1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
537 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
538 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
539 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
540 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
541 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
542 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
543 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
546 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
548 /// Contains a tuple with the following:
549 /// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
550 /// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's
551 /// counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
552 /// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction.
553 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
554 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
555 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
559 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
560 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
561 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
562 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
563 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
564 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
565 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
566 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
567 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
568 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
569 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
570 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
571 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
572 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
573 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
575 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
576 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
577 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
578 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
580 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
581 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
582 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
583 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
585 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
586 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
587 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
588 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
589 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
591 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
592 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
593 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
594 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
596 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
597 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
598 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
600 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
601 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
602 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
603 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
604 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
606 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
607 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
610 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
611 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
613 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
614 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
615 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
616 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
618 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
619 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
621 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
622 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
625 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
626 (0, update, required),
629 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
630 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
631 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
632 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
633 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
637 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
638 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
639 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
641 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
643 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
644 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
645 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
649 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
651 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
658 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
659 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
660 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
661 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
662 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
664 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
665 /// in a timely manner.
666 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
669 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
670 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
671 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
673 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
674 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
675 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
676 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
680 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
681 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
682 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
684 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
685 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
686 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
687 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
689 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
693 /// The current channel ID.
694 channel_id: ChannelId,
695 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
696 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
697 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
700 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
701 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
703 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
704 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
705 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
707 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
708 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
709 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
710 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
712 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
713 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
715 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
717 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
718 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
719 destination_script: Script,
721 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
722 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
723 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
725 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
726 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
727 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
728 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
729 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
730 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
732 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
733 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
734 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
735 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
736 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
737 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
739 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
741 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
742 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
743 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
745 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
746 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
747 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
748 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
749 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
750 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
751 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
753 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
755 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
756 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
757 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
758 // HTLCs with similar state.
759 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
760 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
761 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
762 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
763 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
764 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
765 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
766 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
767 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
770 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
771 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
772 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
774 update_time_counter: u32,
776 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
777 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
778 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
779 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
780 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
781 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
783 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
784 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
786 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
787 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
788 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
789 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
791 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
792 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
794 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
796 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
798 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
799 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
800 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
801 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
802 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
803 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
804 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
805 channel_creation_height: u32,
807 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
810 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
812 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
815 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
817 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
820 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
822 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
824 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
825 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
828 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
830 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
832 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
833 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
835 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
837 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
838 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
839 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
841 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
843 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
844 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
845 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
847 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
848 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
849 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
851 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
853 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
855 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
856 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
857 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
858 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
860 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
861 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
862 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
864 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
865 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
866 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
868 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
869 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
870 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
871 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
872 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
873 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
874 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
875 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
877 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
878 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
879 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
880 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
881 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
883 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
884 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
886 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
887 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
888 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
889 /// unblock the state machine.
891 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
892 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
893 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
895 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
896 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
897 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
900 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
901 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
902 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
903 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
904 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
905 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
906 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
908 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
909 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
911 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
912 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
913 // the channel's funding UTXO.
915 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
916 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
917 // associated channel mapping.
919 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
920 // to store all of them.
921 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
923 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
924 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
925 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
926 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
927 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
929 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
930 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
932 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
933 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
935 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
936 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
937 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
939 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
940 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
941 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
944 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
945 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
946 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
947 self.update_time_counter
950 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
951 self.latest_monitor_update_id
954 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
955 self.config.announced_channel
958 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
959 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
962 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
963 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
964 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
965 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
968 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
969 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
970 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
973 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
974 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
975 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
976 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
977 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
980 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
981 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
982 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
983 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
985 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
986 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
988 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
989 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
991 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
992 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
994 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
997 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
998 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
999 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1000 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1001 self.channel_state &
1002 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1003 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1004 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1005 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1008 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1009 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1010 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1011 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1012 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1015 // Public utilities:
1017 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1021 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1023 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1024 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1025 self.temporary_channel_id
1028 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1032 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1033 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1034 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1038 /// Gets the channel's type
1039 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1043 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1045 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1046 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.short_channel_id
1050 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1051 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1052 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1055 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1056 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1057 self.outbound_scid_alias
1060 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1061 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1062 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1063 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1064 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1065 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1068 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1069 /// get_funding_created.
1070 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1071 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1074 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1075 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1076 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1079 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1080 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1081 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1082 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1086 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1089 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1090 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1093 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1094 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1097 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1098 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1099 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1102 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1103 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1106 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1107 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1108 self.counterparty_node_id
1111 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1112 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1113 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1117 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1118 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1121 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1122 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1124 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1125 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1126 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1127 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1129 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1133 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1134 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1135 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1138 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1139 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1140 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1143 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1144 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1145 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1147 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1148 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1153 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1154 self.channel_value_satoshis
1157 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1158 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1161 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1162 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1165 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1166 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1167 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1169 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1170 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1171 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1172 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
1173 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1175 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1179 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1180 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1181 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1184 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1185 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1186 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1189 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1190 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1191 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1194 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1195 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1196 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1199 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1200 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1201 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1204 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1205 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1206 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1209 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1210 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1211 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1212 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1213 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1216 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1218 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1219 self.prev_config = None;
1223 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1224 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1228 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1229 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1230 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1231 let did_channel_update =
1232 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1233 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1234 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1235 if did_channel_update {
1236 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1237 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1238 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1239 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1241 self.config.options = *config;
1245 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1246 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1247 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1248 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1249 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1252 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1253 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1254 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1255 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1256 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1258 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1259 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1260 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1261 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1262 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1263 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1264 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1266 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1267 where L::Target: Logger
1269 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1270 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1271 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1273 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1274 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1275 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1276 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1278 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1279 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1280 if match update_state {
1281 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1282 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1283 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1284 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1285 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1287 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1291 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1292 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1293 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1295 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1297 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1298 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1299 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1301 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1302 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1303 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1304 transaction_output_index: None
1309 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1310 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1311 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1312 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1313 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1316 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1318 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1319 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1320 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1322 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1323 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1326 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1327 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1330 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1332 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1333 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1334 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1337 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1343 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1344 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1345 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1346 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1347 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1348 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1349 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1353 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1354 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1356 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1358 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1359 if generated_by_local {
1360 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1361 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1370 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1372 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1373 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1374 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1375 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1376 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1377 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1378 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1381 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1382 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1384 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1388 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1389 preimages.push(preimage);
1393 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1394 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1396 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1398 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1399 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1401 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1402 if !generated_by_local {
1403 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1411 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1412 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1413 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1414 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1415 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1416 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1417 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1418 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1420 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1422 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1423 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1424 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1425 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1427 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1429 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1430 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1431 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1432 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1435 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1436 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1437 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1438 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1440 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1443 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1444 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1445 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1446 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1448 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1451 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1452 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1457 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1458 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1463 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1465 let channel_parameters =
1466 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1467 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1468 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1475 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1478 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1479 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1480 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1481 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1483 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1484 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1485 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1493 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1494 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1500 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1501 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1502 /// our counterparty!)
1503 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1504 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1505 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1506 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1507 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1508 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1509 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1511 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1515 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1516 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1517 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1518 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1519 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1520 //may see payments to it!
1521 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1522 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1523 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1525 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1528 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1529 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1530 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1531 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1532 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1535 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1536 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1539 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1543 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1544 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1545 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1546 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1547 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1548 // which are near the dust limit.
1549 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1550 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1551 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1552 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1553 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1555 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1556 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1558 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1561 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1562 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1563 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1566 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1567 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1569 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1570 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1571 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1572 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1573 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1574 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1575 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1578 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1581 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1582 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1583 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1585 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1586 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1587 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1588 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1589 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1590 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1592 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1593 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1599 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1600 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1602 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1603 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1604 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1605 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1606 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1607 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1608 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1611 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1614 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1615 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1616 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1618 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1619 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1620 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1621 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1622 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1623 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1625 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1626 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1630 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1631 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1632 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1633 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1634 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1635 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1636 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1638 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1639 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1641 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1648 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1649 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1650 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1651 /// corner case properly.
1652 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1653 -> AvailableBalances
1654 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1656 let context = &self;
1657 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1658 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1659 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1661 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1662 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1663 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1664 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1667 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1669 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1670 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1672 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1674 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1676 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1677 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1681 if context.is_outbound() {
1682 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1683 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1685 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1686 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1688 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1689 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1690 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1691 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1694 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1695 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1696 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1697 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1698 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1699 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1700 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1703 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1704 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1705 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1706 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1707 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1708 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1709 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1710 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1711 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1712 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1713 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1715 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1718 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1719 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1720 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1721 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1722 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1725 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1726 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1728 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1729 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1730 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1732 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1733 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1734 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1735 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1739 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1741 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1742 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1743 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1744 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1745 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1746 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1747 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1749 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1750 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1752 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1753 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1754 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1756 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1757 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1758 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1759 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1760 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1763 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1764 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1765 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1766 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1767 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1768 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1771 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1772 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1773 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1775 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1779 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1780 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1782 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1783 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1787 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1788 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1789 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1790 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1792 outbound_capacity_msat,
1793 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1794 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1799 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1800 let context = &self;
1801 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1804 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1805 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1807 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1808 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1810 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1811 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1813 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1814 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1815 let context = &self;
1816 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1818 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1821 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1822 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1824 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1825 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1827 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1828 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1830 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1831 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1835 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1836 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1842 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1843 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1844 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1847 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1848 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1849 included_htlcs += 1;
1852 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1853 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1857 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1858 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1859 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1860 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1861 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1862 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1867 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1869 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1870 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1875 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1876 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1880 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1881 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1882 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1885 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1886 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1888 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1889 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1890 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1892 total_pending_htlcs,
1893 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1894 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1895 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1897 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1898 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1899 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1901 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1903 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1908 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1909 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1911 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1912 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1914 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1915 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1917 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1918 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1919 let context = &self;
1920 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1922 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1925 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1926 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1928 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1929 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1931 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1932 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1934 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1935 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1939 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1940 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1946 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1947 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1948 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1949 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1950 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1951 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1954 included_htlcs += 1;
1957 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1958 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1961 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1962 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1964 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1965 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1966 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1971 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1972 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1973 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1976 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1977 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1979 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1980 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1982 total_pending_htlcs,
1983 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1984 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1985 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1987 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1988 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1989 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1991 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1993 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1998 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
1999 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2000 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2001 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2008 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2010 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2011 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2014 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2016 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2017 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2018 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2022 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2023 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2024 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2027 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2029 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2030 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2033 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2034 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2035 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2036 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2037 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2038 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2039 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2040 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2041 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2042 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2043 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2045 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2046 // return them to fail the payment.
2047 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2048 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2049 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2051 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2052 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2057 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2058 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2059 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2060 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2061 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2062 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2063 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2064 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2065 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2066 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2067 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2068 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2069 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2073 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2075 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2076 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2077 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)
2081 // Internal utility functions for channels
2083 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2084 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2085 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2087 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2089 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2090 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2091 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2093 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2096 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2098 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2101 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2102 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2103 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2105 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2107 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2108 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2109 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2110 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2111 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2114 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2115 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2116 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2117 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2118 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2119 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2120 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2123 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2124 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2126 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2127 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2130 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2131 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2132 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2133 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2134 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2135 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2138 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2139 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2140 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2141 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2144 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2145 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2147 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2148 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2149 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2153 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2154 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2155 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2157 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2158 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2159 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2160 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2162 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2163 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2164 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2165 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2166 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2167 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2168 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2170 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2171 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2176 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2177 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2179 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2181 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2182 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2183 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2184 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2186 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2187 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2197 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2198 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2199 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2200 // outside of those situations will fail.
2201 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2205 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2210 1 + // script length (0)
2214 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2215 2 + // witness marker and flag
2216 1 + // witness element count
2217 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2218 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2219 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2220 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2221 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2222 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2224 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2225 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2226 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2232 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2233 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2234 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2235 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2237 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2238 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2239 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2241 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2242 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2243 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2244 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2245 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2246 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2249 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2250 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2253 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2254 value_to_holder = 0;
2257 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2258 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2259 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2260 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2262 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2263 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2266 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2267 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2270 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2273 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2274 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2276 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2278 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2279 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2280 where L::Target: Logger {
2281 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2282 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2283 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2284 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2285 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2286 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2287 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2288 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2292 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2293 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2294 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2295 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2297 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2298 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2300 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2302 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2303 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2304 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2306 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2307 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2308 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2309 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2310 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2311 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2312 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2314 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2315 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2316 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2318 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2319 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2321 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2324 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2325 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2329 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2333 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2334 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2335 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2336 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2337 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2338 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2341 // Now update local state:
2343 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2344 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2345 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2346 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2347 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2348 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2349 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2353 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2354 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2355 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2356 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2357 // do not not get into this branch.
2358 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2359 match pending_update {
2360 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2361 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2362 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2363 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2364 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2365 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2366 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2369 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2370 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2371 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2372 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2373 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2374 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2375 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2381 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2382 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2383 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2385 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2386 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2387 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2389 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2390 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2393 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2394 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2396 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2397 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2399 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2400 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2403 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2406 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2407 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2408 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2409 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2414 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2415 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2416 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2417 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2418 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2419 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2420 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2421 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2422 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2423 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2424 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2425 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2426 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2427 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2428 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2430 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2431 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2432 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2433 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2434 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2437 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2438 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2439 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2445 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2446 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2448 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2452 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2453 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2454 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2455 /// before we fail backwards.
2457 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2458 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2459 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2460 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2461 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2462 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2463 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2466 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2467 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2468 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2469 /// before we fail backwards.
2471 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2472 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2473 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2474 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2475 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2476 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2477 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2479 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2481 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2482 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2483 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2485 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2486 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2487 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2489 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2490 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2491 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2493 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2498 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2499 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2505 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2506 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2507 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2508 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2509 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2513 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2514 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2515 force_holding_cell = true;
2518 // Now update local state:
2519 if force_holding_cell {
2520 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2521 match pending_update {
2522 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2523 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2524 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2525 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2529 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2530 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2531 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2532 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2538 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2539 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2540 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2546 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2548 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2549 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2552 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2553 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2554 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2559 // Message handlers:
2561 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2562 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2563 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2564 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2565 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2569 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2572 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2575 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2576 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2577 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2578 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2581 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2583 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2584 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2585 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2586 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2588 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2589 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2591 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2592 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2594 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2595 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2596 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2597 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2598 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2603 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2604 initial_commitment_tx,
2607 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2608 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2611 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2612 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2615 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2616 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2617 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2618 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2619 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2620 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2621 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2622 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2623 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2624 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2625 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2626 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2628 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2630 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2631 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2632 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2633 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2634 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2635 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2636 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2638 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2639 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2640 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2642 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2644 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2645 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2647 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2649 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2650 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2654 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2655 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2656 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2657 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2658 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2659 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2660 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2663 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2664 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2666 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2667 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2668 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2669 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2671 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2674 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2675 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2676 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2679 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2680 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2681 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2682 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2683 // when routing outbound payments.
2684 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2688 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2690 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2691 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2693 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2694 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2696 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2697 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2698 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2699 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2700 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2701 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2702 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2703 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2704 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2706 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2707 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2708 let expected_point =
2709 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2710 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2712 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2713 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2714 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2715 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2716 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2717 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2719 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2720 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2721 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2722 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2723 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2725 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2726 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2730 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2733 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2734 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2736 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2738 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2741 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2742 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2743 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2744 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2745 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2746 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2748 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2749 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2750 if local_sent_shutdown {
2751 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2753 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2754 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2755 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2756 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2758 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2761 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2764 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2767 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2771 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2772 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2773 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2774 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2776 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2777 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2780 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2781 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2782 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2783 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2784 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2785 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2786 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2787 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2788 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2789 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2790 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2792 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2793 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2794 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2795 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2796 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2797 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2801 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2802 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2805 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2806 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2807 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2809 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2810 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2811 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2812 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2813 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2814 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2815 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2819 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2820 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2821 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2822 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2823 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2824 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2825 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2829 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2830 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2831 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2832 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2833 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2837 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2838 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2840 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2841 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2842 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2844 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2845 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2849 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2852 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2857 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2858 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2862 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2863 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2864 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2865 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2866 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2867 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2868 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2869 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2870 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2872 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2873 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2874 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2875 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2876 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2879 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2880 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2881 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2882 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2883 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2886 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2887 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2889 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2893 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2894 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2895 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2899 // Now update local state:
2900 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2901 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2902 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2903 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2904 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2905 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2906 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2911 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2913 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2914 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2915 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2916 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2917 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2918 None => fail_reason.into(),
2919 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2920 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2921 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2922 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2924 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2928 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2930 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2931 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2933 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2934 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2939 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2942 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2943 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2944 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2946 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2947 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2950 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2953 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2954 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2957 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2961 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2965 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2966 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2969 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2973 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2977 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2978 where L::Target: Logger
2980 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2981 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2983 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2986 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2990 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2992 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2994 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2995 let commitment_txid = {
2996 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2997 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2998 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3000 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3001 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3002 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3003 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3004 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3005 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3009 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3011 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3012 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3013 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3014 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3017 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3018 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3019 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3023 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3025 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3026 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3027 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3028 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3029 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3030 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3031 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3032 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3033 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3034 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3035 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3041 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3045 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3046 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3047 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3048 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3049 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3050 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3051 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3052 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3053 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3054 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3055 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3056 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3057 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3060 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3061 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3062 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3063 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3064 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3065 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3066 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3068 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3069 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3070 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3071 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3072 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3073 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3074 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3077 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3078 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3081 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3083 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3084 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3085 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3088 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3091 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3092 commitment_stats.tx,
3094 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3095 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3096 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3099 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3100 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3102 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3103 let mut need_commitment = false;
3104 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3105 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3106 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3107 need_commitment = true;
3111 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3112 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3113 Some(forward_info.clone())
3115 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3116 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3117 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3118 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3119 need_commitment = true;
3122 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3123 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3124 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3125 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3126 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3127 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3128 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3129 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3130 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3131 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3132 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3133 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3134 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3135 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3137 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3139 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3140 need_commitment = true;
3144 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3145 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3146 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3147 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3148 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3149 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3151 nondust_htlc_sources,
3155 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3156 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3157 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3158 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3160 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3161 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3162 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3163 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3164 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3165 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3166 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3167 // includes the right HTLCs.
3168 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3169 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3170 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3171 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3172 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3173 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3175 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3176 &self.context.channel_id);
3177 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3180 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3181 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3182 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3183 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3184 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3185 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3186 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3187 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3188 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3192 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3193 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3194 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3195 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3198 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3199 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3200 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3201 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3202 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3203 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3204 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3206 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3207 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3208 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3209 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3212 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3213 /// for our counterparty.
3214 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3215 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3216 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3217 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3219 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3220 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3221 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3222 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3224 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3225 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3226 updates: Vec::new(),
3229 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3230 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3231 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3232 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3233 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3234 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3235 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3236 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3237 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3238 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3239 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3240 // to rebalance channels.
3241 match &htlc_update {
3242 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3243 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3244 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3246 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3247 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3249 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3252 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3253 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3254 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3255 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3256 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3257 // into the holding cell without ever being
3258 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3259 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3260 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3263 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3269 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3270 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3271 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3272 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3273 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3274 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3275 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3276 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3277 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3278 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3279 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3280 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3282 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3283 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3284 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3285 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3286 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3287 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3288 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3289 // for a full revocation before failing.
3290 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3291 update_fail_count += 1;
3294 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3296 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3303 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3304 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3306 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3307 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3312 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3313 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3314 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3315 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3316 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3318 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3319 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3320 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3322 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3323 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3329 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3330 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3331 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3332 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3333 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3334 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3335 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3336 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3337 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3339 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3342 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3345 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3349 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3351 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3352 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3357 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3358 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3359 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3360 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3361 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3362 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3363 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3364 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3365 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3368 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3370 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3371 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3374 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3375 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3376 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3377 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3379 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3383 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3384 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3385 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3386 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3387 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3388 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3389 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3390 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3394 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3395 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3396 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3397 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3398 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3399 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3400 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3401 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3402 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3404 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3405 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3408 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3409 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3410 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3411 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3412 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3413 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3414 let mut require_commitment = false;
3415 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3418 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3419 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3420 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3422 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3423 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3424 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3425 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3426 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3427 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3432 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3433 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3434 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3435 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3436 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3438 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3439 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3440 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3445 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3446 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3448 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3452 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3453 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3455 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3456 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3457 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3458 require_commitment = true;
3459 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3460 match forward_info {
3461 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3462 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3463 require_commitment = true;
3465 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3466 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3467 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3469 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3470 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3471 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3475 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3476 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3477 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3478 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3484 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3485 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3486 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3487 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3489 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3490 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3491 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3492 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3493 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3494 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3495 require_commitment = true;
3499 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3501 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3502 match update_state {
3503 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3504 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3505 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3506 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3507 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3509 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3510 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3511 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3512 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3513 require_commitment = true;
3514 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3515 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3520 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3521 let release_state_str =
3522 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3523 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3524 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3525 if !release_monitor {
3526 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3527 update: monitor_update,
3529 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3531 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3536 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3537 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3538 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3539 if require_commitment {
3540 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3541 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3542 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3543 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3544 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3545 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3546 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3547 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3548 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3550 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3551 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3552 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3553 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3554 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3557 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3558 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3559 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3560 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3561 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3562 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3564 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3565 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3567 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3568 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3570 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3571 if require_commitment {
3572 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3574 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3575 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3576 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3577 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3579 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3580 &self.context.channel_id(),
3581 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3584 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3585 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3587 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3588 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3590 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3591 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3597 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3598 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3599 /// commitment update.
3600 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3601 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3602 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3604 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3605 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3608 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3609 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3610 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3611 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3613 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3614 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3615 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3616 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3617 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3618 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3619 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3621 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3622 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3624 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3625 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3627 if !self.context.is_live() {
3628 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3631 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3632 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3633 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3634 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3635 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3636 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3637 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3638 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3639 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3640 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3644 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3645 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3646 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3647 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3648 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3649 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3652 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3653 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3657 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3658 force_holding_cell = true;
3661 if force_holding_cell {
3662 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3666 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3667 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3669 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3670 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3675 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3676 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3678 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3680 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3681 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3682 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3683 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3687 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3688 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3689 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3693 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3694 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3697 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3698 // will be retransmitted.
3699 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3700 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3701 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3703 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3704 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3706 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3707 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3708 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3709 // this HTLC accordingly
3710 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3713 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3714 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3715 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3716 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3719 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3720 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3721 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3722 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3723 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3724 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3729 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3731 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3732 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3733 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3734 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3738 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3739 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3740 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3741 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3742 // the update upon reconnection.
3743 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3747 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3749 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3750 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3754 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3755 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3756 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3757 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3758 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3759 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3760 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3762 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3763 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3764 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3765 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3766 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3767 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3768 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3770 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3771 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3772 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3773 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3774 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3775 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3776 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3779 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3780 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3781 /// to the remote side.
3782 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3783 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3784 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3785 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3788 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3790 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3791 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3793 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3794 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3795 // first received the funding_signed.
3796 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3797 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3798 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3800 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3801 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3802 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3803 funding_broadcastable = None;
3806 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3807 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3808 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3809 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3810 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3811 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3812 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3813 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3814 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3815 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3816 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3817 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3818 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3819 next_per_commitment_point,
3820 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3824 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3826 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3827 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3828 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3829 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3830 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3831 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3833 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3834 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3835 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3836 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3837 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3838 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3842 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3843 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3845 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3846 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3847 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3850 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3851 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3852 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3853 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3854 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3855 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3856 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3857 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3858 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3862 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3863 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3865 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3868 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3871 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3872 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3874 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3875 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3876 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3877 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3878 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3879 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3880 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3881 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3882 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3883 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3884 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3885 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3886 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3887 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3889 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3891 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3897 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3898 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3899 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3900 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3901 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3902 per_commitment_secret,
3903 next_per_commitment_point,
3905 next_local_nonce: None,
3909 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3910 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3911 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3912 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3913 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3915 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3916 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3917 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3918 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3919 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3920 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3921 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3922 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3923 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3924 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3929 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3930 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3932 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3933 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3934 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3935 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3936 reason: err_packet.clone()
3939 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3940 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3941 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3942 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3943 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3944 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3947 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3948 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3949 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3950 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3951 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3958 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3959 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3960 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3961 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3965 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3966 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3967 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3968 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3969 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3970 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3974 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3975 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3976 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3977 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3978 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3979 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3980 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3985 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3986 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3988 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3989 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3990 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3991 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3992 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3993 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3994 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3995 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3998 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4000 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4001 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4002 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4003 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4004 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4007 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4008 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4009 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4012 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4013 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4014 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4015 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4016 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4019 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4020 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4021 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4022 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4023 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4026 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4027 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4028 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4029 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4030 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4031 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4032 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4033 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4037 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4038 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4039 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4040 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4042 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4046 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4047 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4048 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4049 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4051 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4053 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4055 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4056 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4057 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4058 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4059 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4062 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4063 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4064 channel_ready: None,
4065 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4066 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4067 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4071 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4072 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4073 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4074 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4075 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4076 next_per_commitment_point,
4077 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4079 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4080 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4081 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4085 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4086 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4087 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4089 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4090 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4091 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4094 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4100 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4101 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4102 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4103 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4104 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4105 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4106 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4108 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4110 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4111 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4112 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4113 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4114 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4115 next_per_commitment_point,
4116 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4120 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4121 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4122 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4124 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4127 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4128 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4129 raa: required_revoke,
4130 commitment_update: None,
4131 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4133 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4134 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4135 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4137 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4140 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4141 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4142 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4143 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4144 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4145 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4148 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4149 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4150 raa: required_revoke,
4151 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4152 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4156 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4160 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4161 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4162 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4163 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4165 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4167 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4169 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4170 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4171 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4172 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4173 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4174 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4175 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4176 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4178 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4179 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4180 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4181 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4182 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4184 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4185 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4186 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4187 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4190 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4191 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4192 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4193 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4194 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4195 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4196 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4197 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4198 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4199 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4200 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4201 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4202 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4203 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4204 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4206 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4209 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4210 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4213 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4214 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4215 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4216 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4217 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4218 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4221 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4222 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4223 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4224 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4225 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4226 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4229 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4235 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4236 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4237 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4238 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4240 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4241 return Ok((None, None));
4244 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4245 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4246 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4248 return Ok((None, None));
4251 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4253 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4254 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4255 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4256 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4258 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4259 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4261 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4262 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4264 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4265 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4266 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4267 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4269 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4270 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4271 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4278 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4279 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4281 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4282 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4285 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4286 /// within our expected timeframe.
4288 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4289 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4290 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4293 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4296 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4297 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4301 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4302 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4304 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4307 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4308 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4309 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4310 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4313 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4314 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4318 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4320 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4321 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4324 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4325 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4326 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4329 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4332 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4333 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4334 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4335 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4337 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4340 assert!(send_shutdown);
4341 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4342 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4343 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4345 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4348 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4353 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4355 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4356 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4358 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4359 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4360 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4361 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4362 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4363 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4366 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4367 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4369 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4370 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4371 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4372 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4376 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4377 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4378 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4379 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4380 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4381 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4383 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4384 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4391 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4392 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4394 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4397 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4398 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4400 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4402 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4403 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4404 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4405 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4406 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4407 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4408 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4409 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4410 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4412 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4413 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4416 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4420 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4421 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4422 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4423 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4425 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4426 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4428 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4431 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4432 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4434 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4435 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4438 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4442 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4443 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4444 return Ok((None, None));
4447 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4448 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4449 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4450 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4452 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4454 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4457 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4458 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4459 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4460 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4461 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4465 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4466 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4471 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4472 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4473 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4474 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4475 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4476 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4477 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4481 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4483 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4484 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4485 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4486 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4488 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4491 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4492 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4494 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4495 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4497 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4498 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4499 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4500 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4504 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4505 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4506 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4507 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4509 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4510 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4511 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4519 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4520 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4521 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4523 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4524 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4526 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4527 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4530 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4531 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4532 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4533 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4534 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4536 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4537 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4538 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4540 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4541 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4544 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4545 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4546 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4547 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4548 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4549 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4550 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4551 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4556 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4557 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4558 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4559 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4561 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4565 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4566 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4567 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4568 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4570 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4576 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4577 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4578 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4579 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4580 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4581 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4582 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4584 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4585 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4588 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4590 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4591 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4597 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4598 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4599 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4600 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4601 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4602 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4603 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4605 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4606 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4613 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4614 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4617 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4618 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4621 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4622 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4626 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4627 &self.context.holder_signer
4631 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4633 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4634 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4635 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4636 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4637 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4638 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4640 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4642 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4650 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4651 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4655 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4656 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4657 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4658 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4661 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4662 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4663 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4664 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4667 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4668 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4669 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4670 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4671 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4672 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4675 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4676 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4677 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4678 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4679 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4680 if !release_monitor {
4681 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4690 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4691 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4694 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4695 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4696 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4698 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4699 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4700 if self.context.channel_state &
4701 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4702 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4703 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4704 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4705 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4708 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4709 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4710 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4711 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4712 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4713 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4715 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4716 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4717 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4719 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4720 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4721 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4722 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4723 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4724 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4730 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4731 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4732 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4735 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4736 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4737 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4740 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4741 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4742 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4745 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4746 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4747 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4748 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4749 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4750 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4755 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4756 self.context.channel_update_status
4759 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4760 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4761 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4764 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4766 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4767 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4768 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4772 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4773 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4774 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4777 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4781 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4782 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4783 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4784 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4785 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4787 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4788 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4789 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4791 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4792 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4795 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4796 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4797 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4798 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4799 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4800 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4801 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4802 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4803 self.context.channel_state);
4805 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4809 if need_commitment_update {
4810 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4811 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4812 let next_per_commitment_point =
4813 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4814 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4815 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4816 next_per_commitment_point,
4817 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4821 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4827 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4828 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4829 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4830 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4831 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4832 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4833 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4835 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4838 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4839 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4840 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4841 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4842 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4843 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4844 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4845 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4846 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4847 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4848 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4849 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4850 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4851 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4852 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4853 // channel and move on.
4854 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4855 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4857 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4858 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4859 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4861 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4862 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4863 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4864 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4865 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4866 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4867 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4868 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4873 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4874 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4875 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4876 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4877 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4880 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4881 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4882 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4883 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4884 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4885 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4888 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4889 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4890 // may have already happened for this block).
4891 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4892 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4893 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4894 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
4897 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4898 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4899 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4900 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4908 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4909 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4910 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4911 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4913 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4914 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4917 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4919 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4920 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4921 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4922 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4924 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4927 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4930 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4931 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4932 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4933 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4935 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4938 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4939 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4940 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4942 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4943 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4945 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4946 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4947 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4955 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4957 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4958 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
4959 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4961 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4962 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4965 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4966 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4967 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4968 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4969 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4970 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4971 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4972 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4973 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4976 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4977 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4978 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4979 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4981 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4982 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4983 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4985 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4986 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4987 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4988 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4990 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4991 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4992 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4993 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4994 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4995 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4996 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4999 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5000 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5002 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5005 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5006 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5007 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5008 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5009 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5010 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5011 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5012 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5013 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5014 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5015 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5016 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5017 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5018 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5019 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5020 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5021 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5027 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5032 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5033 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5035 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5036 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5037 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5038 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5040 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5043 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5045 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5046 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5047 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5048 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5049 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5050 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5052 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5053 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5056 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5057 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5058 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5059 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5060 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5061 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5063 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5064 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5067 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5068 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5069 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5070 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5071 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5077 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5078 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5079 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5080 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5082 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5085 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5089 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5093 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5094 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5098 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5102 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5103 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5106 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5110 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5112 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5117 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5118 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5119 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5121 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5126 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5128 None => return None,
5131 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5133 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5134 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5136 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5137 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5143 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5145 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5146 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5147 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5148 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5149 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5150 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5151 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5153 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5154 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5155 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5156 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5157 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5158 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5159 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5160 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5161 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5162 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5163 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5164 contents: announcement,
5169 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5173 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5174 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5175 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5176 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5177 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5178 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5179 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5180 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5182 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5184 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5186 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5187 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5189 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5191 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5192 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5195 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5196 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5197 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5198 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5201 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5204 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5205 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5206 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5207 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5208 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5209 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5212 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5214 Err(_) => return None,
5216 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5217 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5222 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5223 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5224 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5225 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5226 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5227 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5228 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5229 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5230 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5231 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5232 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5233 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5234 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5235 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5236 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5237 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5240 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5243 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5244 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5245 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5246 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5247 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5248 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5249 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5250 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5251 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5253 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5254 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5255 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5256 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5257 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5258 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5259 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5260 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5261 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5263 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5264 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5265 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5266 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5267 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5268 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5269 next_funding_txid: None,
5274 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5276 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5277 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5278 /// commitment update.
5280 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5281 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5282 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5283 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5284 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5285 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5286 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5289 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5290 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5291 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5293 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5294 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5299 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5300 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5302 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5304 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5305 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5307 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5308 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5309 /// regenerate them.
5311 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5312 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5314 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5315 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5316 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5317 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5318 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5319 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5320 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5322 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5323 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5325 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5326 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5327 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5330 if amount_msat == 0 {
5331 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5334 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5335 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5336 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5337 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5340 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5341 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5342 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5345 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5346 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5347 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5348 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5349 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5350 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5351 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5352 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5355 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5356 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5357 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5358 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5359 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5360 else { "to peer" });
5362 if need_holding_cell {
5363 force_holding_cell = true;
5366 // Now update local state:
5367 if force_holding_cell {
5368 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5373 onion_routing_packet,
5379 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5380 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5382 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5384 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5389 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5390 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5391 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5395 onion_routing_packet,
5398 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5403 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5404 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5405 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5406 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5408 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5409 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5410 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5412 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5413 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5417 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5418 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5419 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5420 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5421 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5422 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5423 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5426 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5427 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5428 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5429 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5430 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5431 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5434 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5436 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5437 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5438 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5439 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5440 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5442 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5443 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5446 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5447 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5448 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5449 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5450 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5451 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5452 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5453 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5454 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5455 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5456 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5459 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5463 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5464 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5465 where L::Target: Logger
5467 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5468 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5469 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5471 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5473 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5474 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5475 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5476 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5477 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5478 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5479 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5480 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5481 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5482 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5483 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5489 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5492 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5493 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5494 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5495 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5496 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5497 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5499 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5500 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5501 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5503 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5504 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5505 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5508 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5509 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5513 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5514 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5516 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5518 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5519 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5520 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5521 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5523 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5524 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5525 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5526 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5527 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5528 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5532 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5533 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5537 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5538 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5543 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5544 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5546 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5547 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5548 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5549 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5550 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5551 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5552 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5553 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5555 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5556 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5557 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5560 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5561 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5562 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5568 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5570 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5571 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5572 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5573 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5574 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5576 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5578 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5584 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5585 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5587 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5588 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5589 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5590 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5591 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5593 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5594 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5595 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5598 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5599 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5600 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5602 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5603 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5606 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5607 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5609 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5610 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5611 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5614 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5615 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5616 let mut chan_closed = false;
5617 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5621 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5623 None if !chan_closed => {
5624 // use override shutdown script if provided
5625 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5626 Some(script) => script,
5628 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5629 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5630 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5631 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5635 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5636 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5638 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5644 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5645 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5646 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5647 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5649 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5651 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5653 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5654 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5655 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5656 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5657 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5658 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5661 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5662 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5664 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5665 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5666 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5669 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5670 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5671 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5672 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5673 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5675 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5676 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5683 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5684 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5686 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5689 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5690 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5691 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5693 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5694 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5698 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5702 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5703 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5704 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5705 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5708 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5709 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5710 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5711 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5712 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5713 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5714 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5715 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5717 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5718 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5719 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5720 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5722 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5723 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5725 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5726 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5728 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5729 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5730 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5732 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5733 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5735 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5736 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5737 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5738 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5739 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5742 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5743 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5745 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5746 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5748 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5750 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5752 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5753 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5754 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5755 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5758 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5759 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5761 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5762 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5763 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5764 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5768 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5769 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5770 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5774 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5775 Ok(script) => script,
5776 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5779 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5782 context: ChannelContext {
5785 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5786 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5787 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5788 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5793 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5795 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5796 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5797 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5798 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5800 channel_value_satoshis,
5802 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5804 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5805 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5808 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5809 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5812 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5813 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5814 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5815 pending_update_fee: None,
5816 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5817 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5818 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5819 update_time_counter: 1,
5821 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5823 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5824 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5825 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5826 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5827 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5828 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5830 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5831 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5832 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5833 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5835 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5836 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5837 closing_fee_limits: None,
5838 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5840 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5841 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5842 short_channel_id: None,
5843 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5845 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5846 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5847 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5848 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5849 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5850 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5851 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5852 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5853 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5854 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5855 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5856 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5858 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5860 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5861 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5862 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5863 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5864 counterparty_parameters: None,
5865 funding_outpoint: None,
5866 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5868 funding_transaction: None,
5869 is_batch_funding: None,
5871 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5872 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5873 counterparty_node_id,
5875 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5877 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5879 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5880 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5882 announcement_sigs: None,
5884 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5885 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5886 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5887 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5889 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5890 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5892 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5893 outbound_scid_alias,
5895 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5896 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5899 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5904 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5906 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5910 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5911 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5912 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5913 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5914 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5915 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5916 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5917 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5918 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5923 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5924 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5925 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5926 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5927 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5928 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5929 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5930 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5931 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5932 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5933 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5935 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5936 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5938 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5939 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5940 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5941 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5944 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5945 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5947 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5950 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5951 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5952 return Err((self, e));
5956 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5958 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5960 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5961 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5963 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5964 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5965 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5966 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5967 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5968 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5971 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5972 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
5974 let channel = Channel {
5975 context: self.context,
5978 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5979 temporary_channel_id,
5980 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5981 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5984 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5986 next_local_nonce: None,
5990 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5991 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5992 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5993 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5994 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5995 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5996 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5997 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5998 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5999 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6002 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6003 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6004 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6005 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6006 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6007 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6013 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6014 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6015 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6016 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6017 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6018 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6020 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6022 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6023 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6024 // We've exhausted our options
6027 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6028 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6031 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6032 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6033 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6034 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6036 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6037 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6038 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6039 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6040 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6041 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6043 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6045 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6046 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6049 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6050 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6051 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6053 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6054 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6057 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6058 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6061 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6062 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6066 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6067 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6068 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6069 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6070 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6071 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6072 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6073 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6074 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6075 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6076 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6077 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6078 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6079 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6080 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6081 first_per_commitment_point,
6082 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6083 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6084 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6085 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6087 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6092 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6093 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6095 // Check sanity of message fields:
6096 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6099 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6102 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6105 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6108 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6111 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6113 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6115 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6116 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6119 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6120 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6123 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6124 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6126 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6130 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6131 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6134 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6137 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6138 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6140 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6143 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6146 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6149 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6153 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6154 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6157 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6158 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6160 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6161 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6164 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6165 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6168 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6169 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6170 &Some(ref script) => {
6171 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6172 if script.len() == 0 {
6175 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6176 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6178 Some(script.clone())
6181 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6188 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6189 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6190 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6191 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6192 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6194 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6195 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6197 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6200 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6201 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6202 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6203 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6204 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6205 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6208 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6209 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6210 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6213 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6214 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6216 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6217 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6223 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6224 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6225 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6226 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6229 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6230 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6231 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6232 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6233 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6234 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6235 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6236 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6237 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6238 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6239 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6242 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6244 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6245 // support this channel type.
6246 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6247 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6251 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6252 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6253 // `static_remote_key`.
6254 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6257 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6258 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6261 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6264 channel_type.clone()
6266 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6267 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6273 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6274 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6275 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6276 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6277 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6278 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6279 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6280 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6281 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6284 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6285 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6288 // Check sanity of message fields:
6289 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6292 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6295 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6298 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6299 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6302 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6305 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6308 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6310 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6311 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6314 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6317 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6318 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6321 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6322 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6325 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6328 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6329 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6331 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6334 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6335 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6337 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6338 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6340 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6344 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6346 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6347 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6352 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6353 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6354 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6355 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6356 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6358 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6359 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6361 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6362 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6363 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6365 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6366 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6369 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6370 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6371 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6372 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6376 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6377 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6378 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6379 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6382 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6383 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6384 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6385 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6389 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6390 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6391 &Some(ref script) => {
6392 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6393 if script.len() == 0 {
6396 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6397 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6399 Some(script.clone())
6402 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6404 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6409 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6410 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6411 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6412 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6416 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6417 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6418 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6422 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6423 Ok(script) => script,
6424 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6427 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6428 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6430 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6433 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6437 context: ChannelContext {
6440 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6441 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6443 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6448 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6450 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6451 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6452 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6453 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6456 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6458 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6459 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6462 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6463 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6464 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6466 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6467 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6468 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6469 pending_update_fee: None,
6470 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6471 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6472 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6473 update_time_counter: 1,
6475 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6477 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6478 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6479 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6480 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6481 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6482 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6484 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6485 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6486 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6487 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6489 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6490 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6491 closing_fee_limits: None,
6492 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6494 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6495 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6496 short_channel_id: None,
6497 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6499 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6500 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6501 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6502 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6503 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6504 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6505 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6506 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6507 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6508 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6509 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6510 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6513 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6515 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6516 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6517 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6518 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6519 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6520 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6521 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6523 funding_outpoint: None,
6524 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6526 funding_transaction: None,
6527 is_batch_funding: None,
6529 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6530 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6531 counterparty_node_id,
6533 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6535 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6537 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6538 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6540 announcement_sigs: None,
6542 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6543 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6544 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6545 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6547 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6548 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6550 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6551 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6553 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6554 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6556 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6557 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6562 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6564 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6570 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6571 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6573 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6574 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6575 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6576 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6578 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6579 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6581 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6582 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6585 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6588 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6589 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6590 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6592 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6593 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6594 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6595 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6597 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6598 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6599 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6600 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6601 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6602 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6603 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6604 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6605 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6606 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6607 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6608 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6609 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6610 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6611 first_per_commitment_point,
6612 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6613 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6614 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6616 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6618 next_local_nonce: None,
6622 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6623 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6625 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6627 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6628 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6631 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6632 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6634 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6635 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6637 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6638 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6639 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6640 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6641 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6642 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6643 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6644 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6645 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6648 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6649 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6651 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6652 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6653 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6654 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6656 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6657 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6658 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6659 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6660 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6662 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6663 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6668 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6669 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6670 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6674 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6675 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6677 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6678 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6679 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6681 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6683 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6684 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6685 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6686 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6689 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6690 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6691 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6692 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6693 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6695 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6697 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6698 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6699 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6702 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6703 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6704 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6708 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6709 initial_commitment_tx,
6712 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6713 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6716 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6717 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6720 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6722 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6723 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6724 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6725 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6726 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6727 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6728 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6729 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6730 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6731 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6732 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6734 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6736 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6737 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6738 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6739 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6740 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6741 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6743 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6744 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6745 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6746 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6748 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6750 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6751 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6752 let mut channel = Channel {
6753 context: self.context,
6755 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6756 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6757 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6759 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6763 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6764 }, channel_monitor))
6768 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6769 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6771 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6777 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6778 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6779 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6780 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6781 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6783 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6784 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6785 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6786 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6792 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6793 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6794 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6795 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6796 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6797 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6802 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6803 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6804 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6805 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6807 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6808 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6809 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6810 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6815 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6816 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6817 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6818 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6819 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6820 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6825 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6826 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6827 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6830 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6832 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6833 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6834 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6835 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6836 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6838 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6839 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6840 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6841 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6843 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6844 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6845 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6847 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6849 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6850 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6851 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6852 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6853 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6854 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6855 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6857 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6858 // deserialized from that format.
6859 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6860 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6861 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6863 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6865 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6866 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6867 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6869 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6870 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6871 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6872 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6875 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6876 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6877 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6880 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6881 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6882 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6883 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6885 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6886 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6888 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6890 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6892 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6894 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6897 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6899 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6904 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6905 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6907 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6908 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6909 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6910 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6911 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6912 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6913 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6915 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6917 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6919 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6922 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6923 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6924 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6927 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6929 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6930 preimages.push(preimage);
6932 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6933 reason.write(writer)?;
6935 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6937 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6938 preimages.push(preimage);
6940 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6941 reason.write(writer)?;
6944 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6945 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6946 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6948 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6949 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6950 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6954 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6955 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6956 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6958 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6959 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6963 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6964 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6965 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6966 source.write(writer)?;
6967 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6969 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6970 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6971 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6973 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6974 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6976 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6978 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6979 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6981 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6983 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6984 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6989 match self.context.resend_order {
6990 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6991 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6994 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6995 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6996 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6998 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6999 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7000 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7001 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7004 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7005 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7006 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7007 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7008 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7011 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7012 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7013 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7014 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7016 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7017 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7018 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7020 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7022 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7023 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7024 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7025 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7027 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7028 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7029 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7030 // consider the stale state on reload.
7033 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7034 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7035 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7037 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7038 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7039 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7041 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7042 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7044 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7045 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7046 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7048 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7049 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7051 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7054 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7055 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7056 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7058 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7061 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7062 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7064 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7065 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7066 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7068 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7070 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7072 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7074 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7075 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7076 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7077 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7078 htlc.write(writer)?;
7081 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7082 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7083 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7085 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7086 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7088 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7089 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7090 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7091 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7092 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7093 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7094 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7096 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7097 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7098 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7099 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7100 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7102 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7103 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7105 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7106 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7107 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7108 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7110 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7112 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7113 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7114 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7115 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7116 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7117 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7118 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7120 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7121 (2, chan_type, option),
7122 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7123 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7124 (5, self.context.config, required),
7125 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7126 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7127 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7128 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7129 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7130 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7131 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7132 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7133 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7134 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7135 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7136 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7137 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7138 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7139 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7140 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7141 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7142 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7143 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7150 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7151 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7153 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7154 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7156 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7157 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7158 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7160 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7161 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7162 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7163 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7165 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7167 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7168 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7169 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7170 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7171 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7173 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7174 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7177 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7178 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7181 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7183 let mut keys_data = None;
7185 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7186 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7187 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7188 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7189 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7190 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7191 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7192 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7193 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7194 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7198 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7199 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7200 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7203 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7205 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7206 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7207 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7209 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7211 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7212 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7213 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7214 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7215 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7216 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7217 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7218 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7219 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7220 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7221 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7222 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7223 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7228 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7229 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7230 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7231 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7232 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7233 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7234 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7235 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7236 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7237 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7238 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7239 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7241 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7242 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7245 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7246 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7249 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7250 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7252 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7254 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7258 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7259 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7260 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7261 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7262 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7263 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7264 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7265 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7266 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7267 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7268 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7270 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7271 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7272 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7274 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7275 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7276 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7278 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7282 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7283 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7284 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7285 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7288 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7289 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7290 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7292 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7293 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7294 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7295 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7298 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7299 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7300 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7301 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7304 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7308 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7309 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7310 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7314 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7315 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7316 // consider the stale state on reload.
7317 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7320 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7324 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7327 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7328 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7329 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7331 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7333 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7334 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7336 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7337 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7339 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7340 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7342 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7346 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7348 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7349 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7351 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7352 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7355 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7357 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7358 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7359 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7360 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7362 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7365 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7366 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7368 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7370 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7371 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7373 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7374 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7376 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7379 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7380 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7382 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7383 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7384 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7388 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7389 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7390 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7392 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7398 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7399 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7400 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7401 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7402 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7403 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7404 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7405 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7406 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7407 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7409 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7410 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7411 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7412 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7413 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7414 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7415 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7417 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7418 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7419 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7420 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7422 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7424 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7425 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7427 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7429 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7430 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7431 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7432 (2, channel_type, option),
7433 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7434 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7435 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7436 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7437 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7438 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7439 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7440 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7441 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7442 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7443 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7444 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7445 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7446 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7447 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7448 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7449 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7450 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7451 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7452 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7453 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7454 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7457 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7458 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7459 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7460 // required channel parameters.
7461 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7462 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7463 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7465 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7467 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7468 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7469 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7470 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7473 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7474 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7475 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7477 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7478 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7480 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7481 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7486 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7487 if iter.next().is_some() {
7488 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7492 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7493 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7494 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7495 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7496 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7499 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7500 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7501 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7503 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7504 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7506 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7507 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7508 // separate u64 values.
7509 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7511 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7513 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7514 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7515 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7516 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7518 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7519 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7521 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7522 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7523 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7524 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7525 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7528 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7529 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7533 context: ChannelContext {
7536 config: config.unwrap(),
7540 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7541 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7542 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7545 temporary_channel_id,
7547 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7549 channel_value_satoshis,
7551 latest_monitor_update_id,
7553 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7554 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7557 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7558 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7561 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7562 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7563 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7564 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7568 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7569 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7570 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7571 monitor_pending_forwards,
7572 monitor_pending_failures,
7573 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7576 holding_cell_update_fee,
7577 next_holder_htlc_id,
7578 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7579 update_time_counter,
7582 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7583 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7584 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7585 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7587 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7588 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7589 closing_fee_limits: None,
7590 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7592 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7593 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7595 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7597 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7598 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7599 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7600 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7601 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7602 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7603 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7604 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7605 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7608 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7610 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7611 funding_transaction,
7614 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7615 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7616 counterparty_node_id,
7618 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7622 channel_update_status,
7623 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7627 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7628 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7629 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7630 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7632 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7633 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7635 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7636 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7637 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7639 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7640 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7642 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7643 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7645 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7648 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7657 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7658 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7659 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7660 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7661 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7663 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7664 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7665 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7666 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7667 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7668 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7669 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7670 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7671 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7672 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7673 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7674 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7675 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7676 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7677 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7678 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7679 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7680 use crate::util::test_utils;
7681 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7682 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7683 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7684 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7685 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7686 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7687 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7688 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7689 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7690 use crate::prelude::*;
7692 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7695 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7696 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7702 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7703 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7704 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7705 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7709 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7710 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7711 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7712 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7713 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7714 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7715 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7716 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7720 signer: InMemorySigner,
7723 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7724 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7727 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7728 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7730 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7731 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7734 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7738 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7740 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7741 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7742 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7743 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7744 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7747 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7748 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7749 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7750 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7754 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7755 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7756 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7760 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7761 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7762 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7763 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7765 let seed = [42; 32];
7766 let network = Network::Testnet;
7767 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7768 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7769 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7772 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7773 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7774 let config = UserConfig::default();
7775 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7776 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7777 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7779 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7780 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7784 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7785 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7787 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7788 let original_fee = 253;
7789 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7790 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7791 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7792 let seed = [42; 32];
7793 let network = Network::Testnet;
7794 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7796 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7797 let config = UserConfig::default();
7798 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7800 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7801 // same as the old fee.
7802 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7803 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7804 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7808 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7809 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7810 // dust limits are used.
7811 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7812 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7813 let seed = [42; 32];
7814 let network = Network::Testnet;
7815 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7816 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7817 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7819 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7820 // they have different dust limits.
7822 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7823 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7824 let config = UserConfig::default();
7825 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7827 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7828 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7829 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7830 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7831 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7833 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7834 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7835 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7836 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7837 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7839 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7840 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7841 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7842 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7844 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7845 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7846 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7848 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7849 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7851 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7852 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7853 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7855 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7856 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7857 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7858 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7861 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7863 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7864 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7865 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7866 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7867 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7868 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7869 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7870 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7871 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7873 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7876 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7877 // the dust limit check.
7878 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7879 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7880 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7881 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7883 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7884 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7885 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7886 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7887 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7888 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7889 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7893 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7894 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7895 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7896 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7897 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7898 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7899 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7900 let seed = [42; 32];
7901 let network = Network::Testnet;
7902 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7904 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7905 let config = UserConfig::default();
7906 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7908 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7909 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7911 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7912 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7913 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7914 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7915 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7916 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7918 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7919 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7920 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7921 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7922 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7924 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7926 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7927 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7928 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7929 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7930 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7932 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7933 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7934 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7935 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7936 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7940 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7941 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7942 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7943 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7944 let seed = [42; 32];
7945 let network = Network::Testnet;
7946 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7947 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
7948 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7950 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7952 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7953 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7954 let config = UserConfig::default();
7955 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7957 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7958 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7959 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7960 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7962 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7963 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7964 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7966 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7967 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7968 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7969 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7971 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7972 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7973 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7975 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7976 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7978 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7979 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7980 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7981 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7982 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7983 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7984 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7986 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7988 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7989 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7990 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7991 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7992 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7996 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7997 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7998 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7999 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8000 let seed = [42; 32];
8001 let network = Network::Testnet;
8002 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8003 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8004 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8006 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8007 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8008 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8009 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8010 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8011 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8012 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8013 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8015 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8016 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8017 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8018 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8019 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8020 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8022 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8023 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8024 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8025 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8027 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8029 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8030 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8031 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8032 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8033 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8034 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8036 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8037 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8038 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8039 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8041 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8042 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8043 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8044 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8045 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8047 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8048 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8050 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8051 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8052 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8054 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8055 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8056 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8057 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8058 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8060 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8061 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8063 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8064 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8065 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8069 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8071 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8072 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8073 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8075 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8076 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8077 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8078 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8080 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8081 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8082 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8084 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8086 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8087 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8090 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8091 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8092 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8093 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8094 let seed = [42; 32];
8095 let network = Network::Testnet;
8096 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8097 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8098 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8101 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8102 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8103 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8105 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8106 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8108 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8109 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8110 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8112 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8113 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8115 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8117 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8118 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8120 // Channel Negotiations failed
8121 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8122 assert!(result.is_err());
8127 fn channel_update() {
8128 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8129 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8130 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8131 let seed = [42; 32];
8132 let network = Network::Testnet;
8133 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8134 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8135 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8137 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8138 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8139 let config = UserConfig::default();
8140 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8142 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8143 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8144 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8145 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8146 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8148 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8149 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8150 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8151 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8152 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8154 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8155 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8156 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8157 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8159 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8160 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8161 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8163 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8164 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8166 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8167 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8168 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8170 short_channel_id: 0,
8173 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8174 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8175 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8177 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8178 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8180 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8182 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8184 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8185 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8186 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8187 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8189 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8190 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8191 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8193 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8196 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8199 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8201 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8202 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8203 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8204 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8205 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8206 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8207 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8208 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8209 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8210 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8211 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8212 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8213 use crate::sync::Arc;
8215 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8216 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8217 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8218 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8220 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8222 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8223 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8224 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8225 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8226 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8228 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8229 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8235 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8236 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8237 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8239 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8240 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8241 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8242 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8243 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8244 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8246 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8248 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8249 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8250 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8251 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8252 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8253 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8255 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8256 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8257 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8258 selected_contest_delay: 144
8260 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8261 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8263 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8264 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8266 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8267 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8269 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8270 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8272 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8273 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8274 // build_commitment_transaction.
8275 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8276 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8277 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8278 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8279 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8281 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8282 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8283 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8284 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8288 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8289 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8290 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8291 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8295 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8296 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8297 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8299 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8300 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8302 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8303 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8305 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8307 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8308 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8309 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8310 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8311 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8312 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8313 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8315 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8316 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8317 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8318 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8320 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8321 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8322 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8324 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8326 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8327 commitment_tx.clone(),
8328 counterparty_signature,
8329 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8330 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8331 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8333 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8334 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8336 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8337 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8338 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8340 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8341 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8344 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8345 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8347 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8348 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8349 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8350 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8351 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8352 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8353 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8354 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8356 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8359 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8360 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8361 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8365 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8368 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8369 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8370 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8371 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8372 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8373 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8375 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8376 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8377 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8378 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8380 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8381 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8382 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8383 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8384 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8386 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8387 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8388 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8389 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8390 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
8391 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8393 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8397 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8398 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8399 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8400 "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", {});
8402 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8403 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8405 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8406 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8407 "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", {});
8409 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8410 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8411 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8412 "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", {});
8414 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8415 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8417 amount_msat: 1000000,
8419 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8420 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8422 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8425 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8426 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8428 amount_msat: 2000000,
8430 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8431 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8433 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8436 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8437 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8439 amount_msat: 2000000,
8441 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8442 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8443 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8444 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8446 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8449 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8450 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8452 amount_msat: 3000000,
8454 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8455 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8456 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8457 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8459 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8462 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8463 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8465 amount_msat: 4000000,
8467 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8468 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8470 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8474 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8475 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8476 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8478 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8479 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8480 "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", {
8483 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8484 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8485 "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" },
8488 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8489 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8490 "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" },
8493 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8494 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8495 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8498 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8499 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8500 "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" },
8503 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8504 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8505 "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" }
8508 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8509 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8510 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8512 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8513 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8514 "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", {
8517 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8518 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8519 "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" },
8522 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8523 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8524 "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" },
8527 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8528 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8529 "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" },
8532 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8533 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8534 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8537 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8538 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8539 "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" }
8542 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8543 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8544 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8546 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8547 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8548 "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", {
8551 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8552 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8553 "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" },
8556 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8557 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8558 "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" },
8561 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8562 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8563 "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" },
8566 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8567 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8568 "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" }
8571 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8572 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8573 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8574 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8576 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8577 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8578 "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", {
8581 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8582 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8583 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
8586 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8587 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8588 "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" },
8591 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8592 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8593 "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" },
8596 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8597 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8598 "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" }
8601 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8602 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8603 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8604 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8606 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8607 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8608 "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", {
8611 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8612 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8613 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8616 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8617 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8618 "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" },
8621 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8622 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8623 "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" },
8626 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8627 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8628 "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" }
8631 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8632 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8633 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8635 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8636 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8637 "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", {
8640 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8641 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8642 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8645 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8646 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8647 "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" },
8650 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8651 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8652 "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" }
8655 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8656 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8657 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8659 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8660 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8661 "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", {
8664 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8665 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8666 "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" },
8669 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8670 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8671 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8674 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8675 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8676 "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" }
8679 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8680 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8681 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8683 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8684 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8685 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8688 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8689 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8690 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8693 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8694 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8695 "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" }
8698 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8699 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8700 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8701 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8702 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8703 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8705 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8706 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8707 "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", {
8710 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8711 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8712 "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" },
8715 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8716 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8717 "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" }
8720 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8721 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8722 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8723 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8724 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8726 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8727 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8728 "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", {
8731 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8732 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8733 "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" },
8736 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8737 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8738 "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" }
8741 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8742 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8743 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8745 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8746 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8747 "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", {
8750 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8751 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8752 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8755 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8756 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8757 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8758 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8759 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8761 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8762 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8763 "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", {
8766 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8767 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8768 "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" }
8771 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8772 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8773 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8774 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8775 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8777 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8778 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8779 "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", {
8782 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8783 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8784 "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" }
8787 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8788 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8789 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8790 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8792 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8793 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8794 "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", {});
8796 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8797 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8798 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8799 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8800 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8802 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8803 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8804 "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", {});
8806 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8807 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8808 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8809 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8810 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8812 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8813 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8814 "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", {});
8816 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8817 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8818 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8820 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8821 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8822 "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", {});
8824 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8825 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8826 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8827 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8828 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8830 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8831 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8832 "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", {});
8834 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8835 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8836 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8837 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8838 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8840 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8841 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8842 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8844 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8845 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8846 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8847 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8848 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8849 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8851 amount_msat: 2000000,
8853 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8854 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8856 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8859 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8860 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8861 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8863 amount_msat: 5000001,
8865 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8866 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8867 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8868 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8870 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8873 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8874 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8876 amount_msat: 5000000,
8878 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8879 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8880 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8881 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8883 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8887 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8888 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8889 "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", {
8892 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8893 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8894 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce501473044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8896 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8897 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8898 "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" },
8900 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8901 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8902 "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" }
8905 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8906 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8907 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8908 "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", {
8911 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8912 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8913 "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" },
8915 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8916 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8917 "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" },
8919 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8920 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8921 "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" }
8926 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8927 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8929 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8930 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8931 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8932 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8934 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8935 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8936 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8938 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8939 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8941 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8942 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8944 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8945 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8946 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8950 fn test_key_derivation() {
8951 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8952 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8954 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8955 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8957 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8958 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8960 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8961 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8963 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8964 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8966 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8967 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8969 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8970 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8972 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8973 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8977 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8978 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8979 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8980 let seed = [42; 32];
8981 let network = Network::Testnet;
8982 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8983 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8985 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8986 let config = UserConfig::default();
8987 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8988 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8990 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8991 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8993 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8994 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8995 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8996 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8997 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8998 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8999 assert!(res.is_ok());
9003 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9004 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9005 // resulting `channel_type`.
9006 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9007 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9008 let network = Network::Testnet;
9009 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9010 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9012 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9013 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9015 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9016 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9018 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9019 // need to signal it.
9020 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9021 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9022 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9025 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9027 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9028 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9029 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9031 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9032 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9033 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9036 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9037 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9038 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9039 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9040 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9043 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9044 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9048 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9049 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9050 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9051 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9052 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9053 let network = Network::Testnet;
9054 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9055 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9057 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9058 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9060 let config = UserConfig::default();
9062 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9063 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9064 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9065 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9066 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9068 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9069 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9070 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9073 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9074 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9075 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9077 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9078 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9079 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9080 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9081 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9082 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9084 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9088 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9089 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9091 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9092 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9093 let network = Network::Testnet;
9094 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9095 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9097 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9098 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9100 let config = UserConfig::default();
9102 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9103 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9104 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9105 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9106 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9107 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9108 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9109 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9111 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9112 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9113 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9114 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9115 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9116 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9119 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9120 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9122 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9123 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9124 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9125 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9127 assert!(res.is_err());
9129 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9130 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9131 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9133 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9134 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9135 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9138 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9140 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9141 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9142 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9143 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9146 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9147 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9149 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9150 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9152 assert!(res.is_err());
9156 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9157 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9158 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9159 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9160 let seed = [42; 32];
9161 let network = Network::Testnet;
9162 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9163 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9164 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9166 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9167 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9168 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9169 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9171 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9172 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9173 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9178 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9187 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9188 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9189 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9194 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9195 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9201 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9204 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9205 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9206 &accept_channel_msg,
9207 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9208 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9211 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9212 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9213 let tx = Transaction {
9215 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9219 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9222 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9225 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9226 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9231 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9232 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9233 &funding_created_msg,
9237 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9238 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9246 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9247 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9248 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9249 &funding_signed_msg,
9254 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9261 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9262 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9263 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9264 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9266 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9267 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9268 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9271 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9272 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9273 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9281 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9282 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9283 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9284 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9287 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9288 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9290 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9291 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9292 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9294 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());