1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
537 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
538 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
539 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
540 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
541 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
542 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
543 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
546 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
548 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
549 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
550 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
551 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
552 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
553 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
554 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
555 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
558 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
559 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
560 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
561 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
562 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
563 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
564 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
565 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
566 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
567 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
568 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
569 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
570 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
571 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
572 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
574 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
575 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
576 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
577 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
579 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
580 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
581 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
582 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
584 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
585 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
586 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
587 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
588 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
590 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
591 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
592 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
593 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
595 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
596 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
597 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
599 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
600 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
601 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
602 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
603 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
605 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
606 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
609 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
610 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
612 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
613 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
614 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
615 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
617 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
618 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
620 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
621 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
624 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
625 (0, update, required),
628 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
629 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
630 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
631 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
632 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
636 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
637 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
638 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
640 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
642 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
643 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
644 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
648 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
650 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
651 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
657 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
658 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
659 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
660 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
661 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
663 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
664 /// in a timely manner.
665 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
668 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
669 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
670 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
672 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
673 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
674 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
675 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
679 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
680 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
681 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
683 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
684 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
685 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
686 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
688 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
692 /// The current channel ID.
693 channel_id: ChannelId,
694 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
695 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
696 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
699 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
700 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
702 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
703 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
704 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
706 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
707 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
708 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
709 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
711 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
712 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
714 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
716 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
717 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
718 destination_script: Script,
720 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
721 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
722 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
724 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
725 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
726 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
727 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
728 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
729 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
731 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
732 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
733 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
734 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
735 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
736 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
738 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
740 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
741 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
742 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
744 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
745 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
746 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
747 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
748 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
749 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
750 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
752 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
754 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
755 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
756 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
757 // HTLCs with similar state.
758 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
759 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
760 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
761 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
762 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
763 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
764 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
765 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
766 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
769 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
770 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
771 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
773 update_time_counter: u32,
775 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
776 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
777 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
778 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
779 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
780 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
782 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
783 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
785 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
786 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
787 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
788 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
790 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
791 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
793 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
795 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
797 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
798 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
799 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
800 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
801 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
802 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
803 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
804 channel_creation_height: u32,
806 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
809 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
811 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
814 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
816 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
819 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
821 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
823 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
824 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
827 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
829 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
831 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
832 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
834 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
836 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
837 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
838 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
840 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
842 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
843 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
844 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
846 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
847 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
848 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
850 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
852 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
854 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
855 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
856 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
857 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
859 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
860 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
861 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
863 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
864 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
865 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
867 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
868 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
869 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
870 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
872 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
873 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
874 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
876 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
877 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
878 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
879 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
880 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
882 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
883 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
885 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
886 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
887 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
888 /// unblock the state machine.
890 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
891 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
892 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
894 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
895 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
896 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
899 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
900 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
901 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
902 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
903 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
904 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
905 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
907 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
908 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
910 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
911 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
912 // the channel's funding UTXO.
914 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
915 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
916 // associated channel mapping.
918 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
919 // to store all of them.
920 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
922 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
923 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
924 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
925 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
926 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
928 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
929 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
931 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
932 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
934 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
935 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
936 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
938 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
939 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
940 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
943 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
944 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
945 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
946 self.update_time_counter
949 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
950 self.latest_monitor_update_id
953 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
954 self.config.announced_channel
957 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
958 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
961 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
962 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
963 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
964 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
967 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
968 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
969 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
972 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
973 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
974 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
975 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
976 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
979 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
980 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
981 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
982 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
984 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
985 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
987 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
988 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
990 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
991 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
993 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
996 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
997 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
998 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
999 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1000 self.channel_state &
1001 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1002 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1003 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1004 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1007 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1008 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1009 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1010 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1011 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1014 // Public utilities:
1016 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1020 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1022 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1023 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1024 self.temporary_channel_id
1027 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1031 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1032 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1033 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1037 /// Gets the channel's type
1038 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1042 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1044 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1045 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1046 self.short_channel_id
1049 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1050 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1051 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1055 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1056 self.outbound_scid_alias
1059 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1060 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1061 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1062 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1063 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1064 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1067 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1068 /// get_funding_created.
1069 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1070 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1073 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1074 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1075 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1078 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1079 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1080 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1081 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1085 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1088 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1089 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1092 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1093 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1096 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1097 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1098 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1101 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1102 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1105 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1106 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1107 self.counterparty_node_id
1110 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1111 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1112 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1115 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1116 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1117 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1120 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1121 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1123 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1124 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1125 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1126 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1128 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1132 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1133 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1134 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1137 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1138 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1139 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1142 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1143 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1144 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1146 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1147 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1152 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1153 self.channel_value_satoshis
1156 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1157 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1160 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1161 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1164 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1165 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1166 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1168 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1169 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1170 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1171 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
1172 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1174 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1178 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1179 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1180 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1183 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1184 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1185 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1188 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1189 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1190 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1193 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1194 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1195 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1198 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1199 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1200 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1203 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1204 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1205 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1208 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1209 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1210 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1211 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1212 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1215 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1217 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1218 self.prev_config = None;
1222 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1223 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1227 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1228 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1229 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1230 let did_channel_update =
1231 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1232 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1233 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1234 if did_channel_update {
1235 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1236 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1237 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1238 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1240 self.config.options = *config;
1244 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1245 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1246 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1247 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1248 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1251 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1252 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1253 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1254 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1255 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1257 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1258 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1259 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1260 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1261 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1262 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1263 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1265 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1266 where L::Target: Logger
1268 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1269 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1270 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1272 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1273 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1274 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1275 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1277 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1278 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1279 if match update_state {
1280 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1281 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1282 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1283 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1284 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1286 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1290 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1291 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1292 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1294 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1296 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1297 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1298 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1300 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1301 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1302 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1303 transaction_output_index: None
1308 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1309 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1310 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1311 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1312 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1315 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1317 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1318 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1319 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1321 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1322 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1325 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1326 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1329 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1331 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1332 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1333 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1335 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1336 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1342 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1343 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1344 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1345 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1346 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1347 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1348 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1352 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1353 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1355 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1357 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1358 if generated_by_local {
1359 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1360 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1369 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1371 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1372 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1373 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1374 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1375 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1376 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1377 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1380 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1381 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1382 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1387 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1388 preimages.push(preimage);
1392 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1393 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1395 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1397 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1398 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1400 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1401 if !generated_by_local {
1402 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1410 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1411 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1412 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1413 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1414 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1415 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1416 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1417 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1419 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1421 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1422 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1423 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1424 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1426 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1428 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1429 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1430 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1431 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1434 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1435 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1436 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1437 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1439 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1442 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1443 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1444 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1445 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1447 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1450 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1451 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1456 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1462 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1464 let channel_parameters =
1465 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1466 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1467 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1474 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1477 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1478 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1479 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1480 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1482 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1483 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1484 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1492 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1493 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1499 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1500 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1501 /// our counterparty!)
1502 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1503 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1504 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1505 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1506 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1507 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1508 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1510 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1514 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1515 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1516 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1517 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1518 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1519 //may see payments to it!
1520 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1521 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1522 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1524 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1527 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1528 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1529 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1530 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1531 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1534 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1535 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1538 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1542 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1543 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1544 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1545 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1546 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1547 // which are near the dust limit.
1548 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1549 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1550 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1551 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1552 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1554 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1555 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1557 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1560 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1561 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1562 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1565 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1566 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1568 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1569 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1570 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1571 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1572 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1573 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1574 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1577 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1580 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1581 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1582 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1584 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1585 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1586 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1587 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1588 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1589 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1591 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1592 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1598 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1599 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1601 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1602 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1603 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1604 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1605 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1606 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1607 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1610 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1613 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1614 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1615 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1617 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1618 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1619 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1620 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1621 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1622 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1624 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1625 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1629 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1630 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1631 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1632 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1633 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1634 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1635 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1637 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1638 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1640 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1647 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1648 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1649 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1650 /// corner case properly.
1651 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1652 -> AvailableBalances
1653 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1655 let context = &self;
1656 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1657 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1658 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1660 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1661 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1662 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1663 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1666 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1668 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1669 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1671 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1673 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1675 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1676 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1680 if context.is_outbound() {
1681 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1682 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1684 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1685 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1687 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1688 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1689 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1690 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1693 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1694 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1695 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1696 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1697 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1698 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1699 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1702 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1703 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1704 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1705 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1706 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1707 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1708 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1709 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1710 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1711 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1712 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1714 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1717 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1718 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1719 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1720 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1721 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1724 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1725 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1727 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1728 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1729 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1731 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1732 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1733 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1734 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1738 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1740 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1741 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1742 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1743 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1744 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1745 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1746 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1748 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1749 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1751 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1752 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1753 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1755 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1756 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1757 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1758 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1759 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1762 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1763 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1764 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1765 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1766 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1767 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1770 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1771 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1772 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1774 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1778 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1779 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1781 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1782 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1786 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1787 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1788 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1789 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1791 outbound_capacity_msat,
1792 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1793 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1798 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1799 let context = &self;
1800 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1803 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1804 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1806 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1807 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1809 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1810 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1812 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1813 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1814 let context = &self;
1815 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1817 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1820 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1821 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1823 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1824 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1826 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1827 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1829 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1830 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1834 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1835 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1841 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1842 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1843 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1846 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1847 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1848 included_htlcs += 1;
1851 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1852 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1856 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1857 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1858 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1859 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1860 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1861 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1866 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1868 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1869 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1874 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1875 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1879 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1880 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1881 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1884 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1885 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1887 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1888 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1889 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1891 total_pending_htlcs,
1892 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1893 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1894 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1896 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1897 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1898 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1900 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1902 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1907 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1908 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1910 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1911 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1913 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1914 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1916 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1917 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1918 let context = &self;
1919 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1921 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1924 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1925 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1927 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1928 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1930 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1931 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1933 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1934 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1938 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1939 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1945 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1946 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1947 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1948 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1949 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1950 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1953 included_htlcs += 1;
1956 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1957 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1960 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1961 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1963 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1964 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1965 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1970 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1971 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1972 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1975 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1976 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1978 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1979 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1981 total_pending_htlcs,
1982 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1983 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1984 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1986 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1987 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1988 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1990 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1992 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1997 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
1998 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
1999 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2000 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2007 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2009 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2010 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2013 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2015 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2016 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2017 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2021 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2022 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2023 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2026 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2028 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2029 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2032 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2033 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2034 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2035 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2036 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2037 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2038 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2039 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2040 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2041 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2042 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2044 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2045 // return them to fail the payment.
2046 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2047 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2048 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2050 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2051 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2056 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2057 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2058 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2059 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2060 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2061 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2062 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2063 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2064 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2065 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2066 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2067 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2068 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2072 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2074 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2075 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2078 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2079 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2084 // Internal utility functions for channels
2086 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2087 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2088 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2090 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2092 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2093 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2094 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2096 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2099 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2101 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2104 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2105 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2106 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2108 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2110 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2111 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2112 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2113 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2114 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2117 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2118 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2119 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2120 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2121 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2122 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2123 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2126 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2127 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2129 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2130 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2133 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2134 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2135 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2136 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2137 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2138 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2141 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2142 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2143 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2144 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2147 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2148 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2150 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2151 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2152 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2156 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2157 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2158 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2160 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2161 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2162 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2163 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2165 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2166 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2167 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2168 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2169 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2170 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2171 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2173 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2174 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2179 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2180 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2182 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2184 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2185 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2186 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2187 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2189 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2190 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2200 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2201 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2202 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2203 // outside of those situations will fail.
2204 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2208 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2213 1 + // script length (0)
2217 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2218 2 + // witness marker and flag
2219 1 + // witness element count
2220 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2221 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2222 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2223 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2224 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2225 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2227 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2228 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2229 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2235 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2236 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2237 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2238 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2240 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2241 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2242 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2244 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2245 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2246 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2247 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2248 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2249 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2252 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2253 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2256 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2257 value_to_holder = 0;
2260 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2261 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2262 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2263 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2265 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2266 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2269 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2270 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2273 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2276 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2277 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2279 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2281 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2282 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2283 where L::Target: Logger {
2284 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2285 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2286 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2287 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2288 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2289 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2290 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2291 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2295 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2296 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2297 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2298 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2300 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2301 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2303 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2305 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2306 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2307 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2309 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2310 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2311 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2312 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2313 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2314 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2315 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2317 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2318 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2319 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2321 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2322 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2324 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2327 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2328 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2332 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2336 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2337 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2338 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2339 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2340 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2341 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2344 // Now update local state:
2346 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2347 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2348 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2349 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2350 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2351 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2352 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2356 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2357 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2358 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2359 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2360 // do not not get into this branch.
2361 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2362 match pending_update {
2363 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2364 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2365 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2366 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2367 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2368 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2369 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2372 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2373 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2374 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2375 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2376 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2377 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2378 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2384 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2385 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2386 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2388 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2389 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2390 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2392 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2393 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2396 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2397 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2399 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2400 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2402 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2403 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2406 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2409 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2410 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2411 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2412 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2417 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2418 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2419 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2420 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2421 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2422 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2423 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2424 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2425 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2426 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2427 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2428 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2429 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2430 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2431 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2433 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2434 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2435 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2436 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2437 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2440 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2441 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2442 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2448 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2449 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2451 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2455 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2456 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2457 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2458 /// before we fail backwards.
2460 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2461 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2462 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2463 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2464 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2465 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2466 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2469 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2470 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2471 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2472 /// before we fail backwards.
2474 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2475 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2476 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2477 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2478 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2479 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2480 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2482 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2484 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2485 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2486 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2488 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2489 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2490 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2492 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2493 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2494 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2496 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2501 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2502 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2508 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2509 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2510 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2511 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2512 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2516 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2517 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2518 force_holding_cell = true;
2521 // Now update local state:
2522 if force_holding_cell {
2523 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2524 match pending_update {
2525 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2526 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2527 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2528 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2532 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2533 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2534 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2535 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2541 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2542 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2543 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2549 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2551 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2552 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2555 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2556 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2557 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2562 // Message handlers:
2564 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2565 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2566 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2567 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2568 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2572 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2575 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2576 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2578 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2579 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2580 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2581 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2584 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2586 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2587 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2588 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2589 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2591 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2592 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2594 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2595 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2597 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2598 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2599 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2600 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2601 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2606 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2607 initial_commitment_tx,
2610 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2611 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2614 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2615 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2618 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2619 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2620 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2621 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2622 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2623 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2624 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2625 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2626 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2627 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2628 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2629 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2631 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2633 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2634 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2635 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2636 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2637 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2638 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2639 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2641 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2642 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2643 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2645 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2647 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2648 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2650 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2652 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2653 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2657 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2658 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2659 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2660 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2661 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2662 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2663 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2666 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2667 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2669 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2670 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2671 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2672 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2674 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2677 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2678 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2679 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2682 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2683 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2684 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2685 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2686 // when routing outbound payments.
2687 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2691 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2693 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2694 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2696 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2697 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2699 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2700 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2701 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2702 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2703 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2704 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2705 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2706 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2707 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2709 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2710 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2711 let expected_point =
2712 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2713 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2715 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2716 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2717 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2718 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2719 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2720 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2722 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2723 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2724 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2725 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2726 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2728 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2733 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2736 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2737 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2739 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2741 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2744 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2745 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2746 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2747 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2748 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2749 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2751 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2752 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2753 if local_sent_shutdown {
2754 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2756 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2757 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2758 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2761 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2764 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2767 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2770 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2774 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2775 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2776 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2777 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2779 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2780 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2783 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2784 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2785 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2786 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2787 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2788 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2789 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2790 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2791 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2792 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2793 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2795 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2796 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2797 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2798 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2799 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2800 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2804 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2805 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2808 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2809 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2810 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2812 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2813 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2814 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2815 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2816 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2817 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2818 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2822 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2823 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2824 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2825 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2826 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2827 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2828 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2832 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2833 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2834 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2835 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2836 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2840 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2841 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2843 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2844 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2845 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2847 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2848 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2852 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2855 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2856 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2860 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2861 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2865 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2866 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2867 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2868 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2869 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2870 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2871 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2872 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2873 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2875 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2876 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2877 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2878 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2879 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2882 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2883 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2884 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2885 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2886 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2889 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2892 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2893 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2896 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2897 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2898 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2902 // Now update local state:
2903 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2904 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2905 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2906 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2907 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2908 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2909 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2914 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2916 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2917 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2918 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2919 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2920 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2921 None => fail_reason.into(),
2922 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2923 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2924 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2925 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2927 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2931 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2932 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2933 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2934 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2936 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2937 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2942 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2945 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2946 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2947 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2949 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2950 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2953 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2956 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2957 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2960 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2961 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2964 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2968 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2969 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2972 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2976 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2980 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2981 where L::Target: Logger
2983 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2986 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2989 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2993 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2995 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2997 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2998 let commitment_txid = {
2999 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3000 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3001 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3003 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3004 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3005 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3006 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3007 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3008 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3012 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3014 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3015 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3016 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3017 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3020 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3021 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3022 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3023 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3026 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3028 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3029 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3030 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3031 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3032 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3033 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3034 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3035 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3036 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3037 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3038 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3044 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3048 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3049 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3050 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3051 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3052 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3053 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3054 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3055 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3056 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3057 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3058 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3059 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3060 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3063 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3064 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3065 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3066 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3067 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3068 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3069 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3071 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3072 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3073 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3074 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3075 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3076 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3077 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3080 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3081 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3084 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3086 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3087 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3088 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3091 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3094 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3095 commitment_stats.tx,
3097 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3098 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3099 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3102 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3103 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3105 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3106 let mut need_commitment = false;
3107 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3108 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3109 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3110 need_commitment = true;
3114 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3115 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3116 Some(forward_info.clone())
3118 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3119 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3120 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3121 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3122 need_commitment = true;
3125 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3126 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3127 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3128 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3129 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3130 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3131 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3132 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3133 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3134 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3135 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3136 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3137 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3138 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3140 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3142 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3143 need_commitment = true;
3147 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3148 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3149 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3150 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3151 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3152 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3154 nondust_htlc_sources,
3158 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3159 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3160 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3161 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3163 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3164 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3165 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3166 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3167 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3168 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3169 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3170 // includes the right HTLCs.
3171 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3172 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3173 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3174 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3175 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3176 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3178 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3179 &self.context.channel_id);
3180 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3183 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3184 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3185 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3186 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3187 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3188 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3189 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3190 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3191 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3195 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3196 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3197 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3198 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3201 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3202 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3203 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3204 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3205 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3206 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3207 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3209 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3210 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3211 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3212 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3215 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3216 /// for our counterparty.
3217 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3218 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3219 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3220 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3222 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3223 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3224 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3225 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3227 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3228 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3229 updates: Vec::new(),
3232 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3233 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3234 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3235 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3236 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3237 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3238 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3239 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3240 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3241 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3242 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3243 // to rebalance channels.
3244 match &htlc_update {
3245 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3246 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3247 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3249 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3250 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3252 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3255 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3256 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3257 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3258 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3259 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3260 // into the holding cell without ever being
3261 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3262 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3263 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3266 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3273 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3274 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3275 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3276 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3277 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3278 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3279 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3280 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3281 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3282 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3283 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3285 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3286 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3287 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3288 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3289 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3290 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3291 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3292 // for a full revocation before failing.
3293 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3294 update_fail_count += 1;
3297 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3299 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3306 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3307 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3309 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3310 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3315 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3316 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3317 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3318 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3319 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3321 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3322 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3323 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3325 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3326 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3332 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3333 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3334 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3335 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3336 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3337 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3338 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3339 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3340 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3342 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3345 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3348 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3352 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3354 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3355 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3360 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3361 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3362 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3363 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3364 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3365 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3366 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3367 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3371 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3373 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3374 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3377 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3378 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3379 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3380 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3382 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3386 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3387 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3388 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3389 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3390 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3391 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3392 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3393 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3397 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3398 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3399 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3400 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3401 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3402 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3403 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3404 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3405 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3407 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3408 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3411 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3412 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3413 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3414 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3415 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3416 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3417 let mut require_commitment = false;
3418 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3421 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3422 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3423 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3425 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3426 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3427 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3428 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3429 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3430 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3435 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3436 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3437 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3438 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3439 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3441 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3442 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3443 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3448 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3449 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3451 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3455 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3456 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3458 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3459 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3460 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3461 require_commitment = true;
3462 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3463 match forward_info {
3464 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3465 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3466 require_commitment = true;
3468 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3469 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3470 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3472 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3473 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3474 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3478 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3479 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3480 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3481 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3487 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3488 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3489 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3490 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3492 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3493 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3494 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3495 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3496 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3497 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3498 require_commitment = true;
3502 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3504 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3505 match update_state {
3506 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3507 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3508 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3509 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3510 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3512 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3513 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3514 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3515 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3516 require_commitment = true;
3517 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3518 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3523 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3524 let release_state_str =
3525 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3526 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3527 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3528 if !release_monitor {
3529 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3530 update: monitor_update,
3532 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3534 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3539 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3540 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3541 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3542 if require_commitment {
3543 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3544 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3545 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3546 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3547 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3548 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3549 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3550 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3551 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3553 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3554 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3555 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3556 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3557 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3560 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3561 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3562 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3563 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3564 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3565 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3567 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3568 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3570 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3571 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3573 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3574 if require_commitment {
3575 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3577 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3578 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3579 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3580 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3582 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3583 &self.context.channel_id(),
3584 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3587 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3588 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3590 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3591 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3593 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3594 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3600 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3601 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3602 /// commitment update.
3603 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3604 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3605 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3607 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3608 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3611 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3612 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3613 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3614 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3616 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3617 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3618 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3619 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3620 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3621 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3622 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3624 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3625 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3627 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3628 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3630 if !self.context.is_live() {
3631 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3634 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3635 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3636 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3637 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3638 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3639 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3640 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3641 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3642 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3643 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3647 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3648 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3649 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3650 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3651 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3652 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3655 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3656 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3660 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3661 force_holding_cell = true;
3664 if force_holding_cell {
3665 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3669 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3670 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3672 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3673 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3678 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3679 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3681 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3683 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3684 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3685 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3686 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3690 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3691 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3692 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3696 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3697 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3700 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3701 // will be retransmitted.
3702 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3703 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3704 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3706 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3707 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3709 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3710 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3711 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3712 // this HTLC accordingly
3713 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3716 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3717 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3718 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3719 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3722 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3723 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3724 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3725 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3726 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3727 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3732 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3734 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3735 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3736 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3737 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3741 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3742 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3743 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3744 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3745 // the update upon reconnection.
3746 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3750 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3752 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3753 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3757 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3758 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3759 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3760 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3761 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3762 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3763 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3765 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3766 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3767 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3768 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3769 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3770 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3771 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3773 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3774 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3775 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3776 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3777 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3778 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3779 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3782 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3783 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3784 /// to the remote side.
3785 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3786 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3787 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3788 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3791 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3793 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3794 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3796 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3797 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3798 // first received the funding_signed.
3799 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3800 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3801 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3803 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3804 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3805 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3806 funding_broadcastable = None;
3809 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3810 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3811 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3812 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3813 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3814 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3815 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3816 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3817 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3818 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3819 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3820 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3821 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3822 next_per_commitment_point,
3823 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3827 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3829 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3830 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3831 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3832 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3833 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3834 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3836 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3837 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3838 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3839 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3840 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3841 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3845 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3846 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3848 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3849 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3850 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3853 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3854 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3855 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3856 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3857 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3858 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3859 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3860 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3861 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3865 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3866 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3868 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3871 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3872 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3874 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3875 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3877 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3878 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3879 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3880 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3881 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3882 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3883 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3884 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3885 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3886 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3887 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3888 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3889 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3890 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3892 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3893 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3894 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3900 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3901 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3902 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3903 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3904 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3905 per_commitment_secret,
3906 next_per_commitment_point,
3908 next_local_nonce: None,
3912 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3913 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3914 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3915 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3916 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3918 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3919 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3920 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3921 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3922 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3923 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3924 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3925 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3926 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3927 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3932 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3933 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3935 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3936 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3937 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3938 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3939 reason: err_packet.clone()
3942 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3943 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3944 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3945 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3946 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3947 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3950 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3951 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3952 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3953 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3954 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3961 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3962 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3963 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3964 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3968 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3969 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3970 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3971 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3972 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3973 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3977 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3978 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3979 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3980 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3981 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3982 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3983 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3988 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3989 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3991 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3992 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3993 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3994 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3995 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3996 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3997 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3998 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4001 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4003 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4004 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4005 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4006 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4010 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4011 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4012 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4015 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4016 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4017 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4018 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4019 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4022 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4023 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4024 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4025 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4026 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4029 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4030 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4031 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4032 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4033 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4034 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4035 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4036 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4040 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4041 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4042 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4043 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4045 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4049 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4050 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4051 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4052 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4054 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4056 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4058 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4059 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4060 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4061 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4062 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4065 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4066 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4067 channel_ready: None,
4068 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4069 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4070 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4074 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4075 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4076 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4077 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4078 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4079 next_per_commitment_point,
4080 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4082 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4083 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4084 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4088 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4089 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4090 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4092 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4093 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4094 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4097 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4103 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4104 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4105 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4106 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4107 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4108 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4109 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4111 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4113 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4114 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4115 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4116 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4117 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4118 next_per_commitment_point,
4119 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4123 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4124 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4125 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4127 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4130 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4131 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4132 raa: required_revoke,
4133 commitment_update: None,
4134 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4136 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4137 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4138 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4140 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4143 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4144 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4145 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4146 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4147 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4148 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4151 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4152 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4153 raa: required_revoke,
4154 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4155 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4159 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4163 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4164 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4165 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4166 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4168 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4170 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4172 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4173 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4174 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4175 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4176 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4177 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4178 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4179 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4181 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4182 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4183 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4184 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4185 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4187 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4188 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4189 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4190 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4193 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4194 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4195 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4196 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4197 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4198 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4199 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4200 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4201 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4202 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4203 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4204 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4205 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4206 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4207 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4209 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4212 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4213 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4216 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4217 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4218 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4219 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4220 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4221 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4224 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4225 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4226 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4227 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4228 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4229 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4232 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4238 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4239 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4240 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4241 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4243 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4244 return Ok((None, None, None));
4247 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4248 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4249 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4251 return Ok((None, None, None));
4254 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4256 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4257 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4258 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4259 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4261 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4262 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4264 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4265 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4267 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4268 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4269 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4270 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4272 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4273 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4274 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4281 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4282 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4284 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4285 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4288 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4289 /// within our expected timeframe.
4291 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4292 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4293 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4296 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4299 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4300 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4304 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4305 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4307 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4310 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4311 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4312 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4313 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4314 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4316 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4317 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4318 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4321 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4323 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4324 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4327 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4328 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4329 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4332 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4335 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4336 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4337 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4338 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4340 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4343 assert!(send_shutdown);
4344 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4345 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4346 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4348 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4349 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4351 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4356 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4358 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4359 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4361 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4362 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4363 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4364 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4365 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4366 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4369 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4370 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4372 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4373 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4374 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4375 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4379 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4380 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4381 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4382 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4383 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4384 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4386 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4387 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4394 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4395 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4397 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4400 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4401 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4403 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4405 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4406 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4407 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4408 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4409 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4410 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4411 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4412 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4413 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4415 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4416 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4419 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4423 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4424 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4425 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4426 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4428 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4431 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4432 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4434 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4435 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4437 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4441 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4445 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4446 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4447 return Ok((None, None, None));
4450 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4451 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4452 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4453 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4455 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4457 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4460 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4461 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4462 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4463 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4464 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4468 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4469 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4470 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4474 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4475 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4476 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4477 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4478 monitor_update: None,
4479 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4480 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4482 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4483 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4484 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4485 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4489 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4491 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4492 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4493 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4494 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4496 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4499 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4500 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4502 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4503 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4504 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4505 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4506 monitor_update: None,
4507 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4508 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4510 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4511 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4512 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4513 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4518 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4519 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4520 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4521 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4523 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4524 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4525 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4527 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4533 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4534 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4535 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4537 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4538 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4540 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4541 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4544 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4545 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4546 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4547 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4548 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4550 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4551 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4552 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4554 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4555 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4558 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4559 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4560 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4561 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4562 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4563 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4564 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4565 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4567 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4570 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4571 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4572 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4573 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4575 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4579 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4580 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4581 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4582 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4584 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4590 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4591 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4592 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4593 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4594 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4595 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4596 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4598 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4599 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4602 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4604 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4605 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4611 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4612 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4613 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4614 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4615 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4616 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4617 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4619 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4620 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4627 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4628 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4631 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4632 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4635 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4636 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4640 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4641 &self.context.holder_signer
4645 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4647 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4648 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4649 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4650 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4651 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4652 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4654 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4656 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4664 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4665 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4669 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4670 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4671 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4672 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4675 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4676 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4677 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4678 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4681 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4682 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4683 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4684 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4685 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4686 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4689 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4690 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4691 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4692 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4693 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4694 if !release_monitor {
4695 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4704 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4705 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4708 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4709 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4710 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4712 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4713 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4714 if self.context.channel_state &
4715 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4716 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4717 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4718 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4719 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4722 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4723 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4724 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4725 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4726 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4727 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4729 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4730 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4731 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4733 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4734 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4735 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4736 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4737 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4738 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4744 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4745 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4746 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4749 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4750 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4751 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4754 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4755 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4756 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4759 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4760 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4761 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4762 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4763 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4764 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4769 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4770 self.context.channel_update_status
4773 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4774 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4775 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4778 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4780 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4781 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4782 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4786 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4787 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4788 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4791 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4795 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4796 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4797 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4798 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4799 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4801 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4802 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4803 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4805 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4806 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4809 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4810 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4811 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4812 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4813 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4814 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4815 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4816 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4817 self.context.channel_state);
4819 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4823 if need_commitment_update {
4824 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4825 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4826 let next_per_commitment_point =
4827 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4828 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4829 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4830 next_per_commitment_point,
4831 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4835 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4841 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4842 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4843 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4844 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4845 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4846 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4847 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4849 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4852 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4853 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4854 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4855 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4856 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4857 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4858 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4859 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4860 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4861 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4862 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4863 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4864 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4865 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4866 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4867 // channel and move on.
4868 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4869 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4871 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4872 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4873 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4875 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4876 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4877 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4878 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4879 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4880 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4881 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4882 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4887 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4888 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4889 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4890 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4891 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4894 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4895 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4896 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4897 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4898 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4899 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4902 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4903 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4904 // may have already happened for this block).
4905 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4906 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4907 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4908 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
4911 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4912 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4913 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4914 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4922 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4923 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4924 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4925 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4927 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4928 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4931 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4933 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4934 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4935 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4936 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4938 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4941 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4944 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4945 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4946 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4947 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4949 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4952 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4953 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4954 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4956 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4957 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4959 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4960 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4961 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4969 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4971 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4972 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
4973 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4975 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4976 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4979 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4980 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4981 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4982 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4983 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4984 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4985 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4986 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4987 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4990 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4991 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4992 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4993 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4995 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4996 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4997 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4999 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5000 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5001 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5002 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5004 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5005 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5006 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5007 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5008 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5009 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5010 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5013 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5014 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5016 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5019 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5020 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5021 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5022 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5023 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5024 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5025 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5026 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5027 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5028 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5029 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5030 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5031 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5032 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5033 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5034 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5035 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5041 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5046 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5047 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5049 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5050 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5051 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5052 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5054 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5057 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5059 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5060 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5061 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5062 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5063 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5064 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5066 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5067 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5070 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5071 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5072 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5073 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5074 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5075 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5077 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5078 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5081 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5082 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5083 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5084 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5085 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5091 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5092 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5093 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5094 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5096 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5099 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5103 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5107 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5108 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5112 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5116 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5117 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5120 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5124 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5126 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5131 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5132 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5133 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5135 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5140 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5142 None => return None,
5145 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5147 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5148 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5150 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5151 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5157 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5159 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5160 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5161 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5162 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5163 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5164 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5165 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5167 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5168 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5169 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5170 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5171 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5172 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5173 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5174 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5175 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5176 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5177 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5178 contents: announcement,
5183 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5187 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5188 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5189 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5190 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5191 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5192 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5193 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5194 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5196 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5198 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5199 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5200 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5201 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5203 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5204 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5205 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5206 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5209 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5210 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5211 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5212 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5215 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5218 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5219 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5220 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5221 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5222 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5223 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5226 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5228 Err(_) => return None,
5230 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5231 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5236 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5237 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5238 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5239 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5240 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5241 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5242 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5243 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5244 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5245 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5246 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5247 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5248 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5249 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5250 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5251 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5254 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5257 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5258 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5259 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5260 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5261 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5262 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5263 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5264 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5265 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5267 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5268 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5269 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5270 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5271 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5272 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5273 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5274 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5275 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5277 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5278 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5279 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5280 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5281 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5282 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5283 next_funding_txid: None,
5288 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5290 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5291 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5292 /// commitment update.
5294 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5295 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5296 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5297 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5298 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5299 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5300 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5303 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5304 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5305 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5307 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5308 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5313 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5314 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5316 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5318 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5319 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5321 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5322 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5323 /// regenerate them.
5325 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5326 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5328 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5329 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5330 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5331 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5332 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5333 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5334 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5336 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5337 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5339 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5340 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5341 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5344 if amount_msat == 0 {
5345 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5348 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5349 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5350 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5351 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5354 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5355 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5356 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5359 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5360 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5361 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5362 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5363 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5364 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5365 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5366 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5369 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5370 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5371 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5372 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5373 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5374 else { "to peer" });
5376 if need_holding_cell {
5377 force_holding_cell = true;
5380 // Now update local state:
5381 if force_holding_cell {
5382 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5387 onion_routing_packet,
5393 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5394 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5396 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5398 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5403 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5404 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5405 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5409 onion_routing_packet,
5412 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5417 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5418 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5419 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5420 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5422 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5423 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5424 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5426 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5427 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5431 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5432 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5433 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5434 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5435 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5436 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5437 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5440 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5441 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5442 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5443 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5444 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5445 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5448 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5450 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5451 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5452 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5453 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5454 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5456 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5457 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5460 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5461 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5462 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5463 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5464 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5465 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5466 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5467 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5468 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5469 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5470 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5473 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5477 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5478 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5479 where L::Target: Logger
5481 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5482 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5483 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5485 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5487 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5488 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5489 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5490 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5491 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5492 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5493 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5494 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5495 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5496 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5497 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5503 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5506 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5507 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5508 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5509 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5510 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5511 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5513 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5514 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5515 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5517 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5518 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5519 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5522 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5523 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5527 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5528 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5530 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5532 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5533 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5534 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5535 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5537 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5538 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5539 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5540 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5541 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5542 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5546 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5547 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5551 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5552 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5557 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5558 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5560 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5561 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5562 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5563 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5564 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5565 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5566 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5567 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5569 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5570 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5571 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5574 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5575 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5576 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5582 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5584 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5585 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5586 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5587 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5588 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5590 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5592 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5598 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5599 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5601 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5602 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5603 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5604 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5605 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5607 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5608 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5609 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5612 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5613 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5614 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5616 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5617 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5620 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5621 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5623 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5624 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5625 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5628 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5629 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5630 let mut chan_closed = false;
5631 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5635 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5637 None if !chan_closed => {
5638 // use override shutdown script if provided
5639 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5640 Some(script) => script,
5642 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5643 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5644 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5645 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5649 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5650 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5652 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5658 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5659 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5660 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5661 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5662 monitor_update: None,
5663 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5664 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5666 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5667 Some(shutdown_result)
5669 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5672 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5674 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5675 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5676 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5677 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5678 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5679 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5682 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5683 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5685 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5686 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5687 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5690 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5691 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5692 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5693 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5694 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5696 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5697 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5704 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5705 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5707 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5710 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5711 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5712 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5714 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5715 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5719 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5723 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5724 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5725 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5726 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5729 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5730 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5731 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5732 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5733 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5734 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5735 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5736 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5738 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5739 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5740 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5741 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5743 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5744 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5746 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5747 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5749 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5750 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5751 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5753 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5754 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5756 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5757 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5758 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5759 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5760 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5763 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5764 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5766 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5767 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5769 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5771 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5773 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5774 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5775 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5776 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5779 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5780 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5782 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5783 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5784 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5785 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5789 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5790 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5791 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5795 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5796 Ok(script) => script,
5797 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5800 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5803 context: ChannelContext {
5806 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5807 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5808 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5809 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5814 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5816 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5817 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5818 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5819 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5821 channel_value_satoshis,
5823 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5825 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5826 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5829 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5830 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5833 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5834 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5835 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5836 pending_update_fee: None,
5837 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5838 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5839 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5840 update_time_counter: 1,
5842 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5844 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5845 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5846 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5847 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5848 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5849 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5851 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5852 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5853 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5854 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5856 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5857 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5858 closing_fee_limits: None,
5859 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5861 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5862 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5863 short_channel_id: None,
5864 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5866 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5867 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5868 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5869 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5870 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5871 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5872 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5873 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5874 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5875 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5876 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5877 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5879 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5881 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5882 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5883 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5884 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5885 counterparty_parameters: None,
5886 funding_outpoint: None,
5887 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5889 funding_transaction: None,
5890 is_batch_funding: None,
5892 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5893 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5894 counterparty_node_id,
5896 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5898 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5900 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5901 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5903 announcement_sigs: None,
5905 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5906 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5907 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5908 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5910 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5911 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5913 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5914 outbound_scid_alias,
5916 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5917 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5920 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5925 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5927 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5931 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5932 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5933 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5934 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5935 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5936 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5937 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5938 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5939 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5944 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5945 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5946 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5947 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5948 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5949 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5950 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5951 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5952 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5953 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5954 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5956 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5957 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5959 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5960 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5961 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5962 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5965 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5966 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5968 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5971 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5972 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5973 return Err((self, e));
5977 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5979 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5981 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5982 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5984 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5985 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5986 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5987 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5988 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5989 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5992 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5993 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
5995 let channel = Channel {
5996 context: self.context,
5999 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
6000 temporary_channel_id,
6001 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
6002 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
6005 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6007 next_local_nonce: None,
6011 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6012 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6013 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6014 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6015 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6016 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6017 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6018 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6019 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6020 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6023 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6024 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6025 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6026 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6027 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6028 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6034 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6035 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6036 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6037 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6038 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6039 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6041 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6043 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6044 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6045 // We've exhausted our options
6048 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6049 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6052 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6053 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6054 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6055 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6057 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6058 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6059 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6060 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6061 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6062 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6064 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6066 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6067 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6070 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6071 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6072 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6074 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6075 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6078 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6079 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6082 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6083 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6087 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6088 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6089 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6090 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6091 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6092 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6093 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6094 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6095 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6096 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6097 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6098 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6099 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6100 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6101 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6102 first_per_commitment_point,
6103 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6104 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6105 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6106 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6108 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6113 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6114 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6116 // Check sanity of message fields:
6117 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6120 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6123 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6126 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6129 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6132 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6134 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6136 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6137 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6138 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6140 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6141 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6144 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6147 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6151 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6152 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6155 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6156 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6158 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6161 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6164 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6167 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6170 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6171 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6174 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6175 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6178 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6179 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6181 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6182 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6185 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6186 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6189 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6190 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6191 &Some(ref script) => {
6192 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6193 if script.len() == 0 {
6196 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6199 Some(script.clone())
6202 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6209 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6210 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6211 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6212 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6213 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6215 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6216 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6218 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6221 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6222 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6223 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6224 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6225 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6226 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6229 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6230 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6231 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6234 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6235 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6237 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6238 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6244 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6245 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6246 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6247 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6250 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6251 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6252 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6253 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6254 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6255 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6256 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6257 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6258 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6259 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6260 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6263 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6265 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6266 // support this channel type.
6267 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6268 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6272 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6273 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6274 // `static_remote_key`.
6275 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6278 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6279 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6280 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6282 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6283 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6285 channel_type.clone()
6287 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6288 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6294 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6295 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6296 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6297 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6298 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6299 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6300 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6301 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6302 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6305 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6309 // Check sanity of message fields:
6310 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6311 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6313 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6316 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6317 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6319 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6320 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6321 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6323 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6324 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6326 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6327 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6329 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6331 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6332 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6333 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6335 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6338 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6339 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6342 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6343 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6344 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6346 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6347 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6349 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6350 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6352 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6353 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6355 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6356 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6358 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6359 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6361 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6362 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6365 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6367 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6368 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6373 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6374 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6375 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6376 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6377 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6379 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6380 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6382 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6383 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6384 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6386 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6387 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6390 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6391 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6392 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6393 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6397 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6398 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6399 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6400 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6403 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6404 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6405 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6406 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6410 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6411 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6412 &Some(ref script) => {
6413 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6414 if script.len() == 0 {
6417 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6418 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6420 Some(script.clone())
6423 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6430 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6431 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6432 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6433 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6437 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6438 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6439 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6443 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6444 Ok(script) => script,
6445 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6448 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6449 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6451 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6454 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6458 context: ChannelContext {
6461 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6462 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6464 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6469 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6471 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6472 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6473 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6474 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6477 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6479 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6480 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6483 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6484 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6485 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6487 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6488 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6489 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6490 pending_update_fee: None,
6491 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6492 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6493 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6494 update_time_counter: 1,
6496 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6498 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6499 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6500 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6501 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6502 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6503 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6505 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6506 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6507 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6508 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6510 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6511 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6512 closing_fee_limits: None,
6513 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6515 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6516 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6517 short_channel_id: None,
6518 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6520 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6521 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6522 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6523 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6524 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6525 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6526 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6527 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6528 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6529 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6530 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6531 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6534 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6536 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6537 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6538 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6539 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6540 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6541 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6542 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6544 funding_outpoint: None,
6545 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6547 funding_transaction: None,
6548 is_batch_funding: None,
6550 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6551 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6552 counterparty_node_id,
6554 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6556 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6558 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6559 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6561 announcement_sigs: None,
6563 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6564 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6565 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6566 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6568 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6569 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6571 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6572 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6574 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6575 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6577 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6578 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6583 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6585 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6591 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6592 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6594 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6595 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6596 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6597 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6599 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6600 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6602 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6603 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6606 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6609 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6610 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6611 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6613 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6614 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6615 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6616 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6618 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6619 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6620 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6621 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6622 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6623 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6624 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6625 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6626 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6627 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6628 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6629 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6630 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6631 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6632 first_per_commitment_point,
6633 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6634 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6635 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6637 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6639 next_local_nonce: None,
6643 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6644 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6646 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6648 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6649 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6652 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6653 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6655 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6656 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6658 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6659 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6660 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6661 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6662 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6663 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6664 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6665 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6666 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6669 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6670 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6672 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6673 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6674 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6675 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6677 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6678 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6679 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6680 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6681 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6683 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6684 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6689 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6690 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6691 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6695 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6696 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6698 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6699 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6700 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6702 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6704 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6705 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6706 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6707 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6710 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6711 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6712 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6713 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6714 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6716 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6718 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6719 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6720 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6723 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6724 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6725 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6729 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6730 initial_commitment_tx,
6733 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6734 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6737 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6738 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6741 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6743 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6744 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6745 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6746 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6747 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6748 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6749 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6750 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6751 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6752 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6753 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6755 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6757 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6758 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6759 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6760 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6761 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6762 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6764 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6765 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6766 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6767 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6769 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6771 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6772 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6773 let mut channel = Channel {
6774 context: self.context,
6776 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6777 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6778 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6780 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6784 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6785 }, channel_monitor))
6789 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6790 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6792 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6798 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6799 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6800 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6801 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6802 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6804 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6805 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6806 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6807 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6813 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6814 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6815 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6816 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6817 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6818 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6823 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6824 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6825 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6826 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6828 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6829 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6830 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6831 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6836 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6837 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6838 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6839 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6840 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6841 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6846 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6847 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6848 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6851 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6853 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6854 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6855 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6856 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6857 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6859 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6860 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6861 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6862 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6864 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6865 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6866 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6868 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6870 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6871 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6872 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6873 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6874 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6875 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6876 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6878 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6879 // deserialized from that format.
6880 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6881 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6882 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6884 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6886 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6887 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6888 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6890 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6891 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6892 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6893 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6896 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6897 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6898 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6901 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6902 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6903 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6904 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6906 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6907 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6909 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6911 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6913 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6915 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6918 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6920 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6925 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6926 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6928 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6929 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6930 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6931 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6932 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6933 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6934 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6936 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6938 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6940 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6943 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6944 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6945 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6948 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6950 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6951 preimages.push(preimage);
6953 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6954 reason.write(writer)?;
6956 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6958 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6959 preimages.push(preimage);
6961 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6962 reason.write(writer)?;
6965 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6966 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6967 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6969 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6970 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6971 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6975 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6976 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6977 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6979 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6980 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6984 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6985 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6986 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6987 source.write(writer)?;
6988 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6990 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6991 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6992 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6994 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6995 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6997 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6999 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7000 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7002 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7004 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7005 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7010 match self.context.resend_order {
7011 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7012 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7015 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7016 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7017 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7019 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7020 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7021 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7022 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7025 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7026 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7027 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7028 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7029 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7032 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7033 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7034 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7035 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7037 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7038 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7039 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7041 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7043 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7044 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7045 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7046 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7048 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7049 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7050 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7051 // consider the stale state on reload.
7054 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7055 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7056 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7058 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7059 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7060 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7062 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7063 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7065 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7066 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7067 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7069 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7070 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7072 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7075 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7076 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7077 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7079 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7082 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7083 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7085 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7086 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7087 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7089 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7091 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7093 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7095 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7096 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7097 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7098 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7099 htlc.write(writer)?;
7102 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7103 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7104 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7106 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7107 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7109 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7110 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7111 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7112 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7113 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7114 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7115 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7117 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7118 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7119 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7120 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7121 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7123 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7124 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7126 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7127 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7128 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7129 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7131 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7133 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7134 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7135 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7136 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7137 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7138 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7139 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7141 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7142 (2, chan_type, option),
7143 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7144 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7145 (5, self.context.config, required),
7146 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7147 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7148 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7149 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7150 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7151 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7152 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7153 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7154 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7155 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7156 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7157 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7158 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7159 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7160 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7161 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7162 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7163 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7164 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7171 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7172 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7174 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7175 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7177 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7178 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7179 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7181 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7182 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7183 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7184 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7186 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7188 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7189 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7190 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7191 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7192 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7194 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7195 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7198 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7199 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7200 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7202 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7204 let mut keys_data = None;
7206 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7207 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7208 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7209 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7210 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7211 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7212 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7213 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7214 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7215 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7219 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7220 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7221 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7224 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7226 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7227 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7228 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7230 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7232 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7233 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7234 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7235 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7236 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7237 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7238 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7239 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7240 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7241 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7242 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7243 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7244 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7249 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7250 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7251 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7252 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7253 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7254 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7255 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7256 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7257 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7258 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7259 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7260 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7262 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7263 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7266 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7267 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7270 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7271 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7273 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7275 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7279 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7280 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7281 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7282 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7283 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7284 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7285 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7286 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7287 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7288 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7289 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7291 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7292 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7293 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7295 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7296 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7297 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7299 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7303 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7304 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7305 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7306 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7309 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7310 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7314 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7315 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7316 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7319 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7321 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7322 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7325 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7327 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7329 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7331 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7334 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7335 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7336 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7337 // consider the stale state on reload.
7338 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7341 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7342 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7345 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7348 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7349 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7350 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7352 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7353 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7354 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7355 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7357 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7358 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7360 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7361 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7363 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7364 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7365 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7367 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7369 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7370 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7372 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7373 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7376 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7378 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7379 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7380 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7381 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7383 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7386 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7387 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7389 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7391 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7392 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7394 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7395 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7397 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7399 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7400 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7401 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7403 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7404 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7405 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7409 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7410 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7411 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7413 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7419 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7420 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7421 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7422 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7423 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7424 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7425 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7426 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7427 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7428 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7430 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7431 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7432 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7433 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7434 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7435 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7436 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7438 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7439 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7440 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7441 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7443 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7445 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7446 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7448 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7450 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7451 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7452 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7453 (2, channel_type, option),
7454 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7455 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7456 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7457 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7458 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7459 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7460 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7461 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7462 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7463 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7464 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7465 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7466 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7467 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7468 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7469 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7470 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7471 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7472 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7473 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7474 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7475 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7478 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7479 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7480 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7481 // required channel parameters.
7482 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7483 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7484 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7486 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7488 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7489 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7490 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7491 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7494 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7495 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7496 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7498 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7499 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7501 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7502 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7507 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7508 if iter.next().is_some() {
7509 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7513 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7514 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7515 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7516 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7517 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7520 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7521 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7522 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7524 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7525 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7527 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7528 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7529 // separate u64 values.
7530 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7532 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7534 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7535 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7536 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7537 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7539 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7540 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7542 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7543 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7544 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7545 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7546 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7549 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7550 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7554 context: ChannelContext {
7557 config: config.unwrap(),
7561 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7562 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7563 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7566 temporary_channel_id,
7568 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7570 channel_value_satoshis,
7572 latest_monitor_update_id,
7574 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7575 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7578 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7579 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7582 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7583 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7584 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7585 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7589 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7590 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7591 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7592 monitor_pending_forwards,
7593 monitor_pending_failures,
7594 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7597 holding_cell_update_fee,
7598 next_holder_htlc_id,
7599 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7600 update_time_counter,
7603 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7604 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7605 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7606 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7608 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7609 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7610 closing_fee_limits: None,
7611 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7613 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7614 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7616 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7618 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7619 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7620 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7621 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7622 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7623 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7624 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7625 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7626 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7629 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7631 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7632 funding_transaction,
7635 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7636 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7637 counterparty_node_id,
7639 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7643 channel_update_status,
7644 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7648 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7649 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7650 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7651 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7653 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7654 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7656 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7657 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7658 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7660 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7661 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7663 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7664 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7666 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7669 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7678 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7679 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7680 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7681 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7682 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7684 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7685 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7686 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7687 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7688 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7689 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7690 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7691 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7692 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7693 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7694 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7695 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7696 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7697 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7698 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7699 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7700 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7701 use crate::util::test_utils;
7702 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7703 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7704 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7705 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7706 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7707 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7708 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7709 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7710 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7711 use crate::prelude::*;
7713 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7716 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7717 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7723 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7724 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7725 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7726 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7730 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7731 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7732 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7733 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7734 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7735 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7736 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7737 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7741 signer: InMemorySigner,
7744 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7745 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7748 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7749 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7751 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7752 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7755 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7759 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7761 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7762 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7763 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7764 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7765 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7768 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7769 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7770 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7771 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7775 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7776 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7777 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7781 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7782 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7783 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7784 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7786 let seed = [42; 32];
7787 let network = Network::Testnet;
7788 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7789 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7790 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7793 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7794 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7795 let config = UserConfig::default();
7796 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7797 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7798 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7800 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7801 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7805 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7806 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7808 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7809 let original_fee = 253;
7810 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7811 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7812 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7813 let seed = [42; 32];
7814 let network = Network::Testnet;
7815 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7817 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7818 let config = UserConfig::default();
7819 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7821 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7822 // same as the old fee.
7823 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7824 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7825 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7829 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7830 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7831 // dust limits are used.
7832 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7833 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7834 let seed = [42; 32];
7835 let network = Network::Testnet;
7836 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7837 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7838 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7840 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7841 // they have different dust limits.
7843 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7844 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7845 let config = UserConfig::default();
7846 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7848 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7849 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7850 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7851 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7852 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7854 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7855 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7856 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7857 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7858 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7860 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7861 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7862 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7863 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7865 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7866 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7867 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7869 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7870 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7872 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7873 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7874 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7876 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7877 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7878 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7879 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7882 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7884 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7885 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7886 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7887 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7888 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7889 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7890 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7891 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7892 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7894 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7897 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7898 // the dust limit check.
7899 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7900 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7901 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7902 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7904 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7905 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7906 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7907 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7908 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7909 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7910 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7914 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7915 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7916 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7917 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7918 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7919 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7920 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7921 let seed = [42; 32];
7922 let network = Network::Testnet;
7923 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7925 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7926 let config = UserConfig::default();
7927 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7929 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7930 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7932 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7933 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7934 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7935 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7936 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7937 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7939 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7940 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7941 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7942 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7943 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7945 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7947 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7948 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7949 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7950 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7951 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7953 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7954 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7955 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7956 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7957 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7961 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7962 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7963 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7964 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7965 let seed = [42; 32];
7966 let network = Network::Testnet;
7967 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7968 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
7969 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7971 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7973 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7974 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7975 let config = UserConfig::default();
7976 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7978 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7979 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7980 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7981 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7983 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7984 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7985 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7987 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7988 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7989 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7990 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7992 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7993 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7994 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7996 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7997 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7999 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8000 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8001 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8002 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8003 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8004 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8005 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8007 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8009 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8010 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8011 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8012 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8013 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8017 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8018 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8019 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8020 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8021 let seed = [42; 32];
8022 let network = Network::Testnet;
8023 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8024 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8025 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8027 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8028 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8029 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8030 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8031 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8032 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8033 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8034 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8036 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8037 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8038 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8039 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8040 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8041 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8043 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8044 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8045 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8046 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8048 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8050 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8051 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8052 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8053 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8054 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8055 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8057 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8058 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8059 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8060 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8062 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8063 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8064 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8065 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8066 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8068 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8069 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8071 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8072 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8073 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8075 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8076 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8077 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8078 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8079 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8081 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8082 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8084 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8085 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8086 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8090 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8092 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8093 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8094 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8096 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8097 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8098 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8099 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8101 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8102 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8103 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8105 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8107 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8108 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8111 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8112 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8113 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8114 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8115 let seed = [42; 32];
8116 let network = Network::Testnet;
8117 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8118 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8119 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8122 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8123 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8124 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8126 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8127 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8129 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8130 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8131 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8133 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8134 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8136 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8138 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8139 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8141 // Channel Negotiations failed
8142 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8143 assert!(result.is_err());
8148 fn channel_update() {
8149 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8150 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8151 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8152 let seed = [42; 32];
8153 let network = Network::Testnet;
8154 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8155 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8156 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8158 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8159 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8160 let config = UserConfig::default();
8161 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8163 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8164 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8165 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8166 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8167 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8169 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8170 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8171 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8172 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8173 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8175 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8176 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8177 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8178 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8180 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8181 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8182 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8184 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8185 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8187 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8188 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8189 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8191 short_channel_id: 0,
8194 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8195 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8196 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8198 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8199 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8201 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8203 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8205 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8206 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8207 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8208 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8210 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8211 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8212 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8214 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8217 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8220 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8222 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8223 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8224 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8225 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8226 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8227 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8228 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8229 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8230 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8231 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8232 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8233 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8234 use crate::sync::Arc;
8236 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8237 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8238 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8239 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8241 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8243 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8244 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8245 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8246 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8247 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8249 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8250 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8256 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8257 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8258 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8260 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8261 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8262 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8263 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8264 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8265 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8267 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8269 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8270 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8271 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8272 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8273 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8274 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8276 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8277 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8278 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8279 selected_contest_delay: 144
8281 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8282 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8284 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8285 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8287 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8288 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8290 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8291 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8293 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8294 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8295 // build_commitment_transaction.
8296 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8297 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8298 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8299 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8300 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8302 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8303 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8304 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8305 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8309 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8310 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8311 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8312 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8316 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8317 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8318 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8320 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8321 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8323 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8324 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8326 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8328 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8329 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8330 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8331 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8332 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8333 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8334 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8336 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8337 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8338 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8339 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8341 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8342 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8343 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8345 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8347 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8348 commitment_tx.clone(),
8349 counterparty_signature,
8350 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8351 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8352 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8354 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8355 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8357 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8358 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8359 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8361 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8362 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8365 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8366 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8368 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8369 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8370 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8371 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8372 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8373 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8374 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8375 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8377 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8380 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8381 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8382 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8386 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8389 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8390 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8391 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8392 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8393 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8394 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8396 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8397 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8398 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8399 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8401 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8402 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8403 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8404 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8405 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8407 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8408 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8409 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8410 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8411 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
8412 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8414 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8418 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8419 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8420 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8421 "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", {});
8423 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8424 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8426 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8427 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8428 "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", {});
8430 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8431 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8432 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8433 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8435 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8436 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8438 amount_msat: 1000000,
8440 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8441 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8443 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8446 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8447 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8449 amount_msat: 2000000,
8451 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8452 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8454 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8457 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8458 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8460 amount_msat: 2000000,
8462 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8463 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8464 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8465 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8467 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8470 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8471 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8473 amount_msat: 3000000,
8475 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8476 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8477 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8478 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8480 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8483 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8484 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8486 amount_msat: 4000000,
8488 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8489 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8491 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8495 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8496 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8497 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8499 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8500 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8501 "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", {
8504 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8505 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8506 "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" },
8509 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8510 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8511 "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" },
8514 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8515 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8516 "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" },
8519 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8520 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8521 "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" },
8524 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8525 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8526 "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" }
8529 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8530 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8531 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8533 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8534 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8535 "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", {
8538 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8539 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8540 "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" },
8543 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8544 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8545 "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" },
8548 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8549 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8550 "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" },
8553 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8554 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8555 "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" },
8558 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8559 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8560 "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" }
8563 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8564 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8565 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8567 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8568 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8569 "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", {
8572 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8573 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8574 "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" },
8577 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8578 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8579 "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" },
8582 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8583 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8584 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8587 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8588 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8589 "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" }
8592 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8593 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8594 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8595 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8597 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8598 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8599 "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", {
8602 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8603 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8604 "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" },
8607 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8608 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8609 "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" },
8612 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8613 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8614 "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" },
8617 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8618 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8619 "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" }
8622 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8623 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8624 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8625 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8627 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8628 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8629 "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", {
8632 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8633 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8634 "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" },
8637 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8638 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8639 "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" },
8642 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8643 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8644 "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" },
8647 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8648 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8649 "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" }
8652 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8653 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8654 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8656 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8657 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8658 "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", {
8661 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8662 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8663 "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" },
8666 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8667 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8668 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8671 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8672 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8673 "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" }
8676 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8677 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8678 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8680 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8681 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8682 "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", {
8685 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8686 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8687 "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" },
8690 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8691 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8692 "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" },
8695 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8696 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8697 "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" }
8700 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8701 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8702 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8704 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8705 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8706 "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", {
8709 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8710 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8711 "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" },
8714 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8715 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8716 "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" }
8719 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8720 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8721 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8722 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8723 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8724 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8726 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8727 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8728 "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", {
8731 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8732 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8733 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8736 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8737 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8738 "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" }
8741 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8742 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8743 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8744 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8745 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8747 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8748 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8749 "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", {
8752 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8753 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8754 "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" },
8757 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8758 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8759 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8762 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8763 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8764 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8766 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8767 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8768 "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", {
8771 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8772 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8773 "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" }
8776 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8777 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8778 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8779 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8780 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8782 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8783 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8784 "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", {
8787 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8788 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8789 "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" }
8792 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8793 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8794 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8795 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8796 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8798 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8799 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8800 "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", {
8803 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8804 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8805 "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" }
8808 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8809 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8810 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8811 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8813 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8814 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8815 "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", {});
8817 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8818 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8819 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8820 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8821 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8823 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8824 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8825 "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", {});
8827 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8828 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8829 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8830 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8831 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8833 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8834 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8835 "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", {});
8837 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8838 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8839 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8841 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8842 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8843 "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", {});
8845 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8846 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8847 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8848 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8849 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8851 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8852 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8853 "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", {});
8855 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8856 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8857 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8858 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8859 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8861 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8862 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8863 "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", {});
8865 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8866 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8867 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8868 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8869 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8870 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8872 amount_msat: 2000000,
8874 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8875 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8877 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8880 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8881 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8882 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8884 amount_msat: 5000001,
8886 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8887 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8888 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8889 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8891 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8894 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8895 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8897 amount_msat: 5000000,
8899 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8900 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8901 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8902 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8904 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8908 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8909 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8910 "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", {
8913 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8914 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8915 "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" },
8917 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8918 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8919 "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" },
8921 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8922 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8923 "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" }
8926 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8927 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8928 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8929 "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", {
8932 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8933 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8934 "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" },
8936 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8937 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8938 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
8940 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8941 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8942 "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" }
8947 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8948 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8950 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8951 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8952 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8953 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8955 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8956 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8957 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8959 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8960 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8962 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8963 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8965 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8966 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8967 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8971 fn test_key_derivation() {
8972 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8973 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8975 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8976 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8978 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8979 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8981 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8982 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8984 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8985 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8987 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8988 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8990 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8991 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8993 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8994 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8998 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8999 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9000 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9001 let seed = [42; 32];
9002 let network = Network::Testnet;
9003 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9004 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9006 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9007 let config = UserConfig::default();
9008 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9009 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
9011 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9012 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9014 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9015 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9016 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9017 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9018 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9019 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9020 assert!(res.is_ok());
9024 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9025 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9026 // resulting `channel_type`.
9027 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9028 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9029 let network = Network::Testnet;
9030 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9031 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9033 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9034 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9036 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9037 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9039 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9040 // need to signal it.
9041 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9042 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9043 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9046 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9048 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9049 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9050 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9052 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9053 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9054 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9057 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9058 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9059 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9060 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9061 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9064 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9065 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9069 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9070 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9071 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9072 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9073 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9074 let network = Network::Testnet;
9075 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9076 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9078 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9079 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9081 let config = UserConfig::default();
9083 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9084 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9085 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9086 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9087 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9089 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9090 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9091 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9094 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9095 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9096 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9098 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9099 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9100 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9101 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9102 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9103 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9105 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9109 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9110 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9112 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9113 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9114 let network = Network::Testnet;
9115 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9116 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9118 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9119 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9121 let config = UserConfig::default();
9123 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9124 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9125 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9126 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9127 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9128 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9129 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9130 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9132 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9133 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9134 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9135 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9136 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9137 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9140 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9141 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9143 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9144 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9145 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9146 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9148 assert!(res.is_err());
9150 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9151 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9152 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9154 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9155 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9156 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9159 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9161 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9162 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9163 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9164 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9167 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9168 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9170 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9171 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9173 assert!(res.is_err());
9177 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9178 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9179 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9180 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9181 let seed = [42; 32];
9182 let network = Network::Testnet;
9183 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9184 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9185 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9187 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9188 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9189 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9190 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9192 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9193 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9194 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9199 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9208 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9209 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9210 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9215 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9216 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9222 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9225 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9226 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9227 &accept_channel_msg,
9228 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9229 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9232 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9233 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9234 let tx = Transaction {
9236 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9240 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9243 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9246 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9247 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9252 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9253 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9254 &funding_created_msg,
9258 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9259 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9267 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9268 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9269 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9270 &funding_signed_msg,
9275 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9282 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9283 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9284 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9285 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9287 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9288 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9289 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9292 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9293 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9294 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9302 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9303 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9304 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9305 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9308 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9309 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9311 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9312 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9313 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9315 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());