1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
13 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
14 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
15 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see [`chain::Watch`] for more.
17 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
18 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
19 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
20 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
21 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
25 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
26 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
36 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
37 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
39 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
40 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
42 use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
43 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
44 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
45 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
46 use chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
47 use chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderFundingOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageSolvingData, PackageTemplate, RevokedOutput, RevokedHTLCOutput};
49 use util::logger::Logger;
50 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48, OptionDeserWrapper};
52 use util::events::Event;
56 use io::{self, Error};
60 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
61 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
62 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
65 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 pub(crate) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
67 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
68 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
69 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update, with one exception specified below.
71 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
72 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
73 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
75 /// The only instance where update_id values are not strictly increasing is the case where we
76 /// allow post-force-close updates with a special update ID of [`CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID`]. See
77 /// its docs for more details.
82 /// (1) a channel has been force closed and
83 /// (2) we receive a preimage from a forward link that allows us to spend an HTLC output on
84 /// this channel's (the backward link's) broadcasted commitment transaction
85 /// then we allow the `ChannelManager` to send a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with this update ID,
86 /// with the update providing said payment preimage. No other update types are allowed after
88 pub const CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID: u64 = core::u64::MAX;
90 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
91 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
92 write_ver_prefix!(w, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
93 self.update_id.write(w)?;
94 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
95 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
96 update_step.write(w)?;
98 write_tlv_fields!(w, {});
102 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
103 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
104 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(r, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
105 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
106 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
107 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::core::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
109 if let Some(upd) = MaybeReadable::read(r)? {
113 read_tlv_fields!(r, {});
114 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
118 /// An event to be processed by the ChannelManager.
119 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
120 pub enum MonitorEvent {
121 /// A monitor event containing an HTLCUpdate.
122 HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate),
124 /// A monitor event that the Channel's commitment transaction was confirmed.
125 CommitmentTxConfirmed(OutPoint),
127 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has completed. See
128 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
130 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure
132 /// The funding outpoint of the [`ChannelMonitor`] that was updated
133 funding_txo: OutPoint,
134 /// The Update ID from [`ChannelMonitorUpdate::update_id`] which was applied or
135 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_update_id`].
137 /// Note that this should only be set to a given update's ID if all previous updates for the
138 /// same [`ChannelMonitor`] have been applied and persisted.
139 monitor_update_id: u64,
142 /// Indicates a [`ChannelMonitor`] update has failed. See
143 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`] for more information on how this is used.
145 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure`]: super::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure
146 UpdateFailed(OutPoint),
148 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorEvent,
149 // Note that UpdateCompleted and UpdateFailed are currently never serialized to disk as they are
150 // generated only in ChainMonitor
151 (0, UpdateCompleted) => {
152 (0, funding_txo, required),
153 (2, monitor_update_id, required),
157 (4, CommitmentTxConfirmed),
161 /// Simple structure sent back by `chain::Watch` when an HTLC from a forward channel is detected on
162 /// chain. Used to update the corresponding HTLC in the backward channel. Failing to pass the
163 /// preimage claim backward will lead to loss of funds.
164 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
165 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
166 pub(crate) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
167 pub(crate) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
168 pub(crate) source: HTLCSource,
169 pub(crate) htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
171 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCUpdate, {
172 (0, payment_hash, required),
173 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
174 (2, source, required),
175 (4, payment_preimage, option),
178 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
179 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
180 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
181 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
182 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
183 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
184 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
185 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 18;
186 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
187 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
188 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
189 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
190 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
191 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
192 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
193 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
194 /// accurate block height.
195 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
196 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
197 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
198 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
199 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding
200 /// inbound HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us
203 /// Note that this is a library-wide security assumption. If a reorg deeper than this number of
204 /// blocks occurs, counterparties may be able to steal funds or claims made by and balances exposed
205 /// by a [`ChannelMonitor`] may be incorrect.
206 // We also use this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
207 // It may cause spurious generation of bumped claim txn but that's alright given the outpoint is already
208 // solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
209 // keep bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
210 pub const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
211 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
212 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
214 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
215 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
216 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
218 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
219 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
221 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
222 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
224 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
225 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
226 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
227 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
229 // TODO(devrandom) replace this with HolderCommitmentTransaction
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
231 struct HolderSignedTx {
232 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
234 revocation_key: PublicKey,
235 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
236 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
237 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
238 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
239 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
240 to_self_value_sat: u64,
243 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderSignedTx, {
245 // Note that this is filled in with data from OnchainTxHandler if it's missing.
246 // For HolderSignedTx objects serialized with 0.0.100+, this should be filled in.
247 (1, to_self_value_sat, (default_value, u64::max_value())),
248 (2, revocation_key, required),
249 (4, a_htlc_key, required),
250 (6, b_htlc_key, required),
251 (8, delayed_payment_key, required),
252 (10, per_commitment_point, required),
253 (12, feerate_per_kw, required),
254 (14, htlc_outputs, vec_type)
257 /// We use this to track static counterparty commitment transaction data and to generate any
258 /// justice or 2nd-stage preimage/timeout transactions.
260 struct CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
261 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
262 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
263 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
266 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
267 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
268 w.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
269 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
270 (0, self.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
271 (2, self.counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
272 (4, self.on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
277 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
278 fn read<R: io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
279 let counterparty_commitment_transaction = {
280 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 had some per-HTLC state stored here, which is no longer
281 // used. Read it for compatibility.
282 let per_htlc_len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
283 for _ in 0..per_htlc_len {
284 let _txid: Txid = Readable::read(r)?;
285 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
286 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
287 let _htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(r)?;
291 let mut counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
292 let mut counterparty_htlc_base_key = OptionDeserWrapper(None);
293 let mut on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16 = 0;
294 read_tlv_fields!(r, {
295 (0, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
296 (2, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
297 (4, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
299 CounterpartyCommitmentParameters {
300 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key.0.unwrap(),
301 counterparty_htlc_base_key: counterparty_htlc_base_key.0.unwrap(),
302 on_counterparty_tx_csv,
305 Ok(counterparty_commitment_transaction)
309 /// An entry for an [`OnchainEvent`], stating the block height when the event was observed and the
310 /// transaction causing it.
312 /// Used to determine when the on-chain event can be considered safe from a chain reorganization.
314 struct OnchainEventEntry {
320 impl OnchainEventEntry {
321 fn confirmation_threshold(&self) -> u32 {
322 let mut conf_threshold = self.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
324 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
325 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(ref descriptor)
327 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
328 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
329 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + descriptor.to_self_delay as u32 - 1);
331 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { on_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } |
332 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { on_to_local_output_csv: Some(csv), .. } => {
333 // A CSV'd transaction is confirmable in block (input height) + CSV delay, which means
334 // it's broadcastable when we see the previous block.
335 conf_threshold = cmp::max(conf_threshold, self.height + csv as u32 - 1);
342 fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
343 best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
347 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
348 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
351 /// An outbound HTLC failing after a transaction is confirmed. Used
352 /// * when an outbound HTLC output is spent by us after the HTLC timed out
353 /// * an outbound HTLC which was not present in the commitment transaction which appeared
354 /// on-chain (either because it was not fully committed to or it was dust).
355 /// Note that this is *not* used for preimage claims, as those are passed upstream immediately,
356 /// appearing only as an `HTLCSpendConfirmation`, below.
359 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
360 htlc_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
361 /// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
362 /// transaction which appeared on chain.
363 commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
366 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
368 /// A spend of the funding output, either a commitment transaction or a cooperative closing
370 FundingSpendConfirmation {
371 /// The CSV delay for the output of the funding spend transaction (implying it is a local
372 /// commitment transaction, and this is the delay on the to_self output).
373 on_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
375 /// A spend of a commitment transaction HTLC output, set in the cases where *no* `HTLCUpdate`
376 /// is constructed. This is used when
377 /// * an outbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty with a preimage, causing us to
378 /// immediately claim the HTLC on the inbound edge and track the resolution here,
379 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by our counterparty (with a timeout),
380 /// * an inbound HTLC is claimed by us (with a preimage).
381 /// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
383 HTLCSpendConfirmation {
384 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
385 /// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
386 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
387 /// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
388 /// we set this to the output CSV value which we will have to wait until to spend the
389 /// output (and generate a SpendableOutput event).
390 on_to_local_output_csv: Option<u16>,
394 impl Writeable for OnchainEventEntry {
395 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
396 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
397 (0, self.txid, required),
398 (2, self.height, required),
399 (4, self.event, required),
405 impl MaybeReadable for OnchainEventEntry {
406 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Option<Self>, DecodeError> {
407 let mut txid = Default::default();
409 let mut event = None;
410 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
412 (2, height, required),
413 (4, event, ignorable),
415 if let Some(ev) = event {
416 Ok(Some(Self { txid, height, event: ev }))
423 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
425 (0, source, required),
426 (1, htlc_value_satoshis, option),
427 (2, payment_hash, required),
428 (3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
430 (1, MaturingOutput) => {
431 (0, descriptor, required),
433 (3, FundingSpendConfirmation) => {
434 (0, on_local_output_csv, option),
436 (5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
437 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
438 (2, preimage, option),
439 (4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
444 #[cfg_attr(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"), derive(PartialEq))]
446 pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
447 LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
448 commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
449 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
451 LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
452 commitment_txid: Txid,
453 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
454 commitment_number: u64,
455 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
458 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
464 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest holder
465 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
467 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest holder commitment transaction as we
468 /// think we've fallen behind!
469 should_broadcast: bool,
472 scriptpubkey: Script,
476 impl ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
477 fn variant_name(&self) -> &'static str {
479 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo",
480 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } => "LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo",
481 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => "PaymentPreimage",
482 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { .. } => "CommitmentSecret",
483 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => "ChannelForceClosed",
484 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { .. } => "ShutdownScript",
489 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
490 (0, LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo) => {
491 (0, commitment_tx, required),
492 (2, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
494 (1, LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo) => {
495 (0, commitment_txid, required),
496 (2, commitment_number, required),
497 (4, their_per_commitment_point, required),
498 (6, htlc_outputs, vec_type),
500 (2, PaymentPreimage) => {
501 (0, payment_preimage, required),
503 (3, CommitmentSecret) => {
505 (2, secret, required),
507 (4, ChannelForceClosed) => {
508 (0, should_broadcast, required),
510 (5, ShutdownScript) => {
511 (0, scriptpubkey, required),
515 /// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
517 /// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
519 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
520 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
522 /// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
523 /// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
524 /// force-closed now.
525 ClaimableOnChannelClose {
526 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
527 /// required to do so.
528 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
530 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
531 /// we consider it spendable.
532 ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
533 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
534 /// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
535 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
536 /// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
538 confirmation_height: u32,
540 /// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
541 /// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
542 /// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
544 /// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
545 /// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
546 /// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
547 ContentiousClaimable {
548 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
549 /// required to do so.
550 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
551 /// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
555 /// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
556 /// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
557 /// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
558 MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
559 /// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
560 /// required to do so.
561 claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
562 /// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
564 claimable_height: u32,
568 /// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
570 struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
571 commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
572 /// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
573 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
576 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
577 (0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
578 (2, payment_preimage, option),
581 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
582 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
584 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
585 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
587 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
588 /// get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
589 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
590 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
592 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor), which
593 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
594 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
595 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
596 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
597 pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
599 pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
601 inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
604 pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
605 latest_update_id: u64,
606 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
608 destination_script: Script,
609 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>,
610 counterparty_payment_script: Script,
611 shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
613 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
614 holder_revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
615 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
616 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
617 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: Option<Txid>,
619 counterparty_commitment_params: CounterpartyCommitmentParameters,
620 funding_redeemscript: Script,
621 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
622 // first is the idx of the first of the two per-commitment points
623 their_cur_per_commitment_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
625 on_holder_tx_csv: u16,
627 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
628 /// The set of outpoints in each counterparty commitment transaction. We always need at least
629 /// the payment hash from `HTLCOutputInCommitment` to claim even a revoked commitment
630 /// transaction broadcast as we need to be able to construct the witness script in all cases.
631 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
632 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
633 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
634 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the counterparty
635 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
636 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
637 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Txid, u64>,
638 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
639 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for counterparty transactions for non-revoked
640 /// counterparty transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
641 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
642 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
644 // We store two holder commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
645 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
646 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a holder
647 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
648 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx>,
649 current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx,
651 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
653 current_counterparty_commitment_number: u64,
654 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
656 current_holder_commitment_number: u64,
658 /// The set of payment hashes from inbound payments for which we know the preimage. Payment
659 /// preimages that are not included in any unrevoked local commitment transaction or unrevoked
660 /// remote commitment transactions are automatically removed when commitment transactions are
662 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
664 // Note that `MonitorEvent`s MUST NOT be generated during update processing, only generated
665 // during chain data processing. This prevents a race in `ChainMonitor::update_channel` (and
666 // presumably user implementations thereof as well) where we update the in-memory channel
667 // object, then before the persistence finishes (as it's all under a read-lock), we return
668 // pending events to the user or to the relevant `ChannelManager`. Then, on reload, we'll have
669 // the pre-event state here, but have processed the event in the `ChannelManager`.
670 // Note that because the `event_lock` in `ChainMonitor` is only taken in
671 // block/transaction-connected events and *not* during block/transaction-disconnected events,
672 // we further MUST NOT generate events during block/transaction-disconnection.
673 pending_monitor_events: Vec<MonitorEvent>,
675 pending_events: Vec<Event>,
677 // Used to track on-chain events (i.e., transactions part of channels confirmed on chain) on
678 // which to take actions once they reach enough confirmations. Each entry includes the
679 // transaction's id and the height when the transaction was confirmed on chain.
680 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec<OnchainEventEntry>,
682 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
683 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
684 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
685 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
686 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>>,
689 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
691 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
693 // This is set when the Channel[Manager] generated a ChannelMonitorUpdate which indicated the
694 // channel has been force-closed. After this is set, no further holder commitment transaction
695 // updates may occur, and we panic!() if one is provided.
696 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
698 // Set once we've signed a holder commitment transaction and handed it over to our
699 // OnchainTxHandler. After this is set, no future updates to our holder commitment transactions
700 // may occur, and we fail any such monitor updates.
702 // In case of update rejection due to a locally already signed commitment transaction, we
703 // nevertheless store update content to track in case of concurrent broadcast by another
704 // remote monitor out-of-order with regards to the block view.
705 holder_tx_signed: bool,
707 // If a spend of the funding output is seen, we set this to true and reject any further
708 // updates. This prevents any further changes in the offchain state no matter the order
709 // of block connection between ChannelMonitors and the ChannelManager.
710 funding_spend_seen: bool,
712 funding_spend_confirmed: Option<Txid>,
713 /// The set of HTLCs which have been either claimed or failed on chain and have reached
714 /// the requisite confirmations on the claim/fail transaction (either ANTI_REORG_DELAY or the
715 /// spending CSV for revocable outputs).
716 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec<IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC>,
718 // We simply modify best_block in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
719 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
720 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
721 // their best_block from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
722 // the full block_connected).
723 best_block: BestBlock,
725 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
728 /// Transaction outputs to watch for on-chain spends.
729 pub type TransactionOutputs = (Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>);
731 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
732 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
734 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
735 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
736 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
737 let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
742 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
743 /// Used only in testing and fuzzing to check serialization roundtrips don't change the underlying
745 impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
746 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
747 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
748 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
749 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
750 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script ||
751 self.counterparty_payment_script != other.counterparty_payment_script ||
752 self.channel_keys_id != other.channel_keys_id ||
753 self.holder_revocation_basepoint != other.holder_revocation_basepoint ||
754 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
755 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.current_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
756 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid != other.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid ||
757 self.counterparty_commitment_params != other.counterparty_commitment_params ||
758 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
759 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
760 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points != other.their_cur_per_commitment_points ||
761 self.on_holder_tx_csv != other.on_holder_tx_csv ||
762 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
763 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints != other.counterparty_claimable_outpoints ||
764 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
765 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number != other.counterparty_hash_commitment_number ||
766 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx ||
767 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number != other.current_counterparty_commitment_number ||
768 self.current_holder_commitment_number != other.current_holder_commitment_number ||
769 self.current_holder_commitment_tx != other.current_holder_commitment_tx ||
770 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
771 self.pending_monitor_events != other.pending_monitor_events ||
772 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
773 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf ||
774 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch ||
775 self.lockdown_from_offchain != other.lockdown_from_offchain ||
776 self.holder_tx_signed != other.holder_tx_signed ||
777 self.funding_spend_seen != other.funding_spend_seen ||
778 self.funding_spend_confirmed != other.funding_spend_confirmed ||
779 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain != other.htlcs_resolved_on_chain
788 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
789 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
790 self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
794 // These are also used for ChannelMonitorUpdate, above.
795 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
796 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
798 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
799 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
800 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
802 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
804 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
805 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
807 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
808 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
809 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
810 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
811 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
812 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
814 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
817 self.counterparty_payment_script.write(writer)?;
818 match &self.shutdown_script {
819 Some(script) => script.write(writer)?,
820 None => Script::new().write(writer)?,
823 self.channel_keys_id.write(writer)?;
824 self.holder_revocation_basepoint.write(writer)?;
825 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
826 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
827 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
828 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
829 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
831 self.counterparty_commitment_params.write(writer)?;
832 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
833 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
835 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
836 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
837 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
838 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
839 match second_option {
840 Some(second_pubkey) => {
841 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
844 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
849 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
853 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.on_holder_tx_csv))?;
855 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
857 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
858 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
859 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
860 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
861 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
862 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
863 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
867 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
868 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
869 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
870 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
871 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
872 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
873 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
877 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
878 for (ref txid, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
879 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
880 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
883 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
884 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
885 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
886 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
889 if let Some(ref prev_holder_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
890 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
891 prev_holder_tx.write(writer)?;
893 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
896 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.write(writer)?;
898 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_counterparty_commitment_number))?;
899 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_holder_commitment_number))?;
901 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
902 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
903 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
906 writer.write_all(&(self.pending_monitor_events.iter().filter(|ev| match ev {
907 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(_) => true,
908 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => true,
910 }).count() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
911 for event in self.pending_monitor_events.iter() {
913 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(upd) => {
917 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
918 _ => {}, // Covered in the TLV writes below
922 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
923 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
924 event.write(writer)?;
927 self.best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
928 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.height()))?;
930 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
931 for ref entry in self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
932 entry.write(writer)?;
935 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
936 for (txid, idx_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
938 (idx_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
939 for (idx, script) in idx_scripts.iter() {
941 script.write(writer)?;
944 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
946 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
947 self.holder_tx_signed.write(writer)?;
949 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
950 (1, self.funding_spend_confirmed, option),
951 (3, self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
952 (5, self.pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
953 (7, self.funding_spend_seen, required),
960 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
961 pub(crate) fn new(secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, keys: Signer, shutdown_script: Option<Script>,
962 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
963 channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters,
964 funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
965 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
966 initial_holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
967 best_block: BestBlock) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
969 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
970 let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
971 let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
973 let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
974 let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
975 let counterparty_htlc_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.htlc_basepoint;
976 let counterparty_commitment_params = CounterpartyCommitmentParameters { counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, counterparty_htlc_base_key, on_counterparty_tx_csv };
978 let channel_keys_id = keys.channel_keys_id();
979 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
981 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
982 let (holder_commitment_tx, current_holder_commitment_number) = {
983 let trusted_tx = initial_holder_commitment_tx.trust();
984 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
986 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
987 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderSignedTx {
989 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
990 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
991 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
992 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
993 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
994 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
995 to_self_value_sat: initial_holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
996 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
998 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
1001 let onchain_tx_handler =
1002 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys,
1003 channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx, secp_ctx.clone());
1005 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
1006 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
1009 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
1010 latest_update_id: 0,
1011 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1013 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1014 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
1015 counterparty_payment_script,
1019 holder_revocation_basepoint,
1021 current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1022 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
1024 counterparty_commitment_params,
1025 funding_redeemscript,
1026 channel_value_satoshis,
1027 their_cur_per_commitment_points: None,
1029 on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
1031 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1032 counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1033 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1034 counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1036 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1037 current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
1038 current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1039 current_holder_commitment_number,
1041 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1042 pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
1043 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1045 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf: Vec::new(),
1050 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1051 holder_tx_signed: false,
1052 funding_spend_seen: false,
1053 funding_spend_confirmed: None,
1054 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: Vec::new(),
1064 fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1065 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
1068 /// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1069 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1070 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1071 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1072 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
1075 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
1076 commitment_number: u64,
1077 their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
1079 ) where L::Target: Logger {
1080 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
1081 txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1085 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
1086 &self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
1087 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
1088 ) -> Result<(), ()> {
1089 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs).map_err(|_| ())
1092 /// This is used to provide payment preimage(s) out-of-band during startup without updating the
1093 /// off-chain state with a new commitment transaction.
1094 pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1096 payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
1097 payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
1102 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1103 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1106 self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
1107 payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1110 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
1115 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1118 self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
1121 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1124 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1125 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1127 updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1133 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1134 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1137 self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1140 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1142 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1143 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
1146 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1147 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
1148 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
1151 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1152 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1153 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>)> {
1154 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch()
1155 .iter().map(|(txid, outputs)| (*txid, outputs.clone())).collect()
1158 /// Loads the funding txo and outputs to watch into the given `chain::Filter` by repeatedly
1159 /// calling `chain::Filter::register_output` and `chain::Filter::register_tx` until all outputs
1160 /// have been registered.
1161 pub fn load_outputs_to_watch<F: Deref>(&self, filter: &F) where F::Target: chain::Filter {
1162 let lock = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1163 filter.register_tx(&lock.get_funding_txo().0.txid, &lock.get_funding_txo().1);
1164 for (txid, outputs) in lock.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
1165 for (index, script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
1166 assert!(*index <= u16::max_value() as u32);
1167 filter.register_output(WatchedOutput {
1169 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: *txid, index: *index as u16 },
1170 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
1176 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1177 /// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
1178 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
1179 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
1182 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1185 /// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1186 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1187 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1188 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
1189 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
1192 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1193 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
1196 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1197 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
1200 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1201 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
1204 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
1205 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
1206 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
1207 /// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1208 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1209 /// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1210 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1211 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1212 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1213 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1214 where L::Target: Logger {
1215 self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1218 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1219 /// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1220 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1221 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
1222 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
1223 where L::Target: Logger {
1224 self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
1227 /// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
1228 /// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
1229 /// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
1230 /// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
1231 /// - detect settled outputs for later spending
1232 /// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
1234 /// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
1235 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
1237 /// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
1238 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1240 header: &BlockHeader,
1241 txdata: &TransactionData,
1246 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1248 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1249 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1252 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
1253 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1256 /// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
1258 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1260 header: &BlockHeader,
1266 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1267 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1270 self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
1271 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1274 /// Processes transactions confirmed in a block with the given header and height, returning new
1275 /// outputs to watch. See [`block_connected`] for details.
1277 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1278 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1280 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1281 pub fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1283 header: &BlockHeader,
1284 txdata: &TransactionData,
1289 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1291 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1292 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1295 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transactions_confirmed(
1296 header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1299 /// Processes a transaction that was reorganized out of the chain.
1301 /// Used instead of [`block_disconnected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather
1302 /// than blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1304 /// [`block_disconnected`]: Self::block_disconnected
1305 pub fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1312 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1313 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1316 self.inner.lock().unwrap().transaction_unconfirmed(
1317 txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1320 /// Updates the monitor with the current best chain tip, returning new outputs to watch. See
1321 /// [`block_connected`] for details.
1323 /// Used instead of [`block_connected`] by clients that are notified of transactions rather than
1324 /// blocks. See [`chain::Confirm`] for calling expectations.
1326 /// [`block_connected`]: Self::block_connected
1327 pub fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1329 header: &BlockHeader,
1334 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
1336 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1337 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1340 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block_updated(
1341 header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1344 /// Returns the set of txids that should be monitored for re-organization out of the chain.
1345 pub fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
1346 let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1347 let mut txids: Vec<Txid> = inner.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
1349 .map(|entry| entry.txid)
1350 .chain(inner.onchain_tx_handler.get_relevant_txids().into_iter())
1352 txids.sort_unstable();
1357 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
1358 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
1359 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
1360 self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
1363 /// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
1364 /// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
1367 /// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
1368 /// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
1369 /// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
1370 /// confirmations on the claim transaction.
1372 /// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
1373 /// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
1376 /// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
1377 /// may be returned here and their meanings.
1378 pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
1379 let mut res = Vec::new();
1380 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1382 let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
1383 let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
1384 let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1385 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1386 Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
1389 if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
1390 debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
1391 "We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
1392 confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
1393 pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
1396 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1397 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1398 for htlc in $htlc_iter {
1399 if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1400 if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1401 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
1402 if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1405 debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
1406 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1407 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1408 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1410 } else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
1411 // Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
1412 // HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
1413 // commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
1414 // reached, even though HTLCs may be resolved after only
1415 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
1416 debug_assert!($holder_commitment || us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
1417 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1418 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1419 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1420 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1421 let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1422 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1423 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1424 Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
1427 if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
1428 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1429 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1430 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1433 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1434 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1435 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1438 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1439 // Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
1440 // we know the preimage.
1441 // Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
1442 // preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
1443 // to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
1444 let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1445 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
1446 if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
1447 Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
1451 if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
1452 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1453 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1454 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1457 res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
1458 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1459 timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1468 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1469 let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
1470 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1471 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
1472 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1473 if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1474 if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
1475 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
1477 Some(descriptor.output.value)
1480 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1481 claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
1482 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1485 // If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
1486 // should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
1487 // confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
1490 found_commitment_tx = true;
1491 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1492 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1493 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1494 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1495 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1496 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1499 found_commitment_tx = true;
1500 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1501 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1502 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
1503 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1504 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1505 claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
1506 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1509 found_commitment_tx = true;
1512 if !found_commitment_tx {
1513 if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
1514 // We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
1515 // neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
1516 // the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
1517 res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1518 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
1519 confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
1523 // TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
1526 let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
1527 for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1528 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
1530 res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
1531 claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1532 claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1534 } else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
1535 claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1538 res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1539 claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
1546 /// Gets the set of outbound HTLCs which are pending resolution in this channel.
1547 /// This is used to reconstruct pending outbound payments on restart in the ChannelManager.
1548 pub(crate) fn get_pending_outbound_htlcs(&self) -> HashMap<HTLCSource, HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1549 let mut res = HashMap::new();
1550 let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
1552 macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
1553 ($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
1554 for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
1555 if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
1556 // We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
1557 // have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
1559 // TODO: Once tests all connect transactions at consensus-valid times, we
1560 // should assert here like we do in `get_claimable_balances`.
1561 } else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
1562 // If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
1563 // indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
1564 // and awaiting confirmations on it.
1565 let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
1566 if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
1567 // If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
1568 // before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
1569 // provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
1570 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
1571 us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
1572 } else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
1573 // If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
1574 // immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
1576 Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
1579 if !htlc_update_confd {
1580 res.insert(source.clone(), htlc.clone());
1587 // We're only concerned with the confirmation count of HTLC transactions, and don't
1588 // actually care how many confirmations a commitment transaction may or may not have. Thus,
1589 // we look for either a FundingSpendConfirmation event or a funding_spend_confirmed.
1590 let confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed.or_else(|| {
1591 us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
1592 if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
1597 if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
1598 if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1599 walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().filter_map(|(a, b)| {
1600 if let &Some(ref source) = b {
1601 Some((a, &**source))
1604 } else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
1605 walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1606 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1608 } else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1609 if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
1610 walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().filter_map(|(a, _, c)| {
1611 if let Some(source) = c { Some((a, source)) } else { None }
1616 // If we have not seen a commitment transaction on-chain (ie the channel is not yet
1617 // closed), just examine the available counterparty commitment transactions. See docs
1618 // on `fail_unbroadcast_htlcs`, below, for justification.
1619 macro_rules! walk_counterparty_commitment {
1621 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1622 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1623 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1624 res.insert((**source).clone(), htlc.clone());
1630 if let Some(ref txid) = us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1631 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1633 if let Some(ref txid) = us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1634 walk_counterparty_commitment!(txid);
1641 pub(crate) fn get_stored_preimages(&self) -> HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage> {
1642 self.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.clone()
1646 /// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
1647 /// failing any HTLCs which didn't make it into the broadcasted commitment transaction back
1648 /// after ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
1650 /// We always compare against the set of HTLCs in counterparty commitment transactions, as those
1651 /// are the commitment transactions which are generated by us. The off-chain state machine in
1652 /// `Channel` will automatically resolve any HTLCs which were never included in a commitment
1653 /// transaction when it detects channel closure, but it is up to us to ensure any HTLCs which were
1654 /// included in a remote commitment transaction are failed back if they are not present in the
1655 /// broadcasted commitment transaction.
1657 /// Specifically, the removal process for HTLCs in `Channel` is always based on the counterparty
1658 /// sending a `revoke_and_ack`, which causes us to clear `prev_counterparty_commitment_txid`. Thus,
1659 /// as long as we examine both the current counterparty commitment transaction and, if it hasn't
1660 /// been revoked yet, the previous one, we we will never "forget" to resolve an HTLC.
1661 macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
1662 ($self: expr, $commitment_tx_type: expr, $commitment_txid_confirmed: expr,
1663 $commitment_tx_conf_height: expr, $confirmed_htlcs_list: expr, $logger: expr) => { {
1664 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1665 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1666 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = $self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1667 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1668 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1669 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1670 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1671 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1672 // payment_preimage.
1673 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1674 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1675 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1676 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1678 let confirmed_htlcs_iter: &mut Iterator<Item = (&HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = &mut $confirmed_htlcs_list;
1679 let mut matched_htlc = false;
1680 for (ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in confirmed_htlcs_iter {
1681 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(&**source) == *broadcast_source {
1682 matched_htlc = true;
1686 if matched_htlc { continue; }
1687 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
1688 if entry.height != $commitment_tx_conf_height { return true; }
1690 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref update_source, .. } => {
1691 *update_source != **source
1696 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
1697 txid: $commitment_txid_confirmed,
1698 height: $commitment_tx_conf_height,
1699 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
1700 source: (**source).clone(),
1701 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
1702 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
1703 commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
1706 log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction {}, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
1707 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, $commitment_tx_type,
1708 $commitment_txid_confirmed, entry.confirmation_threshold());
1709 $self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
1715 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1716 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1718 if let Some(ref txid) = $self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1719 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous");
1724 impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
1725 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1726 /// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
1727 /// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1728 fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1729 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1730 return Err("Previous secret did not match new one");
1733 // Prune HTLCs from the previous counterparty commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1734 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1735 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid.take() {
1736 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1741 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1742 let cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_holder_commitment_tx;
1743 let prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1744 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1745 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number;
1747 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1748 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1749 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1753 if let Some(prev_holder_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1754 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1755 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1760 let contains = if let Some(cn) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1767 counterparty_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1776 pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_per_commitment_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
1777 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1778 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1779 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1781 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1782 self.counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1785 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking new counterparty commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1786 self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid.take();
1787 self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Some(txid);
1788 self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlc_outputs.clone());
1789 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1790 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-counterparty-transaction output storage stuff
1791 match self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
1792 Some(old_points) => {
1793 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1794 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
1795 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1796 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1797 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_per_commitment_point)));
1799 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1802 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1806 self.their_cur_per_commitment_points = Some((commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point, None));
1809 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs.len());
1810 for htlc in htlc_outputs {
1811 if htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
1817 /// Informs this monitor of the latest holder (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1818 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1819 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1820 /// up-to-date as our holder commitment transaction is updated.
1821 /// Panics if set_on_holder_tx_csv has never been called.
1822 fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(&mut self, holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
1823 // block for Rust 1.34 compat
1824 let mut new_holder_commitment_tx = {
1825 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
1826 let txid = trusted_tx.txid();
1827 let tx_keys = trusted_tx.keys();
1828 self.current_holder_commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
1831 revocation_key: tx_keys.revocation_key,
1832 a_htlc_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key,
1833 b_htlc_key: tx_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key,
1834 delayed_payment_key: tx_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1835 per_commitment_point: tx_keys.per_commitment_point,
1837 to_self_value_sat: holder_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
1838 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
1841 self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(holder_commitment_tx);
1842 mem::swap(&mut new_holder_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
1843 self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_holder_commitment_tx);
1844 if self.holder_tx_signed {
1845 return Err("Latest holder commitment signed has already been signed, update is rejected");
1850 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1851 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1852 fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
1853 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1854 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1857 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1859 // If the channel is force closed, try to claim the output from this preimage.
1860 // First check if a counterparty commitment transaction has been broadcasted:
1861 macro_rules! claim_htlcs {
1862 ($commitment_number: expr, $txid: expr) => {
1863 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs($commitment_number, $txid, None);
1864 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), htlc_claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1867 if let Some(txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1868 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1869 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1873 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
1874 if let Some(commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&txid) {
1875 claim_htlcs!(*commitment_number, txid);
1880 // Then if a holder commitment transaction has been seen on-chain, broadcast transactions
1881 // claiming the HTLC output from each of the holder commitment transactions.
1882 // Note that we can't just use `self.holder_tx_signed`, because that only covers the case where
1883 // *we* sign a holder commitment transaction, not when e.g. a watchtower broadcasts one of our
1884 // holder commitment transactions.
1885 if self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.is_some() {
1886 // Assume that the broadcasted commitment transaction confirmed in the current best
1887 // block. Even if not, its a reasonable metric for the bump criteria on the HTLC
1889 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
1890 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1891 if let Some(ref tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
1892 let (claim_reqs, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&tx, self.best_block.height());
1893 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&Vec::new(), claim_reqs, self.best_block.height(), self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
1898 pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B, logger: &L)
1899 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1902 for tx in self.get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger).iter() {
1903 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting local {}", log_tx!(tx));
1904 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1906 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
1909 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()>
1910 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1911 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1914 log_info!(logger, "Applying update to monitor {}, bringing update_id from {} to {} with {} changes.",
1915 log_funding_info!(self), self.latest_update_id, updates.update_id, updates.updates.len());
1916 // ChannelMonitor updates may be applied after force close if we receive a
1917 // preimage for a broadcasted commitment transaction HTLC output that we'd
1918 // like to claim on-chain. If this is the case, we no longer have guaranteed
1919 // access to the monitor's update ID, so we use a sentinel value instead.
1920 if updates.update_id == CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID {
1921 assert_eq!(updates.updates.len(), 1);
1922 match updates.updates[0] {
1923 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { .. } => {},
1925 log_error!(logger, "Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate of type {}", updates.updates[0].variant_name());
1926 panic!("Attempted to apply post-force-close ChannelMonitorUpdate that wasn't providing a payment preimage");
1929 } else if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1930 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1932 let mut ret = Ok(());
1933 for update in updates.updates.iter() {
1935 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1936 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest holder commitment transaction info");
1937 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1938 if let Err(e) = self.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx.clone(), htlc_outputs.clone()) {
1939 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest holder commitment transaction failed/was refused:");
1940 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
1944 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_per_commitment_point } => {
1945 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with latest counterparty commitment transaction info");
1946 self.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(*commitment_txid, htlc_outputs.clone(), *commitment_number, *their_per_commitment_point, logger)
1948 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } => {
1949 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with payment preimage");
1950 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
1952 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } => {
1953 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with commitment secret");
1954 if let Err(e) = self.provide_secret(*idx, *secret) {
1955 log_error!(logger, "Providing latest counterparty commitment secret failed/was refused:");
1956 log_error!(logger, " {}", e);
1960 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1961 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor: channel force closed, should broadcast: {}", should_broadcast);
1962 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1963 if *should_broadcast {
1964 self.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger);
1965 } else if !self.holder_tx_signed {
1966 log_error!(logger, "You have a toxic holder commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1968 // If we generated a MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed, the ChannelManager
1969 // will still give us a ChannelForceClosed event with !should_broadcast, but we
1970 // shouldn't print the scary warning above.
1971 log_info!(logger, "Channel off-chain state closed after we broadcasted our latest commitment transaction.");
1974 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript { scriptpubkey } => {
1975 log_trace!(logger, "Updating ChannelMonitor with shutdown script");
1976 if let Some(shutdown_script) = self.shutdown_script.replace(scriptpubkey.clone()) {
1977 panic!("Attempted to replace shutdown script {} with {}", shutdown_script, scriptpubkey);
1982 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1984 if ret.is_ok() && self.funding_spend_seen {
1985 log_error!(logger, "Refusing Channel Monitor Update as counterparty attempted to update commitment after funding was spent");
1990 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1991 self.latest_update_id
1994 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
1998 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
1999 // If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
2000 // of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
2001 // its trivial to do, double-check that here.
2002 for (txid, _) in self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
2003 self.outputs_to_watch.get(txid).expect("Counterparty commitment txn which have been broadcast should have outputs registered");
2005 &self.outputs_to_watch
2008 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
2009 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2010 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
2014 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
2015 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2016 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
2020 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
2021 fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
2022 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
2025 pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
2026 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
2029 pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2030 self.current_counterparty_commitment_number
2033 pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
2034 self.current_holder_commitment_number
2037 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
2038 /// data in counterparty_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
2039 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
2040 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
2041 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
2042 /// revoked counterparty commitment tx
2043 fn check_spend_counterparty_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs) where L::Target: Logger {
2044 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
2045 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
2046 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2047 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2049 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2050 let per_commitment_option = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
2052 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2053 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2056 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2061 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
2062 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
2063 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
2064 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2065 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2066 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.holder_revocation_basepoint));
2067 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key));
2069 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &delayed_key);
2070 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2072 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_holder & to_counterparty)
2073 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2074 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2075 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, outp.value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2076 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, idx as u32, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2077 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2081 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
2082 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2083 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
2084 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2085 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
2086 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2087 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
2089 let revk_htlc_outp = RevokedHTLCOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc.clone(), self.onchain_tx_handler.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
2090 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(revk_htlc_outp), htlc.cltv_expiry, true, height);
2091 claimable_outpoints.push(justice_package);
2096 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
2097 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
2098 // We're definitely a counterparty commitment transaction!
2099 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
2100 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2101 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2103 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2105 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "revoked counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
2106 [].iter().map(|a| *a), logger);
2108 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
2109 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
2110 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
2111 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
2112 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
2113 // already processed the block, resulting in the counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
2114 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
2116 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2117 watch_outputs.push((idx as u32, outp.clone()));
2119 self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
2121 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of non-revoked counterparty commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
2122 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "counterparty", commitment_txid, height,
2123 per_commitment_data.iter().map(|(htlc, htlc_source)|
2124 (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref().map(|htlc_source| htlc_source.as_ref()))
2127 let htlc_claim_reqs = self.get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(commitment_number, commitment_txid, Some(tx));
2128 for req in htlc_claim_reqs {
2129 claimable_outpoints.push(req);
2133 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2136 fn get_counterparty_htlc_output_claim_reqs(&self, commitment_number: u64, commitment_txid: Txid, tx: Option<&Transaction>) -> Vec<PackageTemplate> {
2137 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2138 if let Some(htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
2139 if let Some(per_commitment_points) = self.their_cur_per_commitment_points {
2140 let per_commitment_point_option =
2141 // If the counterparty commitment tx is the latest valid state, use their latest
2142 // per-commitment point
2143 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&per_commitment_points.1) }
2144 else if let Some(point) = per_commitment_points.2.as_ref() {
2145 // If counterparty commitment tx is the state previous to the latest valid state, use
2146 // their previous per-commitment point (non-atomicity of revocation means it's valid for
2147 // them to temporarily have two valid commitment txns from our viewpoint)
2148 if per_commitment_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
2150 if let Some(per_commitment_point) = per_commitment_point_option {
2151 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in htlc_outputs.iter().enumerate() {
2152 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2153 if let Some(transaction) = tx {
2154 if transaction_output_index as usize >= transaction.output.len() ||
2155 transaction.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 {
2156 return claimable_outpoints; // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
2159 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
2160 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
2161 let counterparty_htlc_outp = if htlc.offered {
2162 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(
2163 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2164 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2165 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2166 preimage.unwrap(), htlc.clone()))
2168 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(
2169 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(*per_commitment_point,
2170 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
2171 self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key,
2174 let aggregation = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
2175 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(commitment_txid, transaction_output_index, counterparty_htlc_outp, htlc.cltv_expiry,aggregation, 0);
2176 claimable_outpoints.push(counterparty_package);
2186 /// Attempts to claim a counterparty HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2187 fn check_spend_counterparty_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, logger: &L) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<TransactionOutputs>) where L::Target: Logger {
2188 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
2189 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
2190 return (Vec::new(), None)
2193 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2194 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2197 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
2202 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
2203 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2204 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2206 log_error!(logger, "Got broadcast of revoked counterparty HTLC transaction, spending {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
2207 let revk_outp = RevokedOutput::build(per_commitment_point, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, self.counterparty_commitment_params.counterparty_htlc_base_key, per_commitment_key, tx.output[0].value, self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv);
2208 let justice_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(htlc_txid, 0, PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(revk_outp), height + self.counterparty_commitment_params.on_counterparty_tx_csv as u32, true, height);
2209 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(justice_package);
2210 let outputs = vec![(0, tx.output[0].clone())];
2211 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, outputs)))
2214 // Returns (1) `PackageTemplate`s that can be given to the OnChainTxHandler, so that the handler can
2215 // broadcast transactions claiming holder HTLC commitment outputs and (2) a holder revokable
2216 // script so we can detect whether a holder transaction has been seen on-chain.
2217 fn get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, conf_height: u32) -> (Vec<PackageTemplate>, Option<(Script, PublicKey, PublicKey)>) {
2218 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2220 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&holder_tx.revocation_key, self.on_holder_tx_csv, &holder_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2221 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), holder_tx.per_commitment_point.clone(), holder_tx.revocation_key.clone()));
2223 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2224 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2225 let htlc_output = if htlc.offered {
2226 HolderHTLCOutput::build_offered(htlc.amount_msat, htlc.cltv_expiry)
2228 let payment_preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2231 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2234 HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat)
2236 let htlc_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(holder_tx.txid, transaction_output_index, PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(htlc_output), htlc.cltv_expiry, false, conf_height);
2237 claim_requests.push(htlc_package);
2241 (claim_requests, broadcasted_holder_revokable_script)
2244 // Returns holder HTLC outputs to watch and react to in case of spending.
2245 fn get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self, holder_tx: &HolderSignedTx, commitment_tx: &Transaction) -> Vec<(u32, TxOut)> {
2246 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(holder_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2247 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2248 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2249 watch_outputs.push((transaction_output_index, commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone()));
2255 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2256 /// revoked using data in holder_claimable_outpoints.
2257 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2258 /// Returns None unless the transaction is definitely one of our commitment transactions.
2259 fn check_spend_holder_transaction<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<(Vec<PackageTemplate>, TransactionOutputs)> where L::Target: Logger {
2260 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2261 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
2262 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2264 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2265 ($updates: expr, $to_watch: expr) => {
2266 claim_requests = $updates.0;
2267 self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = $updates.1;
2268 watch_outputs.append(&mut $to_watch);
2272 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous holder commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2273 let mut is_holder_tx = false;
2275 if self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2276 is_holder_tx = true;
2277 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of latest holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2278 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, height);
2279 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, tx);
2280 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2281 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "latest holder", commitment_txid, height,
2282 self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter()
2283 .map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())), logger);
2284 } else if let &Some(ref holder_tx) = &self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2285 if holder_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2286 is_holder_tx = true;
2287 log_info!(logger, "Got broadcast of previous holder commitment tx {}, searching for available HTLCs to claim", commitment_txid);
2288 let res = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(holder_tx, height);
2289 let mut to_watch = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(holder_tx, tx);
2290 append_onchain_update!(res, to_watch);
2291 fail_unbroadcast_htlcs!(self, "previous holder", commitment_txid, height,
2292 holder_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(htlc, _, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.as_ref())),
2298 Some((claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)))
2304 pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2305 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
2306 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2307 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2308 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2309 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2310 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2311 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2312 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2313 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2314 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2317 } else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
2318 // Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
2319 // current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
2320 // `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
2321 // Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
2322 // confirmed in the next block.
2325 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2326 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2327 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2331 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2332 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2336 #[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
2337 /// Note that this includes possibly-locktimed-in-the-future transactions!
2338 fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
2339 log_debug!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
2340 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2341 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
2342 let mut holder_transactions = vec![commitment_tx];
2343 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2344 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
2345 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
2346 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
2347 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
2351 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
2352 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
2353 holder_transactions.push(htlc_tx);
2360 pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2361 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2362 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2365 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2366 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2368 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
2371 fn best_block_updated<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2373 header: &BlockHeader,
2378 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2380 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2381 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2384 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2386 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2387 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2388 self.block_confirmed(height, vec![], vec![], vec![], &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2389 } else if block_hash != self.best_block.block_hash() {
2390 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2391 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height <= height);
2392 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height + 1, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2394 } else { Vec::new() }
2397 fn transactions_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2399 header: &BlockHeader,
2400 txdata: &TransactionData,
2405 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2407 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2408 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2411 let txn_matched = self.filter_block(txdata);
2412 for tx in &txn_matched {
2413 let mut output_val = 0;
2414 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2415 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2416 output_val += out.value;
2417 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2421 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
2423 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2424 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
2425 for tx in &txn_matched {
2426 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2427 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2428 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2429 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2431 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2432 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
2433 let mut balance_spendable_csv = None;
2434 log_info!(logger, "Channel {} closed by funding output spend in txid {}.",
2435 log_bytes!(self.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()), tx.txid());
2436 self.funding_spend_seen = true;
2437 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2438 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_counterparty_transaction(&tx, height, &logger);
2439 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2440 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2442 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2443 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
2444 if let Some((mut new_outpoints, new_outputs)) = self.check_spend_holder_transaction(&tx, height, &logger) {
2445 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2446 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2448 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2449 balance_spendable_csv = Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv);
2453 let txid = tx.txid();
2454 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2457 event: OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation {
2458 on_local_output_csv: balance_spendable_csv,
2462 if let Some(&commitment_number) = self.counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2463 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_counterparty_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, &logger);
2464 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2465 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
2466 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2471 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2472 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2473 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2474 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2476 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height, &logger);
2479 if height > self.best_block.height() {
2480 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
2483 self.block_confirmed(height, txn_matched, watch_outputs, claimable_outpoints, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger)
2486 /// Update state for new block(s)/transaction(s) confirmed. Note that the caller must update
2487 /// `self.best_block` before calling if a new best blockchain tip is available. More
2488 /// concretely, `self.best_block` must never be at a lower height than `conf_height`, avoiding
2489 /// complexity especially in `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`.
2491 /// `conf_height` should be set to the height at which any new transaction(s)/block(s) were
2492 /// confirmed at, even if it is not the current best height.
2493 fn block_confirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2496 txn_matched: Vec<&Transaction>,
2497 mut watch_outputs: Vec<TransactionOutputs>,
2498 mut claimable_outpoints: Vec<PackageTemplate>,
2502 ) -> Vec<TransactionOutputs>
2504 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2505 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2508 log_trace!(logger, "Processing {} matched transactions for block at height {}.", txn_matched.len(), conf_height);
2509 debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
2511 let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
2512 if should_broadcast {
2513 let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
2514 let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
2515 claimable_outpoints.push(commitment_package);
2516 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(self.funding_info.0));
2517 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
2518 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
2519 // Because we're broadcasting a commitment transaction, we should construct the package
2520 // assuming it gets confirmed in the next block. Sadly, we have code which considers
2521 // "not yet confirmed" things as discardable, so we cannot do that here.
2522 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, self.best_block.height());
2523 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
2524 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2525 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2527 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
2530 // Find which on-chain events have reached their confirmation threshold.
2531 let onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf =
2532 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2533 let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
2534 for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
2535 if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
2536 onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2538 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2542 // Used to check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2543 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2544 let unmatured_htlcs: Vec<_> = self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf
2546 .filter_map(|entry| match &entry.event {
2547 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source, .. } => Some(source),
2551 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2552 let mut matured_htlcs = Vec::new();
2554 // Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
2555 for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
2557 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, htlc_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
2558 // Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
2559 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2562 unmatured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == &source).is_none(),
2563 "An unmature HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2564 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2565 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2567 matured_htlcs.iter().find(|&htlc| htlc == source).is_none(),
2568 "A matured HTLC transaction conflicts with a maturing one; failed to \
2569 call either transaction_unconfirmed for the conflicting transaction \
2570 or block_disconnected for a block containing it.");
2571 matured_htlcs.push(source.clone());
2574 log_debug!(logger, "HTLC {} failure update in {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream",
2575 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.txid);
2576 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2578 payment_preimage: None,
2579 source: source.clone(),
2580 htlc_value_satoshis,
2582 if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
2583 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
2586 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
2587 log_debug!(logger, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
2588 self.pending_events.push(Event::SpendableOutputs {
2589 outputs: vec![descriptor]
2592 OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
2593 self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
2595 OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
2596 self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
2601 self.onchain_tx_handler.update_claims_view(&txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, conf_height, self.best_block.height(), broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2603 // Determine new outputs to watch by comparing against previously known outputs to watch,
2604 // updating the latter in the process.
2605 watch_outputs.retain(|&(ref txid, ref txouts)| {
2606 let idx_and_scripts = txouts.iter().map(|o| (o.0, o.1.script_pubkey.clone())).collect();
2607 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), idx_and_scripts).is_none()
2611 // If we see a transaction for which we registered outputs previously,
2612 // make sure the registered scriptpubkey at the expected index match
2613 // the actual transaction output one. We failed this case before #653.
2614 for tx in &txn_matched {
2615 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&tx.txid()) {
2616 for idx_and_script in outputs.iter() {
2617 assert!((idx_and_script.0 as usize) < tx.output.len());
2618 assert_eq!(tx.output[idx_and_script.0 as usize].script_pubkey, idx_and_script.1);
2626 pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
2627 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2628 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2631 log_trace!(logger, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", header.block_hash(), height);
2634 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2635 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
2636 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| entry.height < height);
2638 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2640 self.best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, height - 1);
2643 fn transaction_unconfirmed<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2650 B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2651 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2654 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| if entry.txid == *txid {
2655 log_info!(logger, "Removing onchain event with txid {}", txid);
2658 self.onchain_tx_handler.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger);
2661 /// Filters a block's `txdata` for transactions spending watched outputs or for any child
2662 /// transactions thereof.
2663 fn filter_block<'a>(&self, txdata: &TransactionData<'a>) -> Vec<&'a Transaction> {
2664 let mut matched_txn = HashSet::new();
2665 txdata.iter().filter(|&&(_, tx)| {
2666 let mut matches = self.spends_watched_output(tx);
2667 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2668 if matches { break; }
2669 if matched_txn.contains(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2674 matched_txn.insert(tx.txid());
2677 }).map(|(_, tx)| *tx).collect()
2680 /// Checks if a given transaction spends any watched outputs.
2681 fn spends_watched_output(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> bool {
2682 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2683 if let Some(outputs) = self.get_outputs_to_watch().get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2684 for (idx, _script_pubkey) in outputs.iter() {
2685 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
2688 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
2689 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
2690 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
2691 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2692 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2693 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
2694 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
2695 } else { panic!(); }
2706 fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
2707 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2708 // * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2709 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2710 // * are in our latest holder commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2711 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2712 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2713 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2714 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2715 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2716 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2717 let height = self.best_block.height();
2718 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2719 ($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2720 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2721 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2722 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2723 // time out the HTLC first.
2724 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2725 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2726 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2727 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2728 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2729 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2730 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2731 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2732 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2733 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2734 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2735 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2736 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2737 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2738 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2739 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2740 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2741 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2742 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2743 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2744 let htlc_outbound = $holder_tx == htlc.offered;
2745 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2746 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2747 log_info!(logger, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2754 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2756 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2757 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2758 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2761 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
2762 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2763 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2770 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a holder
2771 /// or counterparty commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2772 fn is_resolving_htlc_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2773 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2774 let mut payment_data = None;
2775 let witness_items = input.witness.len();
2776 let htlctype = input.witness.last().map(|w| w.len()).and_then(HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype);
2777 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
2778 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
2779 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
2780 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2781 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2782 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2783 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
2784 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
2785 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2787 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2788 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2789 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
2790 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2791 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap());
2794 macro_rules! log_claim {
2795 ($tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2796 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == $htlc.offered;
2797 // HTLCs must either be claimed by a matching script type or through the
2799 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2800 debug_assert!(!$htlc.offered || offered_preimage_claim || offered_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2801 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2802 debug_assert!($htlc.offered || accepted_preimage_claim || accepted_timeout_claim || revocation_sig_claim);
2803 // Further, only exactly one of the possible spend paths should have been
2804 // matched by any HTLC spend:
2805 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))] // Note that the fuzzer is not bound by pesky things like "signatures"
2806 debug_assert_eq!(accepted_preimage_claim as u8 + accepted_timeout_claim as u8 +
2807 offered_preimage_claim as u8 + offered_timeout_claim as u8 +
2808 revocation_sig_claim as u8, 1);
2809 if ($holder_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2810 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2811 log_error!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2812 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2813 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2814 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2816 log_info!(logger, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2817 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2818 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2819 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2824 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_counterparty {
2825 ($counterparty_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2826 if let Some(txid) = $counterparty_txid {
2827 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2828 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2829 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2830 log_claim!("revoked counterparty commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2831 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash, $htlc_output.amount_msat));
2840 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2841 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
2842 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2843 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2844 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2845 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, true);
2846 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2847 // holder commitment transactions or an unrevoked counterparty commitment
2848 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2849 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2850 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2851 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash, htlc_output.amount_msat));
2852 } else if !$holder_tx {
2853 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.current_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2854 if payment_data.is_none() {
2855 check_htlc_valid_counterparty!(self.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2858 if payment_data.is_none() {
2859 log_claim!($tx_info, $holder_tx, htlc_output, false);
2860 let outbound_htlc = $holder_tx == htlc_output.offered;
2861 if !outbound_htlc || revocation_sig_claim {
2862 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2863 txid: tx.txid(), height,
2864 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2865 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2866 preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
2867 Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
2868 // If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
2869 // wait for the CSV delay before dropping the HTLC from
2870 // claimable balance if the claim was an HTLC-Success
2872 on_to_local_output_csv: if accepted_preimage_claim {
2873 Some(self.on_holder_tx_csv) } else { None },
2877 // Outbound claims should always have payment_data, unless
2878 // we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
2879 // which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
2880 // spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
2881 // as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
2882 // TODO: Track the above as claimable!
2884 continue 'outer_loop;
2891 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
2892 scan_commitment!(self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2893 "our latest holder commitment tx", true);
2895 if let Some(ref prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
2896 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2897 scan_commitment!(prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2898 "our previous holder commitment tx", true);
2901 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2902 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2903 "counterparty commitment tx", false);
2906 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2907 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2908 if let Some((source, payment_hash, amount_msat)) = payment_data {
2909 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2910 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2911 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update { upd.source == source } else { false }) {
2912 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2915 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2916 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2917 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2918 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
2921 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2923 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2925 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2928 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2929 if !self.pending_monitor_events.iter().any(
2930 |update| if let &MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(ref upd) = update {
2931 upd.source == source
2933 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
2936 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
2937 commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
2938 preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2939 on_to_local_output_csv: None,
2942 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(HTLCUpdate {
2944 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2946 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2950 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.retain(|ref entry| {
2951 if entry.height != height { return true; }
2953 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { source: ref htlc_source, .. } => {
2954 *htlc_source != source
2959 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
2962 event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2963 source, payment_hash,
2964 htlc_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
2965 commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
2968 log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
2969 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
2975 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2976 fn is_paying_spendable_output<L: Deref>(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
2977 let mut spendable_output = None;
2978 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2979 if i > ::core::u16::MAX as usize {
2980 // While it is possible that an output exists on chain which is greater than the
2981 // 2^16th output in a given transaction, this is only possible if the output is not
2982 // in a lightning transaction and was instead placed there by some third party who
2983 // wishes to give us money for no reason.
2984 // Namely, any lightning transactions which we pre-sign will never have anywhere
2985 // near 2^16 outputs both because such transactions must have ~2^16 outputs who's
2986 // scripts are not longer than one byte in length and because they are inherently
2987 // non-standard due to their size.
2988 // Thus, it is completely safe to ignore such outputs, and while it may result in
2989 // us ignoring non-lightning fund to us, that is only possible if someone fills
2990 // nearly a full block with garbage just to hit this case.
2993 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2994 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2995 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
2996 output: outp.clone(),
3000 if let Some(ref broadcasted_holder_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_holder_revokable_script {
3001 if broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
3002 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3003 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3004 per_commitment_point: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.1,
3005 to_self_delay: self.on_holder_tx_csv,
3006 output: outp.clone(),
3007 revocation_pubkey: broadcasted_holder_revokable_script.2.clone(),
3008 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3009 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3014 if self.counterparty_payment_script == outp.script_pubkey {
3015 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor {
3016 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3017 output: outp.clone(),
3018 channel_keys_id: self.channel_keys_id,
3019 channel_value_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3023 if self.shutdown_script.as_ref() == Some(&outp.script_pubkey) {
3024 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
3025 outpoint: OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: i as u16 },
3026 output: outp.clone(),
3031 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
3032 let entry = OnchainEventEntry {
3035 event: OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output.clone() },
3037 log_info!(logger, "Received spendable output {}, spendable at height {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), entry.confirmation_threshold());
3038 self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
3043 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3045 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3046 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3049 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3050 self.0.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3053 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3054 self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3058 impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
3060 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3061 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3064 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3065 self.0.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3068 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3069 self.0.transaction_unconfirmed(txid, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3072 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3073 self.0.best_block_updated(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
3076 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3077 self.0.get_relevant_txids()
3081 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3083 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
3084 for (BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<Signer>) {
3085 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_manager: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3086 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3090 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3095 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
3097 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3098 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3100 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3101 let broadcasted_holder_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3103 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
3104 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3105 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3106 Some((revokable_address, per_commitment_point, revokable_script))
3109 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3111 let counterparty_payment_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3112 let shutdown_script = {
3113 let script = <Script as Readable>::read(reader)?;
3114 if script.is_empty() { None } else { Some(script) }
3117 let channel_keys_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3118 let holder_revocation_basepoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3119 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3120 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3121 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3122 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3123 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3125 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
3126 let current_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3127 let prev_counterparty_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3129 let counterparty_commitment_params = Readable::read(reader)?;
3130 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
3131 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3133 let their_cur_per_commitment_points = {
3134 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3138 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3139 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3140 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3141 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3143 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3148 let on_holder_tx_csv: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3150 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3152 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3155 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3156 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3157 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3158 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3159 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3161 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3162 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3168 let counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3169 let mut counterparty_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3170 for _ in 0..counterparty_claimable_outpoints_len {
3171 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3172 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3173 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3174 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3175 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3177 if let Some(_) = counterparty_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3178 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3182 let counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3183 let mut counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3184 for _ in 0..counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3185 let txid: Txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3186 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3187 if let Some(_) = counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
3188 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3192 let counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3193 let mut counterparty_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3194 for _ in 0..counterparty_hash_commitment_number_len {
3195 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3196 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3197 if let Some(_) = counterparty_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3198 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3202 let mut prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: Option<HolderSignedTx> =
3203 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3206 Some(Readable::read(reader)?)
3208 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3210 let mut current_holder_commitment_tx: HolderSignedTx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3212 let current_counterparty_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3213 let current_holder_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
3215 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3216 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3217 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3218 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3219 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3220 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3221 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3225 let pending_monitor_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3226 let mut pending_monitor_events = Some(
3227 Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_monitor_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3))));
3228 for _ in 0..pending_monitor_events_len {
3229 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3230 0 => MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(Readable::read(reader)?),
3231 1 => MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_info.0),
3232 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
3234 pending_monitor_events.as_mut().unwrap().push(ev);
3237 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3238 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Event>()));
3239 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
3240 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3241 pending_events.push(event);
3245 let best_block = BestBlock::new(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3247 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3248 let mut onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3249 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3250 if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3251 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(val);
3255 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3256 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Txid>() + mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3257 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3258 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3259 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3260 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<u32>() + mem::size_of::<Script>())));
3261 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3262 outputs.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3264 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3265 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3268 let onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<Signer> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, keys_manager)?;
3270 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
3271 let holder_tx_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3273 if let Some(prev_commitment_tx) = prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx.as_mut() {
3274 let prev_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_prev_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3275 if prev_holder_value.is_none() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
3276 if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3277 prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = prev_holder_value.unwrap();
3278 } else if prev_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != prev_holder_value.unwrap() {
3279 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3283 let cur_holder_value = onchain_tx_handler.get_cur_holder_commitment_to_self_value();
3284 if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat == u64::max_value() {
3285 current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat = cur_holder_value;
3286 } else if current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat != cur_holder_value {
3287 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3290 let mut funding_spend_confirmed = None;
3291 let mut htlcs_resolved_on_chain = Some(Vec::new());
3292 let mut funding_spend_seen = Some(false);
3293 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
3294 (1, funding_spend_confirmed, option),
3295 (3, htlcs_resolved_on_chain, vec_type),
3296 (5, pending_monitor_events, vec_type),
3297 (7, funding_spend_seen, option),
3300 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3301 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3303 Ok((best_block.block_hash(), ChannelMonitor {
3304 inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
3306 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3309 broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
3310 counterparty_payment_script,
3314 holder_revocation_basepoint,
3316 current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3317 prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
3319 counterparty_commitment_params,
3320 funding_redeemscript,
3321 channel_value_satoshis,
3322 their_cur_per_commitment_points,
3327 counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
3328 counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3329 counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
3331 prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
3332 current_holder_commitment_tx,
3333 current_counterparty_commitment_number,
3334 current_holder_commitment_number,
3337 pending_monitor_events: pending_monitor_events.unwrap(),
3340 onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf,
3345 lockdown_from_offchain,
3347 funding_spend_seen: funding_spend_seen.unwrap(),
3348 funding_spend_confirmed,
3349 htlcs_resolved_on_chain: htlcs_resolved_on_chain.unwrap(),
3361 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
3362 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3363 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3364 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, EcdsaSighashType};
3365 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3366 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
3367 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
3368 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3369 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
3370 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
3371 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
3372 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3373 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3377 use super::ChannelMonitorUpdateStep;
3378 use ::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast, check_closed_event, check_spends, get_local_commitment_txn, get_monitor, get_route_and_payment_hash, unwrap_send_err};
3379 use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm};
3380 use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
3381 use chain::package::{weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc, weight_revoked_offered_htlc, weight_revoked_received_htlc, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
3382 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3383 use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
3384 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3386 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
3387 use ln::channelmanager::PaymentSendFailure;
3388 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
3389 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
3390 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
3391 use util::errors::APIError;
3392 use util::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
3393 use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
3394 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
3395 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
3397 use bitcoin::Witness;
3400 fn do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(use_local_txn: bool) {
3401 // Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a funding-spend transaction
3402 // confirmed. This would allow a race condition where we could receive a payment (including
3403 // the counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it without recourse as
3404 // long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block first, the full commitment update dance
3405 // occurs after the block is connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
3406 // Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the counterparty would be risking
3407 // their full channel balance for it, but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the
3408 // potential ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
3410 // This test checks said behavior, as well as ensuring a ChannelMonitorUpdate with multiple
3411 // updates is handled correctly in such conditions.
3412 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3413 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3415 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3416 let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3417 &nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3418 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(
3419 &nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3421 // Rebalance somewhat
3422 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
3424 // First route two payments for testing at the end
3425 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3426 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000).0;
3428 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel.2);
3429 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
3430 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel.2);
3431 assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3); // Commitment and two HTLC-Timeouts
3432 check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
3433 check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
3434 let broadcast_tx = if use_local_txn { &local_txn[0] } else { &remote_txn[0] };
3436 // Connect a commitment transaction, but only to the ChainMonitor/ChannelMonitor. The
3437 // channel is now closed, but the ChannelManager doesn't know that yet.
3438 let new_header = BlockHeader {
3439 version: 2, time: 0, bits: 0, nonce: 0,
3440 prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_info().0,
3441 merkle_root: Default::default() };
3442 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3443 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(&new_header,
3444 &[(0, broadcast_tx)], conf_height);
3446 let (_, pre_update_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<InMemorySigner>)>::read(
3447 &mut io::Cursor::new(&get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel.2).encode()),
3448 &nodes[1].keys_manager.backing).unwrap();
3450 // If the ChannelManager tries to update the channel, however, the ChainMonitor will pass
3451 // the update through to the ChannelMonitor which will refuse it (as the channel is closed).
3452 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
3453 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)),
3454 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
3455 assert!(err.contains("ChannelMonitor storage failure")));
3456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2); // After the failure we generate a close-channel monitor update
3457 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3458 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_string() });
3460 // Build a new ChannelMonitorUpdate which contains both the failing commitment tx update
3461 // and provides the claim preimages for the two pending HTLCs. The first update generates
3462 // an error, but the point of this test is to ensure the later updates are still applied.
3463 let monitor_updates = nodes[1].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
3464 let mut replay_update = monitor_updates.get(&channel.2).unwrap().iter().rev().skip(1).next().unwrap().clone();
3465 assert_eq!(replay_update.updates.len(), 1);
3466 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo { .. } = replay_update.updates[0] {
3467 } else { panic!(); }
3468 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_1 });
3469 replay_update.updates.push(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage: payment_preimage_2 });
3471 let broadcaster = TestBroadcaster::new(Arc::clone(&nodes[1].blocks));
3473 pre_update_monitor.update_monitor(&replay_update, &&broadcaster, &&chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &nodes[1].logger)
3475 // Even though we error'd on the first update, we should still have generated an HTLC claim
3477 let txn_broadcasted = broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3478 assert!(txn_broadcasted.len() >= 2);
3479 let htlc_txn = txn_broadcasted.iter().filter(|tx| {
3480 assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
3481 tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == broadcast_tx.txid()
3482 }).collect::<Vec<_>>();
3483 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
3484 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], broadcast_tx);
3485 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], broadcast_tx);
3488 fn test_funding_spend_refuses_updates() {
3489 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(true);
3490 do_test_funding_spend_refuses_updates(false);
3494 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3496 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3497 let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
3498 let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
3500 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3501 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3503 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3506 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([i; 32]);
3507 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3508 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3512 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3513 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3515 let mut res = Vec::new();
3516 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3517 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3521 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3522 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3529 macro_rules! preimages_to_holder_htlcs {
3530 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3532 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3533 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3539 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3540 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3541 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3542 assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3547 let keys = InMemorySigner::new(
3549 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3550 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3551 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3552 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3553 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3554 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3560 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
3561 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3562 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3563 payment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[46; 32]).unwrap()),
3564 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[47; 32]).unwrap()),
3565 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[48; 32]).unwrap())
3567 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: Default::default(), index: u16::max_value() };
3568 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
3569 holder_pubkeys: keys.holder_channel_pubkeys.clone(),
3570 holder_selected_contest_delay: 66,
3571 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
3572 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
3573 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
3574 selected_contest_delay: 67,
3576 funding_outpoint: Some(funding_outpoint),
3579 // Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3581 let shutdown_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3582 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(Network::Testnet);
3583 let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
3584 Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(shutdown_pubkey).into_inner()), 0, &Script::new(),
3585 (OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3586 &channel_parameters,
3587 Script::new(), 46, 0,
3588 HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), best_block);
3590 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3591 let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
3592 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key, &logger);
3593 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key, &logger);
3594 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key, &logger);
3595 monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(dummy_txid, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key, &logger);
3596 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3597 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage, &broadcaster, &fee_estimator, &logger);
3600 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3601 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3602 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3603 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3604 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3605 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3606 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3608 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3609 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3610 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3611 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3612 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3613 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3615 // Now update holder commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3616 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3617 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3618 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3619 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3620 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3621 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3622 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3624 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3625 monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3626 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3627 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3628 assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3629 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3633 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3634 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3635 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3637 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3638 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3639 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3641 macro_rules! sign_input {
3642 ($sighash_parts: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $weight: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
3643 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3644 offered: if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) { true } else { false },
3646 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3647 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3648 transaction_output_index: Some($idx as u32),
3650 let redeem_script = if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3651 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.segwit_signature_hash($idx, &redeem_script, $amount, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
3652 let sig = secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&sighash, &privkey);
3653 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
3654 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
3655 $sum_actual_sigs += ser_sig.len();
3656 let witness = $sighash_parts.witness_mut($idx).unwrap();
3657 witness.push(ser_sig);
3658 if *$weight == WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT {
3659 witness.push(vec!(1));
3660 } else if *$weight == weight_revoked_offered_htlc($opt_anchors) || *$weight == weight_revoked_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3661 witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3662 } else if *$weight == weight_received_htlc($opt_anchors) {
3663 witness.push(vec![0]);
3665 witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3667 witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3668 let witness = witness.to_vec();
3669 println!("witness[0] {}", witness[0].len());
3670 println!("witness[1] {}", witness[1].len());
3671 println!("witness[2] {}", witness[2].len());
3675 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3676 let txid = Txid::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3678 // Justice tx with 1 to_holder, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3679 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3680 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3681 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3683 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3684 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3688 script_sig: Script::new(),
3689 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3690 witness: Witness::new(),
3693 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3694 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3697 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3698 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3699 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3701 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3702 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3703 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3704 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3707 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3710 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3711 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3712 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3713 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3715 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3716 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3720 script_sig: Script::new(),
3721 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3722 witness: Witness::new(),
3725 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3726 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3729 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3730 let inputs_weight = vec![weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors), weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors)];
3731 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3733 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3734 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3735 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3736 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3739 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3742 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3743 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
3744 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3745 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3746 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3747 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3751 script_sig: Script::new(),
3752 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3753 witness: Witness::new(),
3755 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3756 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3759 let base_weight = claim_tx.weight();
3760 let inputs_weight = vec![WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT];
3761 let mut inputs_total_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
3763 let mut sighash_parts = sighash::SighashCache::new(&mut claim_tx);
3764 for (idx, inp) in inputs_weight.iter().enumerate() {
3765 sign_input!(sighash_parts, idx, 0, inp, sum_actual_sigs, opt_anchors);
3766 inputs_total_weight += inp;
3769 assert_eq!(base_weight + inputs_total_weight as usize, claim_tx.weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_weight.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3773 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.