488 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2489 // holder commitment transactions.
2490 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2491 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2492 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2494 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2495 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2496 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2497 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
2498 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2503 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
2504 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2507 let commit_txs = self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2508 let mut txs = vec![];
2509 for tx in commit_txs.iter() {
2510 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
2513 broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&txs);
2514 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2517 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
2518 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2519 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2522 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2523 log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2524 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2525 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2526 log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2527 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2529 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2530 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2532 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2533 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2534 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2535 // sentinel value instead.
2537 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2538 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2540 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2541 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2542 match updates.updates[0] {
2543 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2544 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2545 // provide a preimage at this point.
2546 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2547 debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2549 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2550 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2553 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2554 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2556 let mut ret = Ok(());
2557 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&*fee_estimator);
2558 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2560 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2561 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2562 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2563 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2564 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2565 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2569 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2570 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2571 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2573 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2574 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2575 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2577 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2578 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2579 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2580 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2581 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2585 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2586 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2587 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2588 if *should_broadcast {
2589 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2590 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2591 // duplicate/conflicting.
2592 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2593 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2594 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2597 if detected_funding_spend {
2598 log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2601 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
2602 // If the channel supports anchor outputs, we'll need to emit an external
2603 // event to be consumed such that a child transaction is broadcast with a
2604 // high enough feerate for the parent commitment transaction to confirm.
2605 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2606 let funding_output = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2607 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2608 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone(),
2610 let best_block_height = self.best_block.height();
2611 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2612 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2613 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_output),
2614 best_block_height, best_block_height
2616 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2617 vec![commitment_package], best_block_height, best_block_height,
2618 broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger,
2621 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2622 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2623 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()));
2624 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn and take manual action!");
2626 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
2627 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2628 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2629 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2632 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2633 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2634 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2635 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2641 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2642 self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
2645 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
2646 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
2647 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
2651 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2653 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
2654 // force closed monitor update yet.
2655 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2656 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2661 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2662 self.latest_update_id
2665 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
2669 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
2670 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2671 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2672 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2673 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2674 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2676 &self.outputs_to_watch
2679 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2680 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2681 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2685 /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
2686 /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
2687 /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
2688 pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2689 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
2690 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
2691 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
2693 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2694 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2696 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2697 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2698 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2699 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2700 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2701 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2703 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2705 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2706 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2707 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2708 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2709 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2710 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2712 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2713 txid: commitment_txid,
2714 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2720 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
2721 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
2723 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
2725 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
2726 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2727 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2728 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2729 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2731 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
2732 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
2733 per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
2734 htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
2737 preimage: htlc.preimage,
2738 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
2741 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
2743 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2753 pub(crate) fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
2754 let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
2755 to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
2756 let htlc_outputs = vec![];
2758 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2759 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
2760 feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
2764 fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2765 &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
2766 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2767 mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
2768 ) -> CommitmentTransaction {
2769 let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
2770 .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
2771 let countersignatory_keys =
2772 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;
2774 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
2775 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
2776 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
2777 &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
2778 let channel_parameters =
2779 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();
2781 CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2782 to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
2783 countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
2787 pub(crate) fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
2788 update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
2790 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
2791 ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
2792 feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
2793 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
2794 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {
2796 let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
2797 htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
2798 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2800 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
2801 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
2802 to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);
2804 debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);
2813 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2814 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2815 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2818 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2819 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2822 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2823 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2826 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2827 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2830 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2831 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2832 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2833 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2835 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
2836 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
2838 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
2839 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
2840 where L::Target: Logger {
2841 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2842 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2843 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2844 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2845 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
2847 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2848 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2850 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2851 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2854 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2859 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.0 as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2860 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2861 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2862 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2863 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2864 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
2865 let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
2867 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2868 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2870 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2871 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2872 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2873 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
2874 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
2875 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2876 to_counterparty_output_info =
2877 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2881 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2882 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2883 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2884 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2885 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2886 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2887 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2888 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
2889 to_counterparty_output_info);
2891 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2892 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
2893 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2898 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2899 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2900 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2901 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2902 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2903 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2905 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2907 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2908 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2909 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2910 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2913 debug_assert!(false, "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
2914 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
2915 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
2918 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2919 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2920 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2921 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2922 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2923 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2924 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2926 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2927 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2929 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2931 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2932 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
2933 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2934 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2937 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
2938 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2939 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
2940 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2941 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2945 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
2948 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
2949 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
2950 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
2951 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2952 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
2954 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2955 Some(outputs) => outputs,
2956 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2958 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2959 Some(points) => points,
2960 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
2963 let per_commitment_point =
2964 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2965 // per-commitment point
2966 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
2967 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2968 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2969 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2970 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2971 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2973 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
2974 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
2976 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2977 let revocation_pubkey = chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(
2978 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint);
2979 let delayed_key = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
2980 &per_commitment_point,
2981 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key);
2982 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
2983 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
2984 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
2985 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
2986 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2987 to_counterparty_output_info =
2988 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
2993 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2994 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2995 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2996 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2997 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2998 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
2999 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
3002 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
3003 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
3004 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
3005 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
3006 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3007 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3008 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3009 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3011 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
3012 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3013 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3014 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3015 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3017 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
3018 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
3023 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3026 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
3027 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
3028 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
3029 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
3030 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
3031 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
3033 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
3035 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3037 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
3038 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
3039 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
3040 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
3041 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
3042 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
3043 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
3044 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
3045 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
3047 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
3048 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
3049 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
3050 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
3051 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
3052 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
3053 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
3054 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3055 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
3056 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3059 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3060 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
3061 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
3063 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3064 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
3065 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
3067 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
3070 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
3073 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
3074 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
3075 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
3076 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
3077 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3079 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
3080 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
3082 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3083 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3084 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
3085 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
3086 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3090 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
3093 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3096 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
3097 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3101 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3102 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
3103 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
3104 htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
3106 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
3110 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
3113 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
3114 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
3115 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3116 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3117 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3118 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
3124 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
3125 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
3126 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
3127 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
3128 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
3129 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
3130 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
3131 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3133 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
3134 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
3135 claim_requests = $updates.0;
3136 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
3137 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
3141 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
3142 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
3144 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3145 is_holder_tx = true;
3146 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3147 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
3148 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
3149 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3150 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3151 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
3152 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
3153 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3154 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3155 is_holder_tx = true;
3156 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3157 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
3158 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
3159 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3160 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3161 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3167 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3173 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3174 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
3175 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3176 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3177 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3178 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3179 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only valid once the commitment
3180 // transaction confirms.
3181 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3182 return holder_transactions;
3184 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3185 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3186 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3187 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3188 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3191 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
3192 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
3193 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
3194 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
3195 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
3196 // confirmed in the next block.
3199 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3200 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3201 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3205 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
3206 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
3210 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3211 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3212 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3213 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3214 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3215 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3216 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3217 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3218 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3219 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3220 return holder_transactions;
3222 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3223 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3224 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3225 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3226 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3230 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3231 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3232 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3239 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3240 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3241 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3244 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3245 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3247 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3248 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3251 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3253 header: &BlockHeader,
3256 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3258 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3260 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3261 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3264 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3266 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3267 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3268 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
3269 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
3270 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3271 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3272 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3274 } else { Vec::new() }
3277 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3279 header: &BlockHeader,
3280 txdata: &TransactionData,
3283 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3285 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3287 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3291 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3292 for tx in &txn_matched {
3293 let mut output_val = 0;
3294 for out in tx.output.iter() {
3295 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3296 output_val += out.value;
3297 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3301 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3303 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3304 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3305 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3306 let txid = tx.txid();
3307 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3308 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3309 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3312 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3313 if ev.txid == txid {
3314 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3315 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3316 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3317 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3319 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3323 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3324 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3325 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3329 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3330 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3331 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3336 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3337 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3338 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3339 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3340 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3341 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3342 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3343 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3344 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3345 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), txid);
3346 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3347 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3348 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3349 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3350 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3351 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3352 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3353 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3355 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3356 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
3357 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3358 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
3359 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
3360 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3361 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3363 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3364 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3368 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3370 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3372 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3373 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3374 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3375 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3380 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3381 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3382 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3383 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3384 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3385 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3386 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3387 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3388 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3390 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3391 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3392 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3394 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3395 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3396 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3397 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3401 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3403 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3407 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3408 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3411 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
3414 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3415 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3416 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3417 /// complexity especially in
3418 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3420 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3421 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3422 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3425 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3426 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3427 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3428 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3430 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3432 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3434 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3435 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3438 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3439 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
3441 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3442 if should_broadcast {
3443 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone());
3444 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height());
3445 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
3446 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
3447 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3448 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
3449 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
3450 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
3451 // `transactions_confirmed`.
3452 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3453 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
3454 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
3455 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
3456 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
3457 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
3458 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
3459 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
3461 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3465 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3466 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3467 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3468 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3469 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3470 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3471 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3473 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3477 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3478 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3479 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3481 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3482 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3486 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3487 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3489 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3490 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3492 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3493 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3494 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3497 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3498 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3499 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3500 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3502 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3503 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3504 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3505 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3506 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3509 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3510 &payment_hash, entry.txid);
3511 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3513 payment_preimage: None,
3514 source: source.clone(),
3515 htlc_value_satoshis,
3517 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3518 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3519 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3520 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3521 payment_preimage: None,
3524 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3525 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3526 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3527 outputs: vec![descriptor],
3528 channel_id: Some(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()),
3530 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3532 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3533 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3534 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3535 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3536 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3537 payment_preimage: preimage,
3540 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3541 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3542 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3547 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3548 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3550 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3551 // updating the latter in the process.
3552 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3553 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3554 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3558 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3559 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3560 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3561 for tx in &txn_matched {
3562 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3563 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3564 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3565 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3573 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
3574 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3575 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3578 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3581 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3582 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3583 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3585 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3586 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3588 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3591 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3595 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3598 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3599 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3602 let mut removed_height = None;
3603 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3604 if entry.txid == *txid {
3605 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3610 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3611 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3612 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3613 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3618 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3620 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3623 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3624 /// transactions thereof.
3625 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3626 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
3627 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3628 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3629 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3630 if matches { break; }
3631 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3636 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3639 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3642 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3643 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3644 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3645 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3646 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3647 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3650 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3651 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3652 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3653 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3654 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3655 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3656 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3657 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3661 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3662 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3663 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3664 } else { panic!(); }
3675 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3676 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3677 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3678 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3679 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3680 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3686 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3687 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3688 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3689 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3690 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3691 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3692 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3693 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3694 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3695 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3696 let height = self.best_block.height();
3697 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3698 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3699 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3700 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3701 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3702 // time out the HTLC first.
3703 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
3704 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
3705 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
3706 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
3707 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
3708 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
3709 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
3710 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
3711 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
3712 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
3713 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
3714 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
3715 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3716 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3717 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
3718 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
3719 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
3720 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
3721 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
3722 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
3723 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
3724 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
3725 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
3726 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3733 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
3735 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3736 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3737 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3740 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
3741 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
3742 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
3749 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
3750 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
3751 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3752 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
3753 let mut payment_data = None;
3754 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
3755 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
3756 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
3757 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3758 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
3759 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
3760 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3761 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
3763 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3764 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
3765 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
3768 macro_rules! log_claim {
3769 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
3770 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
3771 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
3773 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3774 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3775 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3776 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
3777 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
3778 // matched by any HTLC spend:
3779 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
3780 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
3781 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
3782 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
3783 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
3784 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
3785 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
3786 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3787 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
3788 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
3790 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
3791 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
3792 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
3793 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
3798 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
3799 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
3800 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
3801 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
3802 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
3803 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
3804 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
3805 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
3814 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3815 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3816 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
3817 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
3818 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
3819 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
3820 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
3821 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
3822 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
3823 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
3824 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
3825 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
3826 } else if !$holder_tx {
3827 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3828 if payment_data.is_none() {
3829 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
3832 if payment_data.is_none() {
3833 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
3834 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
3835 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3836 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3837 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3838 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3839 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
3840 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
3841 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
3842 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
3843 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
3844 // accepted_preimage_claim).
3845 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
3846 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
3849 continue 'outer_loop;
3856 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
3857 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3858 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
3860 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3861 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
3862 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
3863 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
3866 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3867 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
3868 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
3871 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
3872 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
3873 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
3874 if accepted_preimage_claim {
3875 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3876 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
3877 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3880 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3881 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3882 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3883 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3884 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3885 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3888 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3890 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3892 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3895 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
3896 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
3897 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
3898 upd.source == source
3900 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3902 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3904 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3905 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
3906 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
3907 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3908 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
3911 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3913 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
3915 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3919 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
3920 if entry.height != height { return true; }
3922 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
3923 *htlc_source != source
3928 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3930 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
3932 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
3933 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3934 source, payment_hash,
3935 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
3936 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
3939 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
3940 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3946 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
3947 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3948 let mut spendable_output = None;
3949 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
3950 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
3951 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
3952 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
3953 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
3954 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
3955 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
3956 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
3957 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
3958 // non-standard due to their size.
3959 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
3960 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
3961 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
3964 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
3965 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3966 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3967 output: outp.clone(),
3971 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3972 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3973 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3974 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3975 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3976 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3977 output: outp.clone(),
3978 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3979 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3980 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3985 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3986 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3987 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3988 output: outp.clone(),
3989 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3990 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3994 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3995 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3996 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3997 output: outp.clone(),
4002 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
4003 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4005 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4007 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4008 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
4010 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
4011 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4016 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
4018 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4019 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4022 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4023 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
4026 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4027 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
4031 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
4033 M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4034 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4035 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4038 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4039 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
4042 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4043 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
4046 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4047 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
4050 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
4051 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
4055 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4057 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
4058 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::Signer>) {
4059 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4060 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
4064 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4069 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
4071 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4073 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4074 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4076 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4077 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4079 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
4080 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4081 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4082 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
4085 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4087 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4088 let shutdown_script = {
4089 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
4090 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
4093 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4094 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
4095 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
4096 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
4097 let outpoint = OutPoint {
4098 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
4099 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
4101 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
4102 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4103 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4105 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
4106 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
4107 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4109 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
4110 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4114 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4115 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
4116 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
4117 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
4119 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
4124 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4126 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4128 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
4131 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
4132 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4133 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4134 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4135 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
4137 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4138 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
4144 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4145 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
4146 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
4147 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4148 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4149 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4150 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
4151 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
4153 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
4154 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4158 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4159 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4160 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4161 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4162 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4163 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4164 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4168 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4169 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4170 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4171 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4172 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4173 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4174 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4178 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4179 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4182 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4184 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4186 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4188 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4189 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4191 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4192 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4193 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4194 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4195 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4196 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4197 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4201 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4202 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4203 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4204 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4205 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4206 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4207 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
4208 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4210 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4213 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4214 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4215 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4216 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4217 pending_events.push(event);
4221 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4223 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4224 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4225 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4226 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4227 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4231 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4232 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
4233 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4234 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4235 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4236 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
4237 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4238 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4240 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4241 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4244 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(
4245 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4248 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4249 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4251 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4252 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4253 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4254 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4255 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4256 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4257 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4261 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4262 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4263 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4264 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4265 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4268 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4269 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4270 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4271 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4272 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4273 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4274 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(HashMap::new());
4275 let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
4276 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4277 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4278 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4279 (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4280 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4281 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4282 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4283 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4284 (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4285 (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
4288 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4290 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4293 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4294 counterparty_payment_script,
4298 holder_revocation_basepoint,
4300 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4301 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4303 counterparty_commitment_params,
4304 funding_redeemscript,
4305 channel_value_satoshis,
4306 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4311 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4312 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4313 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4314 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4316 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4317 current_holder_commitment_tx,
4318 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4319 current_holder_commitment_number,
4322 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4324 is_processing_pending_events: false,
4326 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4331 lockdown_from_offchain,
4333 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4334 funding_spend_confirmed,
4335 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4336 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4337 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4340 counterparty_node_id,
4341 initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
4348 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4349 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4350 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
4351 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4352 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
4353 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4354 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4355 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4356 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4357 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4358 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4359 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4363 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4365 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4366 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4367 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4368 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
4369 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4370 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4371 use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4372 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
4373 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4374 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
4375 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4376 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4377 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4378 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4379 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4380 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4381 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4382 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4384 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
4385 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4386 use crate::prelude::*;
4388 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4389 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4390 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4391 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4392 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4393 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4394 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4395 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4396 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4398 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4399 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4400 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4401 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4402 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4403 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4404 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4405 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4407 // Rebalance somewhat
4408 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4410 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4411 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4412 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4414 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4415 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4416 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4417 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4418 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4419 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4420 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4422 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4423 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4424 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4425 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4426 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4427 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4429 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4430 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4431 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4433 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4434 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4435 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4436 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4437 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4438 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
4439 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
4440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
4441 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4442 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() },
4443 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4445 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4446 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4447 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4448 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4449 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
4450 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4451 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4452 } else { panic!(); }
4453 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4454 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4456 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4458 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4460 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4462 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4463 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4464 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4465 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4466 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4467 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4468 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4469 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4470 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4473 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4474 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4475 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4479 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4480 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4481 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4482 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4483 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4485 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4487 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4490 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4491 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4492 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4496 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4497 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4499 let mut res = Vec::new();
4500 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4501 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4505 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4506 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4513 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4514 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4515 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4518 let dummy_sig = crate::util::crypto::sign(&secp_ctx,
4519 &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
4520 &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4522 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4523 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4524 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4525 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4530 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4532 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4533 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4534 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4535 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4536 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4543 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4544 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4545 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
4546 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4547 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
4548 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
4550 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4551 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4552 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4553 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4554 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4555 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4556 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4557 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4559 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4560 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
4562 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4564 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4565 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
4566 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4567 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
4568 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
4569 &channel_parameters, Script::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
4570 best_block, dummy_key);
4572 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
4573 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4574 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4575 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4576 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"1").into_inner()),
4577 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4578 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"2").into_inner()),
4579 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4580 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4581 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4582 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4585 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4586 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4587 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4588 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4589 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4590 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4591 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4593 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"3").into_inner()),
4594 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4596 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4597 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4598 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4599 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4600 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4601 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4603 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_inner(Sha256::hash(b"4").into_inner()),
4604 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4606 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4607 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4608 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
4609 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4610 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4611 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4612 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4613 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4614 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4615 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4616 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4618 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4619 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
4620 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4621 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
4622 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4623 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4624 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4625 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4626 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4630 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4631 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4632 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4634 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4635 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4636 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4638 macro_rules! sign_input {
4639 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4640 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4641 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4643 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4644 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4645 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4647 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
4648 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4649 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4650 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4651 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4652 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
4653 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4654 witness.push(ser_sig);
4655 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4656 witness.push(vec!(1));
4657 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4658 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4659 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4660 witness.push(vec![0]);
4662 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4664 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4665 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4666 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4667 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4668 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4672 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4673 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4675 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4676 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4677 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4678 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4680 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4681 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4685 script_sig: Script::new(),
4686 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4687 witness: Witness::new(),
4690 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4691 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4694 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4695 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
4696 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4698 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4699 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4700 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4701 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4704 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4707 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
4708 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4709 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4710 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4712 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4713 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4717 script_sig: Script::new(),
4718 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4719 witness: Witness::new(),
4722 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4723 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4726 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4727 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
4728 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4730 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4731 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4732 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4733 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4736 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4739 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
4740 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4741 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4742 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4743 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4744 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4748 script_sig: Script::new(),
4749 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4750 witness: Witness::new(),
4752 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4753 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4756 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
4757 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
4758 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
4760 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
4761 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
4762 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
4763 inputs_total_weight += inp;
4766 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
4770 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.