1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
9 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
11 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
12 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13 use bitcoin_hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
14 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
15 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
17 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
18 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
19 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
22 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
23 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
28 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
30 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
31 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
34 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
40 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
41 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
42 if witness_script_len == 133 {
43 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
44 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
45 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
52 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
53 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
55 pub(super) fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
56 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
59 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
60 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
61 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
67 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
68 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
70 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
73 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
74 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
77 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
78 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
79 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
80 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
88 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
89 pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
90 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
94 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
96 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
103 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
104 //TODO This can be optimized?
105 let mut min = 1 << 48;
106 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
115 pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
116 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
118 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
119 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
120 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
121 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
127 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
128 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
130 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
131 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
135 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
138 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
142 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
143 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
144 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
145 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
146 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
149 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
154 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
155 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
156 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
157 writer.write_all(secret)?;
158 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
163 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
164 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
165 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
166 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
167 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
168 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
171 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
175 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or payment key) from the base
176 /// private key for that type of key and the per_commitment_point (available in TxCreationKeys)
177 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
178 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
179 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
180 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
181 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
183 let mut key = base_secret.clone();
184 key.add_assign(&res)?;
188 pub(super) fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
189 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
190 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
191 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
192 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
194 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
195 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
198 /// Derives a revocation key from its constituent parts.
199 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
200 /// generated (ie our own).
201 pub(super) fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
202 let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
203 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
205 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
206 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
207 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
208 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
210 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
212 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
213 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
214 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
215 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
217 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
220 let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
221 part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
222 let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
223 part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
224 part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
228 pub(super) fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
229 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
230 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
231 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
232 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
234 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
236 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
237 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
238 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
239 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
241 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
244 let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
245 part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
246 let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
247 part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
248 part_a.combine(&part_b)
251 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
252 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
253 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
254 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
255 /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
256 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
257 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
258 /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
259 pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
261 pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
263 pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
264 /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
265 pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
267 pub(crate) b_payment_key: PublicKey,
269 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
270 { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key, b_payment_key });
272 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
273 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
274 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
275 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
276 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
277 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
278 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
279 /// revocation keys. The per-commitment revocation private key is then revealed by the owner of
280 /// a commitment transaction so that their counterparty can claim all available funds if they
281 /// broadcast an old state.
282 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
283 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
284 /// public key which receives immediately-spendable non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
285 pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
286 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
287 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
288 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
289 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
290 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
291 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
292 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
295 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
297 revocation_basepoint,
299 delayed_payment_basepoint,
304 impl TxCreationKeys {
305 pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_payment_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
307 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
308 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
309 a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
310 b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
311 a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
312 b_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_payment_base)?,
317 /// Gets the "to_local" output redeemscript, ie the script which is time-locked or spendable by
318 /// the revocation key
319 pub(super) fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
320 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
321 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
322 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
323 .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
324 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
325 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
326 .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
327 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
328 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
332 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
333 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
334 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
335 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
336 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
337 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
338 /// the remote party or our own.
340 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
341 /// this divided by 1000.
342 pub amount_msat: u64,
343 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
344 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
345 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
346 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
347 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
348 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
349 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
350 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
353 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
358 transaction_output_index
362 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
363 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
365 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
366 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
367 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
368 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
369 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
370 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
371 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
372 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
373 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
374 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
376 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
377 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
378 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
380 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
381 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
383 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
384 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
385 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
386 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
387 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
388 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
389 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
390 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
393 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
394 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
395 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
396 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
397 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
398 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
399 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
400 .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
401 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
402 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
404 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
405 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
406 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
407 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
408 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
410 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
411 .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
413 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
414 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
415 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
416 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
417 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
418 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
419 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
420 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
421 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
426 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
427 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
429 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
430 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
433 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
434 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
435 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
436 let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
437 let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
439 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
440 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
441 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
442 .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
444 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
445 .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
446 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
449 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
450 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
451 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
453 previous_output: OutPoint {
454 txid: prev_hash.clone(),
455 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
457 script_sig: Script::new(),
462 let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
463 feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
465 feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
468 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
470 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
471 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
476 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
483 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
484 /// to broadcast. Eventually this will require a signer which is possibly external, but for now we
485 /// just pass in the SecretKeys required.
486 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
488 //TODO: modify Channel methods to integrate HTLC material at LocalCommitmentTransaction generation to drop Option here
489 local_keys: Option<TxCreationKeys>,
490 feerate_per_kw: Option<u64>,
491 per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<Transaction>)>
493 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
495 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
496 let dummy_input = TxIn {
497 previous_output: OutPoint {
498 txid: Default::default(),
501 script_sig: Default::default(),
503 witness: vec![vec![], vec![], vec![]]
505 Self { tx: Transaction {
507 input: vec![dummy_input],
512 feerate_per_kw: None,
517 /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
518 /// remote signature and both parties keys
519 pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(mut tx: Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
520 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
521 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
523 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
525 if our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..] {
526 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
527 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
528 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
530 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
531 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
532 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
537 feerate_per_kw: None,
542 /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
543 /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
544 pub fn txid(&self) -> Sha256dHash {
548 /// Check if LocalCommitmentTransaction has already been signed by us
549 pub fn has_local_sig(&self) -> bool {
550 if self.tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Commitment transactions must have input count == 1!"); }
551 if self.tx.input[0].witness.len() == 4 {
552 assert!(!self.tx.input[0].witness[1].is_empty());
553 assert!(!self.tx.input[0].witness[2].is_empty());
556 assert_eq!(self.tx.input[0].witness.len(), 3);
557 assert!(self.tx.input[0].witness[0].is_empty());
558 assert!(self.tx.input[0].witness[1].is_empty() || self.tx.input[0].witness[2].is_empty());
563 /// Add local signature for LocalCommitmentTransaction, do nothing if signature is already
566 /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
567 /// by your ChannelKeys.
568 /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
569 /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
570 /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
571 /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
572 pub fn add_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&mut self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) {
573 if self.has_local_sig() { return; }
574 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.tx)
575 .sighash_all(&self.tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
576 let our_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key);
578 if self.tx.input[0].witness[1].is_empty() {
579 self.tx.input[0].witness[1] = our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
580 self.tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
582 self.tx.input[0].witness[2] = our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
583 self.tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
586 self.tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
589 /// Get raw transaction without asserting if witness is complete
590 pub(crate) fn without_valid_witness(&self) -> &Transaction { &self.tx }
591 /// Get raw transaction with panics if witness is incomplete
592 pub fn with_valid_witness(&self) -> &Transaction {
593 assert!(self.has_local_sig());
597 /// Set HTLC cache to generate any local HTLC transaction spending one of htlc ouput
598 /// from this local commitment transaction
599 pub(crate) fn set_htlc_cache(&mut self, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<Transaction>)>) {
600 self.local_keys = Some(local_keys);
601 self.feerate_per_kw = Some(feerate_per_kw);
602 self.per_htlc = htlc_outputs;
605 /// Add local signature for a htlc transaction, do nothing if a cached signed transaction is
607 pub fn add_htlc_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&mut self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_index: u32, preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) {
608 if self.local_keys.is_none() || self.feerate_per_kw.is_none() { return; }
609 let local_keys = self.local_keys.as_ref().unwrap();
610 let txid = self.txid();
611 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter_mut() {
612 if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap() == htlc_index {
613 if this_htlc.2.is_some() { return; } // we already have a cached htlc transaction at provided index
614 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw.unwrap(), local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &local_keys.revocation_key);
615 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { return; } // if we don't have preimage for HTLC-Success, don't try to generate
616 let htlc_secret = if !this_htlc.0.offered { preimage } else { None }; // if we have a preimage for HTLC-Timeout, don't use it that's likely a duplicate HTLC hash
617 if this_htlc.1.is_none() { return; } // we don't have any remote signature for this htlc
618 if htlc_tx.input.len() != 1 { return; }
619 if htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return; }
621 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &local_keys.a_htlc_key, &local_keys.b_htlc_key, &local_keys.revocation_key);
623 if let Ok(our_htlc_key) = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key) {
624 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
625 let our_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key);
627 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
629 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
630 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
631 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
632 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
634 if this_htlc.0.offered {
635 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
636 assert!(htlc_secret.is_none());
638 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_secret.unwrap().0.to_vec());
641 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
643 this_htlc.2 = Some(htlc_tx);
648 /// Expose raw htlc transaction, guarante witness is complete if non-empty
649 pub fn htlc_with_valid_witness(&self, htlc_index: u32) -> &Option<Transaction> {
650 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
651 if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap() == htlc_index {
658 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
659 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
660 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
661 self.txid() == o.txid()
664 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
665 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
666 if let Err(e) = self.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
668 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
669 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
672 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
673 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
674 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
675 for &(ref htlc, ref sig, ref htlc_tx) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
678 htlc_tx.write(writer)?;
683 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
684 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
685 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
688 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
689 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
692 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
693 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
694 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
695 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<Transaction>)>()));
696 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
697 let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
698 let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
699 let htlc_tx = Readable::read(reader)?;
700 per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs, htlc_tx));
703 if tx.input.len() != 1 {
704 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
705 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
718 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
722 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
723 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
724 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
727 macro_rules! test_secrets {
729 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
730 for secret in secrets.iter() {
731 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
734 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
735 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
740 // insert_secret correct sequence
741 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
744 secrets.push([0; 32]);
745 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
746 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
749 secrets.push([0; 32]);
750 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
751 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
754 secrets.push([0; 32]);
755 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
756 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
759 secrets.push([0; 32]);
760 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
761 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
764 secrets.push([0; 32]);
765 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
766 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
769 secrets.push([0; 32]);
770 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
771 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
774 secrets.push([0; 32]);
775 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
776 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
779 secrets.push([0; 32]);
780 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
781 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
786 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
787 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
790 secrets.push([0; 32]);
791 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
792 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
795 secrets.push([0; 32]);
796 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
797 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
801 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
802 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
805 secrets.push([0; 32]);
806 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
807 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
810 secrets.push([0; 32]);
811 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
812 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
815 secrets.push([0; 32]);
816 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
817 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
820 secrets.push([0; 32]);
821 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
822 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
826 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
827 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
830 secrets.push([0; 32]);
831 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
832 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
835 secrets.push([0; 32]);
836 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
837 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
840 secrets.push([0; 32]);
841 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
842 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
845 secrets.push([0; 32]);
846 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
847 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
851 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
852 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
855 secrets.push([0; 32]);
856 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
857 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
860 secrets.push([0; 32]);
861 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
862 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
865 secrets.push([0; 32]);
866 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
867 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
870 secrets.push([0; 32]);
871 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
872 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
875 secrets.push([0; 32]);
876 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
877 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
885 secrets.push([0; 32]);
886 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
887 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
890 secrets.push([0; 32]);
891 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
892 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
896 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
897 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
910 secrets.push([0; 32]);
911 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
912 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
915 secrets.push([0; 32]);
916 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
917 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
920 secrets.push([0; 32]);
921 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
922 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
925 secrets.push([0; 32]);
926 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
927 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
931 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
932 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
935 secrets.push([0; 32]);
936 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
937 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
940 secrets.push([0; 32]);
941 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
942 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
945 secrets.push([0; 32]);
946 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
947 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
950 secrets.push([0; 32]);
951 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
952 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
955 secrets.push([0; 32]);
956 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
957 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
960 secrets.push([0; 32]);
961 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
962 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
965 secrets.push([0; 32]);
966 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
967 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
970 secrets.push([0; 32]);
971 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
972 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
976 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
977 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
980 secrets.push([0; 32]);
981 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
982 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
985 secrets.push([0; 32]);
986 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
987 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
990 secrets.push([0; 32]);
991 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
992 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
995 secrets.push([0; 32]);
996 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
997 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1000 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1001 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1002 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1005 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1006 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1007 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1010 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1011 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1012 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1015 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1016 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1017 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1021 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1022 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1025 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1026 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1027 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1030 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1031 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1032 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1035 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1036 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1037 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1040 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1041 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1042 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1045 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1046 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1047 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1050 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1051 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1052 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1055 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1056 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1057 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1060 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1061 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1062 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());