1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
591 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
592 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
593 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
595 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
599 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
600 (0, update, required),
601 (2, blocked, required),
604 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
605 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
606 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
608 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
609 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
610 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
611 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
613 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
617 channel_id: [u8; 32],
618 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
621 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
622 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
624 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
625 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
626 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
628 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
629 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
631 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
633 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
634 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
636 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
638 holder_signer: Signer,
639 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
640 destination_script: Script,
642 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
643 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
644 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
646 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
647 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
648 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
649 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
650 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
651 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
653 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
654 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
655 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
656 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
657 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
658 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
660 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
662 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
663 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
664 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
666 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
667 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
668 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
669 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
670 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
671 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
672 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
674 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
676 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
677 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
678 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
679 // HTLCs with similar state.
680 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
681 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
682 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
683 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
684 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
685 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
686 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
687 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
688 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
691 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
692 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
693 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
695 update_time_counter: u32,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
699 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
700 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
701 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
702 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
704 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
705 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
707 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
708 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
709 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
710 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
712 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
713 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
715 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
717 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
719 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
720 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
721 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
722 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
723 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
724 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
726 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
727 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
728 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
729 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
730 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
732 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
733 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
734 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
735 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
736 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
737 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
738 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
739 channel_creation_height: u32,
741 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
744 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
749 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
754 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
756 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
758 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
759 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
762 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
764 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
766 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
767 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
769 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
771 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
772 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
773 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
775 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
777 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
778 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
780 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
781 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
782 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
784 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
786 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
788 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
789 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
790 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
791 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
793 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
794 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
795 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
797 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
798 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
799 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
801 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
802 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
803 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
804 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
805 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
806 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
808 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
810 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
811 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
812 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
813 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
814 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
816 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
817 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
819 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
820 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
821 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
822 /// unblock the state machine.
824 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
825 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
826 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
828 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
829 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
830 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
833 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
834 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
835 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
836 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
837 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
838 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
839 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
841 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
842 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
844 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
845 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
846 // the channel's funding UTXO.
848 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
849 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
850 // associated channel mapping.
852 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
853 // to store all of them.
854 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
856 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
857 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
858 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
859 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
860 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
863 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
865 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
866 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
868 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
869 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
870 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
872 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
873 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
874 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
875 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
876 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
879 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
880 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
881 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
884 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
885 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
886 self.update_time_counter
889 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
890 self.latest_monitor_update_id
893 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
894 self.config.announced_channel
897 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
898 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
901 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
902 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
903 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
904 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
907 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
908 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
909 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
912 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
913 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
914 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
915 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
916 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
919 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
920 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
921 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
922 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
923 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
928 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
932 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
934 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
935 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
936 self.temporary_channel_id
939 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
943 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
944 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
945 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
949 /// Gets the channel's type
950 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
954 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
955 /// is_usable() returns true).
956 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
957 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
958 self.short_channel_id
961 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
962 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
963 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
966 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
967 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
968 self.outbound_scid_alias
971 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
972 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
973 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
974 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
975 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
978 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
979 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
980 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
981 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
984 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
985 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
986 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
989 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
990 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
991 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
992 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
996 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
999 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1000 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1003 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1004 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1007 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1008 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1009 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1012 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1013 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1016 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1017 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1018 self.counterparty_node_id
1021 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1022 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1023 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1026 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1027 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1028 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1031 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1032 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1034 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1035 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1036 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1037 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1039 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1043 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1044 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1045 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1049 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1050 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1053 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1054 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1055 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1057 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1058 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1063 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1064 self.channel_value_satoshis
1067 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1068 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1071 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1072 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1075 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1076 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1079 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1080 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1081 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1084 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1085 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1086 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1089 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1090 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1091 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1094 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1095 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1096 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1099 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1100 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1101 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1104 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1105 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1106 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1109 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1110 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1111 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1112 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1113 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1116 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1118 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1119 self.prev_config = None;
1123 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1124 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1128 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1129 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1130 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1131 let did_channel_update =
1132 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1133 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1134 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1135 if did_channel_update {
1136 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1137 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1138 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1139 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1141 self.config.options = *config;
1145 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1146 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1147 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1150 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1151 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1152 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1153 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1154 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1156 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1157 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1158 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1159 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1160 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1161 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1162 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1164 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1165 where L::Target: Logger
1167 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1168 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1169 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1171 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1172 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1173 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1174 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1176 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1177 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1178 if match update_state {
1179 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1180 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1181 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1182 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1183 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1185 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1189 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1190 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1191 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1192 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1194 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1195 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1196 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1198 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1199 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1200 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1201 transaction_output_index: None
1206 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1207 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1208 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1209 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1210 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1213 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1215 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1216 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1217 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1219 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1220 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1223 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1224 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1227 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1229 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1230 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1231 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1233 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1234 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1240 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1241 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1242 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1243 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1244 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1245 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1246 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1250 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1251 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1253 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1255 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1256 if generated_by_local {
1257 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1258 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1267 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1269 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1270 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1271 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1272 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1273 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1274 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1275 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1278 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1279 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1280 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1281 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1285 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1286 preimages.push(preimage);
1290 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1291 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1293 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1295 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1296 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1298 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1299 if !generated_by_local {
1300 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1308 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1309 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1310 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1311 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1312 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1313 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1314 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1315 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1317 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1320 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1321 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1322 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1324 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1326 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1327 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1328 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1329 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1332 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1333 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1334 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1335 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1337 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1340 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1341 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1342 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1343 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1345 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1348 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1349 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1354 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1355 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1360 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1362 let channel_parameters =
1363 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1364 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1365 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1368 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1373 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1376 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1377 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1378 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1379 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1381 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1382 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1383 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1391 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1392 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1398 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1399 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1400 /// our counterparty!)
1401 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1402 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1403 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1404 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1405 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1406 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1407 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1409 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1413 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1414 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1415 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1416 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1417 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1418 //may see payments to it!
1419 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1420 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1421 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1423 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1426 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1427 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1428 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1429 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1430 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1433 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1434 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1437 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1441 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1442 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1443 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1444 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1445 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1446 // which are near the dust limit.
1447 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1448 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1449 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1450 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1451 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1453 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1454 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1456 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1459 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1460 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1461 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1464 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1465 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1467 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1468 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1469 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1470 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1471 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1472 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1473 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1476 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1479 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1480 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1481 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1483 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1484 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1485 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1486 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1487 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1488 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1490 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1491 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1497 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1498 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1500 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1501 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1502 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1503 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1504 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1505 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1506 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1509 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1512 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1513 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1514 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1516 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1517 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1518 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1519 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1520 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1521 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1523 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1524 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1529 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1530 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1531 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1532 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1533 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1534 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1536 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1537 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1539 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1546 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1547 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1548 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1549 /// corner case properly.
1550 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1551 let context = &self;
1552 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1553 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1554 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1556 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1557 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1558 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1559 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1562 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1564 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1565 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1567 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1569 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1571 if context.is_outbound() {
1572 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1573 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1575 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1576 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1578 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1579 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1580 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1581 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1584 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1585 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1586 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1587 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1589 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1590 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1591 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1592 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1593 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1594 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1595 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1596 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1597 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1598 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1600 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1603 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1604 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1605 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1606 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1607 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1610 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1611 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1613 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1614 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1615 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1617 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1618 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1619 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1620 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1624 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1626 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1627 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1628 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1629 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1630 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1631 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1633 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1634 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1636 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1637 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1638 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1640 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1641 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1642 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1643 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1644 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1647 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1648 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1649 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1650 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1651 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1652 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1655 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1656 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1657 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1659 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1663 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1664 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1666 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1667 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1671 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1672 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1673 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1674 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1676 outbound_capacity_msat,
1677 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1678 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1683 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1684 let context = &self;
1685 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1688 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1689 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1691 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1692 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1694 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1695 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1697 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1698 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1699 let context = &self;
1700 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1702 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1705 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1706 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1708 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1709 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1711 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1712 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1714 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1715 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1719 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1720 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1726 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1727 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1728 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1731 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1732 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1733 included_htlcs += 1;
1736 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1737 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1741 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1742 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1743 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1744 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1745 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1746 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1751 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1753 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1754 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1759 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1760 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1764 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1765 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1766 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1769 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1770 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1772 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1773 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1774 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1776 total_pending_htlcs,
1777 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1778 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1779 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1781 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1782 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1783 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1785 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1787 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1792 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1793 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1795 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1796 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1798 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1799 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1801 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1802 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1803 let context = &self;
1804 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1806 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1809 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1810 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1812 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1813 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1815 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1816 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1819 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1823 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1824 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1830 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1831 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1832 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1833 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1834 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1835 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1838 included_htlcs += 1;
1841 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1842 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1845 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1846 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1848 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1849 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1850 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1855 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1856 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1860 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1861 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1863 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1864 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1866 total_pending_htlcs,
1867 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1868 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1869 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1871 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1872 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1873 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1875 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1877 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1882 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1883 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1884 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1885 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1891 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1892 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1893 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1894 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1895 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1896 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1897 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1898 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1899 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1900 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1901 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1903 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1904 // return them to fail the payment.
1905 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1906 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1907 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1909 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1910 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1915 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1916 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1917 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1918 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1919 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1920 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1921 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1922 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1923 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1924 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1925 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1926 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1927 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1932 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1933 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1934 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1938 // Internal utility functions for channels
1940 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1941 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1942 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1944 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1946 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1947 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1948 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1950 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1953 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1955 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1958 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1959 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1960 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1962 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1964 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1965 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1966 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1967 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1968 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1971 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1972 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1973 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1974 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1975 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1976 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1977 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1980 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1981 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1983 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1984 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1987 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1988 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1989 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1990 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1991 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1992 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1995 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1996 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1997 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
2000 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2001 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2002 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2003 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2006 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2007 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2009 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2010 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2011 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2015 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2016 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2017 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2018 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2020 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2021 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2022 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2023 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2024 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2025 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2026 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2029 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2030 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2031 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2032 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2033 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2034 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2035 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2036 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2038 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2039 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2049 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2050 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2051 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2052 // outside of those situations will fail.
2053 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2057 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2062 1 + // script length (0)
2066 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2067 2 + // witness marker and flag
2068 1 + // witness element count
2069 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2070 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2071 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2072 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2073 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2074 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2076 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2077 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2078 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2084 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2085 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2086 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2087 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2089 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2090 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2091 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2093 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2094 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2095 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2096 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2097 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2098 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2101 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2102 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2105 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2106 value_to_holder = 0;
2109 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2110 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2111 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2112 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2114 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2115 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2118 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2119 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2122 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2125 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2126 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2128 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2130 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2131 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2132 where L::Target: Logger {
2133 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2134 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2135 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2136 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2137 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2138 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2139 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2140 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2144 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2145 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2146 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2147 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2149 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2150 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2152 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2154 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2156 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2157 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2158 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2160 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2161 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2162 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2163 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2164 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2166 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2167 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2168 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2170 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2171 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2173 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2176 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2177 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2181 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2185 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2186 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2187 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2188 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2189 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2190 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2193 // Now update local state:
2195 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2196 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2197 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2198 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2199 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2200 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2201 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2205 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2206 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2207 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2208 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2209 // do not not get into this branch.
2210 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2211 match pending_update {
2212 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2213 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2214 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2215 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2216 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2217 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2218 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2221 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2222 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2223 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2224 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2225 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2227 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2233 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2234 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2235 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2237 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2238 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2239 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2242 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2245 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2246 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2248 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2249 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2251 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2252 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2255 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2258 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2259 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2260 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2261 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2266 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2267 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2268 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2269 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2270 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2271 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2272 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2273 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2274 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2275 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2276 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2277 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2278 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2279 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2280 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2281 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2282 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2284 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2286 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2287 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2288 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2289 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2290 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2291 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2292 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2294 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2295 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2298 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2299 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2300 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2301 update, blocked: true,
2306 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2307 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2308 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2309 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2313 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2317 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2318 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2319 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2320 /// before we fail backwards.
2322 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2323 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2324 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2325 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2326 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2327 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2328 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2331 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2332 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2333 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2334 /// before we fail backwards.
2336 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2337 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2338 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2339 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2340 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2341 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2342 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2344 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2346 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2347 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2348 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2350 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2351 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2352 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2354 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2355 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2356 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2358 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2363 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2364 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2370 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2371 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2372 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2373 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2374 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2378 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2379 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2380 force_holding_cell = true;
2383 // Now update local state:
2384 if force_holding_cell {
2385 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2386 match pending_update {
2387 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2388 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2389 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2390 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2394 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2395 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2396 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2397 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2403 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2404 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2405 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2411 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2413 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2414 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2417 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2418 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2419 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2424 // Message handlers:
2426 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2427 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2428 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2429 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2430 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2432 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2435 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2438 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2441 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2442 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2443 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2444 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2447 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2449 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2450 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2451 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2452 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2454 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2455 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2457 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2458 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2460 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2461 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2462 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2463 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2464 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2465 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2469 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2470 initial_commitment_tx,
2473 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2474 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2477 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2478 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2481 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2482 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2483 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2484 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2485 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2486 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2487 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2488 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2489 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2490 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2491 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2492 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2494 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2496 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2498 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2499 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2500 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2501 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2503 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2505 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2506 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2510 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2511 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2513 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2514 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2515 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2516 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2518 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2521 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2522 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2523 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2526 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2527 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2528 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2529 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2530 // when routing outbound payments.
2531 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2535 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2537 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2538 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2539 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2540 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2541 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2542 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2543 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2544 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2545 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2547 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2548 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2549 let expected_point =
2550 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2551 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2553 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2554 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2555 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2556 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2557 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2558 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2560 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2561 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2562 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2563 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2564 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2566 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2574 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2575 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2577 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2579 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2582 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2583 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2584 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2585 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2586 if local_sent_shutdown {
2587 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2589 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2590 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2591 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2594 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2597 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2600 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2603 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2604 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2607 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2608 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2609 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2610 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2612 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2613 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2615 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2616 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2617 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2618 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2619 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2620 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2621 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2622 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2623 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2624 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2625 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2627 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2628 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2629 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2630 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2631 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2632 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2636 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2639 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2640 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2641 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2643 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2644 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2645 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2646 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2647 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2648 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2649 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2653 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2654 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2655 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2656 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2657 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2658 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2659 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2663 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2664 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2665 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2666 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2667 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2668 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2671 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2672 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2673 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2674 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2675 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2677 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2678 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2681 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2685 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2686 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2687 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2688 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2689 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2690 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2691 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2692 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2693 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2694 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2695 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2696 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2697 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2698 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2699 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2700 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2703 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2704 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2705 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2706 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2707 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2710 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2711 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2713 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2714 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2717 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2718 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2719 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2723 // Now update local state:
2724 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2725 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2726 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2727 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2728 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2729 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2730 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2735 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2737 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2738 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2739 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2740 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2741 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2742 None => fail_reason.into(),
2743 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2744 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2745 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2746 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2748 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2752 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2753 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2754 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2755 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2757 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2763 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2766 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2767 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2770 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2774 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2777 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2778 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2781 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2785 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2789 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2790 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2793 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2797 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2801 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2802 where L::Target: Logger
2804 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2807 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2810 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2811 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2814 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2816 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2818 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2819 let commitment_txid = {
2820 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2821 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2822 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2824 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2825 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2826 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2827 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2828 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2833 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2835 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2836 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2837 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2838 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2841 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2842 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2843 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2844 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2847 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2849 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2850 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2851 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2852 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2853 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2854 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2855 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2856 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2857 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2858 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2859 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2865 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2869 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2870 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2871 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2872 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2873 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2874 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2875 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2876 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2877 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2878 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2879 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2880 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2881 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2884 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2885 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2886 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2887 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2888 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2889 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
2890 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2892 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
2893 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2894 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2895 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2896 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2897 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2898 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2901 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2902 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2905 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2907 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2908 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2909 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2912 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2915 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2916 commitment_stats.tx,
2918 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2919 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2920 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2923 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2924 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2926 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2927 let mut need_commitment = false;
2928 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2929 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2930 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2931 need_commitment = true;
2935 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2936 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2937 Some(forward_info.clone())
2939 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2940 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2941 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2942 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2943 need_commitment = true;
2946 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2947 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2948 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2949 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2950 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2951 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2952 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2953 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2954 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2955 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2956 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2957 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2958 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2959 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2961 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2963 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2964 need_commitment = true;
2968 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2969 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2970 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2971 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2972 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2973 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2975 nondust_htlc_sources,
2979 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2980 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2981 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2982 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2984 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
2985 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2986 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2987 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2988 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2989 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2990 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2991 // includes the right HTLCs.
2992 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2993 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2994 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2995 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2996 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2997 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2999 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3000 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3001 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3004 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3005 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3006 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3007 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3008 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3009 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3010 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3011 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3012 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3016 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3017 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3018 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3019 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3022 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3023 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3024 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3025 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3026 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3027 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3028 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3029 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3032 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3033 /// for our counterparty.
3034 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3035 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3036 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3037 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3038 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3040 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3041 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3042 updates: Vec::new(),
3045 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3046 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3047 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3048 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3049 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3050 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3051 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3052 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3053 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3054 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3055 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3056 // to rebalance channels.
3057 match &htlc_update {
3058 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3059 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3060 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3062 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3063 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
3065 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3068 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3069 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3070 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3071 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3072 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3073 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3074 // into the holding cell without ever being
3075 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3076 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3077 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3080 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3086 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3087 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3088 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3089 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3090 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3091 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3092 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3093 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3094 (msg, monitor_update)
3095 } else { unreachable!() };
3096 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3097 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3099 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3100 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3101 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3102 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3103 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3104 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3105 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3106 // for a full revocation before failing.
3107 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3110 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3112 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3119 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3120 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3122 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3123 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3128 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3129 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3130 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3131 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3132 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3134 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3135 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3136 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3138 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3139 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3145 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3146 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3147 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3148 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3149 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3150 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3151 where L::Target: Logger,
3153 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3156 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3159 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3160 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3163 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3165 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3166 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3171 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3172 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3173 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3174 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3175 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3176 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3177 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3178 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3182 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3184 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3185 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3188 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3189 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3191 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3193 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3194 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3195 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3196 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3197 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3198 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3199 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3200 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3204 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3205 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3206 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3207 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3208 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3209 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3210 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3211 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3212 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3214 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3215 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3218 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3219 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3220 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3221 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3222 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3223 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3224 let mut require_commitment = false;
3225 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3228 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3229 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3230 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3232 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3233 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3234 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3235 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3236 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3237 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3242 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3243 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3244 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3245 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3246 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3248 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3249 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3250 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3255 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3256 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3258 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3262 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3263 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3265 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3266 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3267 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3268 require_commitment = true;
3269 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3270 match forward_info {
3271 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3272 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3273 require_commitment = true;
3275 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3276 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3277 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3279 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3280 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3281 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3285 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3286 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3287 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3288 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3294 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3295 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3296 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3297 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3299 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3300 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3301 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3302 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3303 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3304 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3305 require_commitment = true;
3309 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3311 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3312 match update_state {
3313 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3314 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3315 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3316 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3317 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3319 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3320 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3321 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3322 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3323 require_commitment = true;
3324 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3325 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3330 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3331 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3332 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3333 if require_commitment {
3334 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3335 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3336 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3337 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3338 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3339 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3340 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3341 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3342 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3344 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3345 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3346 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3347 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3348 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3351 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3352 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3353 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3354 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3355 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3356 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3357 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3359 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3360 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3362 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3363 if require_commitment {
3364 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3366 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3367 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3368 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3369 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3371 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3372 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3373 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3374 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3376 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3377 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3378 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3384 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3385 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3386 /// commitment update.
3387 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3388 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3389 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3392 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3393 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3394 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3395 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3397 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3398 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3399 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3400 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3401 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3403 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3404 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3406 if !self.context.is_live() {
3407 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3410 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3411 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3412 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3413 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3414 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3415 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3416 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3417 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3418 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3419 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3423 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3424 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3425 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3426 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3427 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3430 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3431 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3435 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3436 force_holding_cell = true;
3439 if force_holding_cell {
3440 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3444 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3445 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3447 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3448 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3453 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3454 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3456 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3458 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3459 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3460 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3461 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3465 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3466 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3467 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3471 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3472 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3475 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3476 // will be retransmitted.
3477 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3478 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3479 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3481 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3482 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3484 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3485 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3486 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3487 // this HTLC accordingly
3488 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3491 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3492 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3493 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3494 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3497 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3498 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3499 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3500 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3501 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3502 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3507 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3509 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3510 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3511 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3512 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3516 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3517 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3518 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3519 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3520 // the update upon reconnection.
3521 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3525 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3527 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3528 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3531 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3532 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3533 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3534 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3535 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3536 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3537 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3539 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3540 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3541 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3542 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3543 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3544 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3545 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3547 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3548 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3549 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3550 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3551 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3552 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3553 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3556 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3557 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3558 /// to the remote side.
3559 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3560 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3561 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3562 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3565 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3567 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3568 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3569 let mut found_blocked = false;
3570 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3571 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3572 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3576 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3577 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3578 // first received the funding_signed.
3579 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3580 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3581 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3583 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3584 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3585 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3586 funding_broadcastable = None;
3589 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3590 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3591 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3592 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3593 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3594 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3595 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3596 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3597 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3598 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3599 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3600 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3601 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3602 next_per_commitment_point,
3603 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3607 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3609 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3610 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3611 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3612 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3613 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3614 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3616 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3617 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3618 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3619 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3620 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3621 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3625 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3626 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3628 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3629 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3630 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3633 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3634 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3635 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3636 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3637 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3638 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3639 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3640 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3641 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3645 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3646 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3648 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3651 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3654 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3655 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3657 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3658 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3659 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3660 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3661 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3662 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3663 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3664 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3665 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3666 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3667 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3669 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3671 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3672 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3673 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3679 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3680 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3681 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3682 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3683 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3684 per_commitment_secret,
3685 next_per_commitment_point,
3687 next_local_nonce: None,
3691 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3692 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3693 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3694 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3695 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3697 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3698 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3699 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3700 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3701 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3702 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3703 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3704 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3705 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3706 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3711 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3712 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3714 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3715 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3716 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3717 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3718 reason: err_packet.clone()
3721 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3722 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3723 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3724 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3725 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3726 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3729 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3730 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3731 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3732 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3733 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3740 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3741 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3742 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3743 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3747 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3748 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3749 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3750 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3751 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3752 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3756 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3757 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3759 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3760 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3761 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3762 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3763 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3764 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3765 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3766 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3769 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3771 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3772 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3773 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3774 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3778 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3779 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3783 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3784 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3785 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3786 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3787 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3788 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3790 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3791 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3792 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3793 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3794 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3797 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3798 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3799 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3800 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3801 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3802 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3803 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3804 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3808 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3809 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3810 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3811 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3813 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3817 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3818 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3819 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3820 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3822 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3823 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3824 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3825 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3826 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3830 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3832 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3833 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3834 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3835 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3836 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3839 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3840 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3841 channel_ready: None,
3842 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3843 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3844 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3848 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3849 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3850 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3851 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3852 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3853 next_per_commitment_point,
3854 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3856 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3857 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3858 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3862 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3863 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3864 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3866 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3867 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3868 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3871 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3874 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3877 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3878 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3879 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3880 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3881 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3882 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3883 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3885 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3887 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3888 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3889 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3890 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3891 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3892 next_per_commitment_point,
3893 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3897 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3898 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3899 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3901 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3904 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3905 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3906 raa: required_revoke,
3907 commitment_update: None,
3908 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3910 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3911 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3912 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3914 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3917 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3918 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3919 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3920 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3921 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3922 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3925 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3926 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3927 raa: required_revoke,
3928 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3929 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3933 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3937 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3938 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3939 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3940 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3942 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3944 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3946 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3947 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3948 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3949 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3950 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3951 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3953 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3954 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3955 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3956 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3957 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3959 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3960 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3961 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3962 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3965 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3966 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3967 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3968 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3969 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3970 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3971 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3972 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3973 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3974 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
3975 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3976 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3977 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3978 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3979 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3981 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3984 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3985 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3988 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3989 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3990 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3991 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3992 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3993 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3994 self.context.channel_state &
3995 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3996 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
3997 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3998 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4001 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4002 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4003 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4004 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4005 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4006 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4009 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4015 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4016 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4017 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4018 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4020 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4021 return Ok((None, None));
4024 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4025 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4026 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4028 return Ok((None, None));
4031 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4033 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4034 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4035 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4036 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4038 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4039 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4040 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4042 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4043 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4044 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4045 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4047 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4048 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4049 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4054 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4055 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4057 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4058 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4061 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4062 /// within our expected timeframe.
4064 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4065 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4066 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4069 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4072 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4073 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4076 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4077 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4078 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4079 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4081 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4084 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4085 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4086 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4087 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4090 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4091 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4095 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4097 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4098 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4101 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4102 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4103 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4106 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4109 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4110 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4111 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4112 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4114 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4117 assert!(send_shutdown);
4118 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4119 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4120 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4122 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4125 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4130 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4132 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4133 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4135 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4136 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4137 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4138 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4139 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4140 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4143 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4144 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4145 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4148 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4149 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4150 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4151 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4155 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4156 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4157 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4158 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4159 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4160 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4162 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4163 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4170 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4171 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4173 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4176 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4177 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4179 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4181 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4182 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4183 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4184 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4185 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4186 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4187 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4188 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4189 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4191 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4192 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4195 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4199 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4200 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4201 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4202 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4204 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4207 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4210 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4213 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4217 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4221 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4222 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4223 return Ok((None, None));
4226 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4227 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4228 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4231 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4233 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4236 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4237 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4238 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4239 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4240 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4244 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4245 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4250 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4251 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4252 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4253 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4254 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4255 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4256 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4260 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4262 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4263 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4264 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4265 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4267 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4270 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4271 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4272 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4274 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4275 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4276 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4277 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4281 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4282 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4283 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4284 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4286 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4287 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4288 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4294 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4295 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4298 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4299 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4301 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4302 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4305 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4306 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4307 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4308 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4309 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4311 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4313 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4315 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4316 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4319 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4320 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4321 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4322 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4323 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4324 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4325 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4326 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4331 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4332 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4333 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4334 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4336 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4340 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4341 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4342 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4343 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4345 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4351 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4352 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4353 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4354 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4355 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4356 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4357 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4359 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4360 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4363 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4365 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4366 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4372 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4373 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4374 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4375 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4376 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4377 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4378 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4380 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4381 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4388 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4389 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4392 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4393 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4396 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4397 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4401 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4402 &self.context.holder_signer
4406 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4408 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4409 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4410 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4411 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4412 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4413 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4415 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4417 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4425 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4426 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4430 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4431 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4432 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4433 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4436 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4437 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4438 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4441 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4442 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4443 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4444 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4445 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4446 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4447 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
4448 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
4454 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
4455 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
4456 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
4457 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
4458 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4459 update, blocked: !release_monitor
4464 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
4465 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
4467 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4468 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4469 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
4470 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
4473 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
4474 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
4477 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4478 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4479 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
4480 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
4486 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4487 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
4490 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
4491 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4492 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
4493 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
4496 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4497 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4498 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4500 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4501 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4502 if self.context.channel_state &
4503 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4504 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4505 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4506 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4507 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4510 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4511 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4512 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4513 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4514 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4515 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4517 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4518 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4519 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4521 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4522 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4523 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4524 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4525 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4526 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4532 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4533 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4534 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4537 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4538 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4539 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4542 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4543 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4544 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4547 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4548 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4549 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4550 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4551 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4552 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4557 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4558 self.context.channel_update_status
4561 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4562 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4563 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4566 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4568 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4569 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4570 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4574 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4575 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4576 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4579 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4583 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4584 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4585 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4587 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4588 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4589 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4591 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4592 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4595 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4596 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4597 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4598 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4599 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4600 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4601 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4602 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4603 self.context.channel_state);
4605 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4609 if need_commitment_update {
4610 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4611 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4612 let next_per_commitment_point =
4613 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4614 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4615 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4616 next_per_commitment_point,
4617 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4621 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4627 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4628 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4629 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4630 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4631 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4632 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4633 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4635 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4638 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4639 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4640 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4641 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4642 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4643 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4644 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4645 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4646 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4647 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4648 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4649 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4650 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4651 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4652 // channel and move on.
4653 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4654 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4656 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4657 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4658 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4660 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4661 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4662 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4663 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4664 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4665 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4666 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4670 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4671 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4672 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4673 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4674 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4678 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4679 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4680 // may have already happened for this block).
4681 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4682 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4683 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4684 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4687 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4688 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4689 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4690 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4698 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4699 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4700 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4701 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4703 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4704 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4707 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4709 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4710 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4711 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4712 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4714 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4717 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4720 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4721 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4722 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4723 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4725 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4728 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4729 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4730 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4732 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4733 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4735 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4736 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4737 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4745 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4747 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4748 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4749 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4751 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4752 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4755 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4756 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4757 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4758 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4759 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4760 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4761 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4762 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4763 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4766 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4767 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4768 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4769 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4771 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4772 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4773 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4775 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4776 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4777 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4778 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4780 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4781 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4782 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4783 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4784 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4785 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4786 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4789 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4790 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4792 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4795 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4796 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4797 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4798 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4799 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4800 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4801 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4802 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4803 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4804 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4805 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4806 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4807 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4808 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4809 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4810 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4811 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4817 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4822 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4823 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4825 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4826 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4827 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4828 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4830 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4833 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4834 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4835 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4836 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4837 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4838 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4840 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4841 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4844 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4845 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4846 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4847 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4849 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4850 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4852 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4853 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4854 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4855 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4856 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4857 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4863 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4864 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4865 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4866 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4868 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4871 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4875 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4879 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4880 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4884 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4888 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4889 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4892 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4896 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4898 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4903 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4905 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4910 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4912 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4913 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4914 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4915 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4916 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4920 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4922 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4923 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4924 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4925 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4926 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4927 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4928 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4930 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4931 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4932 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4933 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4934 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4935 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4936 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4937 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4938 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4939 contents: announcement,
4942 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4946 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4947 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4948 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4949 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4950 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4951 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4952 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4953 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4955 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4957 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4959 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4960 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4962 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4964 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4965 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4968 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4969 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4970 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4971 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4974 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4977 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4978 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4979 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4980 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4981 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4982 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4985 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4987 Err(_) => return None,
4989 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4990 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4995 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4996 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4997 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4998 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4999 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5000 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5001 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5002 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5003 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5004 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5005 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5006 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5007 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5008 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5009 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5010 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5013 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5016 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5017 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5018 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5019 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5020 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5021 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5022 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5023 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5024 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5026 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5027 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5028 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5029 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5030 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5031 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5032 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5033 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5034 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5036 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5037 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5038 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5039 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5040 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5041 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5042 next_funding_txid: None,
5047 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5049 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5050 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5051 /// commitment update.
5053 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5054 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(
5055 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5056 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5057 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5059 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5060 skimmed_fee_msat, logger)
5061 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5063 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5064 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5069 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5070 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5072 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5074 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5075 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5077 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5078 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5079 /// regenerate them.
5081 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5082 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5084 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5085 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(
5086 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5087 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5088 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5089 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5090 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5091 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5093 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5094 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5095 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5098 if amount_msat == 0 {
5099 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5102 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5103 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5104 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5105 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5108 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5109 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5110 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5113 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5114 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5115 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5116 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5117 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5118 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5119 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5120 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5123 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5124 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5125 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5126 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5127 else { "to peer" });
5129 if need_holding_cell {
5130 force_holding_cell = true;
5133 // Now update local state:
5134 if force_holding_cell {
5135 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5140 onion_routing_packet,
5146 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5147 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5149 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5151 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5156 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5157 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5158 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5162 onion_routing_packet,
5165 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5170 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5171 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5172 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5173 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5175 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5176 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5177 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5179 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5180 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5184 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5185 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5186 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5187 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5188 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5189 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5190 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5193 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5194 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5195 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5196 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5197 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5198 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5201 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5203 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5204 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5205 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5207 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5208 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5211 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5212 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5213 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5214 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5215 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5216 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5217 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5218 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5221 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5225 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5226 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5227 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5228 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5230 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5232 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5233 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5234 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5235 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5236 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5237 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5238 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5239 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5240 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5241 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
5242 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5248 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5251 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5252 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5253 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5254 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5255 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5256 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5258 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5259 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5260 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5261 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5264 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5265 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5269 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5270 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5272 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5274 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5275 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5276 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5277 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5279 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5280 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5281 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5282 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5283 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5284 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5288 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5289 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5293 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5294 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5297 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5298 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5300 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5301 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5302 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(
5303 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5304 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, logger: &L
5305 ) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5306 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5307 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, logger);
5308 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5311 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5312 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5313 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5319 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5320 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5323 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5324 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5325 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5326 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5332 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5333 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5335 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5336 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5337 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5338 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5339 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5340 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5341 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5342 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5343 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5346 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5347 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5348 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5350 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5351 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5354 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5355 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5357 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5358 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5359 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5362 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5363 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5364 let mut chan_closed = false;
5365 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5369 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5371 None if !chan_closed => {
5372 // use override shutdown script if provided
5373 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5374 Some(script) => script,
5376 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5377 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5378 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5379 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5383 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5384 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5386 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5392 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5393 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5394 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5395 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5397 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5399 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5401 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5402 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5403 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5404 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5405 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5406 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5409 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5410 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
5411 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
5414 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5415 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5416 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5419 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5420 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5421 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5422 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5423 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5425 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5426 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5433 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5434 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5436 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5439 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5440 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5441 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5443 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5444 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5448 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5452 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5453 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5454 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5457 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5458 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5459 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5460 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5461 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5462 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5463 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5464 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5465 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5467 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5468 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5469 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5470 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5472 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5473 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5475 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5476 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5478 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5479 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5480 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5482 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5483 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5485 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5486 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5487 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5488 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5489 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5492 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5493 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5495 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5497 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5498 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
5499 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5500 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5503 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5504 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5506 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5507 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5508 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5509 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5513 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5514 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5515 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5519 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5520 Ok(script) => script,
5521 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5524 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5527 context: ChannelContext {
5530 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5531 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5532 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5533 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5538 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5540 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5541 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5542 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5543 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5545 channel_value_satoshis,
5547 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5550 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5553 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5554 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5557 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5558 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5559 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5560 pending_update_fee: None,
5561 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5562 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5563 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5564 update_time_counter: 1,
5566 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5568 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5569 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5570 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5571 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5572 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5573 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5575 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5576 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5577 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5578 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5580 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5581 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5582 closing_fee_limits: None,
5583 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5585 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5587 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5588 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5589 short_channel_id: None,
5590 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5592 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5593 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5594 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5595 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5596 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5597 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5598 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5599 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5600 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5601 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5602 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5603 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5605 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5607 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5608 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5609 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5610 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5611 counterparty_parameters: None,
5612 funding_outpoint: None,
5613 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
5614 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
5616 funding_transaction: None,
5618 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5619 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5620 counterparty_node_id,
5622 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5624 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5626 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5627 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5629 announcement_sigs: None,
5631 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5632 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5633 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5634 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5636 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5637 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5639 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5640 outbound_scid_alias,
5642 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5643 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5645 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5646 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5651 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5656 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5657 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5658 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5659 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5660 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5661 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5664 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5665 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5666 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5667 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5668 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5669 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5670 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5671 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5672 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5673 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5674 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5676 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5677 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5679 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5680 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5681 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5682 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5685 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5686 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5688 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5691 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5692 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5693 return Err((self, e));
5697 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5699 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5701 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5702 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5703 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5705 let channel = Channel {
5706 context: self.context,
5709 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5710 temporary_channel_id,
5711 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5712 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5715 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5717 next_local_nonce: None,
5721 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5722 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5723 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5724 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5725 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5726 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5727 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5728 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5729 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5730 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5733 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5734 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5735 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5737 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
5738 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5739 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5740 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5747 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5748 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5749 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5750 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5751 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5752 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5753 // We've exhausted our options
5756 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5757 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5760 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5761 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5762 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5763 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5765 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5766 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5767 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
5768 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
5769 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5770 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5772 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5774 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5777 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5778 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5779 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5781 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5782 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5785 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5786 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5789 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5790 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5794 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5795 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5796 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5797 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5798 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5799 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5800 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5801 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5802 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5803 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5804 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5805 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5806 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5807 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5808 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5809 first_per_commitment_point,
5810 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5811 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5812 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5813 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5815 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5820 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5821 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5823 // Check sanity of message fields:
5824 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5825 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5827 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5830 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5831 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5833 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5834 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5836 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5837 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5839 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5840 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5841 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5843 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5844 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5845 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5847 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5848 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5849 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5851 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5854 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5855 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5858 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5859 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5862 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5865 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5868 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5869 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5871 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5872 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5874 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5875 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5877 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5878 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5881 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5882 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5883 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5885 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5886 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5888 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5889 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5892 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
5895 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5896 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5897 &Some(ref script) => {
5898 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5899 if script.len() == 0 {
5902 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5903 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5905 Some(script.clone())
5908 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5910 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5915 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5916 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5917 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5918 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5919 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5921 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5922 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5924 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5927 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5928 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5929 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5930 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5931 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5932 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5935 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5936 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5937 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5940 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5941 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5943 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5944 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5950 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5951 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5952 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5955 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5956 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5957 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5958 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5959 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5960 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5961 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5962 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5963 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5964 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5965 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5966 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5969 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5971 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5972 // support this channel type.
5973 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5974 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5975 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5978 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5979 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5980 // `static_remote_key`.
5981 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5984 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5985 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5986 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5988 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5989 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5991 channel_type.clone()
5993 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5994 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5999 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6001 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6002 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6003 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6004 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6005 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6006 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6007 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6008 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6009 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6012 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6016 // Check sanity of message fields:
6017 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6018 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6020 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6021 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6023 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6026 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6027 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6030 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6033 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6034 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6036 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6038 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6039 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6042 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6043 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6045 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6046 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6049 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6050 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6053 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6056 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6059 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6060 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6062 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6063 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6065 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6066 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6068 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6072 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6074 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6075 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6080 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6081 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6082 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6083 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6086 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6089 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6090 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6091 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6093 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6094 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6097 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6098 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6099 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6100 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
6101 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6102 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6105 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6106 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6107 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6108 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6112 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6113 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6114 &Some(ref script) => {
6115 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6116 if script.len() == 0 {
6119 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6120 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6122 Some(script.clone())
6125 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6132 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6133 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6134 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6135 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6139 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6140 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6145 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6146 Ok(script) => script,
6147 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6150 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6151 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6154 context: ChannelContext {
6157 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6158 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6160 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6165 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6167 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6168 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6169 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6170 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6173 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6176 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6179 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6180 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6181 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6183 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6184 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6185 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6186 pending_update_fee: None,
6187 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6188 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6189 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6190 update_time_counter: 1,
6192 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6194 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6195 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6196 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6197 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6198 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6199 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6201 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6202 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6203 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6204 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6206 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6207 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6208 closing_fee_limits: None,
6209 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6211 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6213 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6214 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6215 short_channel_id: None,
6216 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6218 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6219 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6220 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6221 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6222 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6223 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6224 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6225 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6226 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6227 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6228 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6229 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6230 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6232 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6234 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6235 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6236 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6237 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6238 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6239 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6240 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6242 funding_outpoint: None,
6243 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
6244 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6246 funding_transaction: None,
6248 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6249 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6250 counterparty_node_id,
6252 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6254 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6256 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6257 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6259 announcement_sigs: None,
6261 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6262 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6263 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6264 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6266 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6267 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6269 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6270 outbound_scid_alias,
6272 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6273 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6275 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6276 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6281 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6288 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6289 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6292 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6293 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6294 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6295 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6298 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6299 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6301 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6302 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6303 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6304 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6306 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6307 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6309 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6310 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6312 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6313 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6316 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6317 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6319 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6322 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6323 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6324 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6326 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6327 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6328 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6329 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6331 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6332 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6333 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6334 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6335 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6336 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6337 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6338 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6339 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6340 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6341 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6342 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6343 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6344 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6345 first_per_commitment_point,
6346 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6347 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6348 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6350 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6352 next_local_nonce: None,
6356 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6357 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6359 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6361 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6362 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6365 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6366 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6368 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6369 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6371 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6372 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6373 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6374 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6375 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6376 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6377 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6378 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6379 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6382 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6383 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6385 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6386 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6387 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6388 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6390 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6391 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6393 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6394 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6397 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6398 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6399 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6401 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6404 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6405 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6407 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6408 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6409 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6411 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6413 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6414 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6416 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6417 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6418 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6419 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6422 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6423 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6424 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6425 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6426 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6428 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6430 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6431 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6432 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6435 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6436 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6437 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6441 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6442 initial_commitment_tx,
6445 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6446 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6449 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6450 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6453 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6455 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6456 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6457 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6458 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6459 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6460 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6461 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6462 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6463 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6464 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6465 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6467 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6469 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6471 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6472 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6473 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6474 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6476 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6478 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6479 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6480 let mut channel = Channel {
6481 context: self.context,
6483 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6484 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6485 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6487 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6491 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6492 }, channel_monitor))
6496 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6497 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6499 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6505 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6506 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6507 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6508 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6509 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6511 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6512 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6513 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6514 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6520 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6521 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6522 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6523 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6524 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6525 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6530 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6531 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6532 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6533 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6535 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6536 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6537 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6538 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6543 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6544 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6545 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6546 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6547 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6548 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6553 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6554 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6555 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6558 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6560 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6561 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6562 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6563 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6564 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6566 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6567 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6568 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6569 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6571 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6572 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6573 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6575 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6577 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6578 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6579 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6580 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6581 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6582 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6584 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6585 // deserialized from that format.
6586 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6587 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6588 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6590 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6592 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6593 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6594 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6596 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6597 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6598 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6599 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6602 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6603 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6604 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6607 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6608 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6609 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6610 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6612 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6613 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6615 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6617 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6619 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6621 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6624 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6626 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6631 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6632 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6634 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6635 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6636 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6637 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6638 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6639 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6640 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6642 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6644 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6646 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6649 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6650 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6651 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6654 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6656 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6657 preimages.push(preimage);
6659 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6660 reason.write(writer)?;
6662 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6664 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6665 preimages.push(preimage);
6667 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6668 reason.write(writer)?;
6671 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6672 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6673 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6675 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6676 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6677 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6681 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6682 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6683 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6685 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6686 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6690 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6691 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6692 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6693 source.write(writer)?;
6694 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6696 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6697 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6698 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6700 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6701 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6703 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6705 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6706 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6708 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6710 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6711 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6716 match self.context.resend_order {
6717 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6718 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6721 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6722 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6723 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6725 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6726 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6727 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6728 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6731 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6732 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6733 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6734 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6735 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6738 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6739 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6740 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6741 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6743 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6744 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6745 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6747 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6749 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6750 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6751 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6752 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6754 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6755 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6756 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6757 // consider the stale state on reload.
6760 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6761 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6762 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6764 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6765 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6766 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6768 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6769 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6771 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6772 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6773 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6775 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6776 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6778 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6781 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6782 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6783 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6785 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6788 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6789 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6791 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6792 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6793 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6795 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6797 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6799 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6801 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6802 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6803 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6804 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6805 htlc.write(writer)?;
6808 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6809 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6810 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6812 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6813 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6815 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6816 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6817 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6818 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6819 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6820 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6821 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6823 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6824 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6825 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6826 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6827 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6829 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6830 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6832 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6833 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6834 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6835 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6837 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6839 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6840 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6841 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6842 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6843 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6844 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6845 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6847 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6848 (2, chan_type, option),
6849 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6850 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6851 (5, self.context.config, required),
6852 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6853 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6854 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6855 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6856 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6857 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6858 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6859 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6860 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6861 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6862 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6863 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6864 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6865 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6866 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6867 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6868 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6869 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6876 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6877 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6879 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6880 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6882 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6883 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6884 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6886 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6887 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6888 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6889 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6891 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6893 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6894 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6896 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6899 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6900 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6903 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6904 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6905 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6907 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 let mut keys_data = None;
6911 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6912 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6913 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6914 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6915 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6916 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6917 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6918 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6919 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6920 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6924 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6925 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6926 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6929 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6931 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6933 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6935 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6938 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6939 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6940 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6941 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6942 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6943 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6944 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6945 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6946 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6947 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6948 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6949 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6954 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6955 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6956 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6957 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6958 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6959 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6960 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6961 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6962 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6963 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6964 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6965 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6967 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6971 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6975 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6976 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6978 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6980 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6984 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6985 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6986 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6987 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6988 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6989 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6990 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6991 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6992 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6993 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6994 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6996 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6997 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6998 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7000 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7001 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7002 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7004 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7008 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7009 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7010 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7011 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7014 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7015 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7018 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7019 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7020 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7021 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7024 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7025 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7026 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7027 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7030 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7036 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7040 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7041 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7042 // consider the stale state on reload.
7043 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7046 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7048 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7053 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7054 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7055 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7057 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7058 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7062 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7063 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7065 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7066 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7068 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7069 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7070 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7072 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7074 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7075 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7077 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7078 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7081 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7083 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7084 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7085 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7086 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7088 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7091 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7092 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7094 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7096 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7097 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7099 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7100 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7102 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7104 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7105 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7106 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7108 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7109 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7110 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7114 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7115 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7116 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7118 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7124 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7125 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7126 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7127 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7128 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7129 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7130 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7131 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7132 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7133 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7135 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7136 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7137 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7138 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7139 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7140 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7141 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7143 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7144 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7145 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7146 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7148 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7150 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7151 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7153 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7154 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7155 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7156 (2, channel_type, option),
7157 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7158 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7159 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7160 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7161 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7162 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7163 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7164 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7165 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7166 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7167 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7168 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7169 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7170 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7171 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7172 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7173 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7174 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7175 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7176 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7177 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7180 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7181 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7182 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7183 // required channel parameters.
7184 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7185 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7186 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7188 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7190 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7191 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7192 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7193 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7196 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7197 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7198 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7200 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7201 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7203 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7204 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7209 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7210 if iter.next().is_some() {
7211 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7215 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7216 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7217 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7218 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7219 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7222 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7223 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7225 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7226 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7227 // separate u64 values.
7228 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7230 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7232 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7233 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7234 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7235 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7237 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7238 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7240 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7241 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7242 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7243 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7244 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7247 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7248 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7252 context: ChannelContext {
7255 config: config.unwrap(),
7259 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7260 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7261 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7264 temporary_channel_id,
7266 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7268 channel_value_satoshis,
7270 latest_monitor_update_id,
7273 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7276 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7277 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7280 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7281 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7282 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7283 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7287 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7288 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7289 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7290 monitor_pending_forwards,
7291 monitor_pending_failures,
7292 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7295 holding_cell_update_fee,
7296 next_holder_htlc_id,
7297 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7298 update_time_counter,
7301 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7302 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7303 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7304 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7306 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7307 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7308 closing_fee_limits: None,
7309 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7311 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7313 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7314 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7316 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7318 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7319 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7320 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7321 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7322 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7323 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7324 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7325 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7326 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7329 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7331 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7332 funding_transaction,
7334 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7335 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7336 counterparty_node_id,
7338 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7342 channel_update_status,
7343 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7347 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7348 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7349 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7350 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7352 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7353 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7355 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7356 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7357 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7359 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7360 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7362 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7363 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7365 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7368 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7377 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7378 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7379 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7380 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7381 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7383 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7384 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7386 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7387 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7388 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7389 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7390 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7391 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7392 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7393 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7394 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7395 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7396 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7397 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7398 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7399 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7400 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7401 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7402 use crate::util::test_utils;
7403 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7404 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7405 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7406 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7407 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7408 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7409 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7410 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7411 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7412 use crate::prelude::*;
7414 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7417 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7418 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7424 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7425 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7426 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7427 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7431 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7432 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7433 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7434 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7435 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7436 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7437 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7441 signer: InMemorySigner,
7444 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7445 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7448 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7449 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7451 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7452 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7455 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7459 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7461 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7462 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7463 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7464 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7465 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7468 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7469 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7470 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7471 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7475 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7476 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7477 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7481 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7482 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7483 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7484 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7486 let seed = [42; 32];
7487 let network = Network::Testnet;
7488 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7489 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7490 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7493 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7494 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7495 let config = UserConfig::default();
7496 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7497 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7498 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7500 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7501 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7505 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7506 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7508 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7509 let original_fee = 253;
7510 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7511 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7512 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7513 let seed = [42; 32];
7514 let network = Network::Testnet;
7515 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7517 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7518 let config = UserConfig::default();
7519 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7521 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7522 // same as the old fee.
7523 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7524 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7525 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7529 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7530 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7531 // dust limits are used.
7532 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7533 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7534 let seed = [42; 32];
7535 let network = Network::Testnet;
7536 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7537 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7538 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7540 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7541 // they have different dust limits.
7543 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7544 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7545 let config = UserConfig::default();
7546 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7548 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7549 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7550 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7551 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7552 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7554 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7555 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7556 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7557 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7558 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7560 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7561 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7562 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7563 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7565 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7566 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7567 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7569 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7570 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7572 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7573 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7574 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7576 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7577 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7578 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7579 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7582 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7584 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7585 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7586 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7587 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7588 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7589 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7590 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7591 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7592 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7594 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7597 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7598 // the dust limit check.
7599 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7600 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7601 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7602 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7604 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7605 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7606 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7607 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7608 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7609 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7610 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7614 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7615 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7616 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7617 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7618 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7619 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7620 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7621 let seed = [42; 32];
7622 let network = Network::Testnet;
7623 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7625 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7626 let config = UserConfig::default();
7627 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7629 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7630 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7632 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7633 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7634 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7635 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7636 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7637 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7639 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7640 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7641 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7642 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7643 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7645 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7647 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7648 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7649 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7650 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7651 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7653 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7654 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7655 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7656 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7657 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7661 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7662 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7663 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7664 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7665 let seed = [42; 32];
7666 let network = Network::Testnet;
7667 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7668 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7669 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7671 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7673 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7674 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7675 let config = UserConfig::default();
7676 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7678 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7679 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7680 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7681 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7683 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7684 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7685 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7687 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7688 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7689 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7690 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7692 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7693 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7694 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7696 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7697 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7699 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7700 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7701 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7702 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7703 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7704 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7705 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7707 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7709 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7710 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7711 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7712 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7713 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7717 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7718 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7719 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7720 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7721 let seed = [42; 32];
7722 let network = Network::Testnet;
7723 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7724 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7725 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7727 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7728 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7729 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7730 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7731 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7732 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7733 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7734 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7736 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7737 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7738 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7739 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7740 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7741 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7743 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7744 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7745 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7746 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7748 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7750 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7751 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7752 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7753 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7754 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7755 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7757 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7758 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7759 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7760 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7762 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7763 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7764 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7765 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7766 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7768 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7769 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7771 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7772 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7773 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7775 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7776 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7777 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7778 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7779 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7781 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7782 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7784 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7785 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7786 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7790 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7792 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7793 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7794 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7796 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7797 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7798 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7799 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7801 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7802 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7803 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7805 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7807 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7808 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7811 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7812 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7813 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7814 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7815 let seed = [42; 32];
7816 let network = Network::Testnet;
7817 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7818 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7819 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7822 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7823 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7824 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7826 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7827 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7829 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7830 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7831 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7833 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7834 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7836 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7838 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7839 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7841 // Channel Negotiations failed
7842 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7843 assert!(result.is_err());
7848 fn channel_update() {
7849 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7850 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7851 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7852 let seed = [42; 32];
7853 let network = Network::Testnet;
7854 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7855 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7856 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7858 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7859 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7860 let config = UserConfig::default();
7861 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7863 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7864 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7865 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7866 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7867 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7869 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7870 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7871 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7872 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7873 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7875 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7876 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7877 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7878 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7880 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7881 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7882 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7884 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7885 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7887 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7888 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7889 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7891 short_channel_id: 0,
7894 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7895 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7896 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7898 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7899 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7901 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7903 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7905 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7906 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7907 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7908 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7910 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7911 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7912 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7914 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7918 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7920 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7921 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7922 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7923 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7924 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7925 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7926 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7927 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7928 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7929 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7930 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7931 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7932 use crate::sync::Arc;
7934 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7935 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7936 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7937 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7939 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7941 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7942 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7943 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7944 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7945 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7947 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7948 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7954 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7955 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7956 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7958 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7959 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7960 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7961 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7962 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7963 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7965 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7967 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7968 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7969 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7970 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7971 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7972 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7974 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7975 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7976 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7977 selected_contest_delay: 144
7979 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7980 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7982 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7983 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7985 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7986 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7988 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7989 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7991 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7992 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7993 // build_commitment_transaction.
7994 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7995 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7996 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7997 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7998 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8000 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8001 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8002 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
8003 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
8007 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8008 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8009 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
8010 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
8014 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8015 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8016 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8018 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8019 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8021 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8022 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8024 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8026 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8027 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8028 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8029 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8030 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8031 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8032 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8034 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8035 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8036 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8037 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8039 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8040 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8041 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8043 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8045 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8046 commitment_tx.clone(),
8047 counterparty_signature,
8048 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8049 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8050 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8052 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8053 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8055 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8056 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8057 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8059 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8060 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8063 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8064 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8066 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8067 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8068 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8069 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8070 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8071 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8072 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8073 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8075 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8078 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8079 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8080 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8084 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8087 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8088 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
8089 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8091 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8092 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8093 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8094 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8095 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8096 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8097 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8098 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8100 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8104 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8105 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8106 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8107 "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", {});
8109 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8110 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8112 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8113 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8114 "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", {});
8116 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8117 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8118 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8119 "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", {});
8121 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8122 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8124 amount_msat: 1000000,
8126 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8127 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8129 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8132 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8133 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8135 amount_msat: 2000000,
8137 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8138 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8140 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8143 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8144 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8146 amount_msat: 2000000,
8148 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8149 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8150 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8151 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8153 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8156 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8157 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8159 amount_msat: 3000000,
8161 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8162 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8163 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8164 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8166 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8169 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8170 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8172 amount_msat: 4000000,
8174 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8175 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8177 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8181 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8182 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8183 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8185 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8186 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8187 "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", {
8190 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8191 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8192 "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" },
8195 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8196 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8197 "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" },
8200 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8201 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8202 "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" },
8205 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8206 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8207 "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" },
8210 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8211 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8212 "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" }
8215 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8216 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8217 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8219 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8220 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8221 "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", {
8224 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8225 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8226 "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" },
8229 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8230 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8231 "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" },
8234 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8235 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8236 "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" },
8239 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8240 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8241 "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" },
8244 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8245 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8246 "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" }
8249 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8250 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8251 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8253 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8254 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8255 "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", {
8258 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8259 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8260 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10000000000000000000123060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e00148304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8263 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8264 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8265 "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" },
8268 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8269 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8270 "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" },
8273 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8274 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8275 "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" }
8278 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8279 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8280 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8281 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8283 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8284 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8285 "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", {
8288 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8289 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8290 "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" },
8293 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8294 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8295 "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" },
8298 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8299 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8300 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320004000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c18347304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8303 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8304 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8305 "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" }
8308 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8309 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8310 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8311 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8313 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8314 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8315 "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", {
8318 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8319 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8320 "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" },
8323 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8324 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8325 "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" },
8328 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8329 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8330 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e001473044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c1801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8333 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8334 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8335 "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" }
8338 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8339 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8340 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8342 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8343 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8344 "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", {
8347 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8348 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8349 "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" },
8352 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8353 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8354 "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" },
8357 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8358 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8359 "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" }
8362 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8363 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8364 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8366 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8367 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8368 "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", {
8371 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8372 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8373 "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" },
8376 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8377 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8378 "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" },
8381 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8382 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8383 "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" }
8386 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8387 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8388 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8390 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8391 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8392 "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", {
8395 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8396 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8397 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8400 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8401 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8402 "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" }
8405 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8406 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8407 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8408 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8410 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8411 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8412 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8415 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8416 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8417 "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" },
8420 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8421 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8422 "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" }
8425 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8426 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8427 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8428 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8430 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8431 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8432 "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", {
8435 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8436 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8437 "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" },
8440 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8441 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8442 "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" }
8445 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8446 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8447 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8449 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8450 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8451 "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", {
8454 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8455 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8456 "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" }
8459 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8460 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8461 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8462 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8464 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8465 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8466 "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", {
8469 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8470 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8471 "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" }
8474 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8475 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8476 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8477 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8479 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8480 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8481 "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", {
8484 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8485 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8486 "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" }
8489 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8490 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8491 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8492 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8494 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8495 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8496 "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", {});
8498 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8499 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8500 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8501 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8503 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8504 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8505 "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", {});
8507 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8508 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8509 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8510 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8512 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8513 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8514 "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", {});
8516 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8517 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8518 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8520 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8521 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8522 "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", {});
8524 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8525 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8526 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8527 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8529 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8530 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8531 "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", {});
8533 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8534 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8535 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8536 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8538 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8539 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8540 "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", {});
8542 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8543 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8544 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8545 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8546 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8547 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8549 amount_msat: 2000000,
8551 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8552 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8554 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8557 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8558 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8559 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8561 amount_msat: 5000001,
8563 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8564 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8565 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8566 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8568 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8571 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8572 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8574 amount_msat: 5000000,
8576 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8577 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8578 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8579 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8581 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8585 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8586 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8587 "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", {
8590 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8591 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8592 "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" },
8594 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8595 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8596 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8598 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8599 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8600 "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" }
8603 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8604 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8605 "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", {
8608 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8609 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8610 "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" },
8612 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8613 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8614 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
8616 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8617 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8618 "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" }
8623 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8624 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8626 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8627 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8628 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8629 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8631 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8632 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8633 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8635 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8636 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8638 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8639 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8641 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8642 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8643 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8647 fn test_key_derivation() {
8648 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8649 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8651 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8652 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8654 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8655 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8657 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8658 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8660 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8661 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8663 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8664 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8666 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8667 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8669 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8670 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8674 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8675 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8676 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8677 let seed = [42; 32];
8678 let network = Network::Testnet;
8679 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8680 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8682 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8683 let config = UserConfig::default();
8684 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8685 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8687 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8688 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8690 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8691 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8692 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8693 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8694 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8695 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8696 assert!(res.is_ok());
8701 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8702 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8703 // resulting `channel_type`.
8704 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8705 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8706 let network = Network::Testnet;
8707 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8708 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8710 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8711 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8713 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8714 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8716 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8717 // need to signal it.
8718 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8719 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8720 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8723 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8725 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8726 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8727 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8729 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8730 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8731 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8734 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8735 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8736 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8737 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8738 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8741 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8742 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8747 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8748 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8749 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8750 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8751 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8752 let network = Network::Testnet;
8753 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8754 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8756 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8757 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8759 let config = UserConfig::default();
8761 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8762 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8763 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8764 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8765 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8767 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8768 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8769 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8772 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8773 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8774 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8776 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8777 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8778 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8779 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8780 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8781 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8783 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8788 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8789 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8791 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8792 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8793 let network = Network::Testnet;
8794 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8795 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8797 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8798 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8800 let config = UserConfig::default();
8802 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8803 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8804 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8805 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8806 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8807 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8808 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8809 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8811 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8812 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8813 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8814 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8815 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8816 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8819 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8820 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8822 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8823 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8824 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8825 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8827 assert!(res.is_err());
8829 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8830 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8831 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8833 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8834 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8835 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8838 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8840 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8841 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8842 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8843 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8846 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8847 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8849 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8850 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8852 assert!(res.is_err());