1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities to assemble claimable outpoints in package of one or more transactions. Those
11 //! packages are attached metadata, guiding their aggregable or fee-bumping re-schedule. This file
12 //! also includes witness weight computation and fee computation methods.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,TxIn, Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
23 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
24 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
25 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
26 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
27 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
28 use crate::chain::keysinterface::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
30 use crate::chain::onchaintx::ExternalHTLCClaim;
31 use crate::chain::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
32 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
33 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable};
36 use crate::prelude::*;
39 use core::convert::TryInto;
42 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Witness};
44 use super::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
46 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
49 pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
50 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
51 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133;
52 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
53 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC }
56 pub(crate) fn weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
57 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
58 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139;
59 const WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
60 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC }
63 pub(crate) fn weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
64 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
65 const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133;
66 const WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
67 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC }
70 pub(crate) fn weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
71 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + counterpartyhtlc_sig + empty_vec_length + empty_vec + witness_script_length + witness_script
72 const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139;
73 const WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS: u64 = WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC + 3; // + OP_1 + OP_CSV + OP_DROP
74 if opt_anchors { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC_ANCHORS } else { WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC }
77 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
78 pub(crate) const WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT: u64 = 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77;
80 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a low priority.
81 const LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 15;
82 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a middle priority.
83 const MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 3;
84 /// Height delay at which transactions are fee-bumped/rebroadcasted with a high priority.
85 const HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL: u32 = 1;
87 /// A struct to describe a revoked output and corresponding information to generate a solving
88 /// witness spending a commitment `to_local` output or a second-stage HTLC transaction output.
90 /// CSV and pubkeys are used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used
91 /// as part of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
92 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
93 pub(crate) struct RevokedOutput {
94 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
95 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
96 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
97 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
100 on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16,
104 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, on_counterparty_tx_csv: u16) -> Self {
106 per_commitment_point,
107 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
108 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
110 weight: WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT,
112 on_counterparty_tx_csv
117 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RevokedOutput, {
118 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
119 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
120 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
121 (6, per_commitment_key, required),
122 (8, weight, required),
123 (10, amount, required),
124 (12, on_counterparty_tx_csv, required),
127 /// A struct to describe a revoked offered output and corresponding information to generate a
130 /// HTLCOuputInCommitment (hash timelock, direction) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
133 /// CSV is used as part of a witnessScript redeeming a balance output, amount is used as part
134 /// of the signature hash and revocation secret to generate a satisfying witness.
135 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
136 pub(crate) struct RevokedHTLCOutput {
137 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
138 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
139 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
140 per_commitment_key: SecretKey,
143 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
146 impl RevokedHTLCOutput {
147 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, per_commitment_key: SecretKey, amount: u64, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
148 let weight = if htlc.offered { weight_revoked_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) } else { weight_revoked_received_htlc(opt_anchors) };
150 per_commitment_point,
151 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
152 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
161 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RevokedHTLCOutput, {
162 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
163 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
164 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
165 (6, per_commitment_key, required),
166 (8, weight, required),
167 (10, amount, required),
168 (12, htlc, required),
171 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
173 /// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
176 /// The preimage is used as part of the witness.
177 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
178 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
179 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
180 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
181 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
182 preimage: PaymentPreimage,
183 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
184 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
187 impl CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
188 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, preimage: PaymentPreimage, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
189 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput {
190 per_commitment_point,
191 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
192 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
195 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
199 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
200 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
204 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, {
205 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
206 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
207 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
208 (6, preimage, required),
210 (10, opt_anchors, option),
213 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on a counterparty commitment transaction.
215 /// HTLCOutputInCommitment (hash, timelock, directon) and pubkeys are used to generate a suitable
217 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
218 pub(crate) struct CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
219 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
220 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
221 counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
222 htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment,
223 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
226 impl CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
227 pub(crate) fn build(per_commitment_point: PublicKey, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey, counterparty_htlc_base_key: PublicKey, htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
228 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput {
229 per_commitment_point,
230 counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key,
231 counterparty_htlc_base_key,
233 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
237 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
238 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
242 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, {
243 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
244 (2, counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, required),
245 (4, counterparty_htlc_base_key, required),
247 (8, opt_anchors, option),
250 /// A struct to describe a HTLC output on holder commitment transaction.
252 /// Either offered or received, the amount is always used as part of the bip143 sighash.
253 /// Preimage is only included as part of the witness in former case.
254 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
255 pub(crate) struct HolderHTLCOutput {
256 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
258 /// Defaults to 0 for HTLC-Success transactions, which have no expiry
260 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
263 impl HolderHTLCOutput {
264 pub(crate) fn build_offered(amount_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
269 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None } ,
273 pub(crate) fn build_accepted(preimage: PaymentPreimage, amount_msat: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
275 preimage: Some(preimage),
278 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None } ,
282 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
283 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
287 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderHTLCOutput, {
288 (0, amount_msat, required),
289 (2, cltv_expiry, required),
290 (4, preimage, option),
291 (6, opt_anchors, option)
294 /// A struct to describe the channel output on the funding transaction.
296 /// witnessScript is used as part of the witness redeeming the funding utxo.
297 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
298 pub(crate) struct HolderFundingOutput {
299 funding_redeemscript: Script,
300 funding_amount: Option<u64>,
301 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
305 impl HolderFundingOutput {
306 pub(crate) fn build(funding_redeemscript: Script, funding_amount: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> Self {
307 HolderFundingOutput {
308 funding_redeemscript,
309 funding_amount: Some(funding_amount),
310 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
314 fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
315 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
319 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderFundingOutput, {
320 (0, funding_redeemscript, required),
321 (2, opt_anchors, option),
322 (3, funding_amount, option),
325 /// A wrapper encapsulating all in-protocol differing outputs types.
327 /// The generic API offers access to an outputs common attributes or allow transformation such as
328 /// finalizing an input claiming the output.
329 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
330 pub(crate) enum PackageSolvingData {
331 RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput),
332 RevokedHTLCOutput(RevokedHTLCOutput),
333 CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
334 CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
335 HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput),
336 HolderFundingOutput(HolderFundingOutput),
339 impl PackageSolvingData {
340 fn amount(&self) -> u64 {
341 let amt = match self {
342 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => outp.amount,
343 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.amount,
344 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
345 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
346 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
347 debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
348 outp.amount_msat / 1000
350 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => {
351 debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
352 outp.funding_amount.unwrap()
357 fn weight(&self) -> usize {
359 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => outp.weight as usize,
360 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.weight as usize,
361 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => weight_offered_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize,
362 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => weight_received_htlc(outp.opt_anchors()) as usize,
363 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
364 debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
365 if outp.preimage.is_none() {
366 weight_offered_htlc(true) as usize
368 weight_received_htlc(true) as usize
371 // Since HolderFundingOutput maps to an untractable package that is already signed, its
372 // weight can be determined from the transaction itself.
373 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => unreachable!(),
376 fn is_compatible(&self, input: &PackageSolvingData) -> bool {
378 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => {
380 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
381 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
385 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => {
387 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { true },
388 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { true },
392 _ => { mem::discriminant(self) == mem::discriminant(&input) }
395 fn finalize_input<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(&self, bumped_tx: &mut Transaction, i: usize, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> bool {
397 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(ref outp) => {
398 let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
399 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&chan_keys.revocation_key, outp.on_counterparty_tx_csv, &chan_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key);
400 //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
401 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_output(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
402 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
403 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
404 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
405 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
406 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
407 } else { return false; }
409 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
410 let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
411 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
412 //TODO: should we panic on signer failure ?
413 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(&bumped_tx, i, outp.amount, &outp.per_commitment_key, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
414 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
415 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
416 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
417 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(chan_keys.revocation_key.clone().serialize().to_vec());
418 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
419 } else { return false; }
421 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
422 let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
423 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
425 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
426 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
427 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
428 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
429 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(outp.preimage.0.to_vec());
430 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
433 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
434 let chan_keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&onchain_handler.secp_ctx, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key, &outp.counterparty_htlc_base_key, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint, &onchain_handler.signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint);
435 let witness_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&outp.htlc, onchain_handler.opt_anchors(), &chan_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &chan_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &chan_keys.revocation_key);
437 if let Ok(sig) = onchain_handler.signer.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(&bumped_tx, i, &outp.htlc.amount_msat / 1000, &outp.per_commitment_point, &outp.htlc, &onchain_handler.secp_ctx) {
438 let mut ser_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
439 ser_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
440 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(ser_sig);
441 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
442 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
443 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
446 _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
450 fn get_finalized_tx<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(&self, outpoint: &BitcoinOutPoint, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>) -> Option<Transaction> {
452 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
453 debug_assert!(!outp.opt_anchors());
454 return onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(outpoint, &outp.preimage);
456 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => {
457 return Some(onchain_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&outp.funding_redeemscript));
459 _ => { panic!("API Error!"); }
462 fn absolute_tx_timelock(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
463 // We use `current_height + 1` as our default locktime to discourage fee sniping and because
464 // transactions with it always propagate.
465 let absolute_timelock = match self {
466 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(_) => current_height + 1,
467 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(_) => current_height + 1,
468 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(_) => current_height + 1,
469 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(ref outp) => cmp::max(outp.htlc.cltv_expiry, current_height + 1),
470 // HTLC timeout/success transactions rely on a fixed timelock due to the counterparty's
472 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
473 if outp.preimage.is_some() {
474 debug_assert_eq!(outp.cltv_expiry, 0);
478 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(_) => current_height + 1,
484 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PackageSolvingData, ;
486 (1, RevokedHTLCOutput),
487 (2, CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput),
488 (3, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput),
489 (4, HolderHTLCOutput),
490 (5, HolderFundingOutput),
493 /// A malleable package might be aggregated with other packages to save on fees.
494 /// A untractable package has been counter-signed and aggregable will break cached counterparty
496 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
497 pub(crate) enum PackageMalleability {
502 /// A structure to describe a package content that is generated by ChannelMonitor and
503 /// used by OnchainTxHandler to generate and broadcast transactions settling onchain claims.
505 /// A package is defined as one or more transactions claiming onchain outputs in reaction
506 /// to confirmation of a channel transaction. Those packages might be aggregated to save on
507 /// fees, if satisfaction of outputs's witnessScript let's us do so.
509 /// As packages are time-sensitive, we fee-bump and rebroadcast them at scheduled intervals.
510 /// Failing to confirm a package translate as a loss of funds for the user.
511 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
512 pub struct PackageTemplate {
513 // List of onchain outputs and solving data to generate satisfying witnesses.
514 inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)>,
515 // Packages are deemed as malleable if we have local knwoledge of at least one set of
516 // private keys yielding a satisfying witnesses. Malleability implies that we can aggregate
517 // packages among them to save on fees or rely on RBF to bump their feerates.
518 // Untractable packages have been counter-signed and thus imply that we can't aggregate
519 // them without breaking signatures. Fee-bumping strategy will also rely on CPFP.
520 malleability: PackageMalleability,
521 // Block height after which the earlier-output belonging to this package is mature for a
522 // competing claim by the counterparty. As our chain tip becomes nearer from the timelock,
523 // the fee-bumping frequency will increase. See `OnchainTxHandler::get_height_timer`.
524 soonest_conf_deadline: u32,
525 // Determines if this package can be aggregated.
526 // Timelocked outputs belonging to the same transaction might have differing
527 // satisfying heights. Picking up the later height among the output set would be a valid
528 // aggregable strategy but it comes with at least 2 trade-offs :
529 // * earlier-output fund are going to take longer to come back
530 // * CLTV delta backing up a corresponding HTLC on an upstream channel could be swallowed
531 // by the requirement of the later-output part of the set
532 // For now, we mark such timelocked outputs as non-aggregable, though we might introduce
533 // smarter aggregable strategy in the future.
535 // Cache of package feerate committed at previous (re)broadcast. If bumping resources
536 // (either claimed output value or external utxo), it will keep increasing until holder
537 // or counterparty successful claim.
538 feerate_previous: u64,
539 // Cache of next height at which fee-bumping and rebroadcast will be attempted. In
540 // the future, we might abstract it to an observed mempool fluctuation.
542 // Confirmation height of the claimed outputs set transaction. In case of reorg reaching
543 // it, we wipe out and forget the package.
544 height_original: u32,
547 impl PackageTemplate {
548 pub(crate) fn is_malleable(&self) -> bool {
549 self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable
551 pub(crate) fn timelock(&self) -> u32 {
552 self.soonest_conf_deadline
554 pub(crate) fn aggregable(&self) -> bool {
557 pub(crate) fn set_feerate(&mut self, new_feerate: u64) {
558 self.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
560 pub(crate) fn timer(&self) -> u32 {
563 pub(crate) fn set_timer(&mut self, new_timer: u32) {
564 self.height_timer = new_timer;
566 pub(crate) fn outpoints(&self) -> Vec<&BitcoinOutPoint> {
567 self.inputs.iter().map(|(o, _)| o).collect()
569 pub(crate) fn inputs(&self) -> impl ExactSizeIterator<Item = &PackageSolvingData> {
570 self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, i)| i)
572 pub(crate) fn split_package(&mut self, split_outp: &BitcoinOutPoint) -> Option<PackageTemplate> {
573 match self.malleability {
574 PackageMalleability::Malleable => {
575 let mut split_package = None;
576 let timelock = self.soonest_conf_deadline;
577 let aggregable = self.aggregable;
578 let feerate_previous = self.feerate_previous;
579 let height_timer = self.height_timer;
580 let height_original = self.height_original;
581 self.inputs.retain(|outp| {
582 if *split_outp == outp.0 {
583 split_package = Some(PackageTemplate {
584 inputs: vec![(outp.0, outp.1.clone())],
585 malleability: PackageMalleability::Malleable,
586 soonest_conf_deadline: timelock,
596 return split_package;
599 // Note, we may try to split on remote transaction for
600 // which we don't have a competing one (HTLC-Success before
601 // timelock expiration). This explain we don't panic!
602 // We should refactor OnchainTxHandler::block_connected to
603 // only test equality on competing claims.
608 pub(crate) fn merge_package(&mut self, mut merge_from: PackageTemplate) {
609 assert_eq!(self.height_original, merge_from.height_original);
610 if self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable || merge_from.malleability == PackageMalleability::Untractable {
611 panic!("Merging template on untractable packages");
613 if !self.aggregable || !merge_from.aggregable {
614 panic!("Merging non aggregatable packages");
616 if let Some((_, lead_input)) = self.inputs.first() {
617 for (_, v) in merge_from.inputs.iter() {
618 if !lead_input.is_compatible(v) { panic!("Merging outputs from differing types !"); }
620 } else { panic!("Merging template on an empty package"); }
621 for (k, v) in merge_from.inputs.drain(..) {
622 self.inputs.push((k, v));
624 //TODO: verify coverage and sanity?
625 if self.soonest_conf_deadline > merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline {
626 self.soonest_conf_deadline = merge_from.soonest_conf_deadline;
628 if self.feerate_previous > merge_from.feerate_previous {
629 self.feerate_previous = merge_from.feerate_previous;
631 self.height_timer = cmp::min(self.height_timer, merge_from.height_timer);
633 /// Gets the amount of all outptus being spent by this package, only valid for malleable
635 pub(crate) fn package_amount(&self) -> u64 {
637 for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
638 amounts += outp.amount();
642 pub(crate) fn package_locktime(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
643 let locktime = self.inputs.iter().map(|(_, outp)| outp.absolute_tx_timelock(current_height))
644 .max().expect("There must always be at least one output to spend in a PackageTemplate");
646 // If we ever try to aggregate a `HolderHTLCOutput`s with another output type, we'll likely
647 // end up with an incorrect transaction locktime since the counterparty has included it in
648 // its HTLC signature. This should never happen unless we decide to aggregate outputs across
649 // different channel commitments.
650 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
651 if self.inputs.iter().any(|(_, outp)|
652 if let PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(outp) = outp {
653 outp.preimage.is_some()
658 debug_assert_eq!(locktime, 0);
660 for timeout_htlc_expiry in self.inputs.iter().filter_map(|(_, outp)|
661 if let PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(outp) = outp {
662 if outp.preimage.is_none() {
663 Some(outp.cltv_expiry)
667 debug_assert_eq!(locktime, timeout_htlc_expiry);
673 pub(crate) fn package_weight(&self, destination_script: &Script) -> usize {
674 let mut inputs_weight = 0;
675 let mut witnesses_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
676 for (_, outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
677 // previous_out_point: 36 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; sequence: 4 bytes
678 inputs_weight += 41 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
679 witnesses_weight += outp.weight();
681 // version: 4 bytes ; count_tx_in: 1 byte ; count_tx_out: 1 byte ; lock_time: 4 bytes
682 let transaction_weight = 10 * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
683 // value: 8 bytes ; var_int: 1 byte ; pk_script: `destination_script.len()`
684 let output_weight = (8 + 1 + destination_script.len()) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
685 inputs_weight + witnesses_weight + transaction_weight + output_weight
688 pub(crate) fn construct_malleable_package_with_external_funding<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(
689 &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>,
690 ) -> Option<Vec<ExternalHTLCClaim>> {
691 debug_assert!(self.requires_external_funding());
692 let mut htlcs: Option<Vec<ExternalHTLCClaim>> = None;
693 for (previous_output, input) in &self.inputs {
695 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => {
696 debug_assert!(outp.opt_anchors());
697 onchain_handler.generate_external_htlc_claim(&previous_output, &outp.preimage).map(|htlc| {
698 htlcs.get_or_insert_with(|| Vec::with_capacity(self.inputs.len())).push(htlc);
701 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Expected HolderHTLCOutputs to not be aggregated with other input types"),
706 pub(crate) fn finalize_malleable_package<L: Deref, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(
707 &self, current_height: u32, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, value: u64,
708 destination_script: Script, logger: &L
709 ) -> Option<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
710 debug_assert!(self.is_malleable());
711 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
713 lock_time: PackedLockTime(self.package_locktime(current_height)),
716 script_pubkey: destination_script,
720 for (outpoint, _) in self.inputs.iter() {
721 bumped_tx.input.push(TxIn {
722 previous_output: *outpoint,
723 script_sig: Script::new(),
724 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
725 witness: Witness::new(),
728 for (i, (outpoint, out)) in self.inputs.iter().enumerate() {
729 log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
730 if !out.finalize_input(&mut bumped_tx, i, onchain_handler) { return None; }
732 log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", bumped_tx.txid());
735 pub(crate) fn finalize_untractable_package<L: Deref, Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(
736 &self, onchain_handler: &mut OnchainTxHandler<Signer>, logger: &L,
737 ) -> Option<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
738 debug_assert!(!self.is_malleable());
739 if let Some((outpoint, outp)) = self.inputs.first() {
740 if let Some(final_tx) = outp.get_finalized_tx(outpoint, onchain_handler) {
741 log_debug!(logger, "Adding claiming input for outpoint {}:{}", outpoint.txid, outpoint.vout);
742 log_debug!(logger, "Finalized transaction {} ready to broadcast", final_tx.txid());
743 return Some(final_tx);
746 } else { panic!("API Error: Package must not be inputs empty"); }
748 /// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
749 /// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
750 /// height that once reached we should generate a new bumped "version" of the claim tx to be sure that we safely claim outputs before
751 /// that our counterparty can do so. If timelock expires soon, height timer is going to be scaled down in consequence to increase
752 /// frequency of the bump and so increase our bets of success.
753 pub(crate) fn get_height_timer(&self, current_height: u32) -> u32 {
754 if self.soonest_conf_deadline <= current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
755 return current_height + HIGH_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
756 } else if self.soonest_conf_deadline - current_height <= LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL {
757 return current_height + MIDDLE_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
759 current_height + LOW_FREQUENCY_BUMP_INTERVAL
762 /// Returns value in satoshis to be included as package outgoing output amount and feerate
763 /// which was used to generate the value. Will not return less than `dust_limit_sats` for the
765 pub(crate) fn compute_package_output<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
766 &self, predicted_weight: usize, dust_limit_sats: u64, force_feerate_bump: bool,
767 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L,
768 ) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
770 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
773 debug_assert!(self.malleability == PackageMalleability::Malleable, "The package output is fixed for non-malleable packages");
774 let input_amounts = self.package_amount();
775 assert!(dust_limit_sats as i64 > 0, "Output script must be broadcastable/have a 'real' dust limit.");
776 // If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation
777 if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
778 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = feerate_bump(
779 predicted_weight, input_amounts, self.feerate_previous, force_feerate_bump,
780 fee_estimator, logger,
782 return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
785 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
786 return Some((cmp::max(input_amounts as i64 - new_fee as i64, dust_limit_sats as i64) as u64, feerate));
793 /// Computes a feerate based on the given confirmation target. If a previous feerate was used,
794 /// the new feerate is below it, and `force_feerate_bump` is set, we'll use a 25% increase of
795 /// the previous feerate instead of the new feerate.
796 pub(crate) fn compute_package_feerate<F: Deref>(
797 &self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, conf_target: ConfirmationTarget,
798 force_feerate_bump: bool,
799 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
800 let feerate_estimate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(conf_target);
801 if self.feerate_previous != 0 {
802 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
803 if feerate_estimate as u64 > self.feerate_previous {
805 } else if !force_feerate_bump {
806 self.feerate_previous.try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value())
808 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
809 (self.feerate_previous + (self.feerate_previous / 4)).try_into().unwrap_or(u32::max_value())
816 /// Determines whether a package contains an input which must have additional external inputs
817 /// attached to help the spending transaction reach confirmation.
818 pub(crate) fn requires_external_funding(&self) -> bool {
819 self.inputs.iter().find(|input| match input.1 {
820 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(ref outp) => outp.opt_anchors(),
821 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => outp.opt_anchors(),
826 pub (crate) fn build_package(txid: Txid, vout: u32, input_solving_data: PackageSolvingData, soonest_conf_deadline: u32, aggregable: bool, height_original: u32) -> Self {
827 let malleability = match input_solving_data {
828 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
829 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
830 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
831 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Malleable,
832 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => if outp.opt_anchors() {
833 PackageMalleability::Malleable
835 PackageMalleability::Untractable
837 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => PackageMalleability::Untractable,
839 let mut inputs = Vec::with_capacity(1);
840 inputs.push((BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout }, input_solving_data));
844 soonest_conf_deadline,
847 height_timer: height_original,
853 impl Writeable for PackageTemplate {
854 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
855 writer.write_all(&(self.inputs.len() as u64).to_be_bytes())?;
856 for (ref outpoint, ref rev_outp) in self.inputs.iter() {
857 outpoint.write(writer)?;
858 rev_outp.write(writer)?;
860 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
861 (0, self.soonest_conf_deadline, required),
862 (2, self.feerate_previous, required),
863 (4, self.height_original, required),
864 (6, self.height_timer, required)
870 impl Readable for PackageTemplate {
871 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
872 let inputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
873 let mut inputs: Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, PackageSolvingData)> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(inputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
874 for _ in 0..inputs_count {
875 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
876 let rev_outp = Readable::read(reader)?;
877 inputs.push((outpoint, rev_outp));
879 let (malleability, aggregable) = if let Some((_, lead_input)) = inputs.first() {
881 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
882 PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
883 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, true) },
884 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Malleable, false) },
885 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(ref outp) => if outp.opt_anchors() {
886 (PackageMalleability::Malleable, outp.preimage.is_some())
888 (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false)
890 PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(..) => { (PackageMalleability::Untractable, false) },
892 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); };
893 let mut soonest_conf_deadline = 0;
894 let mut feerate_previous = 0;
895 let mut height_timer = None;
896 let mut height_original = 0;
897 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
898 (0, soonest_conf_deadline, required),
899 (2, feerate_previous, required),
900 (4, height_original, required),
901 (6, height_timer, option),
903 if height_timer.is_none() {
904 height_timer = Some(height_original);
909 soonest_conf_deadline,
912 height_timer: height_timer.unwrap(),
918 /// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
919 /// weight. We start with the highest priority feerate returned by the node's fee estimator then
920 /// fall-back to lower priorities until we have enough value available to suck from.
922 /// If the proposed fee is less than the available spent output's values, we return the proposed
923 /// fee and the corresponding updated feerate. If the proposed fee is equal or more than the
924 /// available spent output's values, we return nothing
925 fn compute_fee_from_spent_amounts<F: Deref, L: Deref>(input_amounts: u64, predicted_weight: usize, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
926 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
929 let mut updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64;
930 let mut fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
931 if input_amounts <= fee {
932 updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64;
933 fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
934 if input_amounts <= fee {
935 updated_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u64;
936 fee = updated_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
937 if input_amounts <= fee {
938 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
942 log_warn!(logger, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
944 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
947 log_warn!(logger, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
949 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
952 Some((fee, updated_feerate))
956 /// Attempt to propose a bumping fee for a transaction from its spent output's values and predicted
957 /// weight. If feerates proposed by the fee-estimator have been increasing since last fee-bumping
958 /// attempt, use them. If `force_feerate_bump` is set, we bump the feerate by 25% of the previous
959 /// feerate, or just use the previous feerate otherwise. If a feerate bump did happen, we also
960 /// verify that those bumping heuristics respect BIP125 rules 3) and 4) and if required adjust the
961 /// new fee to meet the RBF policy requirement.
962 fn feerate_bump<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
963 predicted_weight: usize, input_amounts: u64, previous_feerate: u64, force_feerate_bump: bool,
964 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L,
965 ) -> Option<(u64, u64)>
967 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
970 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
971 let (new_fee, new_feerate) = if let Some((new_fee, new_feerate)) = compute_fee_from_spent_amounts(input_amounts, predicted_weight, fee_estimator, logger) {
972 if new_feerate > previous_feerate {
973 (new_fee, new_feerate)
974 } else if !force_feerate_bump {
975 let previous_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
976 (previous_fee, previous_feerate)
978 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
979 let bumped_feerate = previous_feerate + (previous_feerate / 4);
980 let bumped_fee = bumped_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
981 if input_amounts <= bumped_fee {
982 log_warn!(logger, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
985 (bumped_fee, bumped_feerate)
988 log_warn!(logger, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", input_amounts);
992 // Our feerates should never decrease. If it hasn't changed though, we just need to
993 // rebroadcast/re-sign the previous claim.
994 debug_assert!(new_feerate >= previous_feerate);
995 if new_feerate == previous_feerate {
996 return Some((new_fee, new_feerate));
999 let previous_fee = previous_feerate * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
1000 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * (predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
1001 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
1002 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
1003 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
1004 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
1005 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
1009 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / (predicted_weight as u64)))
1014 use crate::chain::package::{CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput, CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput, HolderHTLCOutput, PackageTemplate, PackageSolvingData, RevokedOutput, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT, weight_offered_htlc, weight_received_htlc};
1015 use crate::chain::Txid;
1016 use crate::ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
1017 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
1019 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR;
1020 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1021 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
1023 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
1025 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
1026 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
1028 macro_rules! dumb_revk_output {
1029 ($secp_ctx: expr) => {
1031 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1032 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
1033 PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_scalar, 0, 0))
1038 macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_output {
1039 ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
1041 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1042 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
1043 let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
1044 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: true, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 0, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
1045 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, htlc, $opt_anchors))
1050 macro_rules! dumb_counterparty_offered_output {
1051 ($secp_ctx: expr, $amt: expr, $opt_anchors: expr) => {
1053 let dumb_scalar = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1054 let dumb_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&$secp_ctx, &dumb_scalar);
1055 let hash = PaymentHash([1; 32]);
1056 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
1057 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment { offered: false, amount_msat: $amt, cltv_expiry: 1000, payment_hash: hash, transaction_output_index: None };
1058 PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput::build(dumb_point, dumb_point, dumb_point, preimage, htlc, $opt_anchors))
1063 macro_rules! dumb_htlc_output {
1066 let preimage = PaymentPreimage([2;32]);
1067 PackageSolvingData::HolderHTLCOutput(HolderHTLCOutput::build_accepted(preimage, 0, false))
1074 fn test_package_differing_heights() {
1075 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1076 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1077 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1079 let mut package_one_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1080 let package_two_hundred = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 200);
1081 package_one_hundred.merge_package(package_two_hundred);
1086 fn test_package_untractable_merge_to() {
1087 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1088 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1089 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1090 let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
1092 let mut untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1093 let malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1094 untractable_package.merge_package(malleable_package);
1099 fn test_package_untractable_merge_from() {
1100 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1101 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1102 let htlc_outp = dumb_htlc_output!();
1103 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1105 let mut malleable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1106 let untractable_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1107 malleable_package.merge_package(untractable_package);
1112 fn test_package_noaggregation_to() {
1113 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1114 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1115 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1117 let mut noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
1118 let aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1119 noaggregation_package.merge_package(aggregation_package);
1124 fn test_package_noaggregation_from() {
1125 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1126 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1127 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1129 let mut aggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1130 let noaggregation_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, false, 100);
1131 aggregation_package.merge_package(noaggregation_package);
1136 fn test_package_empty() {
1137 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1138 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1139 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1141 let mut empty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1142 empty_package.inputs = vec![];
1143 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp.clone(), 1000, true, 100);
1144 empty_package.merge_package(package);
1149 fn test_package_differing_categories() {
1150 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1151 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1152 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1153 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 0, false);
1155 let mut revoked_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1156 let counterparty_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1157 revoked_package.merge_package(counterparty_package);
1161 fn test_package_split_malleable() {
1162 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1163 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1164 let revk_outp_one = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1165 let revk_outp_two = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1166 let revk_outp_three = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1168 let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
1169 let package_two = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 1, revk_outp_two, 1000, true, 100);
1170 let package_three = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 2, revk_outp_three, 1000, true, 100);
1172 package_one.merge_package(package_two);
1173 package_one.merge_package(package_three);
1174 assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 3);
1176 if let Some(split_package) = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 1 }) {
1177 // Packages attributes should be identical
1178 assert!(split_package.is_malleable());
1179 assert_eq!(split_package.soonest_conf_deadline, package_one.soonest_conf_deadline);
1180 assert_eq!(split_package.aggregable, package_one.aggregable);
1181 assert_eq!(split_package.feerate_previous, package_one.feerate_previous);
1182 assert_eq!(split_package.height_timer, package_one.height_timer);
1183 assert_eq!(split_package.height_original, package_one.height_original);
1184 } else { panic!(); }
1185 assert_eq!(package_one.outpoints().len(), 2);
1189 fn test_package_split_untractable() {
1190 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1191 let htlc_outp_one = dumb_htlc_output!();
1193 let mut package_one = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, htlc_outp_one, 1000, true, 100);
1194 let ret_split = package_one.split_package(&BitcoinOutPoint { txid, vout: 0});
1195 assert!(ret_split.is_none());
1199 fn test_package_timer() {
1200 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1201 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1202 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1204 let mut package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1205 assert_eq!(package.timer(), 100);
1206 package.set_timer(101);
1207 assert_eq!(package.timer(), 101);
1211 fn test_package_amounts() {
1212 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1213 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1214 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, false);
1216 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1217 assert_eq!(package.package_amount(), 1000);
1221 fn test_package_weight() {
1222 let txid = Txid::from_hex("c2d4449afa8d26140898dd54d3390b057ba2a5afcf03ba29d7dc0d8b9ffe966e").unwrap();
1223 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1225 // (nVersion (4) + nLocktime (4) + count_tx_in (1) + prevout (36) + sequence (4) + script_length (1) + count_tx_out (1) + value (8) + var_int (1)) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + witness marker (2)
1226 let weight_sans_output = (4 + 4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 8 + 1) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR + 2;
1229 let revk_outp = dumb_revk_output!(secp_ctx);
1230 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, revk_outp, 0, true, 100);
1231 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT as usize);
1235 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
1236 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
1237 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1238 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_received_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);
1243 for &opt_anchors in [false, true].iter() {
1244 let counterparty_outp = dumb_counterparty_offered_output!(secp_ctx, 1_000_000, opt_anchors);
1245 let package = PackageTemplate::build_package(txid, 0, counterparty_outp, 1000, true, 100);
1246 assert_eq!(package.package_weight(&Script::new()), weight_sans_output + weight_offered_htlc(opt_anchors) as usize);