1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
41 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
42 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
43 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
44 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
45 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
46 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
47 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
50 use crate::prelude::*;
51 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 use core::convert::TryInto;
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
60 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
62 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
67 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
70 pub struct AvailableBalances {
71 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
72 pub balance_msat: u64,
73 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
74 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
76 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
78 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
79 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
83 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
85 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
87 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
88 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
89 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
90 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
91 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
92 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
94 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
98 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
99 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
100 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
101 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
104 enum InboundHTLCState {
105 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
106 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
107 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
108 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
109 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
110 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
111 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
112 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
113 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
114 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
115 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
116 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
117 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
118 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
119 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
121 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
125 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
126 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
127 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
128 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
129 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
130 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
131 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
132 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
133 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
134 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
137 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
139 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
140 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
141 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
142 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
143 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
145 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
146 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
148 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
149 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
150 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
151 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
152 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
153 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
154 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
155 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
158 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
162 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
163 state: InboundHTLCState,
166 enum OutboundHTLCState {
167 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
168 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
169 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
170 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
171 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
172 /// money back (though we won't), and,
173 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
174 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
175 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
176 /// we'll never get out of sync).
177 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
178 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
179 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
181 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
182 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
183 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
188 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
189 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
190 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
191 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
192 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
193 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
194 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
195 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
199 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
200 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
201 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
202 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
205 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
206 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
208 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
209 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
214 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
215 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
218 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
223 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
227 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
228 state: OutboundHTLCState,
230 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
233 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
234 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
235 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
239 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
241 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
242 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
243 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
246 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
251 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
255 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
256 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
257 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
258 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
259 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
260 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
261 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
263 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
264 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
265 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
266 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
267 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
268 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
269 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
271 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
272 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
273 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
275 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
276 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
277 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
278 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
279 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
280 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
283 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
285 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
286 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
287 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
288 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
289 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
290 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
291 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
292 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
293 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
295 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
296 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
298 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
299 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
300 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
301 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
302 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
303 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
304 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
305 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
306 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
307 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
308 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
309 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
310 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
312 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
313 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
314 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
315 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
316 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
317 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
318 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
319 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
321 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
323 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
324 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
326 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
328 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
330 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
332 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
333 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
337 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
339 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
341 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
343 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
344 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
345 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
346 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
347 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
349 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
350 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
352 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
354 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
355 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
357 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
358 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
359 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
360 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
361 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
362 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
364 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
365 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
367 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
368 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
369 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
370 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
371 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
373 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
374 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
376 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
377 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
379 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
380 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
381 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
382 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
388 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
389 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
391 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
393 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
398 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
399 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
401 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
403 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
408 macro_rules! secp_check {
409 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
412 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
417 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
418 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
419 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
420 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
421 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
422 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
423 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
424 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
426 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
428 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
430 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
434 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
436 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
437 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
438 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
440 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
441 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
443 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
444 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
445 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
446 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
447 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
449 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
450 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
454 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
460 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
463 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
464 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
466 holding_cell_msat: u64,
467 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
470 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
471 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
472 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
473 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
474 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
475 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
476 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
477 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
479 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
482 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
483 struct HTLCCandidate {
485 origin: HTLCInitiator,
489 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
497 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
499 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
501 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
502 htlc_value_msat: u64,
503 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
508 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
509 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
510 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
511 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
512 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
514 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
515 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
516 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
517 htlc_value_msat: u64,
519 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
520 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
524 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
525 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
526 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
527 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
528 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
529 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
530 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
531 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
532 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
533 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
534 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
537 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
539 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
540 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
541 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
542 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
543 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
546 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
547 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
548 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
549 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
550 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
551 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
552 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
553 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
556 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
558 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
559 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
560 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
561 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
562 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
563 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
564 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
565 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
568 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
569 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
570 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
571 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
572 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
573 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
574 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
575 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
576 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
577 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
578 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
579 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
580 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
581 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
582 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
584 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
585 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
586 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
587 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
589 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
590 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
591 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
592 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
594 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
595 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
596 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
597 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
598 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
600 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
601 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
602 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
603 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
605 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
606 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
607 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
609 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
610 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
611 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
612 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
613 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
615 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
616 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
619 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
620 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
622 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
623 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
624 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
625 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
627 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
628 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
630 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
631 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
634 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
635 (0, update, required),
638 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
639 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
640 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
641 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
642 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
646 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
647 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
648 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
650 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
652 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
654 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
658 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
660 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
661 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
662 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
667 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
668 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
669 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
670 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
671 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
673 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
674 /// in a timely manner.
675 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
678 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
679 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
680 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
682 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
683 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
684 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
685 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
689 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
690 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
691 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
693 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
694 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
695 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
696 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
698 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
702 /// The current channel ID.
703 channel_id: ChannelId,
704 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
705 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
706 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
709 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
710 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
712 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
713 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
714 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
716 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
717 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
718 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
719 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
721 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
722 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
724 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
726 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
727 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
728 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
730 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
731 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
732 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
734 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
735 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
736 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
737 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
738 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
739 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
741 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
742 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
743 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
744 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
745 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
746 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
748 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
750 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
751 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
752 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
754 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
755 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
756 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
757 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
758 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
759 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
760 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
762 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
763 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
764 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
766 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
767 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
768 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
769 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
770 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
771 /// outbound or inbound.
772 signer_pending_funding: bool,
774 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
776 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
777 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
778 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
779 // HTLCs with similar state.
780 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
781 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
782 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
783 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
784 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
785 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
786 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
787 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
788 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
791 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
792 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
793 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
795 update_time_counter: u32,
797 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
798 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
799 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
800 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
801 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
802 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
804 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
805 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
807 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
808 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
809 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
810 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
812 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
813 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
815 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
817 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
819 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
820 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
821 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
822 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
823 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
825 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
826 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
828 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
829 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
830 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
832 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
833 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
834 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
835 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
836 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
837 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
838 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
839 channel_creation_height: u32,
841 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
844 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
846 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
849 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
851 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
854 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
856 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
858 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
859 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
862 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
864 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
866 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
867 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
869 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
871 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
872 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
873 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
875 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
877 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
878 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
879 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
881 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
882 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
883 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
885 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
887 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
889 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
890 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
891 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
892 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
894 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
895 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
896 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
898 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
899 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
900 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
902 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
903 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
904 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
905 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
906 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
907 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
909 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
911 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
912 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
913 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
914 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
915 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
917 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
918 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
920 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
921 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
922 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
923 /// unblock the state machine.
925 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
926 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
927 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
929 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
930 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
931 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
933 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
934 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
935 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
936 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
937 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
938 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
939 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
940 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
942 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
943 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
945 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
946 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
947 // the channel's funding UTXO.
949 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
950 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
951 // associated channel mapping.
953 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
954 // to store all of them.
955 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
957 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
958 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
959 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
960 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
961 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
963 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
964 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
966 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
967 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
969 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
970 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
971 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
973 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
974 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
975 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
978 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
979 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
980 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
981 self.update_time_counter
984 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
985 self.latest_monitor_update_id
988 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
989 self.config.announced_channel
992 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
993 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
996 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
997 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
998 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
999 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1002 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1003 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1004 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
1007 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1008 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1009 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1010 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
1011 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1014 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1015 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1016 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1017 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1019 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1020 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1022 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1023 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1025 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1026 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1028 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1031 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1032 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1033 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1034 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1035 self.channel_state &
1036 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1037 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1038 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1039 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1042 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1043 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1044 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1045 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1046 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1049 // Public utilities:
1051 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1055 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1057 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1058 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1059 self.temporary_channel_id
1062 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1066 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1067 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1068 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1072 /// Gets the channel's type
1073 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1077 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1079 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1080 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1081 self.short_channel_id
1084 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1085 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1086 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1089 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1090 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1091 self.outbound_scid_alias
1094 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1096 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
1097 return &self.holder_signer
1100 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1101 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1102 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1103 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1104 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1105 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1108 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1109 /// get_funding_created.
1110 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1111 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1114 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1115 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1116 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1117 if conf_height > 0 {
1124 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1125 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1126 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1129 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1130 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1131 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1132 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1136 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1139 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1140 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1143 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1144 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1147 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1148 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1149 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1152 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1153 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1156 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1157 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1158 self.counterparty_node_id
1161 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1162 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1163 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1166 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1167 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1168 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1171 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1172 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1174 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1175 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1176 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1177 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1179 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1183 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1184 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1185 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1188 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1189 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1190 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1193 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1194 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1195 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1197 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1198 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1203 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1204 self.channel_value_satoshis
1207 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1208 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1211 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1212 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1215 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1216 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1217 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1219 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1220 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1221 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1222 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1223 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1225 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1229 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1230 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1231 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1234 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1235 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1236 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1239 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1240 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1241 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1244 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1245 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1246 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1249 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1250 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1251 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1254 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1255 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1256 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1259 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1260 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1261 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1262 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1263 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1266 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1268 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1269 self.prev_config = None;
1273 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1274 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1278 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1279 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1280 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1281 let did_channel_update =
1282 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1283 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1284 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1285 if did_channel_update {
1286 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1287 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1288 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1289 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1291 self.config.options = *config;
1295 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1296 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1297 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1298 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1299 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1302 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1303 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1304 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1305 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1306 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1308 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1309 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1310 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1311 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1312 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1313 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1314 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1316 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1317 where L::Target: Logger
1319 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1320 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1321 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1323 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1324 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1325 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1326 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1328 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1329 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1330 if match update_state {
1331 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1332 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1333 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1334 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1335 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1337 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1341 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1342 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1343 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1345 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1347 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1348 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1349 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1351 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1352 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1353 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1354 transaction_output_index: None
1359 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1360 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1361 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1362 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1363 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1366 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1368 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1369 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1370 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1372 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1373 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1376 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1377 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1380 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1382 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1383 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1384 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1386 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1387 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1393 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1394 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1395 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1396 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1397 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1398 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1399 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1403 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1404 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1406 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1408 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1409 if generated_by_local {
1410 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1411 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1420 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1422 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1423 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1424 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1425 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1426 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1427 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1428 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1431 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1432 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1433 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1434 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1438 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1439 preimages.push(preimage);
1443 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1444 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1446 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1448 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1449 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1451 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1452 if !generated_by_local {
1453 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1461 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1462 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1463 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1464 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1465 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1466 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1467 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1468 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1470 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1472 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1473 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1474 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1475 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1477 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1479 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1480 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1481 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1482 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1485 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1486 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1487 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1488 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1490 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1493 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1494 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1495 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1496 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1498 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1501 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1502 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1507 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1508 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1513 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1515 let channel_parameters =
1516 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1517 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1518 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1525 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1528 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1529 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1530 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1531 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1533 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1534 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1535 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1543 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1544 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1550 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1551 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1552 /// our counterparty!)
1553 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1554 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1555 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1556 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1557 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1558 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1559 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1561 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1565 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1566 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1567 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1568 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1569 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1570 //may see payments to it!
1571 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1572 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1573 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1575 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1578 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1579 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1580 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1581 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1582 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1585 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1586 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1589 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1593 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1594 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1595 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1596 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1597 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1598 // which are near the dust limit.
1599 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1600 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1601 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1602 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1603 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1605 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1606 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1608 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1611 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1612 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1613 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1616 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1617 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1619 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1620 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1621 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1622 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1623 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1624 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1625 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1628 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1631 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1632 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1633 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1635 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1636 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1637 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1638 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1639 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1640 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1642 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1643 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1649 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1650 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1652 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1653 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1654 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1655 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1656 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1657 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1658 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1661 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1664 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1665 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1666 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1668 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1669 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1670 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1671 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1672 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1673 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1675 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1676 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1680 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1681 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1682 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1683 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1684 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1685 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1686 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1688 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1689 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1691 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1698 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1699 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1700 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1701 /// corner case properly.
1702 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1703 -> AvailableBalances
1704 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1706 let context = &self;
1707 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1708 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1709 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1711 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1712 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1713 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1714 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1717 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1719 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1720 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1722 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1724 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1726 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1727 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1731 if context.is_outbound() {
1732 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1733 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1735 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1736 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1738 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1739 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1740 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1741 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1744 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1745 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1746 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1747 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1748 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1749 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1750 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1753 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1754 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1755 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1756 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1757 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1758 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1759 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1760 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1761 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1762 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1763 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1765 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1768 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1769 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1770 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1771 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1772 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1775 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1776 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1778 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1779 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1780 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1782 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1783 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1784 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1785 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1789 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1791 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1792 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1793 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1794 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1795 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1796 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1797 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1799 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1800 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1802 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1803 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1804 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1806 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1807 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1808 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1809 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1810 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1813 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1814 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1815 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1816 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1817 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1818 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1821 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1822 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1823 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1825 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1829 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1830 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1832 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1833 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1837 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1838 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1839 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1840 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1842 outbound_capacity_msat,
1843 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1844 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1849 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1850 let context = &self;
1851 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1854 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1855 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1857 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1858 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1860 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1861 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1863 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1864 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1865 let context = &self;
1866 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1868 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1871 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1872 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1874 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1875 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1877 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1878 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1880 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1881 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1885 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1886 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1892 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1893 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1894 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1897 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1898 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1899 included_htlcs += 1;
1902 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1903 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1907 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1908 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1909 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1910 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1911 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1912 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1917 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1919 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1920 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1925 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1926 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1930 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1931 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1932 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1935 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1936 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1938 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1939 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1940 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1942 total_pending_htlcs,
1943 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1944 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1945 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1947 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1948 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1949 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1951 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1953 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1958 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1959 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1961 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1962 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1964 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1965 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1967 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1968 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1969 let context = &self;
1970 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1972 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1975 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1976 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1978 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1979 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1981 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1982 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1984 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1985 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1989 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1990 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1996 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1997 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1998 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1999 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2000 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2001 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2004 included_htlcs += 1;
2007 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2008 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2011 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2012 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2014 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2015 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2016 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2021 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2022 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2023 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2026 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2027 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2029 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2030 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2032 total_pending_htlcs,
2033 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2034 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2035 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2037 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2038 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2039 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2041 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2043 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2048 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2049 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2050 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2051 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2058 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2060 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2061 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2064 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2066 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2067 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2068 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2072 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2073 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2074 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2077 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2079 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2080 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2083 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2084 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2085 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2086 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2087 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2088 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2089 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2090 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2091 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2092 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2093 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2095 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2096 // return them to fail the payment.
2097 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2098 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2099 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2101 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2102 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2107 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2108 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2109 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2110 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2111 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2112 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2113 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2114 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2115 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2116 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2117 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2118 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2119 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2123 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2125 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2126 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2129 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2130 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2134 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2135 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2136 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2137 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2138 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2139 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2140 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2141 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2142 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2146 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2147 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2148 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2151 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2152 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2153 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2154 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2157 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2159 next_local_nonce: None,
2163 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2164 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2165 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2166 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2168 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2169 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2170 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2171 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2173 match &self.holder_signer {
2174 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2175 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2176 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2177 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2178 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2181 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2185 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2186 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2187 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2188 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2189 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2190 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2193 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2194 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2200 // Internal utility functions for channels
2202 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2203 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2204 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2206 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2208 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2209 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2210 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2212 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2215 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2217 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2220 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2221 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2222 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2224 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2226 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2227 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2228 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2229 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2230 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2233 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2234 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2235 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2236 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2237 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2238 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2239 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2242 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2243 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2245 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2246 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2249 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2250 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2251 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2252 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2253 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2254 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2257 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2258 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2259 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2260 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2263 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2264 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2266 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2267 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2268 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2272 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2273 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2274 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2276 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2277 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2278 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2279 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2281 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2282 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2284 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2286 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2287 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2288 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2289 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2291 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2292 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2302 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2303 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2304 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2305 // outside of those situations will fail.
2306 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2310 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2315 1 + // script length (0)
2319 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2320 2 + // witness marker and flag
2321 1 + // witness element count
2322 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2323 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2324 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2325 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2326 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2327 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2329 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2330 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2331 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2337 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2338 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2339 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2340 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2342 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2343 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2344 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2346 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2347 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2348 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2349 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2350 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2351 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2354 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2355 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2358 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2359 value_to_holder = 0;
2362 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2363 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2364 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2365 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2367 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2368 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2371 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2372 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2375 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2378 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2379 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2381 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2383 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2384 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2385 where L::Target: Logger {
2386 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2387 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2388 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2389 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2390 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2391 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2392 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2393 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2397 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2398 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2399 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2400 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2402 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2403 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2405 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2407 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2408 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2409 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2411 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2412 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2413 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2414 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2415 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2416 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2417 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2419 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2420 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2421 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2423 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2424 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2426 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2429 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2430 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2434 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2438 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2439 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2440 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2441 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2442 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2443 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2446 // Now update local state:
2448 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2449 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2450 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2451 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2452 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2453 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2454 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2458 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2459 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2460 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2461 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2462 // do not not get into this branch.
2463 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2464 match pending_update {
2465 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2466 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2467 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2468 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2469 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2470 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2471 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2474 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2475 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2476 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2477 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2478 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2479 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2480 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2486 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2487 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2488 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2490 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2491 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2492 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2494 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2495 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2498 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2499 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2501 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2502 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2504 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2505 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2508 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2511 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2512 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2513 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2514 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2519 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2520 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2521 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2522 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2523 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2524 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2525 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2526 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2527 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2528 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2529 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2530 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2531 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2532 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2533 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2535 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2536 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2537 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2538 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2539 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2542 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2543 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2544 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2550 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2551 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2553 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2557 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2558 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2559 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2560 /// before we fail backwards.
2562 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2563 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2564 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2565 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2566 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2567 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2568 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2571 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2572 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2573 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2574 /// before we fail backwards.
2576 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2577 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2578 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2579 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2580 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2581 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2582 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2584 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2586 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2587 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2588 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2590 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2591 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2592 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2594 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2595 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2596 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2598 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2603 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2604 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2610 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2611 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2612 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2613 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2614 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2618 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2619 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2620 force_holding_cell = true;
2623 // Now update local state:
2624 if force_holding_cell {
2625 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2626 match pending_update {
2627 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2628 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2629 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2630 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2634 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2635 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2636 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2637 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2643 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2644 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2645 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2651 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2653 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2654 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2657 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2658 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2659 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2664 // Message handlers:
2666 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2667 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2668 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2669 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2670 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2674 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2675 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2677 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2678 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2680 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2681 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2682 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2683 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2686 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2688 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2689 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2690 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2691 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2693 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2694 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2696 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2697 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2699 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2700 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2701 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2702 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2703 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2704 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2708 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2709 initial_commitment_tx,
2712 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2713 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2716 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2717 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2720 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2721 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2722 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2723 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2724 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2725 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2726 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2727 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2728 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2729 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2730 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2731 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2733 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2735 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2736 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2737 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2738 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2739 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2740 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2741 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2743 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2744 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2745 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2747 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2749 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2750 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2752 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2754 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2755 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2759 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2760 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2761 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2762 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2763 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2764 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2765 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2768 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2769 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2771 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2772 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2773 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2774 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2776 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2779 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2780 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2781 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2784 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2785 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2786 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2787 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2788 // when routing outbound payments.
2789 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2793 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2795 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2796 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2798 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2799 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2801 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2802 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2803 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2804 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2805 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2806 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2807 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2808 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2809 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2811 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2812 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2813 let expected_point =
2814 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2815 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2817 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2818 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2819 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2820 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2821 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2822 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2824 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2825 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2826 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2827 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2828 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2830 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2838 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2839 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2841 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2843 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2846 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2847 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2848 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2849 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2850 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2851 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2853 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2854 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2855 if local_sent_shutdown {
2856 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2858 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2859 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2860 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2863 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2866 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2869 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2872 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2876 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2877 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2878 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2879 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2881 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2882 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2885 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2886 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2887 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2888 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2889 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2890 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2891 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2892 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2893 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2894 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2895 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2897 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2898 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2899 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2900 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2901 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2902 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2906 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2907 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2910 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2911 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2912 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2914 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2915 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2916 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2917 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2918 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2919 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2920 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2924 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2925 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2926 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2927 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2928 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2929 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2930 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2934 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2935 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2936 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2937 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2938 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2942 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2943 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2945 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2946 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2947 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2949 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2950 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2954 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2957 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2958 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2962 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2963 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2967 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2968 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2969 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2970 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2971 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2972 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2973 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2974 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2975 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2977 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2978 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2979 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2980 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2981 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2984 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2985 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2986 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2987 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2988 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2991 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2994 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2995 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2998 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2999 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3000 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3004 // Now update local state:
3005 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3006 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3007 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3008 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3009 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3010 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3011 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3016 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3018 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3019 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3020 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3021 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3022 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3023 None => fail_reason.into(),
3024 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3025 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3026 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3029 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3033 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3034 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3035 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3036 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3038 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3044 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3047 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3048 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3049 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3051 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3055 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3058 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3059 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3062 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3066 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3070 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3071 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3074 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3078 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3082 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3083 where L::Target: Logger
3085 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3086 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3088 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3091 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3095 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3097 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3099 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3100 let commitment_txid = {
3101 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3102 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3103 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3105 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3106 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3107 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3108 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3109 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3114 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3116 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3117 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3118 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3119 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3122 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3123 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3124 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3125 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3128 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3130 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3131 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3132 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3133 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3134 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3135 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3136 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3137 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3138 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3139 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3140 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3146 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3150 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3151 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3152 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3153 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3154 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3155 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3156 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3157 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3158 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3159 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3160 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3161 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3162 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3165 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3166 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3167 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3168 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3169 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3170 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3171 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3173 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3174 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3175 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3176 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3177 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3178 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3179 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3182 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3183 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3186 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3188 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3189 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3190 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3193 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3196 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3197 commitment_stats.tx,
3199 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3200 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3201 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3204 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3205 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3207 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3208 let mut need_commitment = false;
3209 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3210 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3211 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3212 need_commitment = true;
3216 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3217 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3218 Some(forward_info.clone())
3220 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3221 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3222 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3223 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3224 need_commitment = true;
3227 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3228 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3229 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3230 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3231 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3232 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3233 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3234 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3235 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3236 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3237 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3238 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3239 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3240 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3242 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3244 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3245 need_commitment = true;
3249 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3250 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3251 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3252 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3253 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3254 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3256 nondust_htlc_sources,
3260 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3261 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3262 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3263 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3264 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3266 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3267 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3268 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3269 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3270 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3271 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3272 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3273 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3274 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3275 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3276 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3277 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3278 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3279 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3281 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3282 &self.context.channel_id);
3283 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3286 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3287 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3288 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3289 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3290 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3291 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3292 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3293 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3294 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3298 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3299 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3300 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3301 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3304 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3305 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3306 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3307 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3308 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3309 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3310 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3312 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3313 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3314 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3315 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3318 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3319 /// for our counterparty.
3320 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3321 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3322 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3323 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3325 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3326 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3327 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3328 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3330 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3331 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3332 updates: Vec::new(),
3335 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3336 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3337 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3338 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3339 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3340 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3341 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3342 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3343 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3344 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3345 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3346 // to rebalance channels.
3347 match &htlc_update {
3348 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3349 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3350 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3352 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3353 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3355 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3358 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3359 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3360 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3361 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3362 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3363 // into the holding cell without ever being
3364 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3365 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3366 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3369 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3375 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3376 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3377 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3378 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3379 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3380 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3381 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3382 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3383 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3384 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3385 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3386 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3388 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3389 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3390 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3391 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3392 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3393 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3394 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3395 // for a full revocation before failing.
3396 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3397 update_fail_count += 1;
3400 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3402 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3409 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3410 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3412 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3413 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3418 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3419 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3420 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3421 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3422 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3424 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3425 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3426 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3428 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3429 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3435 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3436 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3437 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3438 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3439 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3440 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3441 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3442 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3443 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3445 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3446 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3448 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3449 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3451 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3452 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3455 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3457 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3458 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3459 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3463 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3464 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3465 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3466 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3467 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3468 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3469 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3470 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3474 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3476 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3477 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3480 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3481 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3482 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3483 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3485 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3489 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3490 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3491 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3492 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3493 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3494 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3495 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3496 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3500 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3501 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3502 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3503 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3504 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3505 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3506 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3507 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3508 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3510 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3511 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3514 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3515 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3516 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3517 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3518 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3519 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3520 let mut require_commitment = false;
3521 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3524 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3525 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3526 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3527 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3529 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3530 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3531 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3532 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3533 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3534 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3536 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3540 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3541 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3542 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3543 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3544 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3546 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3547 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3548 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3553 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3554 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3556 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3560 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3561 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3563 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3564 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3565 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3566 require_commitment = true;
3567 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3568 match forward_info {
3569 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3570 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3571 require_commitment = true;
3573 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3574 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3575 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3577 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3578 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3579 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3583 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3584 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3585 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3586 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3592 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3593 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3594 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3595 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3596 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3598 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3599 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3600 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3601 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3602 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3603 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3604 require_commitment = true;
3608 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3610 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3611 match update_state {
3612 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3613 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3614 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3615 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3616 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3617 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3619 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3620 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3621 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3622 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3623 require_commitment = true;
3624 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3625 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3630 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3631 let release_state_str =
3632 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3633 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3634 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3635 if !release_monitor {
3636 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3637 update: monitor_update,
3639 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3641 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3646 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3647 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3648 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3649 if require_commitment {
3650 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3651 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3652 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3653 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3655 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3656 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3657 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3658 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3659 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3661 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3662 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3663 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3664 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3665 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3668 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3669 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3670 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3671 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3672 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3673 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3675 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3676 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3678 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3679 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3681 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3682 if require_commitment {
3683 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3685 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3686 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3687 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3688 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3690 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3691 &self.context.channel_id(),
3692 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3695 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3696 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3698 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3699 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3701 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3702 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3708 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3709 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3710 /// commitment update.
3711 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3712 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3713 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3715 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3716 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3719 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3720 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3721 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3722 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3724 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3725 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3726 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3727 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3728 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3729 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3730 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3732 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3733 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3735 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3736 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3738 if !self.context.is_live() {
3739 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3742 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3743 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3744 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3745 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3746 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3747 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3748 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3749 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3750 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3751 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3755 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3756 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3757 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3758 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3759 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3760 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3763 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3764 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3768 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3769 force_holding_cell = true;
3772 if force_holding_cell {
3773 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3777 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3778 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3780 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3781 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3786 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3787 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3789 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3791 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3792 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3793 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3794 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3798 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3799 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3800 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3804 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3805 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3808 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3809 // will be retransmitted.
3810 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3811 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3812 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3814 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3815 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3817 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3818 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3819 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3820 // this HTLC accordingly
3821 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3824 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3825 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3826 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3827 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3830 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3831 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3832 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3833 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3834 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3835 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3840 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3842 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3843 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3844 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3845 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3849 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3850 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3851 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3852 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3853 // the update upon reconnection.
3854 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3858 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3860 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3861 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3865 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3866 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3867 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3868 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3869 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3870 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3871 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3873 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3874 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3875 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3876 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3877 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3878 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3879 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3881 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3882 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3883 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3884 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3885 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3886 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3887 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3890 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3891 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3892 /// to the remote side.
3893 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3894 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3895 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3896 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3899 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3901 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3902 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3904 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3905 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3906 // first received the funding_signed.
3907 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3908 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3909 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3911 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3912 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3913 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3914 funding_broadcastable = None;
3917 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3918 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3919 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3920 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3921 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3922 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3923 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3924 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3925 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3926 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3927 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3928 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3929 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3930 next_per_commitment_point,
3931 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3935 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3937 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3938 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3939 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3940 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3941 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3942 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3944 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3945 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3946 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3947 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3948 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3949 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3953 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3954 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3956 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3957 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3959 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3960 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3963 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3964 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3965 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3966 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3967 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3968 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3969 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3970 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3971 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3975 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3976 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3978 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3979 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3981 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3984 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3986 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3987 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3988 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3989 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3990 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3991 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3992 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3993 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3994 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3995 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3997 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3999 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4001 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4007 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4010 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4011 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4012 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4014 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4015 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4017 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4018 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4020 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4021 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4024 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4025 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4026 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4027 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4028 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4030 SignerResumeUpdates {
4038 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4039 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4040 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4041 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4042 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4043 per_commitment_secret,
4044 next_per_commitment_point,
4046 next_local_nonce: None,
4050 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4051 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4052 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4053 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4054 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4055 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4057 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4058 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4059 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4060 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4061 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4062 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4063 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4064 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4065 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4066 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4071 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4072 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4074 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4075 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4076 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4077 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4078 reason: err_packet.clone()
4081 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4082 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4083 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4084 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4085 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4086 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4089 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4090 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4091 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4092 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4093 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4100 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4101 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4102 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4103 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4107 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4108 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4109 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4110 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4111 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4112 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4113 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4117 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4118 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4119 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4123 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4124 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4129 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4130 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4131 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4132 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4133 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4134 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4135 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4140 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4141 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4143 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4144 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4145 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4146 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4147 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4148 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4149 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4150 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4153 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4155 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4156 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4157 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4158 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4162 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4163 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4167 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4168 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4169 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4170 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4171 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4172 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4174 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4175 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4176 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4177 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4178 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4181 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4182 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4183 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4184 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4185 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4186 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4187 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4188 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4192 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4193 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4194 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4195 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4197 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4201 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4202 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4203 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4204 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4206 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4208 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4210 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4211 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4212 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4213 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4214 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4217 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4218 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4219 channel_ready: None,
4220 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4221 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4222 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4226 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4227 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4228 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4229 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4230 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4231 next_per_commitment_point,
4232 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4234 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4235 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4236 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4240 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4241 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4242 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4244 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4245 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4246 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4249 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4255 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4256 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4257 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4258 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4259 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4260 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4261 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4263 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4265 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4266 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4267 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4268 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4269 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4270 next_per_commitment_point,
4271 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4275 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4276 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4277 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4279 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4282 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4283 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4284 raa: required_revoke,
4285 commitment_update: None,
4286 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4288 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4289 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4290 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4292 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4295 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4296 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4297 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4298 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4299 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4300 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4303 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4304 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4305 raa: required_revoke,
4306 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4307 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4311 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4315 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4316 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4317 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4318 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4320 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4322 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4324 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4325 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4326 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4327 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4328 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4329 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4330 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4331 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4333 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4334 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4335 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4336 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4337 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4339 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4340 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4341 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4342 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4345 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4346 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4347 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4348 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4349 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4350 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4351 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4352 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4353 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4354 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4355 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4356 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4357 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4358 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4359 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4361 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4364 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4365 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4368 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4369 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4370 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4371 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4372 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4373 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4376 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4377 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4378 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4379 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4380 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4381 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4384 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4390 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4391 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4392 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4393 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4395 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4396 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4397 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4398 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4399 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4400 return Ok((None, None, None));
4403 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4404 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4405 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4407 return Ok((None, None, None));
4410 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4411 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4412 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4413 return Ok((None, None, None));
4416 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4418 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4419 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4420 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4421 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4423 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4424 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4426 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4427 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4429 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4430 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4431 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4432 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4434 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4435 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4436 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4443 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4444 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4446 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4447 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4450 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4451 /// within our expected timeframe.
4453 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4454 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4455 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4458 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4461 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4462 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4466 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4467 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4469 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4470 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4472 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4473 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4474 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4475 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4476 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4478 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4479 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4483 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4485 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4486 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4489 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4490 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4491 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4494 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4497 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4498 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4499 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4500 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4502 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4505 assert!(send_shutdown);
4506 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4507 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4508 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4510 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4511 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4513 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4518 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4520 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4521 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4523 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4524 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4525 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4526 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4527 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4528 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4531 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4532 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4534 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4535 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4536 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4537 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4541 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4542 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4543 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4544 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4545 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4546 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4548 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4549 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4556 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4557 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4559 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4562 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4563 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4565 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4567 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4568 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4569 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4570 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4571 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4572 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4573 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4574 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4575 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4577 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4578 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4581 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4585 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4586 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4587 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4588 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4590 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4591 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4593 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4594 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4596 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4597 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4599 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4600 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4603 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4604 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4607 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4608 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4609 return Ok((None, None, None));
4612 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4613 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4614 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4615 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4617 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4619 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4622 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4623 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4624 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4625 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4626 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4630 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4631 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4632 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4636 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4637 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4638 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4639 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4640 monitor_update: None,
4641 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4642 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4644 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4645 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4646 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4647 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4651 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4653 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4654 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4655 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4656 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4658 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4661 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4662 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4664 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4665 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4666 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4667 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4668 monitor_update: None,
4669 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4670 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4672 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4673 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4674 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4675 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4680 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4681 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4682 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4683 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4685 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4686 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4687 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4689 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4695 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4696 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4699 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4700 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4702 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4703 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4706 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4707 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4708 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4709 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4710 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4712 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4713 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4714 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4716 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4717 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4720 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4721 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4722 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4723 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4724 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4725 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4726 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4727 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4729 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4732 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4733 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4734 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4735 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4737 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4741 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4742 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4743 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4744 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4746 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4752 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4753 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4754 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4755 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4756 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4757 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4758 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4760 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4761 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4764 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4766 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4767 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4773 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4774 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4775 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4776 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4777 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4778 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4779 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4781 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4782 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4789 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4790 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4793 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4794 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4797 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4798 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4802 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4803 &self.context.holder_signer
4807 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4809 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4810 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4811 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4812 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4813 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4814 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4816 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4818 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4826 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4827 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4831 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4832 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4833 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4834 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4837 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4838 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4839 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4840 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4843 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4844 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4845 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4846 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4847 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4848 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4851 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4852 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4853 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4854 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4855 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4856 if !release_monitor {
4857 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4866 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4867 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4870 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4871 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4872 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4874 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4875 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4876 if self.context.channel_state &
4877 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4878 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4879 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4880 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4881 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4884 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4885 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4886 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4887 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4888 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4889 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4891 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4892 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4893 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4895 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4896 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4897 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4898 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4899 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4900 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4906 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4907 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4908 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4911 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4912 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4913 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4916 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4917 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4918 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4921 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4922 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4923 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4924 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4925 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4926 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4931 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4932 self.context.channel_update_status
4935 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4936 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4937 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4940 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4942 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4943 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4944 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4948 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4949 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4950 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4953 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4957 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4958 // channel_ready yet.
4959 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4963 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4964 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4965 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4966 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4967 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4969 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4970 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4971 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4973 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4974 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4977 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4978 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4979 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4980 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4981 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4982 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4983 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4984 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4985 self.context.channel_state);
4987 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4991 if need_commitment_update {
4992 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4993 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4994 let next_per_commitment_point =
4995 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4996 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4997 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4998 next_per_commitment_point,
4999 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5003 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5009 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5010 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5011 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5012 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5013 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5014 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5015 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5017 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5020 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5021 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5022 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5023 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5024 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5025 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5026 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5027 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5028 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5029 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5030 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5031 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5032 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5033 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5034 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5035 // channel and move on.
5036 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5037 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5039 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5040 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5041 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5043 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5044 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5045 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5046 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5047 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5048 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5049 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5050 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5055 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5056 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5057 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5058 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5059 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5062 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5063 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5064 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5065 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5066 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5067 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5070 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5071 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5072 // may have already happened for this block).
5073 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5074 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5075 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5076 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5079 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5080 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5081 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5082 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5090 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5091 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5092 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5093 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5095 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5096 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5099 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5101 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5102 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5103 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5104 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5106 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5109 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5112 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5113 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5114 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5115 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5117 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5120 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5121 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5122 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5124 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5125 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5127 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5128 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5129 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5137 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5139 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5140 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5141 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5143 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5144 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5147 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5148 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5149 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5150 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5151 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5152 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5153 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5154 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5155 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5158 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5159 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5160 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5161 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5163 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5164 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5165 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5167 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5168 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5169 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5170 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5172 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5173 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5174 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5175 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5176 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5177 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5178 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5181 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5182 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5184 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5187 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5188 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5189 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5190 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5191 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5192 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5193 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5194 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5195 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5196 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5197 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5198 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5199 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5200 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5201 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5202 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5203 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5209 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5214 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5215 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5217 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5218 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5219 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5220 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5222 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5225 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5227 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5228 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5229 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5230 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5231 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5232 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5234 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5235 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5238 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5239 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5240 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5241 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5242 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5243 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5245 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5246 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5249 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5250 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5251 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5252 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5253 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5259 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5260 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5261 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5262 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5264 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5267 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5271 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5275 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5276 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5280 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5284 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5285 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5288 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5292 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5294 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5299 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5300 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5301 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5303 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5308 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5310 None => return None,
5313 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5315 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5316 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5318 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5319 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5325 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5327 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5328 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5329 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5330 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5331 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5332 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5333 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5335 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5336 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5337 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5338 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5339 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5340 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5341 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5342 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5343 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5344 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5345 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5346 contents: announcement,
5351 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5355 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5356 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5357 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5358 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5359 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5360 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5361 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5362 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5364 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5366 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5367 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5368 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5369 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5371 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5372 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5373 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5374 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5377 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5378 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5379 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5380 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5383 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5386 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5387 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5388 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5389 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5390 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5391 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5394 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5396 Err(_) => return None,
5398 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5399 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5404 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5405 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5406 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5407 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5408 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5409 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5410 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5411 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5412 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5413 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5414 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5415 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5416 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5417 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5418 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5419 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5422 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5425 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5426 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5427 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5428 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5429 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5430 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5431 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5432 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5433 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5435 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5436 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5437 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5438 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5439 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5440 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5441 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5442 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5443 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5445 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5446 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5447 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5448 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5449 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5450 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5451 next_funding_txid: None,
5456 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5458 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5459 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5460 /// commitment update.
5462 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5463 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5464 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5465 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5466 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5467 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5468 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5471 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5472 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5473 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5475 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5476 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5481 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5482 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5484 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5486 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5487 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5489 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5490 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5491 /// regenerate them.
5493 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5494 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5496 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5497 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5498 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5499 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5500 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5501 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5502 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5504 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5505 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5507 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5508 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5509 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5512 if amount_msat == 0 {
5513 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5516 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5517 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5518 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5519 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5522 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5523 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5524 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5527 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5528 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5529 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5530 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5531 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5532 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5533 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5534 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5537 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5538 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5539 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5540 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5541 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5542 else { "to peer" });
5544 if need_holding_cell {
5545 force_holding_cell = true;
5548 // Now update local state:
5549 if force_holding_cell {
5550 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5555 onion_routing_packet,
5561 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5562 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5564 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5566 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5571 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5572 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5573 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5577 onion_routing_packet,
5580 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5585 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5586 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5587 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5588 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5590 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5591 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5592 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5594 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5595 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5599 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5600 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5601 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5602 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5603 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5604 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5605 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5608 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5609 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5610 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5611 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5612 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5613 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5616 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5618 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5619 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5620 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5621 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5622 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5624 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5625 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5628 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5629 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5630 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5631 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5632 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5633 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5634 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5635 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5636 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5637 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5638 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5641 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5645 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5646 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5647 where L::Target: Logger
5649 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5650 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5651 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5653 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5655 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5656 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5657 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5658 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5659 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5660 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5661 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5662 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5663 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5664 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5665 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5671 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5674 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5675 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5676 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5677 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5678 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5679 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5681 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5682 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5683 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5685 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5686 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5687 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5690 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5691 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5695 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5696 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5698 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5700 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5701 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5702 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5703 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5705 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5706 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5707 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5708 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5709 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5710 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5714 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5715 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5719 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5720 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5725 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5726 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5728 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5729 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5730 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5731 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5732 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5733 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5734 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5735 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5737 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5738 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5739 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5742 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5743 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5744 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5750 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5752 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5753 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5754 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5755 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5756 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5758 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5760 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5766 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5767 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5769 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5770 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5771 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5772 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5773 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5775 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5776 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5777 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5780 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5781 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5782 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5784 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5785 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5788 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5789 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5791 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5792 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5793 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5796 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5797 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5798 let mut chan_closed = false;
5799 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5803 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5805 None if !chan_closed => {
5806 // use override shutdown script if provided
5807 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5808 Some(script) => script,
5810 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5811 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5812 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5813 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5817 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5818 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5820 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5826 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5827 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5828 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5829 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5830 monitor_update: None,
5831 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5832 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5834 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5835 Some(shutdown_result)
5837 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5840 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5842 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5843 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5844 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5845 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5846 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5847 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5850 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5851 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5853 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5854 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5855 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5858 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5859 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5860 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5861 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5862 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5864 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5865 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5872 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5873 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5875 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5878 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5879 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5880 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5882 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5883 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5887 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5891 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5892 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5893 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5894 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5897 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5898 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5899 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5900 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5901 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5902 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5903 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5904 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5906 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5907 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5908 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5909 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5911 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5914 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5917 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5918 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5921 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5922 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5924 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5925 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5926 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5927 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5928 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5931 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5932 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5934 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5935 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5937 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5939 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5941 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5942 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5943 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5944 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5947 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5948 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5950 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5951 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5952 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5953 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5957 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5958 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5959 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5963 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5964 Ok(script) => script,
5965 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5968 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
5971 context: ChannelContext {
5974 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5975 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5976 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5977 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5982 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5984 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5985 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5986 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5987 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5989 channel_value_satoshis,
5991 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5993 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5994 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5997 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5998 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6001 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6002 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6003 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6004 pending_update_fee: None,
6005 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6006 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6007 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6008 update_time_counter: 1,
6010 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6012 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6013 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6014 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6015 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6016 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6017 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6019 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6020 signer_pending_funding: false,
6022 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6023 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6024 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6025 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6027 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6028 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6029 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6030 closing_fee_limits: None,
6031 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6033 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6034 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6035 short_channel_id: None,
6036 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6038 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6039 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6040 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6041 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6042 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6043 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6044 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6045 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6046 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6047 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6048 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6049 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6051 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6053 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6054 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6055 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6056 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6057 counterparty_parameters: None,
6058 funding_outpoint: None,
6059 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6061 funding_transaction: None,
6062 is_batch_funding: None,
6064 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6065 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6066 counterparty_node_id,
6068 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6070 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6072 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6073 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6075 announcement_sigs: None,
6077 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6078 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6079 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6080 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6082 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6083 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6085 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6086 outbound_scid_alias,
6088 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6089 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6091 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6092 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6097 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6099 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6103 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6104 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6105 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6106 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6107 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6108 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6109 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6110 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6111 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6112 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6113 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6115 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6116 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6118 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6119 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6120 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6121 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6124 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6125 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6127 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6129 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6130 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6132 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6133 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6134 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6135 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6136 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6137 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6140 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6141 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6143 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6144 if funding_created.is_none() {
6145 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6146 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6147 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6151 let channel = Channel {
6152 context: self.context,
6155 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6158 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6159 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6160 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6161 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6162 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6163 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6164 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6165 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6166 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6167 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6170 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6171 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6172 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6173 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6174 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6175 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6181 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6182 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6183 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6184 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6185 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6186 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6188 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6190 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6191 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6192 // We've exhausted our options
6195 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6196 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6199 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6200 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6201 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6202 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6204 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6205 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6206 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6207 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6208 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6209 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6211 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6213 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6214 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6217 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6218 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6219 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6221 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6222 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6225 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6226 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6229 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6230 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6234 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6235 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6236 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6237 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6238 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6239 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6240 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6241 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6242 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6243 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6244 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6245 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6246 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6247 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6248 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6249 first_per_commitment_point,
6250 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6251 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6252 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6253 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6255 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6260 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6261 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6263 // Check sanity of message fields:
6264 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6265 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6267 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6270 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6273 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6276 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6279 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6281 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6283 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6284 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6285 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6287 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6288 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6291 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6292 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6294 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6298 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6299 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6302 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6305 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6308 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6309 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6311 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6314 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6317 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6318 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6321 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6322 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6325 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6326 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6328 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6329 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6332 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6333 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6336 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6337 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6338 &Some(ref script) => {
6339 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6340 if script.len() == 0 {
6343 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6344 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6346 Some(script.clone())
6349 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6356 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6357 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6358 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6359 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6360 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6362 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6363 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6365 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6368 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6369 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6370 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6371 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6372 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6373 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6376 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6377 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6378 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6381 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6382 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6384 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6385 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6391 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6392 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6393 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6394 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6397 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6398 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6399 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6400 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6401 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6402 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6403 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6404 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6405 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6406 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6407 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6410 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6412 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6413 // support this channel type.
6414 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6415 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6419 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6420 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6421 // `static_remote_key`.
6422 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6425 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6426 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6427 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6429 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6430 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6432 channel_type.clone()
6434 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6435 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6441 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6442 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6443 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6444 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6445 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6446 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6447 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6448 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6449 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6452 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6453 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6456 // Check sanity of message fields:
6457 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6460 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6461 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6463 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6464 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6466 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6467 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6468 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6470 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6471 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6473 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6474 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6476 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6478 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6479 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6480 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6482 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6485 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6486 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6489 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6490 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6491 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6493 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6494 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6496 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6497 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6499 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6502 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6503 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6505 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6508 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6512 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6514 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6515 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6516 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6520 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6521 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6522 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6523 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6526 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6527 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6529 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6530 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6531 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6533 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6534 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6537 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6538 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6539 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6540 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6544 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6545 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6546 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6547 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6550 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6551 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6552 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6553 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6557 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6558 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6559 &Some(ref script) => {
6560 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6561 if script.len() == 0 {
6564 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6565 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6567 Some(script.clone())
6570 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6577 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6578 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6579 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6580 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6584 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6585 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6586 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6590 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6591 Ok(script) => script,
6592 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6595 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6596 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6598 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6601 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6605 context: ChannelContext {
6608 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6609 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6611 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6616 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6618 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6619 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6620 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6621 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6624 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6626 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6627 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6630 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6631 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6632 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6634 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6635 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6636 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6637 pending_update_fee: None,
6638 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6639 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6640 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6641 update_time_counter: 1,
6643 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6645 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6646 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6647 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6648 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6649 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6650 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6652 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6653 signer_pending_funding: false,
6655 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6656 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6657 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6658 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6660 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6661 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6662 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6663 closing_fee_limits: None,
6664 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6666 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6667 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6668 short_channel_id: None,
6669 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6671 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6672 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6673 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6674 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6675 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6676 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6677 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6678 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6679 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6680 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6681 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6682 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6685 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6687 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6688 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6689 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6690 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6691 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6692 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6693 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6695 funding_outpoint: None,
6696 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6698 funding_transaction: None,
6699 is_batch_funding: None,
6701 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6702 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6703 counterparty_node_id,
6705 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6707 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6709 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6710 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6712 announcement_sigs: None,
6714 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6715 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6716 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6717 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6719 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6720 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6722 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6723 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6725 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6726 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6728 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6729 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6734 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6736 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6742 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6743 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6745 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6746 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6747 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6748 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6750 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6751 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6753 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6754 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6757 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6760 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6761 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6762 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6764 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6765 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6766 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6767 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6769 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6770 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6771 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6772 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6773 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6774 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6775 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6776 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6777 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6778 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6779 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6780 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6781 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6782 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6783 first_per_commitment_point,
6784 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6785 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6786 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6788 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6790 next_local_nonce: None,
6794 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6795 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6797 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6799 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6800 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6803 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6804 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6806 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6807 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6808 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6809 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6810 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6811 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6812 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6813 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6814 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6815 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6816 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6818 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6821 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6822 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6823 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6827 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6828 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6830 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6831 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6832 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6834 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6836 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6837 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6838 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6839 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6842 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6843 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6844 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6845 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6846 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6848 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6850 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6851 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6852 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6855 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6856 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6857 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6861 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6862 initial_commitment_tx,
6865 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6866 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6869 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6870 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6873 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6875 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6876 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6877 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6878 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6880 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6882 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6883 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6884 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6885 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6886 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6887 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6888 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6889 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6890 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6891 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6892 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6894 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6896 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6897 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6898 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6899 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6900 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6901 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6903 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6904 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6906 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6907 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6908 let mut channel = Channel {
6909 context: self.context,
6911 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6912 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6914 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6918 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6919 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6921 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6927 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6928 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6929 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6930 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6931 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6933 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6934 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6935 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6936 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6942 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6943 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6944 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6945 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6946 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6947 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6952 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6953 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6954 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6955 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6957 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6958 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6959 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6960 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6965 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6966 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6967 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6968 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6969 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6970 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6975 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6976 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6977 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6980 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6982 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6983 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6984 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6985 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6986 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6988 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6989 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6990 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6991 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6993 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6994 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6995 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6997 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6999 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7000 // deserialized from that format.
7001 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7002 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7003 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7005 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7007 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7008 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7009 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7011 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7012 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7013 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7014 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7017 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7018 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7019 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7022 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7023 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7024 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7025 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7027 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7028 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7030 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7032 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7034 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7036 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7039 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7041 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7046 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7047 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7049 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7050 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7051 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7052 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7053 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7054 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7055 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7057 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7059 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7061 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7064 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7065 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7066 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7069 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7071 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7072 preimages.push(preimage);
7074 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7075 reason.write(writer)?;
7077 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7079 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7080 preimages.push(preimage);
7082 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7083 reason.write(writer)?;
7086 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7087 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7088 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7090 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7091 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7092 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7096 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7097 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7098 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7100 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7101 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7105 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7106 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7107 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7108 source.write(writer)?;
7109 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7111 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7112 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7113 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7115 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7116 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7118 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7120 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7121 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7123 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7125 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7126 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7131 match self.context.resend_order {
7132 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7133 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7136 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7137 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7138 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7140 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7141 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7142 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7143 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7146 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7147 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7148 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7149 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7150 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7153 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7154 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7155 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7156 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7158 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7159 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7160 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7162 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7164 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7165 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7166 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7167 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7169 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7170 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7171 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7172 // consider the stale state on reload.
7175 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7176 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7177 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7179 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7180 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7181 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7183 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7184 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7186 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7187 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7188 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7190 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7191 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7193 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7196 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7197 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7198 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7200 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7203 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7204 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7206 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7207 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7208 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7210 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7212 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7214 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7216 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7217 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7218 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7219 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7220 htlc.write(writer)?;
7223 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7224 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7225 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7227 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7228 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7230 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7231 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7232 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7233 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7234 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7235 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7236 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7238 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7239 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7240 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7241 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7242 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7244 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7245 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7247 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7248 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7249 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7250 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7252 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7254 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7255 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7256 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7257 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7258 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7259 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7260 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7262 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7263 (2, chan_type, option),
7264 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7265 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7266 (5, self.context.config, required),
7267 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7268 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7269 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7270 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7271 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7272 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7273 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7274 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7275 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7276 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7277 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7278 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7279 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7280 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7281 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7282 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7283 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7284 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7285 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7292 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7293 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7295 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7296 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7298 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7299 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7300 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7302 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7303 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7304 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7305 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7307 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7309 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7310 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7312 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7315 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7316 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7319 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7323 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7325 let mut keys_data = None;
7327 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7328 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7329 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7331 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7332 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7333 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7334 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7335 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7336 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7340 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7341 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7342 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7345 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7347 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7348 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7349 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7351 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7353 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7354 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7355 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7356 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7357 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7358 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7359 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7360 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7361 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7362 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7363 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7364 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7365 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7370 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7371 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7372 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7373 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7374 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7375 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7376 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7377 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7378 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7379 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7380 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7381 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7383 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7384 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7387 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7388 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7391 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7392 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7394 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7396 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7400 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7401 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7402 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7403 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7404 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7405 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7406 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7407 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7408 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7409 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7410 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7412 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7413 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7414 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7416 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7417 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7418 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7420 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7424 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7425 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7426 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7427 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7430 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7431 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7432 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7434 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7435 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7436 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7437 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7440 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7441 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7442 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7443 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7446 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7448 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7450 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7456 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7457 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7458 // consider the stale state on reload.
7459 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7462 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7463 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7464 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7469 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7470 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7471 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7473 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7474 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7475 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7476 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7478 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7479 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7481 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7482 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7484 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7485 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7486 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7488 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7490 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7491 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7493 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7494 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7497 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7499 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7500 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7501 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7502 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7504 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7507 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7508 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7510 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7512 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7513 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7516 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7518 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7520 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7521 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7522 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7524 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7525 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7526 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7530 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7531 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7532 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7534 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7540 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7541 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7542 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7543 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7544 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7545 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7546 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7547 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7548 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7549 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7551 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7552 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7553 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7554 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7555 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7556 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7557 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7559 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7560 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7561 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7562 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7564 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7566 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7567 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7569 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7571 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7572 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7573 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7574 (2, channel_type, option),
7575 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7576 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7577 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7578 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7579 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7580 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7581 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7582 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7583 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7584 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7585 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7586 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7587 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7588 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7589 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7590 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7591 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7592 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7593 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7594 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7595 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7596 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7599 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7600 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7601 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7602 // required channel parameters.
7603 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7604 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7605 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7607 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7609 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7610 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7611 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7612 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7615 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7616 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7617 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7619 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7620 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7622 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7623 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7628 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7629 if iter.next().is_some() {
7630 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7634 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7635 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7636 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7637 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7638 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7641 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7642 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7643 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7645 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7646 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7648 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7649 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7650 // separate u64 values.
7651 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7653 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7655 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7656 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7657 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7658 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7660 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7661 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7663 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7664 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7665 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7666 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7667 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7670 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7671 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7675 context: ChannelContext {
7678 config: config.unwrap(),
7682 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7683 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7684 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7687 temporary_channel_id,
7689 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7691 channel_value_satoshis,
7693 latest_monitor_update_id,
7695 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7696 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7699 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7700 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7703 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7704 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7705 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7706 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7710 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7711 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7712 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7713 monitor_pending_forwards,
7714 monitor_pending_failures,
7715 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7717 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7718 signer_pending_funding: false,
7721 holding_cell_update_fee,
7722 next_holder_htlc_id,
7723 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7724 update_time_counter,
7727 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7728 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7729 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7730 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7732 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7733 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7734 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7735 closing_fee_limits: None,
7736 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7738 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7739 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7741 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7743 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7744 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7745 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7746 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7747 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7748 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7749 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7750 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7751 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7754 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7756 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7757 funding_transaction,
7760 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7761 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7762 counterparty_node_id,
7764 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7768 channel_update_status,
7769 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7773 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7774 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7775 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7776 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7778 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7779 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7781 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7782 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7783 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7785 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7786 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7788 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7789 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7791 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7794 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7803 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7804 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
7805 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7806 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7807 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7808 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7809 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7810 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7811 use crate::ln::channel::{ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7812 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7813 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7814 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7815 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7816 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7817 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7818 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7819 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7820 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7821 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7822 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7823 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7824 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7825 use crate::util::test_utils;
7826 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7827 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7828 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7829 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7830 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7831 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7832 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7833 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7834 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
7835 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
7836 use crate::prelude::*;
7838 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7841 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7842 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7848 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7849 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7850 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7851 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7855 signer: InMemorySigner,
7858 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7859 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7862 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7863 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7865 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7866 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7869 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7873 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7875 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
7876 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7877 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7878 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7879 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
7882 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7883 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7884 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7885 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7889 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7890 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7891 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7895 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7896 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7897 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
7898 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
7901 let seed = [42; 32];
7902 let network = Network::Testnet;
7903 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7904 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7905 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7908 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7909 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7910 let config = UserConfig::default();
7911 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
7912 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7913 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7915 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7916 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7920 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7921 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7923 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7924 let original_fee = 253;
7925 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7926 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7927 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7928 let seed = [42; 32];
7929 let network = Network::Testnet;
7930 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7932 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7933 let config = UserConfig::default();
7934 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7936 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7937 // same as the old fee.
7938 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7939 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7940 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7944 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7945 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7946 // dust limits are used.
7947 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7948 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7949 let seed = [42; 32];
7950 let network = Network::Testnet;
7951 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7952 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7953 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7955 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7956 // they have different dust limits.
7958 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7959 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7960 let config = UserConfig::default();
7961 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7963 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7964 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7965 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7966 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7967 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7969 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7970 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7971 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7972 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7973 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7975 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7976 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7977 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7978 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7980 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7981 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7982 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7984 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7985 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7987 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7988 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7989 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7991 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7992 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
7993 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7994 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7997 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7999 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8000 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8001 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8002 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8003 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8004 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8005 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8006 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8007 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8009 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8012 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8013 // the dust limit check.
8014 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8015 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8016 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8017 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8019 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8020 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8021 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8022 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8023 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8024 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8025 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8029 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8030 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8031 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8032 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8033 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8034 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8035 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8036 let seed = [42; 32];
8037 let network = Network::Testnet;
8038 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8040 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8041 let config = UserConfig::default();
8042 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8044 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8045 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8047 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8048 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8049 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8050 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8051 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8052 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8054 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8055 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8056 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8057 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8058 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8060 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8062 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8063 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8064 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8065 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8066 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8068 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8069 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8070 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8071 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8072 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8076 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8077 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8078 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8079 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8080 let seed = [42; 32];
8081 let network = Network::Testnet;
8082 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8083 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8084 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8086 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8088 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8089 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8090 let config = UserConfig::default();
8091 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8093 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8094 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8095 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8096 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8098 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8099 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8100 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8102 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8103 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8104 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8105 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8107 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8108 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8109 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8111 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8112 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8114 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8115 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8116 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8117 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8118 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8119 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8120 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8122 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8124 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8125 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8126 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8127 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8128 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8132 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8133 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8134 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8135 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8136 let seed = [42; 32];
8137 let network = Network::Testnet;
8138 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8139 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8140 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8142 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8143 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8144 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8145 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8146 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8147 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8148 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8149 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8151 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8152 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8153 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8154 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8155 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8156 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8158 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8159 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8160 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8161 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8163 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8165 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8166 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8167 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8168 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8169 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8170 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8172 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8173 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8174 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8175 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8177 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8178 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8179 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8180 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8181 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8183 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8184 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8186 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8187 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8188 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8190 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8191 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8192 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8193 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8194 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8196 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8197 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8199 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8200 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8201 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8205 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8207 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8208 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8209 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8211 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8212 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8213 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8214 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8216 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8217 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8218 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8220 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8222 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8223 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8226 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8227 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8228 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8229 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8230 let seed = [42; 32];
8231 let network = Network::Testnet;
8232 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8233 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8234 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8237 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8238 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8239 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8241 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8242 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8244 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8245 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8246 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8248 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8249 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8251 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8253 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8254 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8256 // Channel Negotiations failed
8257 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8258 assert!(result.is_err());
8263 fn channel_update() {
8264 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8265 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8266 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8267 let seed = [42; 32];
8268 let network = Network::Testnet;
8269 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8270 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8271 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8273 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8274 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8275 let config = UserConfig::default();
8276 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8278 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8279 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8280 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8281 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8282 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8284 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8285 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8286 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8287 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8288 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8290 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8291 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8292 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8293 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8295 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8296 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8297 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8299 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8300 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8302 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8303 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8304 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8306 short_channel_id: 0,
8309 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8310 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8311 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8313 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8314 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8316 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8318 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8320 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8321 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8322 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8323 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8325 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8326 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8327 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8329 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8332 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8335 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8337 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8338 use bitcoin::sighash;
8339 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8340 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8341 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8342 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8343 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8344 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8345 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8346 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8347 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8348 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8349 use crate::sync::Arc;
8350 use core::str::FromStr;
8351 use hex::DisplayHex;
8353 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8354 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8355 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8356 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8358 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8360 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8361 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8362 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8363 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8364 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8366 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8367 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8373 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8374 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8375 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8377 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8378 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8379 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8380 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8381 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8382 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8384 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8386 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8387 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8388 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8389 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8390 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8391 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8393 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8394 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8395 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8396 selected_contest_delay: 144
8398 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8399 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8401 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8402 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8404 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8405 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8407 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8408 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8410 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8411 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8412 // build_commitment_transaction.
8413 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8414 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8415 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8416 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8417 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8419 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8420 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8421 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8422 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8426 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8427 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8428 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8429 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8433 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8434 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8435 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8437 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8438 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8440 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8441 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8443 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8445 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8446 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8447 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8448 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8449 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8450 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8451 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8453 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8454 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8455 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8456 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8458 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8459 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8460 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8462 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8464 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8465 commitment_tx.clone(),
8466 counterparty_signature,
8467 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8468 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8469 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8471 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8472 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8474 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8475 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8476 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8478 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8479 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8482 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8483 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8485 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8486 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8487 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8488 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8489 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8490 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8491 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8492 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8494 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8497 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
8498 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8499 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8503 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8506 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8507 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8508 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8509 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8510 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8511 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8513 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8514 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8515 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8516 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8518 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8519 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8520 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8521 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8522 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8524 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8525 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8526 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8527 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8528 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
8529 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8531 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8535 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8536 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8537 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8538 "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", {});
8540 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8541 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8543 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8544 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8545 "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", {});
8547 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8548 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8549 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8550 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8552 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8553 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8555 amount_msat: 1000000,
8557 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8558 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8560 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8563 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8564 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8566 amount_msat: 2000000,
8568 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8569 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8571 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8574 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8575 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8577 amount_msat: 2000000,
8579 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8580 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8581 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8582 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8584 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8587 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8588 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8590 amount_msat: 3000000,
8592 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8593 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8594 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8595 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8597 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8600 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8601 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8603 amount_msat: 4000000,
8605 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8606 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8608 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8612 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8613 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8614 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8616 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8617 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8618 "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", {
8621 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8622 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8623 "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" },
8626 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8627 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8628 "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" },
8631 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8632 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8633 "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" },
8636 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8637 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8638 "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" },
8641 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8642 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8643 "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" }
8646 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8647 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8648 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8650 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8651 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8652 "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", {
8655 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8656 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8657 "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" },
8660 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8661 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8662 "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" },
8665 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8666 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8667 "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" },
8670 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8671 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8672 "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" },
8675 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8676 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8677 "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" }
8680 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8681 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8682 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8684 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8685 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8686 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8689 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8690 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8691 "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" },
8694 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8695 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8696 "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" },
8699 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8700 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8701 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8704 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8705 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8706 "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" }
8709 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8710 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8711 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8712 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8714 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8715 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8716 "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", {
8719 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8720 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8721 "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" },
8724 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8725 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8726 "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" },
8729 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8730 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8731 "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" },
8734 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8735 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8736 "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" }
8739 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8740 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8741 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8742 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8744 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8745 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8746 "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", {
8749 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8750 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8751 "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" },
8754 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8755 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8756 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8759 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8760 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8761 "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" },
8764 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8765 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8766 "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" }
8769 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8770 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8771 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8773 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8774 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8775 "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", {
8778 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8779 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8780 "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" },
8783 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8784 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8785 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8788 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8789 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8790 "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" }
8793 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8794 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8795 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8797 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8798 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8799 "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", {
8802 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8803 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8804 "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" },
8807 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8808 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8809 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8812 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8813 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8814 "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" }
8817 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8818 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8819 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8821 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8822 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8823 "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", {
8826 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8827 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8828 "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" },
8831 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8832 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8833 "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" }
8836 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8837 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8838 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8839 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8840 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8841 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8843 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8844 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8845 "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", {
8848 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8849 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8850 "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" },
8853 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8854 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8855 "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" }
8858 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8859 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8860 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8861 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8862 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8864 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8865 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8866 "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", {
8869 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8870 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8871 "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" },
8874 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8875 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8876 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8879 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8880 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8881 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8883 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8884 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8885 "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", {
8888 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8889 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8890 "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" }
8893 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8894 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8895 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8896 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8897 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8899 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8900 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8901 "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", {
8904 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8905 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8906 "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" }
8909 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8910 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8911 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8912 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8913 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8915 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8916 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8917 "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", {
8920 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8921 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8922 "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" }
8925 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8926 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8927 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8928 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8930 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8931 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8932 "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", {});
8934 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8935 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8936 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8937 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8938 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8940 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8941 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8942 "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", {});
8944 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8945 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8946 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8947 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8948 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8950 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8951 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8952 "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", {});
8954 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8955 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8956 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8958 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8959 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8960 "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", {});
8962 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8963 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8964 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8965 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8966 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8968 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8969 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8970 "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", {});
8972 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8973 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8974 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8975 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8976 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8978 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8979 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8980 "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", {});
8982 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8983 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8984 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8985 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8986 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8987 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8989 amount_msat: 2000000,
8991 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8992 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8994 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8997 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8998 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8999 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9001 amount_msat: 5000001,
9003 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9004 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9005 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9006 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9008 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9011 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9012 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9014 amount_msat: 5000000,
9016 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9017 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9018 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9019 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9021 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9025 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9026 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9027 "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", {
9030 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9031 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9032 "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" },
9034 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9035 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9036 "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" },
9038 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9039 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9040 "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" }
9043 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9044 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9045 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9046 "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", {
9049 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9050 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9051 "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" },
9053 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9054 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9055 "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" },
9057 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9058 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9059 "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" }
9064 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9065 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9067 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9068 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9069 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9070 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9072 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9073 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9074 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9076 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9077 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9079 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9080 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9082 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9083 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9084 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9088 fn test_key_derivation() {
9089 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9090 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9092 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9093 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9095 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9096 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9098 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9099 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9101 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9102 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
9104 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9105 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9107 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9108 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9110 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9111 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9115 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9116 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9117 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9118 let seed = [42; 32];
9119 let network = Network::Testnet;
9120 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9121 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9123 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9124 let config = UserConfig::default();
9125 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9126 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9128 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9129 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9131 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9132 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9133 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9134 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9135 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9136 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9137 assert!(res.is_ok());
9141 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9142 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9143 // resulting `channel_type`.
9144 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9145 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9146 let network = Network::Testnet;
9147 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9148 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9150 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9151 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9153 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9154 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9156 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9157 // need to signal it.
9158 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9159 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9160 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9161 &config, 0, 42, None
9163 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9165 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9166 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9167 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9169 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9170 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9171 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9175 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9176 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9177 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9178 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9179 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9182 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9183 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9187 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9188 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9189 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9190 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9191 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9192 let network = Network::Testnet;
9193 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9194 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9196 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9197 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9199 let config = UserConfig::default();
9201 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9202 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9203 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9204 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9205 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9207 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9208 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9209 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9213 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9214 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9215 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9217 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9218 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9219 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9220 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9221 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9222 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9224 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9228 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9229 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9231 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9232 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9233 let network = Network::Testnet;
9234 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9235 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9237 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9238 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9240 let config = UserConfig::default();
9242 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9243 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9244 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9245 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9246 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9247 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9248 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9249 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9251 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9252 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9253 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9254 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9255 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9256 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9260 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9261 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9263 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9264 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9265 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9266 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9268 assert!(res.is_err());
9270 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9271 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9272 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9274 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9275 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9276 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9279 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9281 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9282 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9283 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9284 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9287 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9288 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9290 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9291 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9293 assert!(res.is_err());
9297 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9298 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9299 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9300 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9301 let seed = [42; 32];
9302 let network = Network::Testnet;
9303 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9304 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9305 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9307 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9308 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9309 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9310 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9312 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9313 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9314 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9319 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9329 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9330 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9331 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9336 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9337 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9343 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9346 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9347 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9348 &accept_channel_msg,
9349 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9350 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9353 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9354 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9355 let tx = Transaction {
9357 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9361 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9364 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9367 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9368 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9373 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9374 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9375 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9379 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9380 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9388 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9389 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9390 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9391 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9396 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9403 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9404 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9405 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9406 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9408 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9409 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9410 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9413 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9414 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9415 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9423 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9424 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9425 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9426 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9429 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9430 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9432 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9433 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9434 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9436 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());