1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
537 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
538 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
539 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
540 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
541 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
542 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
543 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
546 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
548 /// Contains a tuple with the following:
549 /// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
550 /// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's
551 /// counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
552 /// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction.
553 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
554 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
555 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
559 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
560 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
561 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
562 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
563 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
564 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
565 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
566 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
567 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
568 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
569 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
570 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
571 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
572 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
573 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
575 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
576 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
577 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
578 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
580 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
581 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
582 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
583 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
585 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
586 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
587 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
588 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
589 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
591 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
592 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
593 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
594 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
596 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
597 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
598 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
600 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
601 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
602 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
603 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
604 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
606 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
607 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
610 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
611 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
613 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
614 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
615 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
616 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
618 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
619 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
621 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
622 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
625 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
626 (0, update, required),
629 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
630 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
631 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
632 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
633 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
637 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
638 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
639 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
641 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
643 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
644 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
645 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
649 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
651 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
658 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
659 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
660 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
661 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
662 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
664 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
665 /// in a timely manner.
666 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
669 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
670 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
671 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
673 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
674 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
675 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
676 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
680 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
681 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
682 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
684 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
685 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
686 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
687 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
689 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
693 /// The current channel ID.
694 channel_id: ChannelId,
695 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
696 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
697 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
700 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
701 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
703 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
704 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
705 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
707 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
708 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
709 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
710 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
712 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
713 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
715 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
717 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
718 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
719 destination_script: Script,
721 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
722 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
723 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
725 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
726 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
727 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
728 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
729 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
730 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
732 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
733 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
734 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
735 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
736 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
737 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
739 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
741 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
742 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
743 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
745 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
746 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
747 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
748 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
749 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
750 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
751 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
753 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
755 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
756 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
757 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
758 // HTLCs with similar state.
759 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
760 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
761 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
762 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
763 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
764 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
765 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
766 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
767 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
770 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
771 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
772 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
774 update_time_counter: u32,
776 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
777 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
778 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
779 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
780 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
781 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
783 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
784 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
786 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
787 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
788 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
789 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
791 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
792 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
794 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
796 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
798 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
799 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
800 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
801 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
802 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
803 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
804 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
805 channel_creation_height: u32,
807 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
810 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
812 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
815 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
817 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
820 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
822 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
824 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
825 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
828 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
830 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
832 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
833 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
835 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
837 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
838 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
839 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
841 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
843 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
844 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
845 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
847 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
848 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
849 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
851 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
853 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
855 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
856 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
857 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
858 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
860 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
861 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
862 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
864 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
865 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
866 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
868 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
869 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
870 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
871 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
872 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
873 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
874 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
875 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
877 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
878 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
879 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
880 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
881 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
883 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
884 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
886 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
887 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
888 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
889 /// unblock the state machine.
891 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
892 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
893 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
895 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
896 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
897 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
900 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
901 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
902 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
903 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
904 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
905 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
906 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
908 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
909 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
911 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
912 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
913 // the channel's funding UTXO.
915 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
916 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
917 // associated channel mapping.
919 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
920 // to store all of them.
921 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
923 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
924 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
925 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
926 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
927 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
929 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
930 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
932 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
933 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
935 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
936 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
937 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
939 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
940 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
941 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
944 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
945 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
946 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
947 self.update_time_counter
950 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
951 self.latest_monitor_update_id
954 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
955 self.config.announced_channel
958 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
959 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
962 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
963 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
964 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
965 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
968 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
969 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
970 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
973 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
974 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
975 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
976 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
977 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
980 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
981 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
982 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
983 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
985 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
986 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
988 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
989 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
991 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
992 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
994 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
997 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
998 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
999 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1000 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1001 self.channel_state &
1002 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1003 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1004 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1005 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1008 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1009 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1010 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1011 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1012 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1015 // Public utilities:
1017 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1021 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1023 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1024 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1025 self.temporary_channel_id
1028 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1032 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1033 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1034 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1038 /// Gets the channel's type
1039 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1043 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1045 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1046 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.short_channel_id
1050 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1051 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1052 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1055 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1056 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1057 self.outbound_scid_alias
1060 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1061 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1062 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1063 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1064 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1065 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1068 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1069 /// get_funding_created.
1070 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1071 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1074 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1075 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1076 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1079 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1080 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1081 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1082 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1086 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1089 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1090 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1093 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1094 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1097 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1098 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1099 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1102 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1103 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1106 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1107 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1108 self.counterparty_node_id
1111 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1112 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1113 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1117 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1118 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1121 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1122 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1124 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1125 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1126 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1127 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1129 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1133 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1134 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1135 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1138 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1139 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1140 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1143 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1144 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1145 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1147 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1148 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1153 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1154 self.channel_value_satoshis
1157 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1158 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1161 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1162 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1165 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1166 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1167 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1169 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1170 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1171 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1172 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
1173 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1175 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1179 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1180 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1181 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1184 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1185 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1186 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1189 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1190 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1191 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1194 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1195 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1196 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1199 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1200 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1201 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1204 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1205 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1206 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1209 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1210 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1211 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1212 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1213 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1216 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1218 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1219 self.prev_config = None;
1223 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1224 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1228 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1229 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1230 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1231 let did_channel_update =
1232 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1233 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1234 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1235 if did_channel_update {
1236 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1237 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1238 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1239 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1241 self.config.options = *config;
1245 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1246 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1247 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1248 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1249 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1252 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1253 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1254 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1255 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1256 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1258 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1259 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1260 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1261 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1262 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1263 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1264 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1266 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1267 where L::Target: Logger
1269 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1270 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1271 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1273 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1274 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1275 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1276 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1278 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1279 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1280 if match update_state {
1281 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1282 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1283 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1284 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1285 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1287 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1291 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1292 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1293 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1295 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1297 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1298 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1299 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1301 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1302 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1303 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1304 transaction_output_index: None
1309 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1310 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1311 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1312 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1313 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1316 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1318 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1319 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1320 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1322 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1323 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1326 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1327 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1330 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1332 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1333 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1334 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1337 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1343 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1344 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1345 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1346 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1347 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1348 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1349 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1353 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1354 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1356 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1358 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1359 if generated_by_local {
1360 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1361 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1370 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1372 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1373 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1374 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1375 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1376 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1377 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1378 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1381 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1382 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1384 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1388 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1389 preimages.push(preimage);
1393 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1394 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1396 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1398 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1399 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1401 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1402 if !generated_by_local {
1403 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1411 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1412 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1413 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1414 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1415 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1416 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1417 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1418 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1420 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1422 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1423 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1424 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1425 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1427 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1429 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1430 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1431 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1432 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1435 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1436 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1437 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1438 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1440 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1443 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1444 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1445 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1446 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1448 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1451 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1452 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1457 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1458 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1463 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1465 let channel_parameters =
1466 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1467 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1468 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1475 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1478 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1479 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1480 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1481 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1483 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1484 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1485 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1493 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1494 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1500 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1501 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1502 /// our counterparty!)
1503 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1504 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1505 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1506 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1507 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1508 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1509 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1511 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1515 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1516 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1517 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1518 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1519 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1520 //may see payments to it!
1521 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1522 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1523 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1525 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1528 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1529 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1530 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1531 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1532 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1535 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1536 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1539 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1543 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1544 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1545 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1546 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1547 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1548 // which are near the dust limit.
1549 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1550 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1551 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1552 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1553 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1555 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1556 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1558 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1561 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1562 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1563 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1566 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1567 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1569 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1570 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1571 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1572 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1573 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1574 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1575 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1578 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1581 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1582 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1583 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1585 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1586 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1587 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1588 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1589 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1590 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1592 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1593 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1599 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1600 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1602 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1603 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1604 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1605 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1606 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1607 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1608 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1611 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1614 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1615 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1616 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1618 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1619 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1620 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1621 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1622 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1623 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1625 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1626 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1630 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1631 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1632 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1633 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1634 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1635 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1636 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1638 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1639 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1641 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1648 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1649 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1650 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1651 /// corner case properly.
1652 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1653 -> AvailableBalances
1654 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1656 let context = &self;
1657 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1658 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1659 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1661 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1662 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1663 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1664 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1667 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1669 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1670 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1672 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1674 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1676 if context.is_outbound() {
1677 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1678 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1680 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1681 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1683 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1684 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1685 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1686 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1689 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1690 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1691 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1692 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1694 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1695 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1696 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1697 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1698 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1699 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1700 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1701 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1702 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1703 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1705 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1708 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1709 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1710 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1711 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1712 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1715 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1716 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1718 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1719 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1720 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1722 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1723 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1724 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1725 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1729 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1731 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1732 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1733 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1734 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1735 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1736 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1737 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1739 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1740 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1742 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1743 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1744 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1746 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1747 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1748 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1749 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1750 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1753 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1754 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1755 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1756 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1757 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1758 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1761 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1762 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1763 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1765 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1769 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1770 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1772 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1773 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1777 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1778 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1779 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1780 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1782 outbound_capacity_msat,
1783 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1784 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1789 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1790 let context = &self;
1791 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1794 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1795 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1797 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1798 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1800 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1801 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1803 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1804 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1805 let context = &self;
1806 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1808 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1811 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1812 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1814 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1815 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1817 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1818 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1820 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1821 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1825 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1826 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1832 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1833 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1834 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1837 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1838 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1839 included_htlcs += 1;
1842 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1843 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1847 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1848 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1849 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1850 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1851 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1852 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1857 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1859 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1860 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1865 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1866 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1870 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1871 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1872 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1875 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1876 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1878 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1879 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1880 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1882 total_pending_htlcs,
1883 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1884 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1885 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1887 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1888 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1889 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1891 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1893 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1898 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1899 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1901 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1902 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1904 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1905 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1907 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1908 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1909 let context = &self;
1910 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1912 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1915 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1916 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1918 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1919 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1921 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1922 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1924 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1925 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1929 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1930 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1936 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1937 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1938 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1939 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1940 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1941 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1944 included_htlcs += 1;
1947 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1948 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1951 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1952 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1954 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1955 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1956 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1961 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1962 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1963 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1966 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1967 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1969 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1970 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1972 total_pending_htlcs,
1973 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1974 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1975 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1977 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1978 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1979 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1981 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1983 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1988 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
1989 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
1990 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
1991 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
1998 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2000 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2001 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2004 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2006 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2007 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2008 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2012 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2013 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2014 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2017 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2019 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2020 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2023 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2024 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2025 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2026 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2027 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2028 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2029 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2030 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2031 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2032 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2033 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2035 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2036 // return them to fail the payment.
2037 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2038 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2039 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2041 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2042 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2047 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2048 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2049 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2050 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2051 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2052 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2053 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2054 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2055 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2056 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2057 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2058 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2059 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2063 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2065 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2066 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2067 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)
2071 // Internal utility functions for channels
2073 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2074 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2075 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2077 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2079 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2080 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2081 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2083 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2086 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2088 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2091 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2092 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2093 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2095 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2097 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2098 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2099 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2100 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2101 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2104 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2105 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2106 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2107 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2108 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2109 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2110 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2113 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2114 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2116 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2117 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2120 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2121 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2122 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2123 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2124 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2125 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2128 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2129 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2130 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2131 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2134 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2135 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2137 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2138 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2139 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2143 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2144 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2145 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2147 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2148 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2149 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2150 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2152 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2153 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2154 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2155 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2156 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2157 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2158 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2160 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2161 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2166 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2167 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2169 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2171 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2172 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2173 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2174 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2176 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2177 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2187 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2188 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2189 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2190 // outside of those situations will fail.
2191 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2195 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2200 1 + // script length (0)
2204 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2205 2 + // witness marker and flag
2206 1 + // witness element count
2207 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2208 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2209 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2210 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2211 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2212 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2214 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2215 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2216 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2222 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2223 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2224 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2225 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2227 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2228 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2229 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2231 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2232 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2233 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2234 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2235 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2236 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2239 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2240 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2243 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2244 value_to_holder = 0;
2247 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2248 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2249 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2250 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2252 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2253 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2256 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2257 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2260 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2263 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2264 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2266 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2268 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2269 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2270 where L::Target: Logger {
2271 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2272 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2273 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2274 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2275 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2276 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2277 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2278 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2282 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2283 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2284 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2285 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2287 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2288 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2290 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2292 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2293 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2294 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2296 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2297 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2298 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2299 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2300 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2301 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2302 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2304 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2305 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2306 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2308 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2309 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2311 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2314 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2315 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2319 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2323 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2324 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2325 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2326 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2327 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2328 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2331 // Now update local state:
2333 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2334 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2335 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2336 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2337 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2338 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2339 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2343 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2344 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2345 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2346 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2347 // do not not get into this branch.
2348 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2349 match pending_update {
2350 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2351 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2352 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2353 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2354 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2355 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2356 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2359 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2360 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2361 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2362 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2363 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2364 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2365 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2371 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2372 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2373 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2375 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2376 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2377 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2379 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2380 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2383 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2384 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2386 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2387 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2389 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2390 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2393 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2396 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2397 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2398 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2399 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2404 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2405 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2406 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2407 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2408 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2409 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2410 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2411 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2412 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2413 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2414 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2415 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2416 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2417 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2418 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2420 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2421 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2422 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2423 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2424 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2427 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2428 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2429 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2435 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2436 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2438 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2442 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2443 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2444 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2445 /// before we fail backwards.
2447 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2448 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2449 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2450 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2451 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2452 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2453 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2456 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2457 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2458 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2459 /// before we fail backwards.
2461 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2462 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2463 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2464 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2465 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2466 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2467 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2469 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2471 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2472 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2473 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2475 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2476 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2477 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2479 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2480 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2481 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2483 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2488 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2489 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2495 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2496 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2497 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2498 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2499 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2503 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2504 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2505 force_holding_cell = true;
2508 // Now update local state:
2509 if force_holding_cell {
2510 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2511 match pending_update {
2512 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2513 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2514 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2515 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2519 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2520 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2521 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2522 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2528 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2529 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2530 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2536 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2538 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2539 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2542 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2543 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2544 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2549 // Message handlers:
2551 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2552 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2553 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2554 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2555 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2559 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2562 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2565 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2566 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2567 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2568 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2571 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2573 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2574 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2575 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2576 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2578 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2579 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2581 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2582 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2584 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2585 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2586 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2587 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2588 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2593 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2594 initial_commitment_tx,
2597 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2598 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2601 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2602 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2605 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2606 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2607 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2608 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2609 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2610 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2611 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2612 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2613 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2614 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2615 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2616 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2618 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2620 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2621 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2622 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2623 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2624 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2625 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2626 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2628 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2629 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2630 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2632 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2634 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2635 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2637 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2639 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2640 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2644 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2645 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2646 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2647 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2648 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2649 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2650 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2653 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2654 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2656 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2657 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2658 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2659 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2661 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2664 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2665 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2666 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2669 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2670 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2671 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2672 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2673 // when routing outbound payments.
2674 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2678 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2680 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2681 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2683 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2684 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2686 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2687 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2688 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2689 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2690 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2691 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2692 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2693 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2694 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2696 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2697 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2698 let expected_point =
2699 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2700 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2702 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2703 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2704 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2705 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2706 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2707 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2709 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2710 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2711 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2712 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2713 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2715 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2720 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2723 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2724 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2726 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2728 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2731 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2732 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2733 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2734 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2735 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2736 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2738 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2739 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2740 if local_sent_shutdown {
2741 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2743 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2744 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2745 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2746 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2748 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2751 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2754 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2755 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2757 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2761 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2762 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2763 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2764 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2766 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2767 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2769 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2770 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2771 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2772 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2773 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2774 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2775 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2776 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2777 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2778 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2779 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2781 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2782 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2783 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2784 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2785 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2786 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2790 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2791 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2794 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2795 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2796 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2798 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2799 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2800 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2801 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2802 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2803 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2804 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2808 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2809 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2810 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2811 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2812 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2813 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2814 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2818 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2819 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2820 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2821 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2822 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2826 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2827 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2828 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2829 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2830 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2832 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2836 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2840 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2841 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2842 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2843 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2844 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2845 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2846 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2847 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2848 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2849 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2850 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2851 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2852 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2853 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2854 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2855 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2858 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2859 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2860 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2861 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2865 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2868 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2872 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2873 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2874 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2878 // Now update local state:
2879 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2880 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2881 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2882 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2883 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2884 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2885 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2890 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2892 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2893 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2894 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2895 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2896 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2897 None => fail_reason.into(),
2898 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2899 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2900 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2901 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2903 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2907 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2908 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2909 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2910 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2912 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2918 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2921 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2922 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2925 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2929 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2932 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2933 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2934 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2936 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2940 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2944 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2945 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2948 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2952 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2956 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2957 where L::Target: Logger
2959 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2960 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2962 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2963 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2965 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2969 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2971 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2973 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2974 let commitment_txid = {
2975 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2976 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2977 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2979 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2980 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2981 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2982 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2983 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2988 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2990 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2991 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2992 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2993 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2996 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2997 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2998 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3002 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3004 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3005 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3006 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3007 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3008 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3009 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3010 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3011 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3012 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3013 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3014 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3020 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3021 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3024 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3025 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3026 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3027 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3028 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3029 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3030 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3031 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3032 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3033 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3034 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3035 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3036 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3039 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3040 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3041 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3042 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3043 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3044 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3045 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3047 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3048 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3049 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3050 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3051 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3052 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3053 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3056 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3057 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3060 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3062 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3063 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3064 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3067 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3070 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3071 commitment_stats.tx,
3073 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3074 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3075 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3078 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3079 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3081 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3082 let mut need_commitment = false;
3083 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3084 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3085 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3086 need_commitment = true;
3090 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3091 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3092 Some(forward_info.clone())
3094 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3095 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3096 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3097 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3098 need_commitment = true;
3101 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3102 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3103 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3104 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3105 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3106 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3107 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3108 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3109 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3110 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3111 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3112 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3113 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3114 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3116 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3118 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3119 need_commitment = true;
3123 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3124 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3125 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3126 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3127 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3128 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3130 nondust_htlc_sources,
3134 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3135 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3136 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3137 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3139 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3140 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3141 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3142 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3143 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3144 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3145 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3146 // includes the right HTLCs.
3147 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3148 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3149 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3150 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3151 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3152 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3154 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3155 &self.context.channel_id);
3156 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3159 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3160 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3161 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3162 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3163 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3164 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3165 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3166 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3167 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3171 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3172 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3173 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3174 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3177 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3178 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3179 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3180 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3181 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3182 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3183 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3185 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3186 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3187 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3188 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3191 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3192 /// for our counterparty.
3193 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3194 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3195 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3196 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3198 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3199 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3200 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3201 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3203 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3204 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3205 updates: Vec::new(),
3208 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3209 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3210 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3211 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3212 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3213 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3214 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3215 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3216 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3217 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3218 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3219 // to rebalance channels.
3220 match &htlc_update {
3221 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3222 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3223 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3225 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3226 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3228 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3231 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3232 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3233 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3234 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3235 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3236 // into the holding cell without ever being
3237 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3238 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3239 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3242 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3248 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3249 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3250 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3251 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3252 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3253 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3254 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3255 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3256 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3257 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3258 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3259 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3261 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3262 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3263 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3264 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3265 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3266 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3267 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3268 // for a full revocation before failing.
3269 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3270 update_fail_count += 1;
3273 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3275 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3282 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3283 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3285 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3286 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3291 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3292 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3293 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3294 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3295 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3297 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3298 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3299 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3301 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3302 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3308 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3309 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3310 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3311 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3312 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3313 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3314 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3315 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3316 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3318 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3319 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3321 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3324 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3328 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3330 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3331 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3336 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3337 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3338 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3339 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3340 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3341 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3342 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3343 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3347 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3349 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3350 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3353 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3354 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3355 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3356 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3358 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3362 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3363 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3364 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3365 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3366 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3367 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3368 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3369 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3373 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3374 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3375 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3376 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3377 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3378 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3379 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3380 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3381 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3383 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3384 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3387 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3388 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3389 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3390 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3391 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3392 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3393 let mut require_commitment = false;
3394 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3397 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3398 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3399 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3401 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3402 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3403 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3404 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3405 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3406 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3411 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3412 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3413 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3414 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3415 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3417 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3418 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3419 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3424 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3425 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3427 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3431 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3432 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3434 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3435 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3436 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3437 require_commitment = true;
3438 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3439 match forward_info {
3440 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3441 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3442 require_commitment = true;
3444 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3445 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3446 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3448 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3449 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3450 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3454 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3455 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3456 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3457 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3463 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3464 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3465 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3466 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3468 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3469 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3470 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3471 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3472 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3473 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3474 require_commitment = true;
3478 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3480 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3481 match update_state {
3482 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3483 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3484 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3485 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3486 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3488 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3489 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3490 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3491 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3492 require_commitment = true;
3493 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3494 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3499 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3500 let release_state_str =
3501 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3502 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3503 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3504 if !release_monitor {
3505 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3506 update: monitor_update,
3508 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3510 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3515 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3516 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3517 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3518 if require_commitment {
3519 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3520 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3521 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3522 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3523 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3524 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3525 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3526 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3527 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3529 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3530 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3531 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3532 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3533 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3536 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3537 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3538 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3539 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3540 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3541 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3543 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3544 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3546 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3547 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3549 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3550 if require_commitment {
3551 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3553 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3554 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3555 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3556 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3558 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3559 &self.context.channel_id(),
3560 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3563 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3564 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3566 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3567 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3569 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3570 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3576 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3577 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3578 /// commitment update.
3579 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3580 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3581 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3583 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3584 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3587 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3588 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3589 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3590 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3592 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3593 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3594 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3595 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3596 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3597 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3598 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3600 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3601 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3603 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3604 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3606 if !self.context.is_live() {
3607 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3610 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3611 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3612 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3613 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3614 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3615 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3616 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3617 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3618 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3619 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3623 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3624 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3625 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3626 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3627 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3628 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3631 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3632 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3636 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3637 force_holding_cell = true;
3640 if force_holding_cell {
3641 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3645 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3646 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3648 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3649 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3654 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3655 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3657 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3659 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3660 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3661 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3662 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3666 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3667 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3668 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3672 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3673 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3676 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3677 // will be retransmitted.
3678 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3679 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3680 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3682 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3683 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3685 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3686 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3687 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3688 // this HTLC accordingly
3689 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3692 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3693 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3694 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3695 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3698 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3699 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3700 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3701 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3702 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3703 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3708 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3710 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3711 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3712 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3713 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3717 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3718 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3719 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3720 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3721 // the update upon reconnection.
3722 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3726 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3728 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3729 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3733 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3734 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3735 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3736 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3737 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3738 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3739 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3741 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3742 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3743 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3744 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3745 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3746 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3747 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3749 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3750 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3751 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3752 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3753 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3754 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3755 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3758 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3759 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3760 /// to the remote side.
3761 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3762 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3763 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3764 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3767 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3769 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3770 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3772 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3773 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3774 // first received the funding_signed.
3775 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3776 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3777 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3779 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3780 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3781 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3782 funding_broadcastable = None;
3785 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3786 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3787 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3788 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3789 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3790 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3791 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3792 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3793 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3794 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3795 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3796 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3797 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3798 next_per_commitment_point,
3799 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3803 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3805 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3806 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3807 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3808 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3809 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3810 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3812 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3813 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3814 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3815 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3816 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3817 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3821 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3822 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3824 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3825 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3826 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3829 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3830 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3831 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3832 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3833 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3834 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3835 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3836 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3837 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3841 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3842 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3844 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3845 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3847 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3850 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3851 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3853 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3854 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3855 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3856 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3857 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3858 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3859 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3860 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3861 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3862 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3863 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3864 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3866 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3868 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3869 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3870 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3876 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3877 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3878 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3879 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3880 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3881 per_commitment_secret,
3882 next_per_commitment_point,
3884 next_local_nonce: None,
3888 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3889 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3890 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3891 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3892 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3894 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3895 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3896 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3897 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3898 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3899 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3900 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3901 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3902 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3903 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3908 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3909 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3911 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3912 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3913 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3914 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3915 reason: err_packet.clone()
3918 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3919 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3920 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3921 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3922 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3923 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3926 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3927 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3928 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3929 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3930 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3937 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3938 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3939 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3940 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3944 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3945 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3946 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3947 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3948 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3949 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3953 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3954 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3955 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3956 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3957 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3958 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3959 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3964 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3965 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3967 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3968 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3969 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3970 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3971 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3972 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3973 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3974 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3977 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3979 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3980 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3981 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3982 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3983 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3986 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3987 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3988 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
3991 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3992 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3993 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3994 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3995 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3996 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3998 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3999 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4000 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4001 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4002 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4005 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4006 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4007 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4008 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4009 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4010 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4011 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4012 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4016 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4017 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4018 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4019 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4021 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4025 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4026 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4027 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4028 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4030 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4032 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4034 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4035 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4036 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4037 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4038 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4041 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4042 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4043 channel_ready: None,
4044 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4045 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4046 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4050 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4051 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4052 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4053 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4054 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4055 next_per_commitment_point,
4056 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4058 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4059 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4060 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4064 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4065 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4066 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4068 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4069 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4070 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4073 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4079 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4080 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4081 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4082 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4083 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4084 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4085 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4087 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4089 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4090 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4091 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4092 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4093 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4094 next_per_commitment_point,
4095 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4099 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4100 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4101 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4103 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4106 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4107 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4108 raa: required_revoke,
4109 commitment_update: None,
4110 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4112 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4113 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4114 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4116 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4119 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4120 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4121 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4122 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4123 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4124 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4127 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4128 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4129 raa: required_revoke,
4130 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4131 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4135 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4139 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4140 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4141 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4142 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4144 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4146 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4148 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4149 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4150 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4151 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4152 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4153 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4154 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4155 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4157 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4158 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4159 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4160 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4161 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4163 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4164 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4165 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4166 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4169 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4170 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4171 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4172 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4173 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4174 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4175 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4176 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4177 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4178 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4179 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4180 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4181 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4182 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4183 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4185 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4188 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4189 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4192 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4193 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4194 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4195 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4196 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4197 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4200 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4201 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4202 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4203 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4204 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4205 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4208 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4214 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4215 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4216 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4217 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4219 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4220 return Ok((None, None));
4223 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4224 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4225 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4227 return Ok((None, None));
4230 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4232 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4233 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4234 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4235 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4237 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4238 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4240 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4241 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4243 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4244 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4245 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4246 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4248 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4249 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4250 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4257 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4258 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4260 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4261 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4264 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4265 /// within our expected timeframe.
4267 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4268 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4269 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4272 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4275 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4276 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4280 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4281 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4283 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4286 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4287 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4288 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4289 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4292 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4293 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4297 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4299 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4300 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4303 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4304 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4305 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4308 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4311 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4312 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4313 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4314 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4316 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4319 assert!(send_shutdown);
4320 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4321 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4322 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4324 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4327 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4332 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4334 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4335 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4337 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4338 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4339 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4340 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4341 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4342 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4345 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4346 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4348 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4349 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4350 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4351 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4355 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4356 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4357 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4358 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4359 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4360 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4362 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4363 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4370 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4371 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4373 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4376 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4377 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4379 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4381 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4382 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4383 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4384 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4385 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4386 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4387 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4388 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4389 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4391 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4392 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4395 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4399 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4400 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4401 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4402 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4404 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4407 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4410 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4413 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4417 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4421 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4422 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4423 return Ok((None, None));
4426 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4427 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4428 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4431 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4433 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4436 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4437 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4438 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4439 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4440 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4444 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4445 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4446 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4450 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4451 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4452 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4453 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4454 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4455 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4456 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4460 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4462 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4463 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4464 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4465 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4467 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4470 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4471 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4473 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4474 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4476 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4477 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4478 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4479 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4483 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4484 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4485 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4486 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4488 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4489 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4490 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4498 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4499 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4502 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4503 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4505 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4506 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4509 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4510 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4511 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4512 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4513 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4515 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4516 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4517 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4519 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4520 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4523 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4524 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4525 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4526 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4527 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4528 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4529 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4530 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4532 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4535 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4536 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4537 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4538 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4540 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4544 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4545 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4546 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4547 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4549 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4555 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4556 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4557 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4558 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4559 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4560 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4561 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4563 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4564 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4567 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4569 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4570 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4576 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4577 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4578 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4579 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4580 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4581 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4582 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4584 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4585 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4592 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4593 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4596 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4597 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4600 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4601 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4605 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4606 &self.context.holder_signer
4610 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4612 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4613 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4614 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4615 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4616 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4617 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4619 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4621 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4629 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4630 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4634 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4635 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4636 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4637 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4640 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4641 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4642 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4643 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4646 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4647 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4648 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4649 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4650 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4651 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4654 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4655 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4656 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4657 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4658 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4659 if !release_monitor {
4660 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4669 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4670 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4673 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4674 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4675 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4677 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4678 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4679 if self.context.channel_state &
4680 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4681 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4682 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4683 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4684 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4687 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4688 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4689 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4690 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4691 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4692 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4694 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4695 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4696 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4698 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4699 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4700 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4701 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4702 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4703 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4709 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4710 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4711 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4714 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4715 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4716 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4719 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4720 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4721 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4724 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4725 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4726 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4727 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4728 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4729 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4734 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4735 self.context.channel_update_status
4738 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4739 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4740 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4743 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4745 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4746 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4747 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4751 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4752 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4753 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4756 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4760 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4761 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4762 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4763 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4764 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4766 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4767 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4768 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4770 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4771 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4774 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4775 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4776 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4777 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4778 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4779 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4780 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4781 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4782 self.context.channel_state);
4784 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4788 if need_commitment_update {
4789 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4790 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4791 let next_per_commitment_point =
4792 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4793 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4794 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4795 next_per_commitment_point,
4796 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4800 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4806 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4807 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4808 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4809 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4810 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4811 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4812 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4814 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4817 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4818 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4819 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4820 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4821 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4822 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4823 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4824 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4825 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4826 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4827 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4828 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4829 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4830 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4831 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4832 // channel and move on.
4833 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4834 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4836 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4837 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4838 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4840 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4841 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4842 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4843 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4844 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4845 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4846 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4847 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4852 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4853 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4854 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4855 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4856 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4859 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4860 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4861 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4862 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4863 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4864 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4867 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4868 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4869 // may have already happened for this block).
4870 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4871 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4872 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4873 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
4876 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4877 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4878 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4879 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4887 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4888 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4889 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4890 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4892 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4893 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4896 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4898 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4899 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4900 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4901 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4903 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4906 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4909 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4910 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4911 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4912 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4914 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4917 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4918 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4919 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4921 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4922 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4924 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4925 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4926 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4934 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4936 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4937 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
4938 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4940 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4941 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4944 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4945 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4946 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4947 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4948 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4949 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4950 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4951 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4952 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4955 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4956 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4957 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4958 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4960 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4961 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4962 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4964 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4965 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4966 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4967 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4969 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4970 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4971 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4972 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4973 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4974 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4975 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4978 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
4979 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4981 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4984 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4985 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4986 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4987 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4988 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4989 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4990 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4991 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4992 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4993 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4994 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4995 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4996 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4997 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4998 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4999 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5000 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5006 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5011 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5012 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5014 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5015 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5016 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5017 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5019 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5022 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5024 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5025 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5026 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5027 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5028 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5029 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5031 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5032 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5035 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5036 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5037 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5038 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5039 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5040 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5042 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5043 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5046 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5047 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5048 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5049 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5050 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5056 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5057 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5058 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5059 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5061 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5064 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5068 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5072 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5073 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5077 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5081 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5082 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5085 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5089 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5091 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5096 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5097 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5098 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5100 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5105 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5107 None => return None,
5110 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5112 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5113 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5115 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5116 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5122 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5124 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5125 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5126 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5127 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5128 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5129 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5130 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5132 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5133 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5134 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5135 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5136 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5137 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5138 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5139 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5140 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5141 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5142 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5143 contents: announcement,
5148 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5152 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5153 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5154 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5155 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5156 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5157 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5158 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5159 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5161 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5163 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5164 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5165 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5166 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5168 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5170 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5171 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5174 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5175 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5176 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5177 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5180 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5183 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5184 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5185 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5186 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5187 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5188 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5191 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5193 Err(_) => return None,
5195 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5196 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5201 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5202 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5203 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5204 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5205 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5206 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5207 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5208 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5209 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5210 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5211 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5212 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5213 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5214 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5215 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5216 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5219 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5222 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5223 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5224 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5225 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5226 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5227 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5228 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5229 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5230 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5232 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5233 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5234 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5235 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5236 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5237 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5238 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5239 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5240 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5242 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5243 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5244 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5245 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5246 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5247 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5248 next_funding_txid: None,
5253 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5255 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5256 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5257 /// commitment update.
5259 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5260 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5261 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5262 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5263 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5264 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5265 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5268 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5269 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5270 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5272 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5273 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5278 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5279 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5281 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5283 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5284 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5286 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5287 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5288 /// regenerate them.
5290 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5291 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5293 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5294 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5295 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5296 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5297 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5298 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5299 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5301 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5302 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5304 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5305 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5306 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5309 if amount_msat == 0 {
5310 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5313 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5314 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5315 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5316 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5319 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5320 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5321 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5324 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5325 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5326 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5327 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5328 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5329 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5330 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5331 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5334 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5335 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5336 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5337 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5338 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5339 else { "to peer" });
5341 if need_holding_cell {
5342 force_holding_cell = true;
5345 // Now update local state:
5346 if force_holding_cell {
5347 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5352 onion_routing_packet,
5358 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5359 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5361 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5363 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5368 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5369 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5370 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5374 onion_routing_packet,
5377 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5382 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5383 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5384 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5385 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5387 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5388 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5389 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5391 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5392 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5396 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5397 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5398 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5399 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5400 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5401 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5402 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5405 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5406 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5407 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5408 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5409 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5410 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5413 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5415 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5416 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5417 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5418 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5419 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5421 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5422 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5425 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5426 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5427 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5428 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5429 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5430 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5431 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5432 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5433 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5434 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5435 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5438 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5442 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5443 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5444 where L::Target: Logger
5446 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5447 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5448 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5450 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5452 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5453 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5454 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5455 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5456 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5457 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5458 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5459 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5460 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5461 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5462 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5468 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5471 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5472 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5473 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5474 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5475 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5476 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5478 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5479 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5480 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5482 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5483 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5484 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5487 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5488 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5492 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5493 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5495 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5497 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5498 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5499 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5500 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5502 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5503 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5504 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5505 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5506 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5507 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5511 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5512 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5516 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5517 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5522 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5523 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5525 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5526 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5527 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5528 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5529 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5530 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5531 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5532 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5534 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5535 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5536 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5539 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5540 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5541 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5547 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5549 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5550 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5551 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5552 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5553 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5555 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5557 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5563 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5564 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5566 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5567 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5568 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5569 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5570 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5572 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5573 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5577 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5578 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5579 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5581 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5582 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5585 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5586 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5588 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5589 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5590 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5593 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5594 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5595 let mut chan_closed = false;
5596 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5600 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5602 None if !chan_closed => {
5603 // use override shutdown script if provided
5604 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5605 Some(script) => script,
5607 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5608 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5609 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5610 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5614 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5615 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5617 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5623 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5624 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5625 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5626 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5628 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5630 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5632 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5633 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5634 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5635 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5636 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5637 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5640 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5641 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5643 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5644 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5645 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5648 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5649 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5650 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5651 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5652 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5654 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5655 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5662 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5663 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5665 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5668 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5669 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5670 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5672 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5673 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5677 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5681 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5682 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5683 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5684 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5687 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5688 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5689 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5690 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5691 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5692 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5693 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5694 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5696 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5697 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5698 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5699 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5701 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5702 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5704 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5705 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5707 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5708 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5709 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5711 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5712 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5714 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5715 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5716 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5717 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5718 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5721 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5722 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5724 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5725 ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee
5727 ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
5729 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5731 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5732 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5733 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5734 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5737 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5738 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5740 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5741 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5742 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5743 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5747 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5748 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5749 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5753 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5754 Ok(script) => script,
5755 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5758 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5761 context: ChannelContext {
5764 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5765 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5766 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5767 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5772 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5774 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5775 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5776 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5777 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5779 channel_value_satoshis,
5781 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5783 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5784 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5787 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5788 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5791 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5792 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5793 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5794 pending_update_fee: None,
5795 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5796 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5797 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5798 update_time_counter: 1,
5800 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5802 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5803 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5804 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5805 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5806 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5807 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5809 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5810 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5811 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5812 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5814 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5815 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5816 closing_fee_limits: None,
5817 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5819 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5820 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5821 short_channel_id: None,
5822 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5824 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5825 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5826 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5827 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5828 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5829 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5830 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5831 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5832 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5833 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5834 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5835 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5837 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5839 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5840 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5841 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5842 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5843 counterparty_parameters: None,
5844 funding_outpoint: None,
5845 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5847 funding_transaction: None,
5848 is_batch_funding: None,
5850 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5851 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5852 counterparty_node_id,
5854 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5856 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5858 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5859 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5861 announcement_sigs: None,
5863 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5864 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5865 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5866 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5868 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5869 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5871 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5872 outbound_scid_alias,
5874 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5875 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5877 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5878 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5883 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5885 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5889 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5890 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5891 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5892 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5893 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5894 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5895 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5896 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5897 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5902 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5903 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5904 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5905 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5906 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5907 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5908 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5909 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5910 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5911 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5912 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5914 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5915 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5917 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5918 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5919 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5920 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5923 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5924 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5926 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5929 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5930 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5931 return Err((self, e));
5935 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5937 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5939 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5940 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5942 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5943 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5944 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5945 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5946 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5947 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5950 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5951 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
5953 let channel = Channel {
5954 context: self.context,
5957 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5958 temporary_channel_id,
5959 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5960 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5963 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5965 next_local_nonce: None,
5969 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5970 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5971 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5972 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5973 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5974 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5975 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5976 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5977 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5978 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5981 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5982 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5983 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5984 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5985 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5986 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5992 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5993 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5994 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5995 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5996 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5997 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5999 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6001 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6002 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6003 // We've exhausted our options
6006 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6007 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6010 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6011 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6012 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6013 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6015 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6016 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6017 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6018 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6019 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6020 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6022 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6024 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6025 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6028 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6029 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6030 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6032 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6033 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6036 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6037 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6040 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6041 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6045 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6046 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6047 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6048 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6049 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6050 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6051 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6052 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6053 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6054 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6055 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6056 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6057 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6058 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6059 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6060 first_per_commitment_point,
6061 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6062 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6063 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6064 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6066 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6071 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6072 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6074 // Check sanity of message fields:
6075 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6078 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6081 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6082 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6084 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6087 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6090 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6092 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6094 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6095 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6098 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6099 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6102 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6105 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6109 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6110 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6113 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6116 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6117 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6119 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6120 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6122 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6125 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6126 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6128 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6132 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6133 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6136 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6137 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6139 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6140 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6143 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6144 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6147 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6148 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6149 &Some(ref script) => {
6150 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6151 if script.len() == 0 {
6154 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6155 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6157 Some(script.clone())
6160 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6167 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6168 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6169 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6170 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6171 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6173 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6174 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6176 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6179 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6180 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6181 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6182 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6183 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6184 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6187 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6188 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6189 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6192 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6193 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6195 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6196 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6202 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6203 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6204 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6205 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6208 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6209 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6210 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6211 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6212 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6213 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6214 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6215 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6216 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6217 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6218 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6221 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6223 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6224 // support this channel type.
6225 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6226 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6230 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6231 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6232 // `static_remote_key`.
6233 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6236 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6237 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6240 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6243 channel_type.clone()
6245 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6246 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6247 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6252 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6253 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6254 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6255 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6256 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6257 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6258 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6259 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6260 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6263 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6267 // Check sanity of message fields:
6268 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6269 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6271 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6274 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6277 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6278 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6281 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6284 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6285 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6287 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6289 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6290 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6293 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6296 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6300 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6301 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6304 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6307 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6310 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6311 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6313 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6316 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6317 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6319 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6323 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6325 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6326 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6331 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6332 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6333 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6334 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6335 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6337 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6338 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6340 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6341 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6342 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6344 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6345 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6348 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6349 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6350 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6351 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6352 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6353 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6356 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6357 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6358 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6359 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6360 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6363 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6364 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6365 &Some(ref script) => {
6366 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6367 if script.len() == 0 {
6370 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6371 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6373 Some(script.clone())
6376 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6383 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6384 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6385 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6386 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6390 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6391 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6392 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6396 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6397 Ok(script) => script,
6398 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6401 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6402 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6404 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6407 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6411 context: ChannelContext {
6414 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6415 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6417 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6422 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6424 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6425 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6426 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6427 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6430 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6432 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6433 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6436 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6437 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6438 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6440 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6441 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6442 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6443 pending_update_fee: None,
6444 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6445 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6446 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6447 update_time_counter: 1,
6449 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6451 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6452 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6453 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6454 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6455 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6456 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6458 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6459 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6460 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6461 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6463 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6464 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6465 closing_fee_limits: None,
6466 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6468 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6469 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6470 short_channel_id: None,
6471 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6473 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6474 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6475 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6476 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6477 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6478 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6479 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6480 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6481 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6482 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6483 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6484 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6487 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6489 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6490 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6491 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6492 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6493 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6494 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6495 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6497 funding_outpoint: None,
6498 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6500 funding_transaction: None,
6501 is_batch_funding: None,
6503 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6504 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6505 counterparty_node_id,
6507 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6509 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6511 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6512 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6514 announcement_sigs: None,
6516 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6517 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6518 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6519 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6521 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6522 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6524 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6525 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6527 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6528 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6530 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6531 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6536 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6538 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6544 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6545 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6547 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6548 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6549 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6550 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6552 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6553 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6555 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6556 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6559 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6562 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6563 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6564 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6566 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6567 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6568 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6569 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6571 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6572 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6573 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6574 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6575 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6576 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6577 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6578 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6579 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6580 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6581 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6582 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6583 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6584 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6585 first_per_commitment_point,
6586 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6587 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6588 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6590 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6592 next_local_nonce: None,
6596 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6597 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6599 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6601 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6602 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6605 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6606 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6608 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6609 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6611 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6612 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6613 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6614 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6615 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6616 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6617 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6618 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6619 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6622 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6623 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6625 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6626 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6627 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6628 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6630 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6631 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6632 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6633 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6634 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6636 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6637 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6642 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6643 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6644 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6648 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6649 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6651 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6652 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6653 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6655 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6657 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6658 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6659 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6660 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6663 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6664 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6665 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6666 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6667 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6669 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6671 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6672 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6673 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6676 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6677 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6678 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6682 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6683 initial_commitment_tx,
6686 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6687 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6690 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6691 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6694 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6696 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6697 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6698 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6699 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6700 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6701 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6702 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6703 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6704 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6705 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6706 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6708 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6710 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6711 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6712 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6713 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6714 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6715 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6717 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6718 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6719 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6720 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6722 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6724 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6725 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6726 let mut channel = Channel {
6727 context: self.context,
6729 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6730 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6731 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6733 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6737 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6738 }, channel_monitor))
6742 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6743 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6745 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6751 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6752 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6753 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6754 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6755 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6757 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6758 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6759 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6760 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6766 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6767 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6768 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6769 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6770 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6771 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6776 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6777 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6778 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6779 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6781 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6782 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6783 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6784 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6789 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6790 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6791 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6792 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6793 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6794 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6799 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6800 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6801 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6804 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6806 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6807 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6808 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6809 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6810 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6812 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6813 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6814 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6815 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6817 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6818 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6819 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6821 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6823 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6824 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6825 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6826 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6827 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6828 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6829 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6831 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6832 // deserialized from that format.
6833 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6834 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6835 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6837 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6839 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6840 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6841 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6843 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6844 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6845 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6846 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6849 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6850 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6851 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6854 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6855 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6856 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6857 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6859 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6860 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6862 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6864 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6866 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6868 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6871 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6873 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6878 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6879 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6881 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6882 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6883 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6884 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6885 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6886 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6887 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6889 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6891 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6893 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6896 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6897 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6898 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6901 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6903 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6904 preimages.push(preimage);
6906 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6907 reason.write(writer)?;
6909 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6911 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6912 preimages.push(preimage);
6914 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6915 reason.write(writer)?;
6918 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6919 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6920 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6922 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6923 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6924 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6928 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6929 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6930 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6932 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6933 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6937 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6938 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6939 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6940 source.write(writer)?;
6941 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6943 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6944 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6945 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6947 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6948 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6950 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6952 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6953 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6955 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6957 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6958 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6963 match self.context.resend_order {
6964 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6965 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6968 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6969 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6970 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6972 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6973 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6974 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6975 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6978 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6979 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6980 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6981 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6982 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6985 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6986 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6987 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6988 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6990 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6991 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6992 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6994 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6996 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6997 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6998 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6999 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7001 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7002 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7003 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7004 // consider the stale state on reload.
7007 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7008 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7009 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7011 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7012 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7013 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7015 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7016 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7018 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7019 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7020 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7022 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7023 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7025 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7028 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7029 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7030 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7032 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7035 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7036 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7038 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7039 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7040 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7042 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7044 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7046 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7048 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7049 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7050 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7051 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7052 htlc.write(writer)?;
7055 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7056 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7057 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7059 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7060 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7062 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7063 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7064 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7065 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7066 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7067 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7068 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7070 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7071 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7072 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7073 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7074 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7076 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7077 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7079 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7080 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7081 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7082 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7084 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7086 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7087 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7088 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7089 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7090 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7091 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7092 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7094 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7095 (2, chan_type, option),
7096 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7097 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7098 (5, self.context.config, required),
7099 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7100 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7101 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7102 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7103 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7104 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7105 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7106 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7107 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7108 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7109 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7110 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7111 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7112 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7113 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7114 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7115 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7116 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7117 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7124 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7125 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7127 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7128 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7130 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7131 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7132 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7134 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7135 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7136 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7137 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7139 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7141 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7142 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7143 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7144 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7145 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7147 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7148 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7152 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7153 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7155 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7157 let mut keys_data = None;
7159 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7160 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7161 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7162 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7163 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7164 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7165 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7166 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7167 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7168 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7172 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7173 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7174 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7177 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7180 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7181 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7183 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7186 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7187 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7188 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7189 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7190 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7191 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7192 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7193 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7194 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7195 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7196 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7197 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7202 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7203 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7204 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7205 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7206 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7207 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7208 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7209 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7210 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7211 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7212 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7213 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7215 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7216 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7219 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7220 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7223 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7224 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7226 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7228 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7232 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7233 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7234 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7235 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7236 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7237 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7238 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7239 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7240 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7241 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7242 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7244 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7245 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7246 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7248 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7249 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7250 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7252 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7256 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7257 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7258 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7259 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7262 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7263 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7264 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7266 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7267 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7268 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7269 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7272 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7273 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7274 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7275 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7278 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7280 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7282 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7283 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7284 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7285 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7287 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7288 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7289 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7290 // consider the stale state on reload.
7291 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7294 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7295 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7296 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7298 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7301 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7302 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7303 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7305 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7307 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7308 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7310 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7311 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7313 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7314 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7316 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7317 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7318 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7322 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7323 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7325 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7326 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7329 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7331 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7332 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7333 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7334 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7336 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7339 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7340 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7342 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7345 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7347 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7348 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7350 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7352 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7353 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7354 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7356 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7357 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7358 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7362 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7363 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7364 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7366 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7372 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7373 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7374 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7375 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7376 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7377 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7378 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7379 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7380 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7381 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7383 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7384 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7385 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7386 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7387 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7388 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7389 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7391 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7392 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7393 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7394 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7396 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7398 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7399 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7401 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7403 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7404 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7405 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7406 (2, channel_type, option),
7407 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7408 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7409 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7410 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7411 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7412 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7413 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7414 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7415 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7416 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7417 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7418 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7419 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7420 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7421 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7422 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7423 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7424 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7425 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7426 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7427 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7428 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7431 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7432 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7433 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7434 // required channel parameters.
7435 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7436 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7437 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7439 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7441 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7442 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7443 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7444 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7447 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7448 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7449 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7451 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7452 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7454 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7455 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7460 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7461 if iter.next().is_some() {
7462 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7466 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7467 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7468 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7469 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7470 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7473 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7474 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7475 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7477 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7478 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7480 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7481 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7482 // separate u64 values.
7483 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7485 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7487 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7488 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7489 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7490 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7492 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7493 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7495 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7496 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7497 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7498 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7499 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7502 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7503 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7507 context: ChannelContext {
7510 config: config.unwrap(),
7514 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7515 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7516 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7519 temporary_channel_id,
7521 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7523 channel_value_satoshis,
7525 latest_monitor_update_id,
7527 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7528 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7531 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7532 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7535 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7536 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7537 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7538 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7542 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7543 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7544 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7545 monitor_pending_forwards,
7546 monitor_pending_failures,
7547 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7550 holding_cell_update_fee,
7551 next_holder_htlc_id,
7552 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7553 update_time_counter,
7556 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7557 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7558 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7559 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7561 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7562 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7563 closing_fee_limits: None,
7564 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7566 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7567 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7569 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7571 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7572 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7573 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7574 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7575 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7576 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7577 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7578 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7579 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7582 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7584 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7585 funding_transaction,
7588 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7589 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7590 counterparty_node_id,
7592 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7596 channel_update_status,
7597 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7601 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7602 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7603 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7604 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7606 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7607 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7609 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7610 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7611 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7613 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7614 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7616 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7617 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7619 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7622 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7631 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7632 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7633 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7634 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7635 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7637 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7638 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7639 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7640 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7641 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7642 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7643 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7644 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7645 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7646 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7647 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7648 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7649 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7650 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7651 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7652 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7653 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7654 use crate::util::test_utils;
7655 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7656 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7657 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7658 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7659 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7660 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7661 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7662 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7663 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7664 use crate::prelude::*;
7666 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7669 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7670 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7676 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7677 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7678 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7679 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7683 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7684 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7685 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7686 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7687 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7688 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7689 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7690 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7694 signer: InMemorySigner,
7697 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7698 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7701 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7702 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7704 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7705 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7708 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7712 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7714 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7715 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7716 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7717 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7718 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7721 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7722 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7723 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7724 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7728 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7729 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7730 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7734 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7735 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7736 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7737 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7739 let seed = [42; 32];
7740 let network = Network::Testnet;
7741 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7742 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7743 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7746 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7747 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7748 let config = UserConfig::default();
7749 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7750 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7751 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7753 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7754 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7758 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7759 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7761 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7762 let original_fee = 253;
7763 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7764 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7765 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7766 let seed = [42; 32];
7767 let network = Network::Testnet;
7768 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7770 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7771 let config = UserConfig::default();
7772 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7774 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7775 // same as the old fee.
7776 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7777 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7778 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7782 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7783 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7784 // dust limits are used.
7785 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7786 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7787 let seed = [42; 32];
7788 let network = Network::Testnet;
7789 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7790 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7791 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7793 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7794 // they have different dust limits.
7796 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7797 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7798 let config = UserConfig::default();
7799 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7801 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7802 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7803 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7804 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7805 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7807 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7808 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7809 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7810 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7811 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7813 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7814 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7815 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7816 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7818 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7819 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7820 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7822 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7823 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7825 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7826 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7827 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7829 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7830 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7831 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7832 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7835 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7837 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7838 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7839 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7840 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7841 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7842 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7843 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7844 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7845 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7847 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7850 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7851 // the dust limit check.
7852 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7853 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7854 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7855 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7857 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7858 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7859 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7860 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7861 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7862 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7863 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7867 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7868 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7869 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7870 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7871 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7872 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7873 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7874 let seed = [42; 32];
7875 let network = Network::Testnet;
7876 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7878 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7879 let config = UserConfig::default();
7880 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7882 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7883 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7885 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7886 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7887 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7888 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7889 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7890 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7892 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7893 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7894 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7895 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7896 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7898 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7900 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7901 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7902 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7903 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7904 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7906 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7907 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7908 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7909 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7910 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7914 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7915 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7916 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7917 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7918 let seed = [42; 32];
7919 let network = Network::Testnet;
7920 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7921 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
7922 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7924 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7926 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7927 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7928 let config = UserConfig::default();
7929 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7931 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7932 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7933 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7934 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7936 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7937 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7938 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7940 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7941 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7942 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7943 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7945 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7946 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7947 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7949 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7950 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7952 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7953 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7954 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7955 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7956 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7957 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7958 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7960 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7962 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
7963 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7964 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7965 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7966 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7970 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7971 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7972 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7973 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7974 let seed = [42; 32];
7975 let network = Network::Testnet;
7976 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7977 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7978 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7980 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7981 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7982 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7983 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7984 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7985 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7986 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7987 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7989 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7990 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7991 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7992 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7993 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7994 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7996 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7997 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7998 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7999 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8001 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8003 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8004 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8005 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8006 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8007 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8008 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8010 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8011 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8012 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8013 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8015 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8016 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8017 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8018 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8019 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8021 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8022 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8024 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8025 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8026 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8028 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8029 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8030 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8031 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8032 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8034 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8035 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8037 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8038 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8039 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8043 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8045 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8046 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8047 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8049 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8050 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8051 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8052 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8054 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8055 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8056 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8058 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8060 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8061 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8064 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8065 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8066 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8067 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8068 let seed = [42; 32];
8069 let network = Network::Testnet;
8070 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8071 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8072 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8075 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8076 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8077 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8079 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8080 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8082 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8083 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8084 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8086 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8087 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8089 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8091 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8092 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8094 // Channel Negotiations failed
8095 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8096 assert!(result.is_err());
8101 fn channel_update() {
8102 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8103 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8104 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8105 let seed = [42; 32];
8106 let network = Network::Testnet;
8107 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8108 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8109 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8111 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8112 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8113 let config = UserConfig::default();
8114 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8116 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8117 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8118 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8119 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8120 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8122 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8123 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8124 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8125 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8126 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8128 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8129 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8130 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8131 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8133 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8134 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8135 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8137 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8138 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8140 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8141 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8142 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8144 short_channel_id: 0,
8147 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8148 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8149 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8151 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8152 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8154 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8156 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8158 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8159 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8160 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8161 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8163 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8164 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8165 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8167 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8170 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8173 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8175 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8176 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8177 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8178 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8179 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8180 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8181 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8182 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8183 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8184 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8185 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8186 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8187 use crate::sync::Arc;
8189 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8190 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8191 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8192 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8194 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8196 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8197 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8198 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8199 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8200 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8202 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8203 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8209 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8210 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8211 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8213 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8214 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8215 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8216 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8217 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8218 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8220 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8222 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8223 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8224 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8225 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8226 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8227 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8229 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8230 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8231 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8232 selected_contest_delay: 144
8234 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8235 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8237 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8238 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8240 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8241 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8243 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8244 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8246 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8247 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8248 // build_commitment_transaction.
8249 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8250 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8251 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8252 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8253 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8255 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8256 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8257 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8258 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8262 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8263 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8264 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8265 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8269 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8270 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8271 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8273 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8274 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8276 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8277 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8279 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8281 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8282 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8283 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8284 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8285 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8286 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8287 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8289 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8290 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8291 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8292 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8294 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8295 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8296 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8298 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8300 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8301 commitment_tx.clone(),
8302 counterparty_signature,
8303 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8304 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8305 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8307 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8308 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8310 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8311 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8312 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8314 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8315 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8318 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8319 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8321 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8322 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8323 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8324 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8325 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8326 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8327 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8328 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8330 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8333 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8334 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8335 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8339 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8342 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8343 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8344 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8346 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8347 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8348 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8349 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8350 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8351 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8352 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8353 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8355 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8359 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8360 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8361 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8362 "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", {});
8364 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8365 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8367 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8368 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8369 "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", {});
8371 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8372 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8373 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8374 "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", {});
8376 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8377 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8379 amount_msat: 1000000,
8381 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8382 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8384 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8387 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8388 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8390 amount_msat: 2000000,
8392 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8393 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8395 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8398 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8399 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8401 amount_msat: 2000000,
8403 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8404 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8405 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8406 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8408 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8411 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8412 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8414 amount_msat: 3000000,
8416 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8417 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8418 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8419 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8421 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8424 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8425 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8427 amount_msat: 4000000,
8429 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8430 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8432 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8436 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8437 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8438 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8440 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8441 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8442 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8445 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8446 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8447 "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" },
8450 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8451 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8452 "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" },
8455 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8456 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8457 "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" },
8460 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8461 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8462 "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" },
8465 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8466 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8467 "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" }
8470 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8471 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8472 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8474 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8475 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8476 "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", {
8479 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8480 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8481 "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" },
8484 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8485 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8486 "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" },
8489 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8490 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8491 "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" },
8494 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8495 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8496 "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" },
8499 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8500 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8501 "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" }
8504 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8505 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8506 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8508 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8509 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8510 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8513 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8514 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8515 "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" },
8518 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8519 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8520 "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" },
8523 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8524 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8525 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8528 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8529 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8530 "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" }
8533 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8534 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8535 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8536 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8538 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8539 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8540 "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", {
8543 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8544 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8545 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
8548 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8549 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8550 "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" },
8553 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8554 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8555 "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" },
8558 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8559 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8560 "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" }
8563 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8564 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8565 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8566 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8568 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8569 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8570 "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", {
8573 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8574 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8575 "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" },
8578 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8579 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8580 "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" },
8583 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8584 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8585 "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" },
8588 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8589 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8590 "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" }
8593 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8594 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8595 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8597 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8598 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8599 "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", {
8602 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8603 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8604 "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" },
8607 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8608 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8609 "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" },
8612 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8613 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8614 "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" }
8617 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8618 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8619 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8621 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8622 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8623 "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", {
8626 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8627 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8628 "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" },
8631 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8632 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8633 "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" },
8636 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8637 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8638 "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" }
8641 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8642 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8643 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8645 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8646 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8647 "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", {
8650 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8651 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8652 "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" },
8655 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8656 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8657 "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" }
8660 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8661 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8662 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8663 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8664 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8665 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8667 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8668 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8669 "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", {
8672 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8673 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8674 "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" },
8677 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8678 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8679 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8682 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8683 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8684 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8685 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8686 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8688 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8689 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8690 "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", {
8693 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8694 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8695 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8698 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8699 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8700 "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" }
8703 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8704 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8705 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8707 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8708 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8709 "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", {
8712 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8713 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8714 "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" }
8717 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8718 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8719 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8720 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8721 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8723 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8724 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8725 "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", {
8728 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8729 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8730 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8733 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8734 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8735 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8736 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8737 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8739 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8740 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8741 "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", {
8744 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8745 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8746 "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" }
8749 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8750 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8751 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8752 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8754 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8755 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8756 "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", {});
8758 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8759 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8760 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8761 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8762 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8764 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8765 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8766 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8768 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8769 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8770 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8771 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8772 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8774 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8775 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8776 "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", {});
8778 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8779 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8780 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8782 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8783 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8784 "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", {});
8786 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8787 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8788 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8789 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8790 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8792 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8793 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8794 "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", {});
8796 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8797 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8798 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8799 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8800 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8802 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8803 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8804 "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", {});
8806 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8807 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8808 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8809 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8810 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8811 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8813 amount_msat: 2000000,
8815 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8816 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8818 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8821 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8822 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8823 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8825 amount_msat: 5000001,
8827 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8828 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8829 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8830 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8832 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8835 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8836 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8838 amount_msat: 5000000,
8840 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8841 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8842 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8843 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8845 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8849 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8850 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8851 "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", {
8854 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8855 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8856 "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" },
8858 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8859 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8860 "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" },
8862 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8863 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8864 "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" }
8867 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8868 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8869 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8870 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8873 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8874 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8875 "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" },
8877 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8878 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8879 "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" },
8881 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8882 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8883 "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" }
8888 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8889 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8891 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8892 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8893 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8894 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8896 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8897 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8898 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8900 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8901 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8903 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8904 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8906 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8907 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8908 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8912 fn test_key_derivation() {
8913 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8914 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8916 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8917 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8919 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8920 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8922 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8923 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8925 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8926 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8928 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8929 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8931 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8932 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8934 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8935 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8939 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8940 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8941 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8942 let seed = [42; 32];
8943 let network = Network::Testnet;
8944 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8945 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8947 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8948 let config = UserConfig::default();
8949 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8950 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8952 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8953 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8955 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8956 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8957 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8958 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8959 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8960 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8961 assert!(res.is_ok());
8965 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8966 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8967 // resulting `channel_type`.
8968 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8969 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8970 let network = Network::Testnet;
8971 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8972 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8974 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8975 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8977 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8978 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8980 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8981 // need to signal it.
8982 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8983 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8984 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8987 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8989 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8990 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8991 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8993 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8994 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8995 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8998 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8999 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9000 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9001 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9002 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9005 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9006 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9010 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9011 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9012 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9013 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9014 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9015 let network = Network::Testnet;
9016 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9017 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9019 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9020 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9022 let config = UserConfig::default();
9024 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9025 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9026 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9027 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9028 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9030 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9031 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9032 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9035 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9036 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9037 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9039 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9040 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9041 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9042 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9043 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9044 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9046 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9050 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9051 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9053 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9054 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9055 let network = Network::Testnet;
9056 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9057 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9059 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9060 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9062 let config = UserConfig::default();
9064 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9065 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9066 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9067 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9068 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9069 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9070 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9071 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9073 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9074 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9075 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9076 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9077 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9078 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9081 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9082 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9084 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9085 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9086 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9087 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9089 assert!(res.is_err());
9091 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9092 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9093 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9095 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9096 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9097 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9100 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9102 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9103 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9104 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9105 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9108 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9109 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9111 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9112 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9114 assert!(res.is_err());
9118 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9119 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9120 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9121 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9122 let seed = [42; 32];
9123 let network = Network::Testnet;
9124 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9125 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9126 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9128 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9129 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9130 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9131 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9133 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9134 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9135 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9140 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9149 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9150 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9151 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9156 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9157 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9163 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9166 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9167 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9168 &accept_channel_msg,
9169 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9170 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9173 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9174 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9175 let tx = Transaction {
9177 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9181 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9184 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9187 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9188 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9193 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9194 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9195 &funding_created_msg,
9199 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9200 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9208 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9209 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9210 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9211 &funding_signed_msg,
9216 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9223 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9224 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9225 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9226 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9228 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9229 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9230 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9233 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9234 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9235 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9243 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9244 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9245 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9246 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9249 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9250 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9252 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9253 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9254 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9256 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());