1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
14 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
27 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
28 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
29 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
31 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
32 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
33 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
34 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
35 use util::transaction_utils;
36 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
37 use util::logger::Logger;
38 use util::errors::APIError;
39 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
40 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
43 use std::default::Default;
44 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
46 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
48 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
49 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
52 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
53 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
54 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
55 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
56 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
57 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
58 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
60 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
63 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
64 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
65 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
66 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
69 enum InboundHTLCState {
70 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
71 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
72 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
73 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
74 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
75 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
76 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
77 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
78 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
79 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
80 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
81 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
82 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
83 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
84 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
86 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
87 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
88 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
89 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
90 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
91 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
92 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
93 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
94 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
95 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
96 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
97 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
98 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
99 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
100 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
101 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
103 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
104 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
105 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
106 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
107 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
109 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
110 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
112 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
113 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
114 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
115 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
116 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
117 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
118 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
119 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
122 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
126 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 state: InboundHTLCState,
130 enum OutboundHTLCState {
131 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
132 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
133 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
134 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
135 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
136 /// money back (though we won't), and,
137 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
138 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
139 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
140 /// we'll never get out of sync).
141 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
142 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
143 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
145 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
146 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
147 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
148 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
149 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
150 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
151 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
152 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
153 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
154 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
155 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
156 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
157 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
158 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
159 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
162 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
166 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
167 state: OutboundHTLCState,
171 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
172 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
173 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
177 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
179 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
182 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
187 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
191 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
192 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
193 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
194 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
195 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
196 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
197 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
199 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
200 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
201 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
202 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
203 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
204 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
205 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
207 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
208 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
209 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
211 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
212 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
213 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
214 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
215 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
216 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
218 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
219 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
221 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
222 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
223 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
224 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
225 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
226 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
227 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
228 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
229 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
231 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
232 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
233 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
234 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
235 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
236 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
237 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
238 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
239 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
240 /// us their shutdown.
241 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
242 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
243 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
244 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
246 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
247 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
249 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
251 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
252 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
253 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
254 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
257 /// Status has been gossiped.
259 /// Status has been changed.
261 /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
265 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
271 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
272 struct HTLCCandidate {
274 origin: HTLCInitiator,
278 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
286 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
287 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
288 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
291 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
292 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
293 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
294 config: ChannelConfig,
298 channel_id: [u8; 32],
300 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
301 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
303 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
305 holder_signer: Signer,
306 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
307 destination_script: Script,
309 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
310 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
311 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
313 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
314 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
315 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
316 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
317 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
318 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
320 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
321 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
322 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
323 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
324 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
325 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
327 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
329 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
330 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
331 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
332 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
333 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
335 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
336 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
337 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
339 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
340 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
341 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
342 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
343 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
344 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
345 // commitment_signed.
346 pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
347 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
348 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
349 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
350 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
351 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
352 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
353 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
354 update_time_counter: u32,
357 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
358 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
359 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
360 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
361 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
362 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
364 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
366 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
367 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
368 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
369 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
370 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
371 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
372 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
373 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
374 pub(super) last_block_connected: BlockHash,
375 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
377 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
379 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
381 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
383 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
385 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
386 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
387 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
388 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
389 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
390 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
391 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
393 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
395 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
396 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
399 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
401 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
403 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
404 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
406 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
408 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
410 network_sync: UpdateStatus,
412 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
413 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
414 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
415 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
416 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
417 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
418 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
419 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
422 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
423 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
425 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
426 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
427 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
431 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
432 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
433 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
434 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
435 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
436 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
437 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
440 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
442 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
444 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
446 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
448 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
450 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
452 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
453 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
454 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
455 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
458 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
461 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
462 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
464 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
465 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
466 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
471 macro_rules! secp_check {
472 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
475 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
480 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
481 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
482 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
483 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
486 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
489 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
490 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
491 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
492 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
495 fn derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u32) -> u64 {
496 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate as u64 * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
500 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
501 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
502 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
504 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
505 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
506 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
508 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
509 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
511 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
512 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
513 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
515 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
516 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
518 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
519 if Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
520 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
523 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
525 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
526 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
530 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
532 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
533 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
535 channel_value_satoshis,
537 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
540 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
541 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
543 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
544 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
545 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
547 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
548 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
549 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
550 pending_update_fee: None,
551 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
552 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
553 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
554 update_time_counter: 1,
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
558 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
564 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
565 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
566 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
567 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
569 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
571 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
572 short_channel_id: None,
573 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
574 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
576 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
577 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
578 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
579 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
580 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
581 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
582 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
583 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
584 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
586 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
587 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
588 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
589 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
590 counterparty_parameters: None,
591 funding_outpoint: None
593 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
595 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
596 counterparty_node_id,
598 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
600 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
602 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
604 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
605 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
606 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
607 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
611 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
612 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
614 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
615 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
616 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
618 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 2;
619 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
625 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
626 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
627 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
628 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
629 F::Target: FeeEstimator
631 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
632 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
633 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
634 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
635 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
636 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
637 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
638 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
640 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
642 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
643 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
646 // Check sanity of message fields:
647 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
648 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
650 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
651 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
653 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
654 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
657 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
658 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
660 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
661 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
663 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
664 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
665 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
667 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
669 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
670 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
671 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
673 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
674 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
676 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
677 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
680 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
681 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
682 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
684 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
685 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
687 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
690 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
693 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
694 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
696 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
699 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
700 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
703 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
705 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
706 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
707 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
711 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
712 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
714 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
716 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
717 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
718 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
719 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
721 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
722 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
724 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
725 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
728 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
729 // for full fee payment
730 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
731 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
732 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
733 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
736 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
737 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
738 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
742 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
743 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
744 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
745 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
746 if script.len() == 0 {
748 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
749 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
755 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
756 &OptionalField::Absent => {
757 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
762 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
763 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
767 config: local_config,
769 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
770 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
773 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
776 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
777 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
779 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
780 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
781 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
783 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
784 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
785 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
786 pending_update_fee: None,
787 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
788 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
789 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
790 update_time_counter: 1,
792 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
794 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
795 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
796 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
797 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
798 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
800 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
801 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
802 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
803 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
805 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
807 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
808 short_channel_id: None,
809 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
810 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
812 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
813 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
814 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
815 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
816 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
817 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
818 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
819 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
820 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
821 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
823 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
824 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
825 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
826 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
827 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
828 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
829 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
831 funding_outpoint: None
833 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
835 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
836 counterparty_node_id,
838 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
840 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
842 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
844 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
845 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
846 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
847 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
853 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
854 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
855 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
856 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
857 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
859 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
860 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
861 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
862 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
863 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
864 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
865 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
866 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
867 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
868 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
869 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
871 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
872 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
873 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
874 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
876 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
877 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
878 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
879 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
881 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
883 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
884 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
885 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
887 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
888 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
889 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
890 transaction_output_index: None
895 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
896 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
897 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
898 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
899 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
900 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
901 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
903 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
904 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
907 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
908 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
909 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
910 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
912 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
913 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
919 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
920 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
921 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
922 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
923 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
924 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
925 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
929 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
930 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
932 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
934 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
935 if generated_by_local {
936 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
937 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
946 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
947 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
948 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
949 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
950 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
951 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
952 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
956 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
957 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
959 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
961 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
962 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
964 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
965 if !generated_by_local {
966 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
974 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
975 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
976 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
977 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
978 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
979 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
980 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
981 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
983 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
985 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
986 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
987 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
988 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
990 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
992 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
993 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
994 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
995 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
998 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
999 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1000 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1002 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1005 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1006 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1008 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1009 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1014 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1015 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1020 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1022 let channel_parameters =
1023 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1024 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1025 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1030 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1033 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1034 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1035 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1036 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1038 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1042 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1043 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1044 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1048 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1053 1 + // script length (0)
1057 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1058 2 + // witness marker and flag
1059 1 + // witness element count
1060 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1061 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1062 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1063 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1064 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1065 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1067 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1068 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1069 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1075 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1077 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1079 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1080 script_sig: Script::new(),
1081 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1082 witness: Vec::new(),
1087 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1088 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1089 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1091 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1092 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1093 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1095 if value_to_self < 0 {
1096 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1097 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1098 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1099 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1100 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1103 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1104 txouts.push((TxOut {
1105 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1106 value: value_to_remote as u64
1110 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1111 txouts.push((TxOut {
1112 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1113 value: value_to_self as u64
1117 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1119 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1120 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1121 outputs.push(out.0);
1129 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1132 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1133 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1137 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1138 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1139 /// our counterparty!)
1140 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1141 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1142 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1143 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1144 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1145 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1146 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1148 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1152 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1153 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1154 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1155 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1156 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1157 //may see payments to it!
1158 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1159 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1160 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1162 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1165 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1166 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1167 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1168 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1169 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1172 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1173 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1174 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1175 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1176 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1179 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1180 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1181 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1183 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1184 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1185 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1186 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1187 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1188 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1190 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1191 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1193 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1195 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1197 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1198 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1199 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1201 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1202 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1203 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1204 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1206 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1207 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1208 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1210 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1212 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1213 return Ok((None, None));
1216 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1217 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1224 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1228 // Now update local state:
1230 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1231 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1232 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1233 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1234 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1235 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1236 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1240 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1241 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1242 match pending_update {
1243 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1244 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1245 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1246 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1247 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1248 return Ok((None, None));
1251 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1252 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1253 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1254 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1255 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1256 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1257 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1263 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1264 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1265 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1267 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1271 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1272 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1274 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1275 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1277 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1278 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1281 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1282 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1283 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1284 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1285 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1288 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1289 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1290 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1291 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1292 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1293 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1294 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1295 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1296 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1298 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1299 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1300 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1302 (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1303 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1307 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1308 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1309 /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1311 /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1312 /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1313 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1314 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1315 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1317 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1319 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1320 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1321 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1323 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1324 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1325 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1327 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1328 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1329 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1333 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1334 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1340 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1341 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1344 // Now update local state:
1345 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1346 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1347 match pending_update {
1348 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1349 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1350 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1351 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1354 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1355 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1356 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1357 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1363 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1364 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1371 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1372 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1375 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1376 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1377 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1382 // Message handlers:
1384 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1385 // Check sanity of message fields:
1386 if !self.is_outbound() {
1387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1389 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1392 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1393 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1395 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1396 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1398 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1399 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1401 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1402 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1404 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1405 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1406 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1408 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1409 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1410 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1412 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1413 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1414 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1416 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1419 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1420 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1423 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1424 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1425 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1427 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1428 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1430 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1431 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1433 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1434 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1436 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1439 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1440 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the user specified limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1442 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1446 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1447 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1448 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1449 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1450 if script.len() == 0 {
1452 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1453 } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1454 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1456 Some(script.clone())
1459 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1460 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1466 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1467 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1468 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1469 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1470 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1471 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1473 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1474 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1475 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1476 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1477 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1478 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1481 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1482 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1483 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1486 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1487 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1489 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1494 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1495 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1497 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1498 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1500 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1501 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1502 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1503 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1504 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1505 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1508 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1509 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1511 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1512 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1513 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1515 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1516 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1518 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1519 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1522 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1523 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1526 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1527 if self.is_outbound() {
1528 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1530 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1531 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1532 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1536 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1537 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1538 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1539 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1542 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1543 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1544 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1545 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1546 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1548 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1550 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1551 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1552 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1555 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1556 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1557 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1561 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1562 initial_commitment_tx,
1565 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1566 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1569 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1571 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1572 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1573 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1574 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1575 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1576 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1577 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1578 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1580 holder_commitment_tx);
1582 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1584 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1585 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1586 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1587 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1589 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1590 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1592 }, channel_monitor))
1595 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1596 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1597 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1598 if !self.is_outbound() {
1599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1601 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1604 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1605 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1606 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1607 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1610 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1612 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1613 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1614 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1615 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1617 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1619 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1620 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1622 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1623 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1624 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1625 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1626 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1627 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1631 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1632 initial_commitment_tx,
1635 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1636 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1640 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1641 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1642 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1643 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1644 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1645 &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1646 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1647 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1648 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1650 holder_commitment_tx);
1652 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1654 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1655 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1656 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1657 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1662 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1663 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1664 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1667 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1669 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1670 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1671 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1672 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1673 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1674 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1675 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1676 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1677 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1678 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1679 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1680 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1681 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1684 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1690 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1691 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1695 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1696 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1697 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1698 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1699 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1701 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1704 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1706 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1707 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1708 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1709 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1712 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1713 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1714 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1715 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1716 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1720 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1723 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1724 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1725 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1726 /// corner case properly.
1727 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1728 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1729 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1730 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1733 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1734 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1735 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1736 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1737 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1738 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1741 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1742 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1743 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1745 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1746 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1748 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1749 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1751 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1752 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1754 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1755 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1759 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1760 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1766 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1767 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1768 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1771 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1772 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1773 included_htlcs += 1;
1776 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1777 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1781 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1782 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1783 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1784 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1785 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1786 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1791 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1793 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1794 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1799 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1800 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1804 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1805 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1806 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1809 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1810 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1812 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1813 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1814 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1816 total_pending_htlcs,
1817 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1818 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1819 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1821 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1822 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1823 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1825 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1827 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1832 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1833 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1834 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1836 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1837 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1839 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1840 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1842 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1843 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1845 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1846 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1850 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1851 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1857 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1858 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1859 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1860 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1861 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1862 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1865 included_htlcs += 1;
1868 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1869 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1872 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1873 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1875 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1876 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1877 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1882 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1883 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1884 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1887 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1888 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1890 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1891 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1893 total_pending_htlcs,
1894 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1895 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1896 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1898 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1899 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1900 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1902 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1904 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1909 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1910 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1911 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1912 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1913 if local_sent_shutdown {
1914 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1916 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1917 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1918 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1919 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1921 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1924 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1927 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1930 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1931 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1934 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1935 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1936 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1938 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1939 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1940 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1942 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1943 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1944 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1945 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1946 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1947 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1948 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1949 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1950 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1951 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1952 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1954 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1955 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1956 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1957 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1958 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1959 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1963 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1964 self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1965 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1966 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1967 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1971 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
1972 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
1973 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
1974 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1975 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
1977 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
1978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
1981 let chan_reserve_msat =
1982 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
1983 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
1984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
1987 if !self.is_outbound() {
1988 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
1989 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
1990 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
1991 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
1992 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
1993 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
1994 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
1995 // sensitive to fee spikes.
1996 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
1997 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
1998 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
1999 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2000 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2001 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2002 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2005 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2006 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2007 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2008 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2009 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2012 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2015 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2016 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2019 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2020 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2021 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2025 // Now update local state:
2026 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2027 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2028 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2029 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2030 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2031 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2032 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2037 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2039 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2040 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2041 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2042 match check_preimage {
2044 Some(payment_hash) =>
2045 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2046 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2050 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2052 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2053 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2055 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2058 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2061 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2064 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2065 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2066 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2068 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2069 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2072 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2073 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2076 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2077 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2080 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2081 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2084 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2088 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2089 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2090 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2092 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2093 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2096 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2100 pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2101 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2104 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2105 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2107 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2108 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2110 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2111 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2114 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2116 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2118 let mut update_fee = false;
2119 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2121 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2126 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2127 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2128 let commitment_txid = {
2129 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2130 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2131 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2133 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2134 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2135 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2139 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2140 (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2143 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2144 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2146 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2147 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2148 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2151 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2153 if self.is_outbound() {
2154 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2155 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2156 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2157 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2158 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2159 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2160 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2161 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2162 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2163 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2169 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2170 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2173 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2174 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2175 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2176 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2177 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2178 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2179 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2180 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2181 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2182 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2184 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2186 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2190 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2193 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2194 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2195 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2198 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2199 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2201 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2202 let mut need_commitment = false;
2203 if !self.is_outbound() {
2204 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2205 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2206 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2207 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2208 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2209 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2210 need_commitment = true;
2211 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2216 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2217 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2218 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2219 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2220 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2221 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2225 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2226 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2227 Some(forward_info.clone())
2229 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2230 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2231 need_commitment = true;
2234 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2235 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2236 Some(fail_reason.take())
2238 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2239 need_commitment = true;
2243 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2244 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2245 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2246 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2248 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2249 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2250 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2251 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2252 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2253 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2254 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2255 // includes the right HTLCs.
2256 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2257 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2258 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2259 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2260 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2261 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2263 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2264 // re-send the message on restoration)
2265 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2268 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2269 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2270 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2271 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2272 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2273 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2274 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2275 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2276 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2278 } else if !need_commitment {
2279 (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2280 } else { (None, None) };
2282 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2283 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2284 per_commitment_secret,
2285 next_per_commitment_point,
2286 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2289 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2290 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2291 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2292 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2293 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2294 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2296 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2297 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2298 updates: Vec::new(),
2301 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2302 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2303 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2304 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2305 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2306 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2307 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2308 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2309 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2310 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2311 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2312 // to rebalance channels.
2313 match &htlc_update {
2314 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2315 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2316 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2319 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2320 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2321 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2322 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2323 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2324 // into the holding cell without ever being
2325 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2326 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2327 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2330 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2336 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2337 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2338 Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2339 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2340 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2341 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2345 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2347 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2352 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2353 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2354 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2356 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2358 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2365 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2366 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2368 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2369 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2370 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2371 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2372 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2378 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2379 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2380 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2381 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2382 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2384 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2386 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2388 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2391 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2393 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2397 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2398 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2399 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2400 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2401 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2402 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2403 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2406 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2409 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2412 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2413 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2416 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2417 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2418 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2422 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2423 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2424 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2425 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2426 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2427 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2428 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2429 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2430 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2435 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2436 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2439 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2440 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2441 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2442 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2443 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2444 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2445 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2446 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2450 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2451 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2452 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2453 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2454 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2455 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2456 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2457 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2459 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2460 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2461 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2462 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2463 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2464 let mut require_commitment = false;
2465 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2468 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2469 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2470 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2472 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2473 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2474 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2475 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2476 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2477 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2482 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2483 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2484 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2485 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2486 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2488 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2489 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2494 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2495 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2496 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2498 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2499 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2503 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2504 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2506 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2507 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2508 require_commitment = true;
2509 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2510 match forward_info {
2511 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2512 require_commitment = true;
2514 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2515 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2516 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2518 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2519 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2520 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2524 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2525 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2526 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2532 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2533 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2534 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2535 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2537 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2538 Some(fail_reason.take())
2540 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2541 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2542 require_commitment = true;
2546 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2548 if self.is_outbound() {
2549 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2550 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2553 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2554 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2555 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2556 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2557 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2558 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2559 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2560 require_commitment = true;
2561 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2566 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2567 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2568 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2569 if require_commitment {
2570 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2571 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2572 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2573 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2574 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2575 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2576 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2577 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2578 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2580 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2581 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2582 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2585 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2586 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2587 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2588 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2589 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2591 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2592 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2593 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2596 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2597 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2598 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2599 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2601 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2603 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2604 if require_commitment {
2605 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2607 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2608 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2609 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2610 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2612 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2613 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2614 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2616 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2619 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2621 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2628 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2629 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2630 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2631 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2632 if !self.is_outbound() {
2633 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2635 if !self.is_usable() {
2636 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2638 if !self.is_live() {
2639 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2642 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2643 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2647 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2648 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2650 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2651 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2656 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2657 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2658 Some(update_fee) => {
2659 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2660 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2666 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2667 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2668 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2669 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2670 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2672 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2673 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2675 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2676 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2677 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2678 return outbound_drops;
2680 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2681 // will be retransmitted.
2682 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2684 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2685 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2687 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2688 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2689 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2690 // this HTLC accordingly
2691 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2694 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2695 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2696 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2697 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2700 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2701 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2702 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2703 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2704 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2705 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2710 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2712 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2713 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2714 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2715 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2716 // the update upon reconnection.
2717 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2721 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2723 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2724 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2725 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2726 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2728 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2729 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2732 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2735 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2736 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2740 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2741 /// updates are partially paused.
2742 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2743 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2744 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2745 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2746 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2747 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2748 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2749 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2750 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2751 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2752 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2753 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2754 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2757 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2758 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2759 /// to the remote side.
2760 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2761 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2762 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2764 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound();
2766 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2767 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2768 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2769 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2770 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2771 // monitor was persisted.
2772 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2773 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2774 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2775 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2776 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2777 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2778 next_per_commitment_point,
2782 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2783 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2784 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2785 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2787 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2788 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2789 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2790 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2793 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2794 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2796 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2797 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2800 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2801 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2802 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2803 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2804 if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2805 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2806 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2807 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2808 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2811 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2812 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2814 if self.is_outbound() {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2817 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2818 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2820 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2821 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2822 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2826 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2827 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2828 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2829 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2830 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2831 per_commitment_secret,
2832 next_per_commitment_point,
2836 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2837 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2838 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2839 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2840 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2842 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2843 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2844 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2845 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2846 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2847 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2848 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2849 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2850 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2855 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2856 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2858 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2859 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2860 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2861 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2862 reason: err_packet.clone()
2865 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2866 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2867 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2868 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2869 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2870 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2873 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2874 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2875 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2876 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2877 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2884 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2885 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2886 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2887 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2889 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2893 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2894 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2895 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2896 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2897 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2898 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2899 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2903 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2904 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2908 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2909 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2910 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2911 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2912 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2913 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2914 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2915 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2917 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2918 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2919 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2923 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2927 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2928 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2929 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2931 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2932 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2933 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2934 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2938 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2939 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2940 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2941 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2942 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2945 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2946 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2949 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2950 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2951 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2952 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2953 next_per_commitment_point,
2954 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2957 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2958 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2959 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2961 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2962 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2963 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2966 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2969 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
2972 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2973 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2974 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2975 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2976 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2978 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2979 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2980 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2981 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2982 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2983 next_per_commitment_point,
2987 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
2988 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2989 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2991 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2994 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2995 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
2996 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
2997 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2998 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
2999 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
3003 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3004 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3005 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3007 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3008 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3009 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3010 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3011 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3012 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3013 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3014 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3016 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3017 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3018 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3019 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3020 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3024 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3026 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3027 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3028 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3030 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3033 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3034 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3035 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3038 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3044 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3045 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3047 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3048 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3049 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3053 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3054 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3055 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3057 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3058 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3060 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3061 let sig = self.holder_signer
3062 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3064 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3065 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3067 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3068 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3069 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3070 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3071 signature: sig.unwrap(),
3075 pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3076 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3078 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3081 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3082 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3083 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3084 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3085 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3087 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3088 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3092 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3094 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3098 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3099 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3103 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3106 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3108 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3109 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3111 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3112 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3113 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3114 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3115 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3116 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3118 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3119 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3125 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3126 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3127 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3129 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3132 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3133 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3134 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3138 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3139 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3141 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3144 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3145 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3146 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3147 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3149 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3151 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3152 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3153 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3154 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3155 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3157 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3158 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3160 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3161 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3163 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3166 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3167 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3169 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3172 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3173 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3175 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3178 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3182 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3183 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3184 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3187 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3189 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3192 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3193 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3194 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3195 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3196 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3200 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3201 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3202 if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3203 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3204 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3205 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3206 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3207 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3208 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3209 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3210 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3214 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3215 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3216 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3217 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3218 let sig = self.holder_signer
3219 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3220 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3221 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3222 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3223 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3224 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3225 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3231 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3232 if self.is_outbound() {
3233 let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3234 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3235 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3236 if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3237 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3240 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3243 min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3245 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3246 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3247 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3251 propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3254 let sig = self.holder_signer
3255 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3256 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3257 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3258 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3259 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3261 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3262 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3264 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3265 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3266 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3268 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3271 // Public utilities:
3273 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3277 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3278 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3279 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3283 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3284 /// is_usable() returns true).
3285 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3286 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3287 self.short_channel_id
3290 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3291 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3292 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3293 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3296 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3297 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3300 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3301 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3304 fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3305 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3308 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3309 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3312 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3313 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3314 self.counterparty_node_id
3317 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3319 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3320 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3323 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3324 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3326 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3327 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3328 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3329 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3331 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3335 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3336 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3337 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3340 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3341 self.channel_value_satoshis
3344 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3345 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3349 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3353 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3354 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3357 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3358 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3361 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3362 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3366 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3371 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3373 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3374 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3375 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3376 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3377 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3378 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3380 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3382 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3390 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3391 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3395 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3396 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3397 self.update_time_counter
3400 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3401 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3404 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3405 self.config.announced_channel
3408 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3409 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3412 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3413 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3414 pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3415 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3417 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3418 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3420 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3421 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3423 if self.is_outbound() {
3424 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3425 res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3428 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3429 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3434 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3435 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3436 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3439 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3440 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3441 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3442 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3443 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3446 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3447 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3448 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3449 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3450 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3453 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3455 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3456 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3459 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3460 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3461 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3464 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3465 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3466 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3467 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3468 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3469 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3474 pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
3475 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
3478 pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
3479 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
3482 pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
3483 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
3486 pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
3487 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
3490 pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
3491 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
3494 /// When we receive a new block, we (a) check whether the block contains the funding
3495 /// transaction (which would start us counting blocks until we send the funding_signed), and
3496 /// (b) check the height of the block against outbound holding cell HTLCs in case we need to
3497 /// give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything else (e.g. commitment
3498 /// transaction broadcasts, channel closure detection, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3499 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3501 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3502 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3504 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
3506 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3508 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3509 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3510 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3512 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3513 if *cltv_expiry <= height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3514 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3521 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3522 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3523 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3524 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
3527 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3528 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3529 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3530 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3531 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3532 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3533 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3534 if self.is_outbound() {
3535 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3536 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3537 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3538 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3539 // channel and move on.
3540 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3541 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3543 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3544 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3545 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3546 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3547 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3550 if self.is_outbound() {
3551 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3552 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3553 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3554 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3555 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3556 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3560 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3561 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3562 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3563 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3569 if header.block_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
3570 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3571 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, header.time);
3572 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3573 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
3574 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3575 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3577 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3578 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3579 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3581 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3582 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3583 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3585 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3586 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3588 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
3589 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
3592 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(self.last_block_connected);
3594 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3595 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3596 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3597 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3598 if need_commitment_update {
3599 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3600 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3601 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3602 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3603 next_per_commitment_point,
3604 }), timed_out_htlcs));
3606 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3607 return Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs));
3613 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3616 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3617 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3618 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3619 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3620 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3621 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3622 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3626 self.last_block_connected = header.block_hash();
3627 if Some(self.last_block_connected) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3628 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3633 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3634 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3636 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3637 if !self.is_outbound() {
3638 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3640 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3641 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3644 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3645 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3648 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3649 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3653 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3654 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3655 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3656 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3657 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3658 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3659 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3660 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3661 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3662 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3663 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3664 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3665 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3666 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3667 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3668 first_per_commitment_point,
3669 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3670 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3674 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3675 if self.is_outbound() {
3676 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3678 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3679 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3681 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3682 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3685 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3686 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3688 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3689 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3690 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3691 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3692 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3693 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3694 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3695 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3696 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3697 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3698 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3699 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3700 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3701 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3702 first_per_commitment_point,
3703 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3707 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3708 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3709 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3710 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3711 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3712 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3715 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3716 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3717 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3718 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3719 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3720 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3721 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3722 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3723 if !self.is_outbound() {
3724 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3726 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3727 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3729 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3730 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3731 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3732 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3735 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3736 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3738 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3741 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3742 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3747 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3749 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3751 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3752 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3754 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3755 temporary_channel_id,
3756 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3757 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3762 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3763 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3764 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3765 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3766 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3768 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3769 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3770 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3771 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3772 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3774 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3775 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3777 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3778 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3781 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3783 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3784 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3786 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3787 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3788 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3789 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3790 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3791 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3794 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3795 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3800 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3801 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3802 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3803 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3804 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3805 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3806 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3807 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3808 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3809 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3810 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3811 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3812 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3813 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3814 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3815 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3816 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3817 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3818 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3821 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3822 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3823 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3824 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3827 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3828 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3829 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3830 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3831 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3832 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3833 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3834 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3836 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3837 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3838 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3839 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3840 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3841 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3842 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3843 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3844 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3846 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3852 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3854 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3855 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3856 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3857 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3858 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3859 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3860 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3861 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3862 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3863 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3865 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3866 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3867 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3870 if amount_msat == 0 {
3871 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3874 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
3875 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
3878 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3879 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3880 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3881 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3882 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3883 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3884 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3885 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
3888 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3889 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3890 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3892 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3893 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3894 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3897 if !self.is_outbound() {
3898 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3899 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
3900 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
3901 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3902 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3903 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3904 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3908 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
3909 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
3910 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
3913 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
3914 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
3915 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3916 2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
3918 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
3919 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
3922 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3923 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3924 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3925 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
3926 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
3929 // Now update local state:
3930 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3931 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3936 onion_routing_packet,
3941 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3942 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3944 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3946 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3950 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3951 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3952 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3956 onion_routing_packet,
3958 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
3963 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3964 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3965 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3966 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3967 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3968 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3969 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3971 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3972 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3974 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3975 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3977 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3978 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3980 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3981 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3982 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3983 have_updates = true;
3985 if have_updates { break; }
3987 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3988 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3989 have_updates = true;
3991 if have_updates { break; }
3994 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3996 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
3998 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3999 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4000 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4001 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4003 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4004 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4005 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4007 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4011 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4012 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4013 Some(fail_reason.take())
4015 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4018 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4020 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4021 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4022 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4023 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4024 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4025 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4027 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4030 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4031 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4032 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4033 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4034 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4035 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4036 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4037 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4040 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4041 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4044 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4045 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4046 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4047 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4048 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4049 if self.is_outbound() {
4050 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4054 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4055 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4056 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4057 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4059 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4061 if !self.is_outbound() {
4062 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4063 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4064 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4065 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4066 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4067 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4068 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4069 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4070 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4071 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4078 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4079 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4083 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4084 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4086 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4088 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4089 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4090 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4091 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4092 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4094 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4095 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4096 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4097 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4098 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4099 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4103 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4104 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4107 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4110 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4111 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4112 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4114 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4115 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4116 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4117 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4118 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4124 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4125 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4126 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4127 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4128 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4129 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4132 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4133 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4134 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4136 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4137 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4140 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4141 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4142 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4145 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4147 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4148 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4149 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4151 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4153 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4155 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4156 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4157 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4158 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4159 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4161 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4162 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4169 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4170 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4171 scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4172 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4175 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4176 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4177 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4178 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4179 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4180 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4181 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4183 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4184 // return them to fail the payment.
4185 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4186 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4188 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4189 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4194 let funding_txo = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4195 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4196 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4197 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4198 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4199 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4200 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4201 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4202 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4203 Some(funding_txo.clone())
4207 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4208 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4209 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4210 (funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4211 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4212 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4213 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4217 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4218 // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4220 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4221 // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4222 // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4223 let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4224 if is_script_too_long {
4228 if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4232 return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4235 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4236 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4238 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4241 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4243 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4245 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4247 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4248 err_code.write(writer)?;
4250 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4252 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4259 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4260 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4261 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4262 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4263 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4264 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4265 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4270 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4271 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4272 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4273 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4275 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4276 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4278 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4279 self.config.write(writer)?;
4281 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4282 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4283 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4285 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4287 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4288 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4289 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::usize::MAX);
4290 assert!(key_data.0.len() < std::u32::MAX as usize);
4291 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4292 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4294 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4295 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4297 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4298 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4299 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4301 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4302 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4303 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4304 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4307 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4308 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4309 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4312 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4313 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4314 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4315 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4317 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4318 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4320 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4322 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4324 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4326 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4329 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4331 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4336 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4337 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4338 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4339 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4340 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4341 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4342 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4344 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4346 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4348 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4351 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4353 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4355 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4357 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4359 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4361 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4366 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4367 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4369 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4371 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4372 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4373 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4374 source.write(writer)?;
4375 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4377 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4379 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4380 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4382 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4384 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4385 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4390 match self.resend_order {
4391 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4392 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4395 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4396 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4397 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4399 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4400 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4401 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4402 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4405 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4406 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4407 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4408 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4409 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4412 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4413 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4415 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4416 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4417 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4418 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4420 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4421 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4423 feerate.write(writer)?;
4427 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4430 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4431 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4433 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
4434 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
4436 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4437 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4438 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4439 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4440 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4441 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4442 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4443 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4445 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4446 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4448 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4449 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4451 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4453 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4458 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4459 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4460 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4461 fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4462 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4463 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4464 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4465 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4468 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4469 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4471 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4472 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4473 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4475 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4477 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4478 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4479 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4480 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4481 let mut data = [0; 1024];
4482 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4483 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4484 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4486 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4488 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4489 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4491 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4492 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4493 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4495 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4496 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4497 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4498 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4499 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4500 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4501 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4502 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4503 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4504 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4505 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4506 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4507 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4508 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4513 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4514 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4515 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4516 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4517 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4518 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4519 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4520 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4521 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4522 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4523 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4524 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4525 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4526 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4527 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4528 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4533 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4534 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4535 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4536 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4537 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4538 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4539 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4540 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4541 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4542 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4544 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4545 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4546 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4548 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4549 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4550 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4552 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4556 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4557 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4558 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4559 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4562 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4563 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4564 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4566 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4567 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4568 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4569 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4572 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4573 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4574 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4575 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4578 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4579 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4581 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4582 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4583 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4584 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4586 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4588 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4589 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4592 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4593 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4595 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
4596 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
4598 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4599 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4600 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4601 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4602 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4603 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4605 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4607 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4608 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4610 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4611 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4613 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4614 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4616 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4617 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4626 channel_value_satoshis,
4628 latest_monitor_update_id,
4634 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4635 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4638 pending_inbound_htlcs,
4639 pending_outbound_htlcs,
4640 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4644 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4645 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4646 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4647 monitor_pending_forwards,
4648 monitor_pending_failures,
4651 holding_cell_update_fee,
4652 next_holder_htlc_id,
4653 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4654 update_time_counter,
4657 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4658 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4659 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4660 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4662 last_sent_closing_fee,
4664 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4666 last_block_connected,
4667 funding_tx_confirmations,
4669 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4670 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4671 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4672 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4673 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4674 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4675 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4678 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4679 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4681 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4682 counterparty_node_id,
4684 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4688 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4690 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4691 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4692 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4693 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4700 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4701 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4702 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4703 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4704 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4705 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4706 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4707 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4709 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4710 use ln::channel::{Channel,Sign,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4711 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4712 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4713 use ln::msgs::{OptionalField, DataLossProtect, DecodeError};
4715 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4716 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4717 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
4718 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4719 use util::config::UserConfig;
4720 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4721 use util::test_utils;
4722 use util::logger::Logger;
4723 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4724 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4725 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4726 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4727 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4730 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4733 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4734 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4740 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4741 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4742 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4746 signer: InMemorySigner,
4748 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4749 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4751 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4752 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4753 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4754 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4755 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4756 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4759 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4760 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4761 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4762 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4765 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4768 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4769 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4772 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4773 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4776 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4777 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4779 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4780 let original_fee = 253;
4781 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4782 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4783 let seed = [42; 32];
4784 let network = Network::Testnet;
4785 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4787 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4788 let config = UserConfig::default();
4789 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4791 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4792 // same as the old fee.
4793 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4794 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4795 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
4799 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
4800 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
4801 // dust limits are used.
4802 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4803 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4804 let seed = [42; 32];
4805 let network = Network::Testnet;
4806 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4808 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
4809 // they have different dust limits.
4811 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4812 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4813 let config = UserConfig::default();
4814 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4816 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4817 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
4818 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4819 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis, 1560);
4820 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4821 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4823 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
4824 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4825 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4826 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4828 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
4829 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
4830 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4832 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
4833 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
4834 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
4835 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4838 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4840 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
4841 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
4842 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
4843 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4844 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4846 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4847 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
4851 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
4852 // the dust limit check.
4853 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4854 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4855 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4856 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
4858 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
4859 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
4860 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4861 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
4862 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4863 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4864 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
4868 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
4869 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
4870 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
4871 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
4872 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
4873 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
4874 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4875 let seed = [42; 32];
4876 let network = Network::Testnet;
4877 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4879 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4880 let config = UserConfig::default();
4881 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4883 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
4884 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
4886 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
4887 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4888 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4889 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4890 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4891 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4893 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4894 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4895 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4896 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4897 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4899 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
4901 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
4902 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
4903 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4904 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4905 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
4907 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
4908 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
4909 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4910 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4911 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
4915 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
4916 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4917 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4918 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4919 let seed = [42; 32];
4920 let network = Network::Testnet;
4921 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4923 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
4925 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
4926 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4927 let config = UserConfig::default();
4928 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4930 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
4931 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
4932 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
4933 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
4935 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
4936 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
4937 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
4939 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
4940 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4941 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4942 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
4944 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4945 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
4946 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, &&logger).unwrap();
4948 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
4949 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, &&logger);
4951 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
4952 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
4953 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4954 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4955 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4956 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4957 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4958 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4959 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4964 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
4966 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
4967 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
4968 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
4969 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
4970 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4971 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
4972 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
4979 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4980 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4981 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4982 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4983 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4985 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
4987 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4988 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4989 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4990 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4991 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4993 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4994 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4999 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5000 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5001 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5003 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5004 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5005 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5006 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5007 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5009 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5011 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5012 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5013 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5014 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5015 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5016 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5018 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5019 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5020 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5021 selected_contest_delay: 144
5023 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5024 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5026 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5027 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5029 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5030 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5032 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5033 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5035 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5036 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5037 // build_commitment_transaction.
5038 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5039 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5040 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5041 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5042 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5044 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5045 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5046 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5048 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5049 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5051 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5052 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5056 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5057 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5058 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5059 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5060 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5061 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5063 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5064 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5065 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5066 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5068 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5069 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5070 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5072 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5074 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5075 commitment_tx.clone(),
5076 counterparty_signature,
5077 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5078 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5079 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5081 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5082 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5084 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5085 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5086 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5088 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5089 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5092 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5094 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5095 let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5096 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5097 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5098 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5100 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5103 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5104 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5105 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5109 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5112 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5113 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5115 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5116 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5117 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5118 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5119 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5120 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5121 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5123 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5127 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5128 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5130 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5131 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5132 "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", {});
5134 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5135 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5137 amount_msat: 1000000,
5139 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5140 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5142 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5145 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5146 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5148 amount_msat: 2000000,
5150 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5151 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5153 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5156 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5157 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5159 amount_msat: 2000000,
5161 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5162 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5163 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5165 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5168 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5169 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5171 amount_msat: 3000000,
5173 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5174 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5175 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5177 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5180 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5181 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5183 amount_msat: 4000000,
5185 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5186 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5188 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5192 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5193 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5194 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5196 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5197 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5198 "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", {
5201 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5202 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5203 "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" },
5206 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5207 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5208 "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" },
5211 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5212 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5213 "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" },
5216 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5217 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5218 "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" },
5221 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5222 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5223 "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" }
5226 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5227 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5228 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5230 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5231 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5232 "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", {
5235 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5236 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5237 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
5240 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5241 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5242 "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" },
5245 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5246 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5247 "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" },
5250 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5251 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5252 "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" },
5255 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5256 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5257 "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" }
5260 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5261 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5262 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5264 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5265 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5266 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
5269 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5270 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5271 "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" },
5274 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5275 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5276 "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" },
5279 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5280 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5281 "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" },
5284 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5285 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5286 "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" }
5289 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5290 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5291 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5293 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5294 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5295 "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", {
5298 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5299 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5300 "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" },
5303 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5304 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5305 "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" },
5308 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5309 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5310 "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" },
5313 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5314 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5315 "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" }
5318 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5319 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5320 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5322 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5323 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5324 "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", {
5327 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5328 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5329 "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" },
5332 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5333 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5334 "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" },
5337 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5338 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5339 "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" }
5342 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5343 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5344 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5346 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5347 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5348 "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", {
5351 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5352 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5353 "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" },
5356 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5357 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5358 "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" },
5361 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5362 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5363 "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" }
5366 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5367 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5368 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5370 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5371 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5372 "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", {
5375 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5376 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5377 "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" },
5380 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5381 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5382 "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" }
5385 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5386 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5387 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5389 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5390 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5391 "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", {
5394 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5395 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5396 "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" },
5399 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5400 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5401 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5404 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5405 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5406 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5408 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5409 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5410 "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", {
5413 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5414 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5415 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5418 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5419 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5420 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5422 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5423 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5424 "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", {
5427 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5428 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5429 "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" }
5432 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5433 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5434 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5436 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5437 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5438 "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", {});
5440 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5441 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5442 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5444 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5445 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5446 "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", {});
5448 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5449 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5450 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5452 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5453 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5454 "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", {});
5456 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5457 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5458 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5460 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5461 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5462 "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", {});
5464 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5465 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5466 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5467 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5468 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5469 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5471 amount_msat: 2000000,
5473 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5474 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5476 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5479 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5480 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5481 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5483 amount_msat: 5000000,
5485 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5486 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5487 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5489 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5492 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5493 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5495 amount_msat: 5000000,
5497 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5498 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5499 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5501 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5505 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5506 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5507 "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", {
5510 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5511 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5512 "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" },
5514 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5515 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5516 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc3401000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5014830450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d3901008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
5518 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5519 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5520 "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" }
5525 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5526 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5528 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5529 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5530 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5531 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5533 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5534 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5535 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5537 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5538 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5540 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5541 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5543 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5544 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5545 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5549 fn test_key_derivation() {
5550 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5551 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5553 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5554 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5556 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5557 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5559 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5560 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5562 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5563 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5565 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5566 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5568 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5569 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5571 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5572 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());