1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
36 use crate::ln::channel::INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER;
37 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, ChannelId};
38 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentKey, DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, HtlcKey, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
40 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,CommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCClaim, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys};
41 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, SentHTLCId};
43 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
44 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
45 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
46 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, SignerProvider, EntropySource};
47 use crate::chain::onchaintx::{ClaimEvent, OnchainTxHandler};
48 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use crate::chain::Filter;
50 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
51 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, RequiredWrapper, MaybeReadable, UpgradableRequired, Writer, Writeable, U48};
52 use crate::util::byte_utils;
53 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler};
54 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
56 use crate::prelude::*;
58 use crate::io::{self, Error};
59 use core::convert::TryInto;
61 use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
63 /// An update generated by the underlying channel itself which contains some new information the
64 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] should be made aware of.
66 /// Because this represents only a small number of updates to the underlying state, it is generally
67 /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction
68 /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment
69 /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size.
70 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
72 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
73 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
74 /// Historically, [`ChannelMonitor`]s didn't know their counterparty node id. However,
75 /// `ChannelManager` really wants to know it so that it can easily look up the corresponding
76 /// channel. For now, this results in a temporary map in `ChannelManager` to look up channels
77 /// by only the funding outpoint.
79 /// To eventually remove that, we repeat the counterparty node id here so that we can upgrade
80 /// `ChannelMonitor`s to become aware of the counterparty node id if they were generated prior
81 /// to when it was stored directly in them.
82 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
83 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
84 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
85 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with two exceptions specified below.
87 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
88 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] have been applied to all copies of a given
89 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
91 /// The only instances we allow where update_id values are not strictly increasing have a
92 /// special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. This update ID is used for updates that
93 /// will force close the channel by broadcasting the latest commitment transaction or
94 /// special post-force-close updates, like providing preimages necessary to claim outputs on the
95 /// broadcast commitment transaction. See its docs for more details.
97 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
99 /// The channel ID associated with these updates.
101 /// Will be `None` for `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.121 and
102 /// always `Some` otherwise.
103 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
106 /// The update ID used for a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] that is either:
108 /// (1) attempting to force close the channel by broadcasting our latest commitment transaction or
109 /// (2) providing a preimage (after the channel has been force closed) from a forward link that
110 /// allows us to spend an HTLC output on this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted
111 /// commitment transaction.
113 /// No other [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are allowed after force-close.
114 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
116 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
117 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
118 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
119 self.update_id.write(w)?;
120 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
121 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
122 update_step.write(w)?;
124 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
125 (1, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
126 (3, self.channel_id, option),
131 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
132 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
133 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
134 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
135 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
136 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
138 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
142 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
143 let mut channel_id = None;
144 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
145 (1, counterparty_node_id, option),
146 (3, channel_id, option),
148 Ok(Self { update_id, counterparty_node_id, updates, channel_id })
152 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
153 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
154 pub enum MonitorEvent {
155 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
156 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
158 /// Indicates we broadcasted the channel's latest commitment transaction and thus closed the
160 HolderForceClosed(OutPoint),
162 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
163 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`] for more information on how this is used.
165 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
167 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
168 funding_txo: OutPoint,
169 /// The channel ID of the channel associated with the [`ChannelMonitor`]
170 channel_id: ChannelId,
171 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
172 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
174 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
175 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
176 monitor_update_id: u64,
179 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
180 // Note that Completed is currently never serialized to disk as it is generated only in
183 (0, funding_txo, required),
184 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
185 (4, channel_id, required),
189 (4, HolderForceClosed),
190 // 6 was `UpdateFailed` until LDK 0.0.117
193 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
194 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
195 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
196 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
197 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
198 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
199 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
200 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
201 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
203 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
204 (0, payment_hash, required),
205 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
206 (2, source, required),
207 (4, payment_preimage, option),
210 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
211 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
212 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
213 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
214 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
215 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
216 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
217 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
218 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
219 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
220 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
221 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
222 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
223 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
224 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
225 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
226 /// accurate block height.
227 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
228 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
229 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
230 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
231 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
232 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
235 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
236 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
237 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
238 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
239 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
240 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
241 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
242 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
243 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
244 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
246 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
247 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
248 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
250 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
251 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
253 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
254 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
256 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
257 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
258 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
259 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
261 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
262 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
263 struct HolderSignedTx {
264 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
266 revocation_key: RevocationKey,
269 delayed_payment_key: DelayedPaymentKey,
270 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
271 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
272 to_self_value_sat: u64,
275 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
277 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
278 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
279 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
280 (2, revocation_key, required),
281 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
282 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
283 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
284 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
285 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
286 (14, htlc_outputs, required_vec)
289 impl HolderSignedTx {
290 fn non_dust_htlcs(&self) -> Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
291 self.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _, _)| {
292 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
302 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
303 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
304 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
305 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
306 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: DelayedPaymentBasepoint,
307 counterparty_htlc_base_key: HtlcBasepoint,
308 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
311 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
312 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
313 w.write_all(&(0 as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
314 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
315 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
316 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
317 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
322 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
323 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
324 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
325 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
326 // used. Read it for compatibility.
327 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
328 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
329 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
330 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
331 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
332 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
336 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
337 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = RequiredWrapper(None);
338 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
339 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
340 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
341 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
342 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
344 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
345 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
346 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
347 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
350 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
354 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height and hash when the event was
355 /// observed, as well as the transaction causing it.
357 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
358 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
359 struct OnchainEventEntry {
362 block_hash: Option<BlockHash>, // Added as optional, will be filled in for any entry generated on 0.0.113 or after
364 transaction: Option<Transaction>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in LDK 0.0.110
367 impl OnchainEventEntry {
368 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
369 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
371 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
372 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
374 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
375 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
376 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
378 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
379 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
380 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
381 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
382 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
389 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
390 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
394 /// The (output index, sats value) for the counterparty's output in a commitment transaction.
396 /// This was added as an `Option` in 0.0.110.
397 type CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = Option<(u32, u64)>;
399 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
400 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
401 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
403 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
404 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
405 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
406 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
407 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
408 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
411 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
412 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
413 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
414 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
415 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
417 /// An output waiting on [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`] confirmations before we hand the user the
418 /// [`SpendableOutputDescriptor`].
420 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
422 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
424 FundingSpendConfirmation {
425 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
426 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
427 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
428 /// If the funding spend transaction was a known remote commitment transaction, we track
429 /// the output index and amount of the counterparty's `to_self` output here.
431 /// This allows us to generate a [`Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`] for the
432 /// counterparty output.
433 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
435 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
436 /// is constructed. This is used when
437 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
438 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
439 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
440 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
441 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
443 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by an
444 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Failure transaction (and is still claimable with a revocation
446 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
447 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
448 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
449 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
450 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
451 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
452 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
453 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
457 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
458 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
459 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
460 (0, self.txid, required),
461 (1, self.transaction, option),
462 (2, self.height, required),
463 (3, self.block_hash, option),
464 (4, self.event, required),
470 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
471 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
472 let mut txid = Txid::all_zeros();
473 let mut transaction = None;
474 let mut block_hash = None;
476 let mut event = UpgradableRequired(None);
477 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
479 (1, transaction, option),
480 (2, height, required),
481 (3, block_hash, option),
482 (4, event, upgradable_required),
484 Ok(Some(Self { txid, transaction, height, block_hash, event: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(event, upgradable_required) }))
488 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
490 (0, source, required),
491 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
492 (2, payment_hash, required),
493 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
495 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
496 (0, descriptor, required),
498 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
499 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
500 (1, commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, option),
502 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
503 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
504 (2, preimage, option),
505 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
510 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
511 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
512 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
513 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
514 /// Note that LDK after 0.0.115 supports this only containing dust HTLCs (implying the
515 /// `Signature` field is never filled in). At that point, non-dust HTLCs are implied by the
516 /// HTLC fields in `commitment_tx` and the sources passed via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
517 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
518 claimed_htlcs: Vec<(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)>,
519 nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>,
521 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
522 commitment_txid: Txid,
523 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
524 commitment_number: u64,
525 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
526 feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>,
527 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Option<u64>,
528 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Option<u64>,
531 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
537 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
538 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
540 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
541 /// think we've fallen behind!
542 should_broadcast: bool,
545 scriptpubkey: ScriptBuf,
549 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
550 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
552 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
553 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
554 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
555 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
556 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
557 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
562 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
563 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
564 (0, commitment_tx, required),
565 (1, claimed_htlcs, optional_vec),
566 (2, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
567 (4, nondust_htlc_sources, optional_vec),
569 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
570 (0, commitment_txid, required),
571 (1, feerate_per_kw, option),
572 (2, commitment_number, required),
573 (3, to_broadcaster_value_sat, option),
574 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
575 (5, to_countersignatory_value_sat, option),
576 (6, htlc_outputs, required_vec),
578 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
579 (0, payment_preimage, required),
581 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
583 (2, secret, required),
585 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
586 (0, should_broadcast, required),
588 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
589 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
593 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
595 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
597 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
598 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
600 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
601 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
602 /// force-closed now.
603 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
604 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
605 /// required to do so.
606 amount_satoshis: u64,
608 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
609 /// we consider it spendable.
610 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
611 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
612 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
613 amount_satoshis: u64,
614 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
616 confirmation_height: u32,
618 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
619 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
620 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
622 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
623 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
624 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
625 ContentiousClaimable {
626 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
627 /// required to do so.
628 amount_satoshis: u64,
629 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
632 /// The payment hash that locks this HTLC.
633 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
634 /// The preimage that can be used to claim this HTLC.
635 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
637 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
638 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
639 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
640 MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
641 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
642 /// which will be required to do so.
643 amount_satoshis: u64,
644 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
646 claimable_height: u32,
647 /// The payment hash whose preimage our counterparty needs to claim this HTLC.
648 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
650 /// HTLCs which we received from our counterparty which are claimable with a preimage which we
651 /// do not currently have. This will only be claimable if we receive the preimage from the node
652 /// to which we forwarded this HTLC before the timeout.
653 MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
654 /// The amount potentially available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees
655 /// which will be required to do so.
656 amount_satoshis: u64,
657 /// The height at which our counterparty will be able to claim the balance if we have not
658 /// yet received the preimage and claimed it ourselves.
660 /// The payment hash whose preimage we need to claim this HTLC.
661 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
663 /// The channel has been closed, and our counterparty broadcasted a revoked commitment
666 /// Thus, we're able to claim all outputs in the commitment transaction, one of which has the
667 /// following amount.
668 CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
669 /// The amount, in satoshis, of the output which we can claim.
671 /// Note that for outputs from HTLC balances this may be excluding some on-chain fees that
672 /// were already spent.
673 amount_satoshis: u64,
678 /// The amount claimable, in satoshis. This excludes balances that we are unsure if we are able
679 /// to claim, this is because we are waiting for a preimage or for a timeout to expire. For more
680 /// information on these balances see [`Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC`] and
681 /// [`Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC`].
683 /// On-chain fees required to claim the balance are not included in this amount.
684 pub fn claimable_amount_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
686 Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis, .. }|
687 Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. }|
688 Balance::ContentiousClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }|
689 Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { amount_satoshis, .. }
691 Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC { .. }|
692 Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC { .. }
698 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
699 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
700 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
701 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
702 /// The txid of the transaction which resolved the HTLC, this may be a commitment (if the HTLC
703 /// was not present in the confirmed commitment transaction), HTLC-Success, or HTLC-Timeout
705 resolving_txid: Option<Txid>, // Added as optional, but always filled in, in 0.0.110
706 resolving_tx: Option<Transaction>,
707 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
708 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
711 // In LDK versions prior to 0.0.111 commitment_tx_output_idx was not Option-al and
712 // IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC objects only existed for non-dust HTLCs. This was a bug, but to maintain
713 // backwards compatibility we must ensure we always write out a commitment_tx_output_idx field,
714 // using `u32::max_value()` as a sentinal to indicate the HTLC was dust.
715 impl Writeable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
716 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
717 let mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = self.commitment_tx_output_idx.unwrap_or(u32::max_value());
718 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
719 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
720 (1, self.resolving_txid, option),
721 (2, self.payment_preimage, option),
722 (3, self.resolving_tx, option),
728 impl Readable for IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
729 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
730 let mut mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx = 0;
731 let mut resolving_txid = None;
732 let mut payment_preimage = None;
733 let mut resolving_tx = None;
734 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
735 (0, mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
736 (1, resolving_txid, option),
737 (2, payment_preimage, option),
738 (3, resolving_tx, option),
741 commitment_tx_output_idx: if mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx == u32::max_value() { None } else { Some(mapped_commitment_tx_output_idx) },
749 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
750 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
752 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
753 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
755 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
756 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
757 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
758 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
759 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
760 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
762 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
764 pub(super) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
767 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Clone for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: Clone {
768 fn clone(&self) -> Self {
769 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap().clone();
770 ChannelMonitor::from_impl(inner)
774 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
775 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> {
776 latest_update_id: u64,
777 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
779 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
780 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>,
781 counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf,
782 shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
784 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
785 holder_revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint,
786 channel_id: ChannelId,
787 funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
788 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
789 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
791 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
792 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf,
793 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
794 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
795 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
797 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
799 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
800 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
801 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
802 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
803 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
804 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
805 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
806 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
807 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
808 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
809 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
810 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
811 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
812 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
813 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
814 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
816 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: HashMap<SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage>,
818 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
819 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
820 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
821 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
822 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
823 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
825 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
827 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
828 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
830 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
832 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
833 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
834 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
836 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
838 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
839 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
840 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
841 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
842 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
843 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
844 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
845 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
846 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
847 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
849 pub(super) pending_events: Vec<Event>,
850 pub(super) is_processing_pending_events: bool,
852 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
853 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
854 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
855 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
857 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
858 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
859 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
860 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
861 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>>,
864 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
866 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
868 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
869 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
870 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
871 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
873 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
874 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
875 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
877 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
878 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
879 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
880 holder_tx_signed: bool,
882 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
883 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
884 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
885 funding_spend_seen: bool,
887 /// Set to `Some` of the confirmed transaction spending the funding input of the channel after
888 /// reaching `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` confirmations.
889 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
891 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo,
892 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
893 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
894 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
895 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
897 /// The set of `SpendableOutput` events which we have already passed upstream to be claimed.
898 /// These are tracked explicitly to ensure that we don't generate the same events redundantly
899 /// if users duplicatively confirm old transactions. Specifically for transactions claiming a
900 /// revoked remote outpoint we otherwise have no tracking at all once they've reached
901 /// [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`], so we have to track them here.
902 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec<Txid>,
904 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
905 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
906 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
907 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
908 // the full block_connected).
909 best_block: BestBlock,
911 /// The node_id of our counterparty
912 counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
914 /// Initial counterparty commmitment data needed to recreate the commitment tx
915 /// in the persistence pipeline for third-party watchtowers. This will only be present on
916 /// monitors created after 0.0.117.
918 /// Ordering of tuple data: (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_sats,
919 /// to_countersignatory_sats)
920 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: Option<(PublicKey, u32, u64, u64)>,
923 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
924 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
926 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> where Signer: PartialEq {
927 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
928 // We need some kind of total lockorder. Absent a better idea, we sort by position in
929 // memory and take locks in that order (assuming that we can't move within memory while a
931 let ord = ((self as *const _) as usize) < ((other as *const _) as usize);
932 let a = if ord { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
933 let b = if ord { other.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() } else { self.inner.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self() };
938 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
939 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
940 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
944 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
945 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
946 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
948 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
949 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
950 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
952 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
954 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
955 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
957 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
958 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
959 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
960 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
961 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
962 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
964 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
967 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
968 match &self.shutdown_script {
969 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
970 None => ScriptBuf::new().write(writer)?,
973 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
974 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
975 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
976 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.index.to_be_bytes())?;
977 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
978 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
979 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
981 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
982 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
983 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
985 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
986 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
987 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
988 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
989 match second_option {
990 Some(second_pubkey) => {
991 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
994 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
999 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1003 writer.write_all(&self.on_holder_tx_csv.to_be_bytes())?;
1005 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
1007 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1008 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1009 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1010 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.amount_msat.to_be_bytes())?;
1011 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes())?;
1012 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1013 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1017 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1018 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1019 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1020 writer.write_all(&(htlc_infos.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1021 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1022 debug_assert!(htlc_source.is_none() || Some(**txid) == self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid
1023 || Some(**txid) == self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
1024 "HTLC Sources for all revoked commitment transactions should be none!");
1025 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1026 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
1030 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1031 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1032 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1033 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1036 writer.write_all(&(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1037 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1038 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1039 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1042 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1043 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1044 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
1046 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1049 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
1051 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
1052 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
1054 writer.write_all(&(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1055 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1056 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1059 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
1060 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
1061 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => true,
1063 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1064 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
1066 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
1070 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
1071 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
1075 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_events.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1076 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
1077 event.write(writer)?;
1080 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
1081 writer.write_all(&self.best_block.height().to_be_bytes())?;
1083 writer.write_all(&(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
1084 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1085 entry.write(writer)?;
1088 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1089 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1090 txid.write(writer)?;
1091 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1092 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
1094 script.write(writer)?;
1097 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1099 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1100 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
1102 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
1103 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
1104 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, required_vec),
1105 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, required_vec),
1106 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
1107 (9, self.counterparty_node_id, option),
1108 (11, self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
1109 (13, self.spendable_txids_confirmed, required_vec),
1110 (15, self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, required),
1111 (17, self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
1112 (19, self.channel_id, required),
1119 macro_rules! _process_events_body {
1120 ($self_opt: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1122 let (pending_events, repeated_events);
1123 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1124 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1125 if inner.is_processing_pending_events {
1128 inner.is_processing_pending_events = true;
1130 pending_events = inner.pending_events.clone();
1131 repeated_events = inner.get_repeated_events();
1133 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1135 for event in pending_events.into_iter().chain(repeated_events.into_iter()) {
1136 $event_to_handle = event;
1140 if let Some(us) = $self_opt {
1141 let mut inner = us.inner.lock().unwrap();
1142 inner.pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1143 inner.is_processing_pending_events = false;
1144 if !inner.pending_events.is_empty() {
1145 // If there's more events to process, go ahead and do so.
1153 pub(super) use _process_events_body as process_events_body;
1155 pub(crate) struct WithChannelMonitor<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
1157 peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
1158 channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1161 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1162 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
1163 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
1164 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
1165 self.logger.log(record)
1169 impl<'a, L: Deref> WithChannelMonitor<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
1170 pub(crate) fn from<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<S>) -> Self {
1171 Self::from_impl(logger, &*monitor.inner.lock().unwrap())
1174 pub(crate) fn from_impl<S: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(logger: &'a L, monitor_impl: &ChannelMonitorImpl<S>) -> Self {
1175 let peer_id = monitor_impl.counterparty_node_id;
1176 let channel_id = Some(monitor_impl.channel_id());
1177 WithChannelMonitor {
1178 logger, peer_id, channel_id,
1183 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1184 /// For lockorder enforcement purposes, we need to have a single site which constructs the
1185 /// `inner` mutex, otherwise cases where we lock two monitors at the same time (eg in our
1186 /// PartialEq implementation) we may decide a lockorder violation has occurred.
1187 fn from_impl(imp: ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>) -> Self {
1188 ChannelMonitor { inner: Mutex::new(imp) }
1191 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1192 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, ScriptBuf),
1193 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
1194 funding_redeemscript: ScriptBuf, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1195 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1196 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1197 best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId,
1198 ) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1200 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1201 let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
1202 &channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
1205 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
1206 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
1207 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
1208 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
1210 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
1211 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1213 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1214 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
1215 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1216 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1218 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1219 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
1221 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1222 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1223 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1224 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1225 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1226 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1227 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1228 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1230 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1233 let onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(
1234 channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id, destination_script.into(), keys,
1235 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx
1238 let mut outputs_to_watch = new_hash_map();
1239 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1241 Self::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1242 latest_update_id: 0,
1243 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1245 destination_script: destination_script.into(),
1246 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1247 counterparty_payment_script,
1251 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1254 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1255 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1257 counterparty_commitment_params,
1258 funding_redeemscript,
1259 channel_value_satoshis,
1260 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1262 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1264 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1265 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: new_hash_map(),
1266 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: new_hash_map(),
1267 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: new_hash_map(),
1268 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: new_hash_map(),
1270 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1271 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1272 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1273 current_holder_commitment_number,
1275 payment_preimages: new_hash_map(),
1276 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1277 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1278 is_processing_pending_events: false,
1280 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1285 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1286 holder_tx_signed: false,
1287 funding_spend_seen: false,
1288 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1289 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output: None,
1290 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1291 spendable_txids_confirmed: Vec::new(),
1294 counterparty_node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id),
1295 initial_counterparty_commitment_info: None,
1300 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1301 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1304 /// A variant of `Self::provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx` used to provide
1305 /// additional information to the monitor to store in order to recreate the initial
1306 /// counterparty commitment transaction during persistence (mainly for use in third-party
1309 /// This is used to provide the counterparty commitment information directly to the monitor
1310 /// before the initial persistence of a new channel.
1311 pub(crate) fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1312 &self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1313 commitment_number: u64, their_cur_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
1314 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, logger: &L,
1316 where L::Target: Logger
1318 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1319 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1320 inner.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid,
1321 htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_cur_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
1322 to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, &logger);
1325 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1326 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1327 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1328 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1330 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1333 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1334 commitment_number: u64,
1335 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1337 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1338 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1339 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1340 inner.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1341 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, &logger)
1345 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1346 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1347 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1348 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1349 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, &Vec::new(), Vec::new()).map_err(|_| ())
1352 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1353 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1354 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1356 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1357 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1359 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1362 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1363 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1366 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1367 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1368 inner.provide_payment_preimage(
1369 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1372 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1375 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1376 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1378 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1384 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1385 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1388 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1389 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1390 inner.update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1393 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1395 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1396 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1399 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1400 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
1401 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1404 /// Gets the channel_id of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1405 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1406 self.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id()
1409 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1410 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1411 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>)> {
1412 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1413 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1416 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1417 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1418 /// have been registered.
1419 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&self, filter: &F, logger: &L)
1421 F::Target: chain::Filter, L::Target: Logger,
1423 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1424 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*lock);
1425 log_trace!(&logger, "Registering funding outpoint {}", &lock.get_funding_txo().0);
1426 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1427 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1428 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1429 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1430 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 };
1431 log_trace!(logger, "Registering outpoint {} with the filter for monitoring spends", outpoint);
1432 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1435 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1441 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1442 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1443 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1444 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1447 /// Processes [`SpendableOutputs`] events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] upon maturity.
1449 /// For channels featuring anchor outputs, this method will also process [`BumpTransaction`]
1450 /// events produced from each [`ChannelMonitor`] while there is a balance to claim onchain
1451 /// within each channel. As the confirmation of a commitment transaction may be critical to the
1452 /// safety of funds, we recommend invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an
1453 /// environment with spotty connections, like on mobile.
1455 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider, though this shouldn't be needed in
1456 /// order to handle these events.
1458 /// [`SpendableOutputs`]: crate::events::Event::SpendableOutputs
1459 /// [`BumpTransaction`]: crate::events::Event::BumpTransaction
1460 pub fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: &H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
1462 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
1465 /// Processes any events asynchronously.
1467 /// See [`Self::process_pending_events`] for more information.
1468 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
1472 process_events_body!(Some(self), ev, { handler(ev).await });
1476 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1477 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1478 let mut lck = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1479 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut lck.pending_events);
1480 ret.append(&mut lck.get_repeated_events());
1484 /// Gets the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. The returned commitment
1485 /// transaction is unsigned. This is intended to be called during the initial persistence of
1486 /// the monitor (inside an implementation of [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]), to allow for
1487 /// watchtowers in the persistence pipeline to have enough data to form justice transactions.
1489 /// This is similar to [`Self::counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update`], except
1490 /// that for the initial commitment transaction, we don't have a corresponding update.
1492 /// This will only return `Some` for channel monitors that have been created after upgrading
1493 /// to LDK 0.0.117+.
1495 /// [`Persist::persist_new_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::persist_new_channel
1496 pub fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
1497 self.inner.lock().unwrap().initial_counterparty_commitment_tx()
1500 /// Gets all of the counterparty commitment transactions provided by the given update. This
1501 /// may be empty if the update doesn't include any new counterparty commitments. Returned
1502 /// commitment transactions are unsigned.
1504 /// This is provided so that watchtower clients in the persistence pipeline are able to build
1505 /// justice transactions for each counterparty commitment upon each update. It's intended to be
1506 /// used within an implementation of [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`], which is provided
1507 /// with a monitor and an update. Once revoked, signing a justice transaction can be done using
1508 /// [`Self::sign_to_local_justice_tx`].
1510 /// It is expected that a watchtower client may use this method to retrieve the latest counterparty
1511 /// commitment transaction(s), and then hold the necessary data until a later update in which
1512 /// the monitor has been updated with the corresponding revocation data, at which point the
1513 /// monitor can sign the justice transaction.
1515 /// This will only return a non-empty list for monitor updates that have been created after
1516 /// upgrading to LDK 0.0.117+. Note that no restriction lies on the monitors themselves, which
1517 /// may have been created prior to upgrading.
1519 /// [`Persist::update_persisted_channel`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist::update_persisted_channel
1520 pub fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
1521 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(update)
1524 /// Wrapper around [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`] to make
1525 /// signing the justice transaction easier for implementors of
1526 /// [`chain::chainmonitor::Persist`]. On success this method returns the provided transaction
1527 /// signing the input at `input_idx`. This method will only produce a valid signature for
1528 /// a transaction spending the `to_local` output of a commitment transaction, i.e. this cannot
1529 /// be used for revoked HTLC outputs.
1531 /// `Value` is the value of the output being spent by the input at `input_idx`, committed
1532 /// in the BIP 143 signature.
1534 /// This method will only succeed if this monitor has received the revocation secret for the
1535 /// provided `commitment_number`. If a commitment number is provided that does not correspond
1536 /// to the commitment transaction being revoked, this will return a signed transaction, but
1537 /// the signature will not be valid.
1539 /// [`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output`]: crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_justice_revoked_output
1540 /// [`Persist`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist
1541 pub fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(&self, justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
1542 self.inner.lock().unwrap().sign_to_local_justice_tx(justice_tx, input_idx, value, commitment_number)
1545 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1546 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1549 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1550 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1553 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1554 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1557 /// Gets the `node_id` of the counterparty for this channel.
1559 /// Will be `None` for channels constructed on LDK versions prior to 0.0.110 and always `Some`
1561 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1562 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_node_id
1565 /// You may use this to broadcast the latest local commitment transaction, either because
1566 /// a monitor update failed or because we've fallen behind (i.e. we've received proof that our
1567 /// counterparty side knows a revocation secret we gave them that they shouldn't know).
1569 /// Broadcasting these transactions in this manner is UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty
1570 /// side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to broadcast them if counterparty doesn't
1571 /// close channel with their commitment transaction after a substantial amount of time. Best
1572 /// may be to contact the other node operator out-of-band to coordinate other options available
1574 pub fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1575 &self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L
1578 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1579 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1582 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1583 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
1584 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1585 inner.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
1588 /// Unsafe test-only version of `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` used by our test framework
1589 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1590 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1591 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1592 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1593 where L::Target: Logger {
1594 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1595 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1596 inner.unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&logger)
1599 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1600 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1601 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1602 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1603 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1604 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1606 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1607 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1609 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1610 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1613 txdata: &TransactionData,
1618 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1620 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1621 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1624 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1625 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1626 inner.block_connected(
1627 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1630 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1632 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1640 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1641 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1644 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1645 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1646 inner.block_disconnected(
1647 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, &logger)
1650 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1651 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1653 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1654 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1656 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1657 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1660 txdata: &TransactionData,
1665 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1667 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1668 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1671 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1672 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1673 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1674 inner.transactions_confirmed(
1675 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger)
1678 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1680 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1681 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1683 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1684 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1691 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1695 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1696 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1697 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1698 inner.transaction_unconfirmed(
1699 txid, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1703 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1704 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1706 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1707 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1709 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1710 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1717 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1719 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1720 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1723 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1724 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1725 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1726 inner.best_block_updated(
1727 header, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger
1731 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1732 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
1733 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1734 let mut txids: Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1736 .map(|entry| (entry.txid, entry.height, entry.block_hash))
1737 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1739 txids.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0).then(b.1.cmp(&a.1)));
1740 txids.dedup_by_key(|(txid, _, _)| *txid);
1744 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1745 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1746 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1747 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1750 /// Triggers rebroadcasts/fee-bumps of pending claims from a force-closed channel. This is
1751 /// crucial in preventing certain classes of pinning attacks, detecting substantial mempool
1752 /// feerate changes between blocks, and ensuring reliability if broadcasting fails. We recommend
1753 /// invoking this every 30 seconds, or lower if running in an environment with spotty
1754 /// connections, like on mobile.
1755 pub fn rebroadcast_pending_claims<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1756 &self, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &L,
1759 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1760 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1763 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
1764 let mut inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1765 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from_impl(logger, &*inner);
1766 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1767 inner.onchain_tx_handler.rebroadcast_pending_claims(
1768 current_height, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger,
1772 /// Returns the descriptors for relevant outputs (i.e., those that we can spend) within the
1773 /// transaction if they exist and the transaction has at least [`ANTI_REORG_DELAY`]
1774 /// confirmations. For [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] descriptors to be
1775 /// returned, the transaction must have at least `max(ANTI_REORG_DELAY, to_self_delay)`
1778 /// Descriptors returned by this method are primarily exposed via [`Event::SpendableOutputs`]
1779 /// once they are no longer under reorg risk. This method serves as a way to retrieve these
1780 /// descriptors at a later time, either for historical purposes, or to replay any
1781 /// missed/unhandled descriptors. For the purpose of gathering historical records, if the
1782 /// channel close has fully resolved (i.e., [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] returns
1783 /// an empty set), you can retrieve all spendable outputs by providing all descendant spending
1784 /// transactions starting from the channel's funding transaction and going down three levels.
1786 /// `tx` is a transaction we'll scan the outputs of. Any transaction can be provided. If any
1787 /// outputs which can be spent by us are found, at least one descriptor is returned.
1789 /// `confirmation_height` must be the height of the block in which `tx` was included in.
1790 pub fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction, confirmation_height: u32) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
1791 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1792 let current_height = inner.best_block.height;
1793 let mut spendable_outputs = inner.get_spendable_outputs(tx);
1794 spendable_outputs.retain(|descriptor| {
1795 let mut conf_threshold = current_height.saturating_sub(ANTI_REORG_DELAY) + 1;
1796 if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) = descriptor {
1797 conf_threshold = cmp::min(conf_threshold,
1798 current_height.saturating_sub(descriptor.to_self_delay as u32) + 1);
1800 conf_threshold >= confirmation_height
1806 pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1807 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script.clone()
1811 pub fn set_counterparty_payment_script(&self, script: ScriptBuf) {
1812 self.inner.lock().unwrap().counterparty_payment_script = script;
1816 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1817 /// Helper for get_claimable_balances which does the work for an individual HTLC, generating up
1818 /// to one `Balance` for the HTLC.
1819 fn get_htlc_balance(&self, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, holder_commitment: bool,
1820 counterparty_revoked_commitment: bool, confirmed_txid: Option<Txid>)
1821 -> Option<Balance> {
1822 let htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx =
1823 if let Some(v) = htlc.transaction_output_index { v } else { return None; };
1825 let mut htlc_spend_txid_opt = None;
1826 let mut htlc_spend_tx_opt = None;
1827 let mut holder_timeout_spend_pending = None;
1828 let mut htlc_spend_pending = None;
1829 let mut holder_delayed_output_pending = None;
1830 for event in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1832 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx, htlc_value_satoshis, .. }
1833 if commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) => {
1834 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1835 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1836 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1837 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1838 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1839 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_value_satoshis.unwrap(), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1840 holder_timeout_spend_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1842 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. }
1843 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx => {
1844 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1845 htlc_spend_txid_opt = Some(&event.txid);
1846 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1847 htlc_spend_tx_opt = event.transaction.as_ref();
1848 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_pending.is_none());
1849 htlc_spend_pending = Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()));
1851 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1852 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor) }
1853 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1854 .any(|(input_idx, inp)|
1855 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1856 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx &&
1857 // A maturing output for an HTLC claim will always be at the same
1858 // index as the HTLC input. This is true pre-anchors, as there's
1859 // only 1 input and 1 output. This is also true post-anchors,
1860 // because we have a SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY signature from our
1861 // channel counterparty.
1862 descriptor.outpoint.index as usize == input_idx
1866 debug_assert!(holder_delayed_output_pending.is_none());
1867 holder_delayed_output_pending = Some(event.confirmation_threshold());
1872 let htlc_resolved = self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter()
1873 .find(|v| if v.commitment_tx_output_idx == Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1874 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_txid_opt.is_none());
1875 htlc_spend_txid_opt = v.resolving_txid.as_ref();
1876 debug_assert!(htlc_spend_tx_opt.is_none());
1877 htlc_spend_tx_opt = v.resolving_tx.as_ref();
1880 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_spend_pending.is_some() as u8 + htlc_resolved.is_some() as u8 <= 1);
1882 let htlc_commitment_outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint::new(confirmed_txid.unwrap(), htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx);
1883 let htlc_output_to_spend =
1884 if let Some(txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1885 // Because HTLC transactions either only have 1 input and 1 output (pre-anchors) or
1886 // are signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY under BIP-0143 (post-anchors), we can
1887 // locate the correct output by ensuring its adjacent input spends the HTLC output
1888 // in the commitment.
1889 if let Some(ref tx) = htlc_spend_tx_opt {
1890 let htlc_input_idx_opt = tx.input.iter().enumerate()
1891 .find(|(_, input)| input.previous_output == htlc_commitment_outpoint)
1892 .map(|(idx, _)| idx as u32);
1893 debug_assert!(htlc_input_idx_opt.is_some());
1894 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, htlc_input_idx_opt.unwrap_or(0))
1896 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1897 BitcoinOutPoint::new(*txid, 0)
1900 htlc_commitment_outpoint
1902 let htlc_output_spend_pending = self.onchain_tx_handler.is_output_spend_pending(&htlc_output_to_spend);
1904 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_delayed_output_pending {
1905 debug_assert!(holder_commitment);
1906 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1907 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1908 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1910 } else if htlc_resolved.is_some() && !htlc_output_spend_pending {
1911 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1912 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1913 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1914 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1915 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1916 debug_assert!(holder_commitment || self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1917 } else if counterparty_revoked_commitment {
1918 let htlc_output_claim_pending = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1919 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1920 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { .. }
1922 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| {
1923 if let Some(htlc_spend_txid) = htlc_spend_txid_opt {
1924 tx.txid() == *htlc_spend_txid || inp.previous_output.txid == *htlc_spend_txid
1926 Some(inp.previous_output.txid) == confirmed_txid &&
1927 inp.previous_output.vout == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx
1929 })).unwrap_or(false) {
1934 if htlc_output_claim_pending.is_some() {
1935 // We already push `Balance`s onto the `res` list for every
1936 // `StaticOutput` in a `MaturingOutput` in the revoked
1937 // counterparty commitment transaction case generally, so don't
1938 // need to do so again here.
1940 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none(),
1941 "HTLCUpdate OnchainEvents should never appear for preimage claims");
1942 debug_assert!(!htlc.offered || htlc_spend_pending.is_none() || !htlc_spend_pending.unwrap().1,
1943 "We don't (currently) generate preimage claims against revoked outputs, where did you get one?!");
1944 return Some(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1945 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1948 } else if htlc.offered == holder_commitment {
1949 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1950 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1951 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1952 if let Some(conf_thresh) = holder_timeout_spend_pending {
1953 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1954 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1955 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1958 return Some(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1959 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1960 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1961 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1964 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1965 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1966 // we know the preimage.
1967 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1968 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1969 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1970 debug_assert!(holder_timeout_spend_pending.is_none());
1971 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1972 return Some(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1973 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1974 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1977 return Some(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1978 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1979 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1980 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1981 payment_preimage: *payment_preimage,
1984 } else if htlc_resolved.is_none() {
1985 return Some(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
1986 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1987 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1988 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
1995 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
1996 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1997 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
2000 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
2001 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
2002 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
2003 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
2005 /// Note that for `ChannelMonitors` which track a channel which went on-chain with versions of
2006 /// LDK prior to 0.0.111, not all or excess balances may be included.
2008 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
2009 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
2010 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
2011 let mut res = Vec::new();
2012 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2014 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
2015 let mut confirmed_counterparty_output = us.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output;
2016 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
2017 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2018 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } =
2021 confirmed_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
2022 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
2025 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
2026 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
2027 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
2028 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
2029 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
2032 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2033 ($holder_commitment: expr, $counterparty_revoked_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2034 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
2035 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2037 if let Some(bal) = us.get_htlc_balance(htlc, $holder_commitment, $counterparty_revoked_commitment, confirmed_txid) {
2045 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
2046 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
2047 if let Some(counterparty_tx_htlcs) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
2048 // First look for the to_remote output back to us.
2049 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2050 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2051 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2052 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
2054 Some(descriptor.output.value)
2057 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2058 amount_satoshis: value,
2059 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2062 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
2063 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
2064 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
2067 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2068 walk_htlcs!(false, false, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2070 walk_htlcs!(false, true, counterparty_tx_htlcs.iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
2071 // The counterparty broadcasted a revoked state!
2072 // Look for any StaticOutputs first, generating claimable balances for those.
2073 // If any match the confirmed counterparty revoked to_self output, skip
2074 // generating a CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable.
2075 let mut spent_counterparty_output = false;
2076 for event in us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
2077 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2078 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { output, .. }
2080 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2081 amount_satoshis: output.value,
2082 confirmation_height: event.confirmation_threshold(),
2084 if let Some(confirmed_to_self_idx) = confirmed_counterparty_output.map(|(idx, _)| idx) {
2085 if event.transaction.as_ref().map(|tx|
2086 tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.vout == confirmed_to_self_idx)
2087 ).unwrap_or(false) {
2088 spent_counterparty_output = true;
2094 if spent_counterparty_output {
2095 } else if let Some((confirmed_to_self_idx, amt)) = confirmed_counterparty_output {
2096 let output_spendable = us.onchain_tx_handler
2097 .is_output_spend_pending(&BitcoinOutPoint::new(txid, confirmed_to_self_idx));
2098 if output_spendable {
2099 res.push(Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
2100 amount_satoshis: amt,
2104 // Counterparty output is missing, either it was broadcasted on a
2105 // previous version of LDK or the counterparty hadn't met dust.
2108 found_commitment_tx = true;
2109 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2110 walk_htlcs!(true, false, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2111 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2112 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2113 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2114 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2117 found_commitment_tx = true;
2118 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2119 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2120 walk_htlcs!(true, false, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
2121 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2122 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2123 amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
2124 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2127 found_commitment_tx = true;
2130 if !found_commitment_tx {
2131 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
2132 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
2133 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
2134 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
2135 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
2136 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
2137 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
2142 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
2143 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2144 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
2146 res.push(Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
2147 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2148 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2149 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2151 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
2152 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
2154 // As long as the HTLC is still in our latest commitment state, treat
2155 // it as potentially claimable, even if it has long-since expired.
2156 res.push(Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
2157 amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2158 expiry_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2159 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2163 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
2164 amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
2171 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which can be (or have been) resolved by this
2172 /// `ChannelMonitor`. This is used to determine if an HTLC was removed from the channel prior
2173 /// to the `ChannelManager` having been persisted.
2175 /// This is similar to [`Self::get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs`] except it includes
2176 /// HTLCs which were resolved on-chain (i.e. where the final HTLC resolution was done by an
2177 /// event from this `ChannelMonitor`).
2178 pub(crate) fn get_all_current_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2179 let mut res = new_hash_map();
2180 // Just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs on
2181 // `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
2182 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2183 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
2185 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2186 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2187 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2188 res.insert((**source).clone(), (htlc.clone(),
2189 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned()));
2195 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2196 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2198 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2199 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
2204 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel or which were
2205 /// resolved with a preimage from our counterparty.
2207 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
2209 /// Currently, the preimage is unused, however if it is present in the relevant internal state
2210 /// an HTLC is always included even if it has been resolved.
2211 pub(crate) fn get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, (HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<PaymentPreimage>)> {
2212 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
2213 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
2214 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
2215 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
2216 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2217 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
2218 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
2224 if confirmed_txid.is_none() {
2225 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
2226 // closed), just get the full set.
2228 return self.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs();
2231 let mut res = new_hash_map();
2232 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
2233 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
2234 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
2235 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
2236 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
2237 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
2239 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
2240 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
2241 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
2242 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
2243 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
2244 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
2245 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
2246 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
2247 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
2248 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
2249 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
2250 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
2251 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
2252 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
2253 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
2254 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
2256 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
2259 let counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt =
2260 us.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).cloned();
2261 if !htlc_update_confd || counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt.is_some() {
2262 res.insert(source.clone(), (htlc.clone(), counterparty_resolved_preimage_opt));
2269 let txid = confirmed_txid.unwrap();
2270 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2271 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
2272 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
2273 Some((a, &**source))
2276 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2277 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2278 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2280 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2281 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
2282 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
2283 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
2291 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
2292 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
2296 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
2297 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
2298 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
2300 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
2301 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
2302 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
2303 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
2304 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
2305 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
2307 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
2308 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
2309 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
2310 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
2311 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
2312 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr, $commitment_tx_confirmed: expr,
2313 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $commitment_tx_conf_hash: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
2314 debug_assert_eq!($commitment_tx_confirmed.txid(), $commitment_txid_confirmed);
2316 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
2317 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
2318 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
2319 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
2320 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
2321 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
2322 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
2323 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
2324 // payment_preimage.
2325 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
2326 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
2327 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
2328 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
2330 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
2332 let mut matched_htlc = false;
2333 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
2334 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() &&
2335 (Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source ||
2336 (broadcast_source.is_none() &&
2337 broadcast_htlc.payment_hash == htlc.payment_hash &&
2338 broadcast_htlc.amount_msat == htlc.amount_msat)) {
2339 matched_htlc = true;
2343 if matched_htlc { continue; }
2344 if $self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.get(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source)).is_some() {
2347 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2348 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
2350 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
2351 *update_source != **source
2356 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2357 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
2358 transaction: Some($commitment_tx_confirmed.clone()),
2359 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
2360 block_hash: Some(*$commitment_tx_conf_hash),
2361 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2362 source: (**source).clone(),
2363 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
2364 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
2365 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
2368 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
2369 &htlc.payment_hash, $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
2370 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
2371 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2377 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2378 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
2380 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2381 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
2386 // In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
2387 // witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
2388 // in-line tests later.
2391 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
2392 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2393 let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
2394 ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2395 ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2396 ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2397 ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
2398 ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.to_u8();
2403 pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
2404 vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
2407 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
2408 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
2409 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
2410 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
2411 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2412 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
2413 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
2416 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
2417 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
2418 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
2419 if self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap() != txid {
2420 let cur_claimables = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2421 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2422 for (_, ref source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2423 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2424 if !cur_claimables.iter()
2425 .any(|(_, cur_source_opt)| cur_source_opt == source_opt)
2427 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.remove(&SentHTLCId::from_source(source));
2431 for &mut (_, ref mut source_opt) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
2435 assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "Commitment txids are unique outside of fuzzing, where hashes can collide");
2439 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
2440 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
2441 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
2442 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
2443 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
2445 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
2446 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2447 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2451 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2452 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2453 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
2458 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
2465 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
2474 fn provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2475 &mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2476 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, feerate_per_kw: u32,
2477 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2478 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2479 self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info = Some((their_per_commitment_point.clone(),
2480 feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value));
2482 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2483 let rebuilt_commitment_tx = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_tx().unwrap();
2484 debug_assert_eq!(rebuilt_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), txid);
2487 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number,
2488 their_per_commitment_point, logger);
2491 fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
2492 &mut self, txid: Txid,
2493 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
2494 commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
2495 ) where L::Target: Logger {
2496 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
2497 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
2498 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
2500 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
2501 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
2504 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
2505 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
2506 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
2507 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
2508 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
2509 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
2510 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2511 Some(old_points) => {
2512 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
2513 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2514 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
2515 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
2516 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
2518 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2521 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2525 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
2528 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
2529 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
2530 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
2536 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
2537 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
2538 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
2539 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
2540 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
2541 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, mut htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>, claimed_htlcs: &[(SentHTLCId, PaymentPreimage)], nondust_htlc_sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
2542 if htlc_outputs.iter().any(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()) {
2543 // If we have non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, ensure they match the HTLCs in the
2544 // `holder_commitment_tx`. In the future, we'll no longer provide the redundant data
2545 // and just pass in source data via `nondust_htlc_sources`.
2546 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len());
2547 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).map(|(h, _, _)| h).zip(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()) {
2548 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2550 debug_assert_eq!(htlc_outputs.iter().filter(|(_, s, _)| s.is_some()).count(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2551 for (a, b) in htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, s, _)| s.as_ref()).zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter()) {
2552 debug_assert_eq!(a, b);
2554 debug_assert!(nondust_htlc_sources.is_empty());
2556 // If we don't have any non-dust HTLCs in htlc_outputs, assume they were all passed via
2557 // `nondust_htlc_sources`, building up the final htlc_outputs by combining
2558 // `nondust_htlc_sources` and the `holder_commitment_tx`
2559 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2561 for htlc in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter() {
2562 assert!(htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32 > prev);
2563 prev = htlc.transaction_output_index.unwrap() as i32;
2566 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(htlc, _, _)| htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()));
2567 debug_assert!(htlc_outputs.iter().all(|(_, sig_opt, _)| sig_opt.is_none()));
2568 debug_assert_eq!(holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().len(), holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.len());
2570 let mut sources_iter = nondust_htlc_sources.into_iter();
2572 for (htlc, counterparty_sig) in holder_commitment_tx.trust().htlcs().iter()
2573 .zip(holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter())
2576 let source = sources_iter.next().expect("Non-dust HTLC sources didn't match commitment tx");
2577 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2578 assert!(source.possibly_matches_output(htlc));
2580 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), Some(source)));
2582 htlc_outputs.push((htlc.clone(), Some(counterparty_sig.clone()), None));
2585 debug_assert!(sources_iter.next().is_none());
2588 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
2589 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
2590 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
2591 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
2592 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
2594 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
2595 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
2596 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
2597 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
2598 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
2600 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2601 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2603 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
2604 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
2605 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
2606 for (claimed_htlc_id, claimed_preimage) in claimed_htlcs {
2607 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2608 let cur_counterparty_htlcs = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(
2609 &self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.unwrap()).unwrap();
2610 assert!(cur_counterparty_htlcs.iter().any(|(_, source_opt)| {
2611 if let Some(source) = source_opt {
2612 SentHTLCId::from_source(source) == *claimed_htlc_id
2616 self.counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.insert(*claimed_htlc_id, *claimed_preimage);
2618 if self.holder_tx_signed {
2619 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
2624 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
2625 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
2626 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2627 &mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B,
2628 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>)
2629 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2630 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2633 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
2635 let confirmed_spend_txid = self.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
2636 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| match event.event {
2637 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => Some(event.txid),
2641 let confirmed_spend_txid = if let Some(txid) = confirmed_spend_txid {
2647 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
2648 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
2649 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
2650 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
2651 let (htlc_claim_reqs, _) = self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info($commitment_number, $txid, None);
2652 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2655 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2656 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2657 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2658 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2660 debug_assert!(false);
2661 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2666 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2667 if txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2668 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
2669 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
2671 debug_assert!(false);
2672 log_error!(logger, "Detected counterparty commitment tx on-chain without tracking commitment number");
2678 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
2679 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
2680 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
2681 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
2682 // holder commitment transactions.
2683 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
2684 let holder_commitment_tx = if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2685 Some(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx)
2686 } else if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2687 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid == confirmed_spend_txid {
2688 Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx)
2695 if let Some(holder_commitment_tx) = holder_commitment_tx {
2696 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
2697 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
2699 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2700 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2705 fn generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs(&mut self) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Vec<TransactionOutputs>) {
2706 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(
2707 self.funding_redeemscript.clone(),
2708 self.channel_value_satoshis,
2709 self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
2711 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
2712 self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32,
2713 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp),
2714 self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height()
2716 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![commitment_package];
2717 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(self.funding_info.0));
2718 // Although we aren't signing the transaction directly here, the transaction will be signed
2719 // in the claim that is queued to OnchainTxHandler. We set holder_tx_signed here to reject
2720 // new channel updates.
2721 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2722 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2723 // We can't broadcast our HTLC transactions while the commitment transaction is
2724 // unconfirmed. We'll delay doing so until we detect the confirmed commitment in
2725 // `transactions_confirmed`.
2726 if !self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2727 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2728 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2729 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2730 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(
2731 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height()
2733 let unsigned_commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_unsigned_holder_commitment_tx();
2734 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(
2735 &self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &unsigned_commitment_tx
2737 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2738 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2740 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2742 (claimable_outpoints, watch_outputs)
2745 pub(crate) fn queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2746 &mut self, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2749 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2750 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2753 let (claimable_outpoints, _) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
2754 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(
2755 claimable_outpoints, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster,
2756 fee_estimator, logger
2760 fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2761 &mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
2763 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2764 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2767 if self.latest_update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2768 log_info!(logger, "Applying post-force-closed update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2769 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2770 } else if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2771 log_info!(logger, "Applying force close update to monitor {} with {} change(s).",
2772 log_funding_info!(self), updates.updates.len());
2774 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} change(s).",
2775 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
2778 if updates.counterparty_node_id.is_some() {
2779 if self.counterparty_node_id.is_none() {
2780 self.counterparty_node_id = updates.counterparty_node_id;
2782 debug_assert_eq!(self.counterparty_node_id, updates.counterparty_node_id);
2786 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a preimage for a
2787 // broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd like to claim on-chain. If this
2788 // is the case, we no longer have guaranteed access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a
2789 // sentinel value instead.
2791 // The `ChannelManager` may also queue redundant `ChannelForceClosed` updates if it still
2792 // thinks the channel needs to have its commitment transaction broadcast, so we'll allow
2794 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2795 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
2796 match updates.updates[0] {
2797 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
2798 // We should have already seen a `ChannelForceClosed` update if we're trying to
2799 // provide a preimage at this point.
2800 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } =>
2801 debug_assert_eq!(self.latest_update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID),
2803 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
2804 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
2807 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
2808 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
2810 let mut ret = Ok(());
2811 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&**fee_estimator);
2812 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
2814 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources } => {
2815 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
2816 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
2817 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone(), &claimed_htlcs, nondust_htlc_sources.clone()) {
2818 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
2819 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2823 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2824 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
2825 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
2827 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
2828 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
2829 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
2831 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
2832 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
2833 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
2834 debug_assert!(false, "Latest counterparty commitment secret was invalid");
2835 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
2836 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
2840 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
2841 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
2842 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
2843 if *should_broadcast {
2844 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one
2845 // confirmed (even with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as
2846 // duplicate/conflicting.
2847 let detected_funding_spend = self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
2848 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
2849 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
2852 if detected_funding_spend {
2853 log_trace!(logger, "Avoiding commitment broadcast, already detected confirmed spend onchain");
2856 self.queue_latest_holder_commitment_txn_for_broadcast(broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
2857 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
2858 log_error!(logger, "WARNING: You have a potentially-unsafe holder commitment transaction available to broadcast");
2859 log_error!(logger, " in channel monitor for channel {}!", &self.channel_id());
2860 log_error!(logger, " Read the docs for ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn to take manual action!");
2862 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed, the ChannelManager
2863 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
2864 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
2865 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
2868 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
2869 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
2870 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
2871 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
2877 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
2878 self.counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(updates);
2881 // If the updates succeeded and we were in an already closed channel state, then there's no
2882 // need to refuse any updates we expect to receive afer seeing a confirmed commitment.
2883 if ret.is_ok() && updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID && self.latest_update_id == updates.update_id {
2887 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
2889 // Refuse updates after we've detected a spend onchain, but only if we haven't processed a
2890 // force closed monitor update yet.
2891 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen && self.latest_update_id != CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
2892 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
2897 fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2898 self.latest_update_id
2901 fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, ScriptBuf) {
2905 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2909 fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, ScriptBuf)>> {
2910 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2911 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2912 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2913 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2914 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2916 &self.outputs_to_watch
2919 fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2920 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2921 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2925 /// Gets the set of events that are repeated regularly (e.g. those which RBF bump
2926 /// transactions). We're okay if we lose these on restart as they'll be regenerated for us at
2927 /// some regular interval via [`ChannelMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims`].
2928 pub(super) fn get_repeated_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2929 let pending_claim_events = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_and_clear_pending_claim_events();
2930 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(pending_claim_events.len());
2931 for (claim_id, claim_event) in pending_claim_events {
2933 ClaimEvent::BumpCommitment {
2934 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, commitment_tx, anchor_output_idx,
2936 let channel_id = self.channel_id;
2937 // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
2938 // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
2940 let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
2941 let commitment_txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2942 debug_assert_eq!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, commitment_txid);
2943 let pending_htlcs = self.current_holder_commitment_tx.non_dust_htlcs();
2944 let commitment_tx_fee_satoshis = self.channel_value_satoshis -
2945 commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0u64, |sum, output| sum + output.value);
2946 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose {
2948 counterparty_node_id,
2950 package_target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
2952 commitment_tx_fee_satoshis,
2953 anchor_descriptor: AnchorDescriptor {
2954 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2955 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2956 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2957 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2959 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint {
2960 txid: commitment_txid,
2961 vout: anchor_output_idx,
2967 ClaimEvent::BumpHTLC {
2968 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, htlcs, tx_lock_time,
2970 let channel_id = self.channel_id;
2971 // unwrap safety: `ClaimEvent`s are only available for Anchor channels,
2972 // introduced with v0.0.116. counterparty_node_id is guaranteed to be `Some`
2974 let counterparty_node_id = self.counterparty_node_id.unwrap();
2975 let mut htlc_descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs.len());
2977 htlc_descriptors.push(HTLCDescriptor {
2978 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
2979 keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
2980 value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2981 transaction_parameters: self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
2983 commitment_txid: htlc.commitment_txid,
2984 per_commitment_number: htlc.per_commitment_number,
2985 per_commitment_point: self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.get_per_commitment_point(
2986 htlc.per_commitment_number, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
2990 preimage: htlc.preimage,
2991 counterparty_sig: htlc.counterparty_sig,
2994 ret.push(Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution {
2996 counterparty_node_id,
2998 target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
3008 fn initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(&mut self) -> Option<CommitmentTransaction> {
3009 let (their_per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw, to_broadcaster_value,
3010 to_countersignatory_value) = self.initial_counterparty_commitment_info?;
3011 let htlc_outputs = vec![];
3013 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
3014 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value,
3015 feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs);
3019 fn build_counterparty_commitment_tx(
3020 &self, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: &PublicKey,
3021 to_broadcaster_value: u64, to_countersignatory_value: u64, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3022 mut nondust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>
3023 ) -> CommitmentTransaction {
3024 let broadcaster_keys = &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters
3025 .counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys;
3026 let countersignatory_keys =
3027 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys;
3029 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey;
3030 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey;
3031 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&their_per_commitment_point,
3032 &broadcaster_keys, &countersignatory_keys, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx);
3033 let channel_parameters =
3034 &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable();
3036 CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
3037 to_broadcaster_value, to_countersignatory_value, broadcaster_funding_key,
3038 countersignatory_funding_key, keys, feerate_per_kw, &mut nondust_htlcs,
3042 fn counterparty_commitment_txs_from_update(&self, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Vec<CommitmentTransaction> {
3043 update.updates.iter().filter_map(|update| {
3045 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid,
3046 ref htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point,
3047 feerate_per_kw: Some(feerate_per_kw),
3048 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(to_broadcaster_value),
3049 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(to_countersignatory_value) } => {
3051 let nondust_htlcs = htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(htlc, _)| {
3052 htlc.transaction_output_index.map(|_| (htlc.clone(), None))
3053 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3055 let commitment_tx = self.build_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_number,
3056 &their_per_commitment_point, to_broadcaster_value,
3057 to_countersignatory_value, feerate_per_kw, nondust_htlcs);
3059 debug_assert_eq!(commitment_tx.trust().txid(), commitment_txid);
3068 fn sign_to_local_justice_tx(
3069 &self, mut justice_tx: Transaction, input_idx: usize, value: u64, commitment_number: u64
3070 ) -> Result<Transaction, ()> {
3071 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).ok_or(())?;
3072 let per_commitment_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&secret).map_err(|_| ())?;
3073 let their_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(
3074 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3076 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3077 &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &their_per_commitment_point);
3078 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx,
3079 &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &their_per_commitment_point);
3080 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3081 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3083 let sig = self.onchain_tx_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(
3084 &justice_tx, input_idx, value, &per_commitment_key, &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx)?;
3085 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push_bitcoin_signature(&sig.serialize_der(), EcdsaSighashType::All);
3086 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(&[1u8]);
3087 justice_tx.input[input_idx].witness.push(revokeable_redeemscript.as_bytes());
3091 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
3092 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
3093 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
3096 fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
3097 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
3100 fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3101 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
3104 fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
3105 self.current_holder_commitment_number
3108 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
3109 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
3110 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
3111 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
3113 /// Returns packages to claim the revoked output(s), as well as additional outputs to watch and
3114 /// general information about the output that is to the counterparty in the commitment
3116 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L)
3117 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo)
3118 where L::Target: Logger {
3119 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
3120 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
3121 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3122 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3123 let mut to_counterparty_output_info = None;
3125 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
3126 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
3128 macro_rules! ignore_error {
3129 ( $thing : expr ) => {
3132 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3137 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence.0 as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
3138 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
3139 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
3140 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
3141 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3142 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point,);
3143 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key));
3145 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
3146 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3148 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
3149 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3150 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3151 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
3152 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height);
3153 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3154 to_counterparty_output_info =
3155 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Txn can't have more than 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3159 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
3160 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3161 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
3162 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3163 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
3164 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3165 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3166 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs),
3167 to_counterparty_output_info);
3169 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), &self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
3170 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, height);
3171 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3176 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
3177 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
3178 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
3179 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
3180 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3181 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3183 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3185 if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3186 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked_counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3187 block_hash, per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3188 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3191 // Our fuzzers aren't constrained by pesky things like valid signatures, so can
3192 // spend our funding output with a transaction which doesn't match our past
3193 // commitment transactions. Thus, we can only debug-assert here when not
3195 debug_assert!(cfg!(fuzzing), "We should have per-commitment option for any recognized old commitment txn");
3196 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3197 block_hash, [].iter().map(|reference| *reference), logger);
3200 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
3201 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
3202 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
3203 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
3204 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
3205 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
3206 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
3208 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3209 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
3211 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
3213 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
3214 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3215 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
3216 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
3219 let (htlc_claim_reqs, counterparty_output_info) =
3220 self.get_counterparty_output_claim_info(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
3221 to_counterparty_output_info = counterparty_output_info;
3222 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
3223 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
3227 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), to_counterparty_output_info)
3230 /// Returns the HTLC claim package templates and the counterparty output info
3231 fn get_counterparty_output_claim_info(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>)
3232 -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo) {
3233 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3234 let mut to_counterparty_output_info: CommitmentTxCounterpartyOutputInfo = None;
3236 let htlc_outputs = match self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
3237 Some(outputs) => outputs,
3238 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3240 let per_commitment_points = match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
3241 Some(points) => points,
3242 None => return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info),
3245 let per_commitment_point =
3246 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
3247 // per-commitment point
3248 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { &per_commitment_points.1 }
3249 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
3250 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
3251 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
3252 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
3253 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
3255 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); }
3256 } else { return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info); };
3258 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3259 let revocation_pubkey = RevocationKey::from_basepoint(
3260 &self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint, &per_commitment_point);
3262 let delayed_key = DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &per_commitment_point);
3264 let revokeable_p2wsh = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey,
3265 self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3266 &delayed_key).to_v0_p2wsh();
3267 for (idx, outp) in transaction.output.iter().enumerate() {
3268 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
3269 to_counterparty_output_info =
3270 Some((idx.try_into().expect("Can't have > 2^32 outputs"), outp.value));
3275 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
3276 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3277 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
3278 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
3279 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
3280 // per_commitment_data is corrupt or our commitment signing key leaked!
3281 return (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info);
3284 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
3285 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
3286 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
3287 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
3288 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3289 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3290 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3291 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3293 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
3294 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
3295 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3296 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
3297 htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()))
3299 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry, 0);
3300 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
3305 (claimable_outpoints, to_counterparty_output_info)
3308 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
3309 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(
3310 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: &Txid, height: u32, logger: &L
3311 ) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
3312 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
3313 let per_commitment_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(&secret) {
3315 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
3317 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.onchain_tx_handler.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
3319 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
3320 let mut claimable_outpoints = vec![];
3321 let mut outputs_to_watch = None;
3322 // Previously, we would only claim HTLCs from revoked HTLC transactions if they had 1 input
3323 // with a witness of 5 elements and 1 output. This wasn't enough for anchor outputs, as the
3324 // counterparty can now aggregate multiple HTLCs into a single transaction thanks to
3325 // `SIGHASH_SINGLE` remote signatures, leading us to not claim any HTLCs upon seeing a
3326 // confirmed revoked HTLC transaction (for more details, see
3327 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2022-April/003561.html).
3329 // We make sure we're not vulnerable to this case by checking all inputs of the transaction,
3330 // and claim those which spend the commitment transaction, have a witness of 5 elements, and
3331 // have a corresponding output at the same index within the transaction.
3332 for (idx, input) in tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
3333 if input.previous_output.txid == *commitment_txid && input.witness.len() == 5 && tx.output.get(idx).is_some() {
3334 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, idx);
3335 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(
3336 per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
3337 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key,
3338 tx.output[idx].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv,
3341 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3342 htlc_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp),
3343 height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, height
3345 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
3346 if outputs_to_watch.is_none() {
3347 outputs_to_watch = Some((htlc_txid, vec![]));
3349 outputs_to_watch.as_mut().unwrap().1.push((idx as u32, tx.output[idx].clone()));
3352 (claimable_outpoints, outputs_to_watch)
3355 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnchainTxHandler, so that the handler can
3356 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
3357 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
3358 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(ScriptBuf, PublicKey, RevocationKey)>) {
3359 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3361 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
3362 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
3364 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3365 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3366 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
3367 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(
3368 htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3372 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
3375 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3378 let htlc_output = HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(
3379 payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat, self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().clone()
3383 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(
3384 holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index,
3385 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output),
3386 htlc.cltv_expiry, conf_height
3388 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
3392 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
3395 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
3396 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
3397 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
3398 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3399 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3400 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
3406 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
3407 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
3408 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
3409 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
3410 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
3411 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
3412 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
3413 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3415 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
3416 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
3417 claim_requests = $updates.0;
3418 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
3419 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
3423 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
3424 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
3426 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3427 is_holder_tx = true;
3428 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3429 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
3430 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
3431 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3432 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, tx, height,
3433 block_hash, self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
3434 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
3435 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3436 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
3437 is_holder_tx = true;
3438 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
3439 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
3440 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
3441 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
3442 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, tx, height, block_hash,
3443 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
3449 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
3455 /// Cancels any existing pending claims for a commitment that previously confirmed and has now
3456 /// been replaced by another.
3457 pub fn cancel_prev_commitment_claims<L: Deref>(
3458 &mut self, logger: &L, confirmed_commitment_txid: &Txid
3459 ) where L::Target: Logger {
3460 for (counterparty_commitment_txid, _) in &self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain {
3461 // Cancel any pending claims for counterparty commitments we've seen confirm.
3462 if counterparty_commitment_txid == confirmed_commitment_txid {
3465 for (htlc, _) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(counterparty_commitment_txid).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
3466 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously confirmed counterparty commitment {}",
3467 counterparty_commitment_txid);
3468 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: *counterparty_commitment_txid, vout: 0 };
3469 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3470 outpoint.vout = vout;
3471 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3475 if self.holder_tx_signed {
3476 // If we've signed, we may have broadcast either commitment (prev or current), and
3477 // attempted to claim from it immediately without waiting for a confirmation.
3478 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3479 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3480 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3481 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3482 for (htlc, _, _) in &self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3483 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3484 outpoint.vout = vout;
3485 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3489 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
3490 if prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid != *confirmed_commitment_txid {
3491 log_trace!(logger, "Canceling claims for previously broadcast holder commitment {}",
3492 prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid);
3493 let mut outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: prev_holder_commitment_tx.txid, vout: 0 };
3494 for (htlc, _, _) in &prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
3495 if let Some(vout) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3496 outpoint.vout = vout;
3497 self.onchain_tx_handler.abandon_claim(&outpoint);
3503 // No previous claim.
3507 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
3508 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
3509 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3510 &mut self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3511 ) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
3512 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
3513 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
3514 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
3515 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
3516 // When anchor outputs are present, the HTLC transactions are only final once the commitment
3517 // transaction confirms due to the CSV 1 encumberance.
3518 if self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3519 return holder_transactions;
3521 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
3522 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
3523 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
3524 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
3525 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
3529 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
3530 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
3531 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
3538 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3539 &mut self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B,
3540 fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3541 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3542 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3543 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3546 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3547 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3549 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3550 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger)
3553 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3558 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3559 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3560 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3562 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3563 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3566 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3568 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3569 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3570 log_trace!(logger, "Connecting new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3571 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3572 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
3573 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3574 log_trace!(logger, "Best block re-orged, replaced with new block {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3575 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
3576 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3578 } else { Vec::new() }
3581 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3584 txdata: &TransactionData,
3587 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3588 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3589 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3591 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3592 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3595 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
3596 for tx in &txn_matched {
3597 let mut output_val = 0;
3598 for out in tx.output.iter() {
3599 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3600 output_val += out.value;
3601 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
3605 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3607 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
3608 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
3609 'tx_iter: for tx in &txn_matched {
3610 let txid = tx.txid();
3611 log_trace!(logger, "Transaction {} confirmed in block {}", txid , block_hash);
3612 // If a transaction has already been confirmed, ensure we don't bother processing it duplicatively.
3613 if Some(txid) == self.funding_spend_confirmed {
3614 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of funding-spend tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3617 for ev in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3618 if ev.txid == txid {
3619 if let Some(conf_hash) = ev.block_hash {
3620 assert_eq!(header.block_hash(), conf_hash,
3621 "Transaction {} was already confirmed and is being re-confirmed in a different block.\n\
3622 This indicates a severe bug in the transaction connection logic - a reorg should have been processed first!", ev.txid);
3624 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of confirming tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3628 for htlc in self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter() {
3629 if Some(txid) == htlc.resolving_txid {
3630 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of HTLC resolution tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3634 for spendable_txid in self.spendable_txids_confirmed.iter() {
3635 if txid == *spendable_txid {
3636 log_debug!(logger, "Skipping redundant processing of spendable tx {} as it was previously confirmed", txid);
3641 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
3642 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
3643 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input
3644 // (except for HTLC transactions for channels with anchor outputs), which is an easy
3645 // way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy filters.
3646 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
3647 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
3648 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
3649 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
3650 &self.channel_id(), txid);
3651 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
3652 let mut commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = None;
3653 if (tx.input[0].sequence.0 >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
3654 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, counterparty_output_idx_sats) =
3655 self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger);
3656 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output = counterparty_output_idx_sats;
3657 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3658 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3660 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3661 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
3662 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &block_hash, &logger) {
3663 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
3664 debug_assert!(commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output.is_none(),
3665 "A commitment transaction matched as both a counterparty and local commitment tx?");
3666 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
3667 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3669 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3670 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
3674 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
3676 transaction: Some((*tx).clone()),
3678 block_hash: Some(block_hash),
3679 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
3680 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
3681 commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output,
3684 // Now that we've detected a confirmed commitment transaction, attempt to cancel
3685 // pending claims for any commitments that were previously confirmed such that
3686 // we don't continue claiming inputs that no longer exist.
3687 self.cancel_prev_commitment_claims(&logger, &txid);
3690 if tx.input.len() >= 1 {
3691 // While all commitment transactions have one input, HTLC transactions may have more
3692 // if the HTLC was present in an anchor channel. HTLCs can also be resolved in a few
3693 // other ways which can have more than one output.
3694 for tx_input in &tx.input {
3695 let commitment_txid = tx_input.previous_output.txid;
3696 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&commitment_txid) {
3697 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(
3698 &tx, commitment_number, &commitment_txid, height, &logger
3700 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3701 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
3702 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
3704 // Since there may be multiple HTLCs for this channel (all spending the
3705 // same commitment tx) being claimed by the counterparty within the same
3706 // transaction, and `check_spend_counterparty_htlc` already checks all the
3707 // ones relevant to this channel, we can safely break from our loop.
3711 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3713 self.check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs(&tx, height, &block_hash, logger);
3717 if height > self.best_block.height() {
3718 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3721 self.block_confirmed(height, block_hash, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, logger)
3724 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
3725 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
3726 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
3727 /// complexity especially in
3728 /// `OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_requests`/`OnchainTx::update_claims_view_from_matched_txn`.
3730 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
3731 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
3732 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3735 conf_hash: BlockHash,
3736 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
3737 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
3738 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
3740 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3741 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3742 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
3744 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3745 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3748 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
3749 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
3751 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
3752 if should_broadcast {
3753 let (mut new_outpoints, mut new_outputs) = self.generate_claimable_outpoints_and_watch_outputs();
3754 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
3755 watch_outputs.append(&mut new_outputs);
3758 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
3759 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
3760 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3761 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
3762 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
3763 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
3764 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3766 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3770 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3771 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3772 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
3774 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
3775 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
3779 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3780 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
3782 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
3783 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
3785 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
3786 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
3787 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3790 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
3791 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3792 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3793 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3795 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
3796 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
3797 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
3798 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
3799 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
3802 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
3803 &payment_hash, entry.txid);
3804 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
3806 payment_preimage: None,
3807 source: source.clone(),
3808 htlc_value_satoshis,
3810 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3811 commitment_tx_output_idx,
3812 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3813 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3814 payment_preimage: None,
3817 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
3818 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
3819 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
3820 outputs: vec![descriptor],
3821 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3823 self.spendable_txids_confirmed.push(entry.txid);
3825 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
3826 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
3827 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx),
3828 resolving_txid: Some(entry.txid),
3829 resolving_tx: entry.transaction,
3830 payment_preimage: preimage,
3833 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output, .. } => {
3834 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
3835 self.confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = commitment_tx_to_counterparty_output;
3840 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_requests(claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3841 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view_from_matched_txn(&txn_matched, conf_height, conf_hash, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3843 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
3844 // updating the latter in the process.
3845 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
3846 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
3847 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
3851 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
3852 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
3853 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
3854 for tx in &txn_matched {
3855 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
3856 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
3857 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
3858 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
3866 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3867 &mut self, header: &Header, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3868 ) where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3869 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3872 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
3875 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
3876 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
3877 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
3879 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_estimator);
3880 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, logger);
3882 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
3885 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3889 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3890 logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
3892 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3893 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3896 let mut removed_height = None;
3897 for entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
3898 if entry.txid == *txid {
3899 removed_height = Some(entry.height);
3904 if let Some(removed_height) = removed_height {
3905 log_info!(logger, "transaction_unconfirmed of txid {} implies height {} was reorg'd out", txid, removed_height);
3906 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.height >= removed_height {
3907 log_info!(logger, "Transaction {} reorg'd out", entry.txid);
3912 debug_assert!(!self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|ref entry| entry.txid == *txid));
3914 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
3917 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
3918 /// transactions thereof.
3919 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
3920 let mut matched_txn = new_hash_set();
3921 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
3922 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
3923 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3924 if matches { break; }
3925 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3930 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
3933 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
3936 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
3937 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
3938 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3939 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
3940 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
3941 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
3944 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
3945 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
3946 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
3947 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
3948 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
3949 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
3950 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
3951 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
3955 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&ScriptBuf::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3956 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
3957 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
3958 } else { panic!(); }
3969 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(
3970 &self, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>
3971 ) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
3972 // There's no need to broadcast our commitment transaction if we've seen one confirmed (even
3973 // with 1 confirmation) as it'll be rejected as duplicate/conflicting.
3974 if self.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some() ||
3975 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find(|event| match event.event {
3976 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => true,
3982 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
3983 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
3984 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
3985 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
3986 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
3987 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
3988 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
3989 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
3990 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
3991 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
3992 let height = self.best_block.height();
3993 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
3994 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
3995 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
3996 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
3997 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
3998 // time out the HTLC first.
3999 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
4000 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
4001 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
4002 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
4003 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
4004 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
4005 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
4006 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
4007 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
4008 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
4009 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
4010 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
4011 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4012 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4013 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
4014 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
4015 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
4016 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
4017 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
4018 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
4019 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
4020 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
4021 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
4022 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4029 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
4031 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4032 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4033 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4036 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
4037 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
4038 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
4045 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
4046 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
4047 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(
4048 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4049 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4050 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
4051 let mut payment_data = None;
4052 let htlc_claim = HTLCClaim::from_witness(&input.witness);
4053 let revocation_sig_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::Revocation);
4054 let accepted_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedPreimage);
4055 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4056 let accepted_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::AcceptedTimeout);
4057 let offered_preimage_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedPreimage);
4058 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4059 let offered_timeout_claim = htlc_claim == Some(HTLCClaim::OfferedTimeout);
4061 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4062 if offered_preimage_claim || accepted_preimage_claim {
4063 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
4066 macro_rules! log_claim {
4067 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
4068 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
4069 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
4071 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4072 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4073 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4074 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
4075 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
4076 // matched by any HTLC spend:
4077 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
4078 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
4079 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
4080 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
4081 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
4082 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
4083 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
4084 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4085 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4086 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back. We can likely claim the HTLC output with a revocation claim" });
4088 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
4089 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
4090 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, &$htlc.payment_hash,
4091 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
4096 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
4097 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
4098 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
4099 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
4100 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
4101 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
4102 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
4103 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
4112 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
4113 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
4114 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
4115 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
4116 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
4117 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
4118 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
4119 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
4120 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
4121 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
4122 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
4123 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
4124 } else if !$holder_tx {
4125 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4126 if payment_data.is_none() {
4127 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
4130 if payment_data.is_none() {
4131 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
4132 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
4133 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4134 txid: tx.txid(), height, block_hash: Some(*block_hash), transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4135 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4136 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4137 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
4138 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
4139 // If this is a payment to us (ie !outbound_htlc), wait for
4140 // the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from claimable
4141 // balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success transaction (ie
4142 // accepted_preimage_claim).
4143 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim && !outbound_htlc {
4144 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
4147 continue 'outer_loop;
4154 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
4155 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4156 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
4158 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
4159 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
4160 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
4161 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
4164 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
4165 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
4166 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
4169 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
4170 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
4171 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
4172 if accepted_preimage_claim {
4173 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4174 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
4175 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4178 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4179 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4180 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4181 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4182 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4183 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4186 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4188 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4190 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4193 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
4194 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
4195 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
4196 upd.source == source
4198 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
4200 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4202 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4203 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
4204 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
4205 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4206 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
4209 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
4211 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
4213 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4217 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
4218 if entry.height != height { return true; }
4220 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
4221 *htlc_source != source
4226 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4228 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4230 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4231 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
4232 source, payment_hash,
4233 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
4234 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
4237 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", &payment_hash, entry.confirmation_threshold());
4238 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4244 fn get_spendable_outputs(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
4245 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
4246 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4247 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
4248 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4249 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4250 output: outp.clone(),
4251 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4254 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
4255 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
4256 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4257 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4258 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
4259 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
4260 output: outp.clone(),
4261 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2,
4262 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4263 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4267 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
4268 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
4269 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4270 output: outp.clone(),
4271 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
4272 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4273 channel_transaction_parameters: Some(self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.clone()),
4276 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
4277 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
4278 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
4279 output: outp.clone(),
4280 channel_keys_id: Some(self.channel_keys_id),
4287 /// Checks if the confirmed transaction is paying funds back to some address we can assume to
4289 fn check_tx_and_push_spendable_outputs<L: Deref>(
4290 &mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, block_hash: &BlockHash, logger: &WithChannelMonitor<L>,
4291 ) where L::Target: Logger {
4292 for spendable_output in self.get_spendable_outputs(tx) {
4293 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
4295 transaction: Some(tx.clone()),
4297 block_hash: Some(*block_hash),
4298 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
4300 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
4301 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
4306 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
4308 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4309 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4312 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4313 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4316 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4317 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4321 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, M, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (M, T, F, L)
4323 M: Deref<Target = ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4324 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4325 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4328 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4329 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4332 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4333 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4336 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
4337 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &self.3);
4340 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
4341 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
4345 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4347 impl<'a, 'b, ES: EntropySource, SP: SignerProvider> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP)>
4348 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<SP::EcdsaSigner>) {
4349 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4350 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
4354 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4359 let (entropy_source, signer_provider) = args;
4361 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4363 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4364 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4366 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4367 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4369 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
4370 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4371 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4372 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
4375 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4377 let mut counterparty_payment_script: ScriptBuf = Readable::read(reader)?;
4378 let shutdown_script = {
4379 let script = <ScriptBuf as Readable>::read(reader)?;
4380 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
4383 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4384 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
4385 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
4386 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
4387 let outpoint = OutPoint {
4388 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
4389 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
4391 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
4392 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4393 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4395 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
4396 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
4397 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4399 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
4400 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4404 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4405 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
4406 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
4407 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
4409 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
4414 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4416 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4418 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
4421 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
4422 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4423 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4424 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4425 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
4427 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4428 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
4434 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4435 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
4436 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
4437 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4438 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4439 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4440 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
4441 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
4443 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
4444 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4448 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4449 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4450 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
4451 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4452 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4453 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
4454 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4458 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4459 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4460 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
4461 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4462 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4463 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
4464 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4468 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
4469 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4472 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
4474 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4476 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
4478 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4479 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
4481 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4482 let mut payment_preimages = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
4483 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
4484 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
4485 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4486 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
4487 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4491 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4492 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
4493 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
4494 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
4495 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4496 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
4497 1 => MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_info.0),
4498 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4500 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
4503 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4504 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
4505 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
4506 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4507 pending_events.push(event);
4511 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
4513 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4514 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
4515 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
4516 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4517 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
4521 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4522 let mut outputs_to_watch = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<ScriptBuf>>())));
4523 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
4524 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
4525 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4526 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<ScriptBuf>())));
4527 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
4528 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4530 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
4531 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4534 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<SP::EcdsaSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(
4535 reader, (entropy_source, signer_provider, channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id)
4538 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
4539 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4541 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
4542 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4543 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
4544 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4545 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
4546 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
4547 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4551 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
4552 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
4553 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
4554 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
4555 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4558 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
4559 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
4560 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
4561 let mut counterparty_node_id = None;
4562 let mut confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output = None;
4563 let mut spendable_txids_confirmed = Some(Vec::new());
4564 let mut counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs = Some(new_hash_map());
4565 let mut initial_counterparty_commitment_info = None;
4566 let mut channel_id = None;
4567 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4568 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
4569 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, optional_vec),
4570 (5, pending_monitor_events, optional_vec),
4571 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
4572 (9, counterparty_node_id, option),
4573 (11, confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output, option),
4574 (13, spendable_txids_confirmed, optional_vec),
4575 (15, counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs, option),
4576 (17, initial_counterparty_commitment_info, option),
4577 (19, channel_id, option),
4580 // Monitors for anchor outputs channels opened in v0.0.116 suffered from a bug in which the
4581 // wrong `counterparty_payment_script` was being tracked. Fix it now on deserialization to
4582 // give them a chance to recognize the spendable output.
4583 if onchain_tx_handler.channel_type_features().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() &&
4584 counterparty_payment_script.is_v0_p2wpkh()
4586 let payment_point = onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys.payment_point;
4587 counterparty_payment_script =
4588 chan_utils::get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh();
4591 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor::from_impl(ChannelMonitorImpl {
4593 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
4596 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
4597 counterparty_payment_script,
4601 holder_revocation_basepoint,
4602 channel_id: channel_id.unwrap_or(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint)),
4604 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4605 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
4607 counterparty_commitment_params,
4608 funding_redeemscript,
4609 channel_value_satoshis,
4610 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
4615 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
4616 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
4617 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
4618 counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs: counterparty_fulfilled_htlcs.unwrap(),
4620 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
4621 current_holder_commitment_tx,
4622 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
4623 current_holder_commitment_number,
4626 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
4628 is_processing_pending_events: false,
4630 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
4635 lockdown_from_offchain,
4637 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
4638 funding_spend_confirmed,
4639 confirmed_commitment_tx_counterparty_output,
4640 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
4641 spendable_txids_confirmed: spendable_txids_confirmed.unwrap(),
4644 counterparty_node_id,
4645 initial_counterparty_commitment_info,
4652 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
4653 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
4654 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4655 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut};
4656 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
4657 use bitcoin::sighash;
4658 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
4659 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4660 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4661 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4662 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
4663 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4664 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4665 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
4666 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Witness};
4668 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
4670 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
4671 use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
4672 use crate::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
4673 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, WithChannelMonitor};
4674 use crate::chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
4675 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4676 use crate::sign::InMemorySigner;
4677 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, ChannelId};
4678 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint, RevocationKey};
4679 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self,HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
4680 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{PaymentSendFailure, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
4681 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4682 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
4683 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
4684 use crate::util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
4685 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
4686 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
4687 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4689 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
4690 use crate::prelude::*;
4692 use std::str::FromStr;
4694 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
4695 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
4696 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
4697 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
4698 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
4699 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
4700 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
4701 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
4702 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
4704 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
4705 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
4706 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4707 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4708 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4709 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4710 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4711 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4713 // Rebalance somewhat
4714 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
4716 // First route two payments for testing at the end
4717 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4718 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
4720 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
4721 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4722 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
4723 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
4724 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
4725 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
4726 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
4728 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
4729 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
4730 let new_header = create_dummy_header(nodes[0].best_block_info().0, 0);
4731 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4732 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
4733 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
4735 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
4736 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
4737 (&nodes[1].keys_manager.backing, &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing)).unwrap();
4739 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
4740 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
4741 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
4742 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
4743 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
4744 ), false, APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress, {});
4745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4747 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
4748 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
4749 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
4750 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
4751 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().next().unwrap().clone();
4752 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
4753 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
4754 } else { panic!(); }
4755 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
4756 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
4758 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
4760 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
4762 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
4764 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4765 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
4766 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
4767 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
4768 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
4769 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
4770 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4771 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
4772 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
4775 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
4776 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
4777 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
4781 fn test_prune_preimages() {
4782 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4783 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
4784 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster::new(Network::Testnet));
4785 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4787 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4789 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
4792 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
4793 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4794 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
4798 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlcs {
4799 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4801 let mut res = Vec::new();
4802 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
4803 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4807 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
4808 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
4815 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
4816 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
4817 preimages_slice_to_htlcs!($preimages_slice).into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, None)).collect()
4820 let dummy_sig = crate::crypto::utils::sign(&secp_ctx,
4821 &bitcoin::secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(),
4822 &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4824 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
4825 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
4826 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
4827 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
4832 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
4834 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4835 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4836 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4837 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4838 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
4845 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4846 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
4847 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
4848 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
4849 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
4850 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap()))
4852 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
4853 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
4854 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
4855 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
4856 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
4857 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
4858 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
4859 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
4860 selected_contest_delay: 67,
4862 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
4863 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
4865 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
4867 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4868 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
4869 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
4870 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
4871 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
4872 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
4873 best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
4875 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]);
4876 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4878 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4879 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4880 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"1").to_byte_array()),
4881 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
4882 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"2").to_byte_array()),
4883 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
4884 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
4885 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_estimator);
4886 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &logger);
4889 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
4890 let mut secret = [0; 32];
4891 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
4892 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4893 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
4894 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4895 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
4897 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"3").to_byte_array()),
4898 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
4900 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
4901 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
4902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4903 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
4904 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4905 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
4907 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(Txid::from_byte_array(Sha256::hash(b"4").to_byte_array()),
4908 preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
4910 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
4911 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
4912 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]);
4913 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4914 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx.clone(),
4915 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4916 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
4917 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4918 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
4919 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
4920 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
4922 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
4923 let mut htlcs = preimages_slice_to_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]);
4924 let dummy_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut htlcs);
4925 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(dummy_commitment_tx,
4926 htlcs.into_iter().map(|(htlc, _)| (htlc, Some(dummy_sig), None)).collect()).unwrap();
4927 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
4928 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
4929 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
4930 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
4934 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
4935 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
4936 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
4938 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4939 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4940 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
4942 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint};
4943 macro_rules! sign_input {
4944 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
4945 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
4946 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
4948 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
4949 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
4950 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
4952 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), 256, &DelayedPaymentKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &HtlcKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &HtlcBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey), &RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(pubkey), &pubkey)) };
4953 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
4954 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
4955 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4956 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4957 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len() as u64;
4958 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
4959 witness.push(ser_sig);
4960 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
4961 witness.push(vec!(1));
4962 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4963 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
4964 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
4965 witness.push(vec![0]);
4967 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
4969 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
4970 let witness = witness.to_vec();
4971 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
4972 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
4973 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
4977 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
4978 let txid = Txid::from_str("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
4980 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
4981 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
4982 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
4983 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
4985 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
4986 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
4990 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
4991 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
4992 witness: Witness::new(),
4995 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
4996 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
4999 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5000 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_revoked_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5001 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5003 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5004 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5005 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5006 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5009 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5012 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
5013 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5014 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5015 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5017 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5018 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5022 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5023 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5024 witness: Witness::new(),
5027 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5028 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5031 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5032 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features), weight_received_htlc(channel_type_features)];
5033 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5035 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5036 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5037 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5038 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5041 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5044 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
5045 for channel_type_features in [ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies()].iter() {
5046 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
5047 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
5048 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
5049 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
5053 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
5054 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
5055 witness: Witness::new(),
5057 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
5058 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
5061 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight().to_wu();
5062 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
5063 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
5065 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
5066 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
5067 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, channel_type_features);
5068 inputs_total_weight += inp;
5071 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight, claim_tx.weight().to_wu() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
5076 fn test_with_channel_monitor_impl_logger() {
5077 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5078 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
5080 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5082 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
5084 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5085 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5086 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5087 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5088 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
5095 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5096 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
5097 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap())),
5098 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
5099 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap())),
5100 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())),
5102 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: u16::max_value() };
5103 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
5104 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
5105 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
5106 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
5107 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5108 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5109 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5110 selected_contest_delay: 67,
5112 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
5113 channel_type_features: ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key()
5115 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5116 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(Network::Testnet);
5117 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
5118 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &ScriptBuf::new(),
5119 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, ScriptBuf::new()),
5120 &channel_parameters, ScriptBuf::new(), 46, 0, HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(&mut Vec::new()),
5121 best_block, dummy_key, channel_id);
5123 let chan_id = monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().channel_id();
5124 let context_logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&logger, &monitor);
5125 log_error!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5126 log_warn!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5127 log_debug!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5128 log_trace!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5129 log_gossip!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5130 log_info!(context_logger, "This is an error");
5131 logger.assert_log_context_contains("lightning::chain::channelmonitor::tests", Some(dummy_key), Some(chan_id), 6);
5133 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.