1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 use core::convert::TryInto;
53 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
54 use crate::sync::Mutex;
55 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
60 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
62 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
67 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
70 pub struct AvailableBalances {
71 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
72 pub balance_msat: u64,
73 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
74 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
76 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
78 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
79 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
83 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
85 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
87 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
88 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
89 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
90 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
91 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
92 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
94 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
98 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
99 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
100 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
101 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
104 enum InboundHTLCState {
105 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
106 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
107 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
108 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
109 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
110 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
111 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
112 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
113 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
114 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
115 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
116 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
117 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
118 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
119 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
121 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
125 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
126 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
127 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
128 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
129 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
130 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
131 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
132 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
133 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
134 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
137 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
139 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
140 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
141 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
142 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
143 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
145 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
146 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
148 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
149 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
150 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
151 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
152 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
153 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
154 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
155 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
158 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
162 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
163 state: InboundHTLCState,
166 enum OutboundHTLCState {
167 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
168 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
169 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
170 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
171 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
172 /// money back (though we won't), and,
173 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
174 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
175 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
176 /// we'll never get out of sync).
177 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
178 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
179 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
181 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
182 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
183 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
188 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
189 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
190 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
191 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
192 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
193 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
194 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
195 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
199 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
200 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
201 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
202 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
205 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
206 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
208 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
209 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
214 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
215 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
218 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
223 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
227 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
228 state: OutboundHTLCState,
230 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
233 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
234 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
235 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
239 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
241 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
242 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
243 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
246 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
251 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
255 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
256 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
257 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
258 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
259 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
260 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
261 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
263 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
264 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
265 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
266 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
267 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
268 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
269 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
271 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
272 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
273 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
275 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
276 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
277 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
278 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
279 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
280 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
283 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
285 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
286 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
287 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
288 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
289 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
290 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
291 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
292 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
293 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
295 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
296 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
298 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
299 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
300 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
301 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
302 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
303 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
304 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
305 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
306 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
307 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
308 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
309 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
310 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
312 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
313 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
314 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
315 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
316 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
317 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
318 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
319 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
321 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
323 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
324 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
326 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
328 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
330 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
332 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
333 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
337 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
339 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
341 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
343 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
344 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
345 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
346 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
347 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
349 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
350 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
352 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
354 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
355 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
357 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
358 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
359 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
360 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
361 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
362 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
364 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
365 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
367 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
368 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
369 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
370 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
371 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
373 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
374 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
376 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
377 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
379 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
380 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
381 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
382 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
388 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
389 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
391 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
393 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
398 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
399 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
401 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
403 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
408 macro_rules! secp_check {
409 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
412 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
417 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
418 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
419 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
420 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
421 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
422 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
423 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
424 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
426 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
428 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
430 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
434 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
436 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
437 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
438 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
440 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
441 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
443 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
444 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
445 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
446 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
447 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
449 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
450 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
454 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
460 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
463 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
464 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
466 holding_cell_msat: u64,
467 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
470 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
471 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
472 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
473 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
474 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
475 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
476 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
477 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
479 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
482 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
483 struct HTLCCandidate {
485 origin: HTLCInitiator,
489 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
497 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
499 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
501 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
502 htlc_value_msat: u64,
503 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
508 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
509 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
510 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
511 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
512 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
514 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
515 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
516 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
517 htlc_value_msat: u64,
519 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
520 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
524 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
525 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
526 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
527 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
528 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
529 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
530 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
531 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
532 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
533 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
534 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
537 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
539 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
540 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
541 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
542 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
543 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
546 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
547 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
548 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
549 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
550 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
551 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
552 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
553 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
556 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
558 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
559 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
560 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
561 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
562 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
563 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
564 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
565 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
568 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
569 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
570 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
571 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
572 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
573 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
574 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
575 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
576 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
577 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
578 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
579 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
580 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
581 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
582 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
584 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
585 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
586 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
587 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
589 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
590 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
591 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
592 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
594 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
595 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
596 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
597 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
598 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
600 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
601 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
602 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
603 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
605 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
606 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
607 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
609 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
610 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
611 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
612 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
613 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
615 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
616 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
619 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
620 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
622 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
623 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
624 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
625 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
627 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
628 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
630 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
631 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
634 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
635 (0, update, required),
638 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
639 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
640 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
641 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
642 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
646 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
647 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
648 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
650 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
652 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
654 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
658 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
660 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
661 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
662 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
667 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
668 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
669 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
670 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
671 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
673 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
674 /// in a timely manner.
675 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
678 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
679 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
680 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
682 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
683 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
684 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
685 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
689 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
690 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
691 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
693 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
694 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
695 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
696 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
698 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
702 /// The current channel ID.
703 channel_id: ChannelId,
704 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
705 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
706 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
709 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
710 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
712 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
713 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
714 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
716 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
717 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
718 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
719 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
721 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
722 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
724 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
726 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
727 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
728 destination_script: Script,
730 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
731 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
732 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
734 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
735 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
736 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
737 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
738 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
739 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
741 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
742 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
743 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
744 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
745 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
746 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
748 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
750 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
751 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
752 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
754 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
755 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
756 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
757 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
758 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
759 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
760 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
762 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
763 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
764 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
766 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
767 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
768 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
769 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
770 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
771 /// outbound or inbound.
772 signer_pending_funding: bool,
774 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
776 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
777 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
778 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
779 // HTLCs with similar state.
780 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
781 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
782 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
783 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
784 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
785 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
786 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
787 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
788 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
791 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
792 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
793 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
795 update_time_counter: u32,
797 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
798 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
799 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
800 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
801 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
802 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
804 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
805 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
807 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
808 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
809 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
810 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
812 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
813 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
815 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
817 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
819 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
820 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
821 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
822 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
823 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
825 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
826 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
828 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
829 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
830 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
832 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
833 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
834 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
835 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
836 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
837 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
838 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
839 channel_creation_height: u32,
841 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
844 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
846 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
849 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
851 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
854 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
856 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
858 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
859 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
862 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
864 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
866 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
867 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
869 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
871 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
872 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
873 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
875 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
877 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
878 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
879 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
881 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
882 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
883 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
885 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
887 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
889 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
890 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
891 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
892 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
894 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
895 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
896 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
898 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
899 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
900 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
902 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
903 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
904 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
905 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
906 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
907 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
909 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
911 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
912 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
913 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
914 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
915 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
917 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
918 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
920 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
921 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
922 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
923 /// unblock the state machine.
925 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
926 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
927 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
929 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
930 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
931 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
933 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
934 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
935 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
936 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
937 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
938 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
939 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
940 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
942 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
943 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
945 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
946 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
947 // the channel's funding UTXO.
949 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
950 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
951 // associated channel mapping.
953 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
954 // to store all of them.
955 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
957 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
958 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
959 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
960 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
961 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
963 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
964 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
966 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
967 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
969 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
970 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
971 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
973 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
974 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
975 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
978 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
979 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
980 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
981 self.update_time_counter
984 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
985 self.latest_monitor_update_id
988 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
989 self.config.announced_channel
992 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
993 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
996 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
997 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
998 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
999 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1002 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1003 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1004 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
1007 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1008 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1009 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1010 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
1011 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1014 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1015 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1016 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1017 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1019 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1020 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1022 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1023 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1025 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1026 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1028 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1031 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1032 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1033 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1034 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1035 self.channel_state &
1036 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1037 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1038 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1039 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1042 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1043 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1044 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1045 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1046 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1049 // Public utilities:
1051 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1055 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1057 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1058 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1059 self.temporary_channel_id
1062 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1066 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1067 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1068 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1072 /// Gets the channel's type
1073 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1077 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1079 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1080 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1081 self.short_channel_id
1084 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1085 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1086 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1089 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1090 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1091 self.outbound_scid_alias
1094 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1096 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
1097 return &self.holder_signer
1100 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1101 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1102 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1103 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1104 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1105 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1108 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1109 /// get_funding_created.
1110 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1111 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1114 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1115 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1116 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1119 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1120 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1121 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1122 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1126 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1129 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1130 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1133 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1134 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1137 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1138 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1139 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1142 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1143 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1146 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1147 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1148 self.counterparty_node_id
1151 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1152 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1153 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1156 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1157 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1158 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1161 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1162 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1164 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1165 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1166 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1167 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1169 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1173 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1174 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1175 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1178 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1179 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1180 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1183 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1184 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1185 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1187 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1188 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1193 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1194 self.channel_value_satoshis
1197 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1198 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1201 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1202 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1205 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1206 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1207 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1209 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1210 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1211 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1212 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1213 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1215 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1219 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1220 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1221 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1224 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1225 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1226 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1229 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1230 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1231 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1234 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1235 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1236 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1239 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1240 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1241 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1244 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1245 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1246 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1249 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1250 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1251 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1252 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1253 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1256 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1258 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1259 self.prev_config = None;
1263 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1264 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1268 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1269 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1270 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1271 let did_channel_update =
1272 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1273 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1274 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1275 if did_channel_update {
1276 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1277 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1278 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1279 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1281 self.config.options = *config;
1285 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1286 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1287 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1288 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1289 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1292 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1293 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1294 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1295 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1296 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1298 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1299 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1300 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1301 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1302 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1303 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1304 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1306 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1307 where L::Target: Logger
1309 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1310 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1311 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1313 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1314 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1315 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1316 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1318 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1319 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1320 if match update_state {
1321 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1322 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1323 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1324 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1325 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1327 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1331 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1332 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1333 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1335 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1337 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1338 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1339 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1341 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1342 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1343 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1344 transaction_output_index: None
1349 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1350 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1351 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1352 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1353 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1356 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1358 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1359 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1360 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1362 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1363 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1366 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1367 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1370 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1372 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1373 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1374 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1376 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1377 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1383 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1384 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1385 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1386 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1387 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1388 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1389 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1393 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1394 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1396 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1398 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1399 if generated_by_local {
1400 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1401 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1410 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1412 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1413 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1414 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1415 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1416 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1417 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1418 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1421 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1422 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1423 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1424 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1428 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1429 preimages.push(preimage);
1433 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1434 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1436 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1438 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1439 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1441 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1442 if !generated_by_local {
1443 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1451 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1452 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1453 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1454 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1455 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1456 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1457 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1458 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1460 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1462 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1463 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1464 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1465 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1467 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1469 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1470 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1471 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1472 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1475 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1476 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1477 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1478 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1480 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1483 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1484 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1485 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1486 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1488 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1491 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1492 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1497 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1498 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1503 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1505 let channel_parameters =
1506 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1507 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1508 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1515 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1518 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1519 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1520 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1521 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1523 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1524 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1525 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1533 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1534 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1540 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1541 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1542 /// our counterparty!)
1543 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1544 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1545 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1546 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1547 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1548 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1549 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1551 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1555 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1556 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1557 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1558 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1559 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1560 //may see payments to it!
1561 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1562 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1563 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1565 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1568 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1569 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1570 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1571 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1572 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1575 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1576 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1579 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1583 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1584 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1585 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1586 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1587 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1588 // which are near the dust limit.
1589 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1590 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1591 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1592 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1593 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1595 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1596 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1598 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1601 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1602 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1603 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1606 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1607 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1609 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1610 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1611 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1612 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1613 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1614 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1615 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1618 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1621 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1622 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1623 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1625 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1626 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1627 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1628 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1629 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1630 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1632 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1633 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1639 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1640 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1642 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1643 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1644 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1645 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1646 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1647 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1648 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1651 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1654 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1655 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1656 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1658 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1659 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1660 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1661 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1662 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1663 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1665 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1666 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1670 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1671 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1672 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1673 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1674 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1675 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1676 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1678 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1679 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1681 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1688 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1689 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1690 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1691 /// corner case properly.
1692 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1693 -> AvailableBalances
1694 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1696 let context = &self;
1697 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1698 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1699 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1701 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1702 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1703 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1704 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1707 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1709 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1710 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1712 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1714 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1716 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1717 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1721 if context.is_outbound() {
1722 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1723 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1725 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1726 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1728 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1729 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1730 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1731 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1734 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1735 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1736 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1737 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1738 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1739 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1740 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1743 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1744 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1745 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1746 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1747 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1748 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1749 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1750 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1751 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1752 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1753 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1755 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1758 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1759 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1760 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1761 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1762 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1765 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1766 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1768 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1769 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1770 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1772 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1773 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1774 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1775 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1779 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1781 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1782 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1783 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1784 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1785 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1786 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1787 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1789 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1790 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1792 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1793 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1794 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1796 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1797 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1798 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1799 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1800 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1803 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1804 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1805 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1806 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1807 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1808 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1811 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1812 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1813 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1815 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1819 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1820 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1822 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1823 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1827 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1828 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1829 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1830 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1832 outbound_capacity_msat,
1833 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1834 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1839 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1840 let context = &self;
1841 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1844 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1845 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1847 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1848 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1850 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1851 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1853 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1854 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1855 let context = &self;
1856 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1858 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1861 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1862 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1864 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1865 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1867 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1868 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1870 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1871 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1875 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1876 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1882 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1883 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1884 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1887 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1888 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1889 included_htlcs += 1;
1892 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1893 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1897 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1898 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1899 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1900 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1901 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1902 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1907 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1909 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1910 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1915 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1916 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1920 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1921 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1922 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1925 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1926 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1928 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1929 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1930 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1932 total_pending_htlcs,
1933 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1934 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1935 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1937 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1938 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1939 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1941 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1943 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1948 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1949 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1951 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1952 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1954 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1955 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1957 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1958 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1959 let context = &self;
1960 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1962 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1965 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1966 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1968 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1969 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1971 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1972 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1974 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1975 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1979 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1980 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1986 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1987 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1988 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1989 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1990 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1991 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1994 included_htlcs += 1;
1997 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1998 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2001 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2002 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2004 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2005 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2006 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2011 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2012 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2013 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2016 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2017 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2019 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2020 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2022 total_pending_htlcs,
2023 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2024 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2025 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2027 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2028 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2029 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2031 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2033 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2038 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2039 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2040 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2041 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2048 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2050 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2051 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2054 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2056 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2057 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2058 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2062 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2063 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2064 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2067 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2069 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2070 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2073 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2074 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2075 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2076 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2077 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2078 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2079 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2080 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2081 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2082 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2083 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2085 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2086 // return them to fail the payment.
2087 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2088 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2089 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2091 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2092 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2097 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2098 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2099 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2100 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2101 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2102 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2103 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2104 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2105 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2106 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2107 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2108 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2109 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2113 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2115 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2116 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2119 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2120 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2124 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2125 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2126 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2127 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2128 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2129 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2130 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2131 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2132 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2136 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2137 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2138 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2141 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2142 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2143 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2144 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2147 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2149 next_local_nonce: None,
2153 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2154 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2155 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2156 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2158 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2159 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2160 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2161 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2163 match &self.holder_signer {
2164 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2165 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2166 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2167 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2168 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2171 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2175 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2176 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2177 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2178 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2179 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2180 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2183 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2184 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2190 // Internal utility functions for channels
2192 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2193 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2194 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2196 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2198 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2199 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2200 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2202 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2205 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2207 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2210 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2211 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2212 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2214 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2216 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2217 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2218 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2219 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2220 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2223 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2224 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2225 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2226 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2227 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2228 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2229 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2232 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2233 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2235 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2236 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2239 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2240 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2241 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2242 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2243 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2244 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2247 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2248 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2249 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2250 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2253 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2254 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2256 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2257 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2258 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2262 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2263 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2264 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2266 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2267 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2268 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2269 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2271 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2272 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2273 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2274 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2275 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2276 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2277 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2279 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2280 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2285 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2286 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2288 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2290 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2291 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2292 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2293 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2295 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2296 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2306 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2307 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2308 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2309 // outside of those situations will fail.
2310 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2314 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2319 1 + // script length (0)
2323 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2324 2 + // witness marker and flag
2325 1 + // witness element count
2326 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2327 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2328 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2329 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2330 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2331 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2333 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2334 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2335 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2341 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2342 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2343 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2344 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2346 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2347 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2348 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2350 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2351 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2352 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2353 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2354 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2355 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2358 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2359 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2362 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2363 value_to_holder = 0;
2366 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2367 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2368 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2369 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2371 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2372 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2375 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2376 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2379 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2382 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2383 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2385 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2387 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2388 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2389 where L::Target: Logger {
2390 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2391 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2392 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2393 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2394 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2395 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2396 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2397 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2401 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2402 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2403 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2404 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2406 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2407 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2409 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2411 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2412 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2413 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2415 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2416 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2417 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2418 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2419 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2420 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2421 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2423 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2424 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2425 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2427 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2428 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2430 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2433 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2434 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2438 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2442 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2443 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2444 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2445 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2446 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2447 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2450 // Now update local state:
2452 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2453 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2454 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2455 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2456 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2457 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2458 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2462 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2463 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2464 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2465 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2466 // do not not get into this branch.
2467 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2468 match pending_update {
2469 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2470 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2471 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2472 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2473 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2474 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2475 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2478 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2479 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2480 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2481 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2482 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2483 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2484 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2490 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2491 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2492 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2494 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2495 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2496 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2498 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2499 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2502 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2503 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2505 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2506 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2508 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2509 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2512 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2515 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2516 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2517 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2518 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2523 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2524 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2525 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2526 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2527 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2528 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2529 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2530 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2531 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2532 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2533 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2534 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2535 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2536 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2537 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2539 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2540 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2541 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2542 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2543 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2546 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2547 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2548 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2554 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2555 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2557 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2561 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2562 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2563 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2564 /// before we fail backwards.
2566 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2567 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2568 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2569 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2570 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2571 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2572 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2575 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2576 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2577 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2578 /// before we fail backwards.
2580 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2581 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2582 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2583 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2584 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2585 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2586 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2588 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2590 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2591 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2592 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2594 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2595 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2596 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2598 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2599 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2600 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2602 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2607 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2614 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2615 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2616 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2617 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2618 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2622 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2623 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2624 force_holding_cell = true;
2627 // Now update local state:
2628 if force_holding_cell {
2629 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2630 match pending_update {
2631 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2632 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2633 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2634 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2638 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2639 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2640 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2641 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2647 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2648 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2649 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2655 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2657 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2658 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2661 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2662 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2663 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2668 // Message handlers:
2670 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2671 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2672 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2673 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2674 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2678 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2681 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2684 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2685 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2686 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2687 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2690 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2692 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2693 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2694 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2695 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2697 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2698 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2700 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2701 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2703 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2704 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2705 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2706 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2707 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2712 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2713 initial_commitment_tx,
2716 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2717 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2720 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2721 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2724 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2725 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2726 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2727 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2728 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2729 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2730 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2731 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2732 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2733 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2734 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2735 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2737 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2739 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2740 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2741 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2742 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2743 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2744 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2745 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2747 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2748 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2749 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2751 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2753 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2754 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2756 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2758 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2759 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2763 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2764 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2765 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2766 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2767 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2768 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2769 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2772 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2773 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2775 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2776 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2777 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2778 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2780 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2783 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2784 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2785 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2788 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2789 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2790 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2791 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2792 // when routing outbound payments.
2793 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2797 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2799 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2800 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2802 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2803 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2805 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2806 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2807 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2808 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2809 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2810 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2811 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2812 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2813 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2815 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2816 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2817 let expected_point =
2818 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2819 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2821 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2822 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2823 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2824 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2825 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2826 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2828 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2829 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2830 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2831 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2832 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2834 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2842 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2843 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2845 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2847 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2850 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2851 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2852 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2853 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2854 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2855 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2857 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2858 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2859 if local_sent_shutdown {
2860 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2862 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2863 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2864 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2867 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2870 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2871 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2873 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2874 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2876 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2877 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2880 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2881 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2882 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2885 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2886 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2889 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2890 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2891 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2892 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2893 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2894 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2895 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2896 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2897 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2898 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2899 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2901 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2902 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2903 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2904 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2905 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2906 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2910 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2911 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2914 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2915 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2916 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2918 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2919 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2920 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2921 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2922 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2923 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2924 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2928 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2929 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2930 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2931 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2932 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2933 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2934 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2938 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2939 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2940 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2941 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2942 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2946 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2947 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2949 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2950 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2951 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2953 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2954 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2958 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2961 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2966 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2967 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2971 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2972 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2973 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2974 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2975 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2976 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2977 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2978 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2979 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2981 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2982 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2983 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2984 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2985 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2988 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2989 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2990 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2991 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2995 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2998 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3002 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3003 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3004 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3008 // Now update local state:
3009 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3010 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3011 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3012 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3013 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3014 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3015 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3020 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3022 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3023 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3024 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3025 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3026 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3027 None => fail_reason.into(),
3028 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3029 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3030 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3033 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3037 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3039 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3040 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3042 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3048 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3051 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3052 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3055 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3056 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3059 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3062 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3063 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3066 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3070 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3074 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3075 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3078 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3082 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3086 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3087 where L::Target: Logger
3089 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3090 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3092 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3093 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3095 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3099 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3101 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3103 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3104 let commitment_txid = {
3105 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3106 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3107 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3109 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3110 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3111 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3112 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3113 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3118 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3120 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3121 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3122 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3123 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3126 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3127 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3128 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3129 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3132 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3134 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3135 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3136 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3137 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3138 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3139 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3140 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3141 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3142 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3143 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3144 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3150 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3154 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3155 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3156 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3157 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3158 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3159 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3160 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3161 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3162 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3163 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3164 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3165 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3166 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3169 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3170 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3171 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3172 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3173 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3174 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3175 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3177 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3178 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3179 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3180 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3181 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3182 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3183 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3186 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3187 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3190 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3192 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3193 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3194 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3197 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3200 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3201 commitment_stats.tx,
3203 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3204 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3205 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3208 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3209 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3211 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3212 let mut need_commitment = false;
3213 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3214 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3215 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3216 need_commitment = true;
3220 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3221 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3222 Some(forward_info.clone())
3224 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3225 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3226 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3227 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3228 need_commitment = true;
3231 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3232 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3233 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3234 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3235 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3236 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3237 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3238 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3239 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3240 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3241 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3242 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3243 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3244 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3246 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3248 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3249 need_commitment = true;
3253 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3254 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3255 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3256 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3257 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3258 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3260 nondust_htlc_sources,
3264 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3265 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3266 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3267 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3268 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3270 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3271 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3272 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3273 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3274 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3275 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3276 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3277 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3278 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3279 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3280 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3281 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3282 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3283 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3285 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3286 &self.context.channel_id);
3287 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3290 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3291 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3292 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3293 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3294 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3295 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3296 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3297 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3298 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3302 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3303 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3304 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3305 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3308 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3309 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3310 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3311 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3312 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3313 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3314 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3316 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3317 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3318 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3319 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3322 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3323 /// for our counterparty.
3324 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3325 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3326 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3327 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3329 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3330 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3331 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3332 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3334 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3335 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3336 updates: Vec::new(),
3339 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3340 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3341 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3342 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3343 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3344 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3345 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3346 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3347 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3348 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3349 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3350 // to rebalance channels.
3351 match &htlc_update {
3352 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3353 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3354 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3356 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3357 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3359 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3362 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3363 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3364 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3365 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3366 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3367 // into the holding cell without ever being
3368 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3369 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3370 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3373 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3379 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3380 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3381 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3382 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3383 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3384 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3385 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3386 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3387 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3388 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3389 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3390 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3392 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3393 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3394 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3395 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3396 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3397 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3398 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3399 // for a full revocation before failing.
3400 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3401 update_fail_count += 1;
3404 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3406 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3413 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3414 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3416 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3417 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3422 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3423 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3424 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3425 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3426 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3428 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3429 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3430 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3432 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3433 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3439 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3440 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3441 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3442 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3443 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3444 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3445 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3446 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3447 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3449 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3450 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3452 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3453 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3455 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3456 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3459 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3461 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3462 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3463 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3467 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3468 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3469 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3470 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3471 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3472 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3473 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3474 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3475 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3478 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3480 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3481 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3484 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3485 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3486 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3487 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3489 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3493 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3494 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3495 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3496 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3497 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3498 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3499 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3500 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3504 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3505 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3506 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3507 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3508 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3509 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3510 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3511 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3512 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3514 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3515 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3518 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3519 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3520 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3521 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3522 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3523 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3524 let mut require_commitment = false;
3525 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3528 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3529 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3530 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3531 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3533 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3534 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3535 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3536 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3537 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3538 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3540 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3544 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3545 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3546 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3547 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3548 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3550 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3551 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3552 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3557 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3558 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3560 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3564 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3565 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3567 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3568 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3569 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3570 require_commitment = true;
3571 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3572 match forward_info {
3573 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3574 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3575 require_commitment = true;
3577 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3578 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3579 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3581 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3582 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3583 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3587 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3588 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3589 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3590 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3596 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3597 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3598 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3599 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3600 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3602 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3603 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3604 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3605 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3606 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3607 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3608 require_commitment = true;
3612 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3614 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3615 match update_state {
3616 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3617 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3618 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3619 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3620 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3621 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3623 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3624 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3625 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3626 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3627 require_commitment = true;
3628 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3629 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3634 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3635 let release_state_str =
3636 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3637 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3638 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3639 if !release_monitor {
3640 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3641 update: monitor_update,
3643 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3645 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3650 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3651 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3652 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3653 if require_commitment {
3654 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3655 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3656 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3657 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3659 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3660 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3661 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3662 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3663 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3665 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3666 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3667 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3668 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3669 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3672 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3673 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3674 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3675 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3676 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3677 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3679 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3680 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3682 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3683 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3685 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3686 if require_commitment {
3687 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3689 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3690 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3691 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3692 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3694 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3695 &self.context.channel_id(),
3696 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3699 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3700 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3702 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3703 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3705 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3706 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3712 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3713 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3714 /// commitment update.
3715 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3716 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3717 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3719 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3720 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3723 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3724 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3725 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3726 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3728 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3729 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3730 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3731 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3732 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3733 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3734 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3736 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3737 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3739 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3740 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3742 if !self.context.is_live() {
3743 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3746 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3747 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3748 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3749 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3750 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3751 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3752 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3753 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3754 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3755 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3759 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3760 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3761 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3762 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3763 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3764 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3767 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3768 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3772 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3773 force_holding_cell = true;
3776 if force_holding_cell {
3777 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3781 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3782 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3784 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3785 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3790 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3791 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3793 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3795 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3796 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3797 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3798 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3802 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3803 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3804 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3808 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3809 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3812 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3813 // will be retransmitted.
3814 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3815 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3816 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3818 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3819 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3821 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3822 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3823 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3824 // this HTLC accordingly
3825 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3828 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3829 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3830 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3831 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3834 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3835 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3836 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3837 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3838 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3839 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3844 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3846 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3847 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3848 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3849 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3853 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3854 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3855 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3856 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3857 // the update upon reconnection.
3858 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3862 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3864 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3865 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3869 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3870 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3871 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3872 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3873 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3874 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3875 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3877 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3878 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3879 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3880 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3881 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3882 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3883 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3885 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3886 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3887 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3888 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3889 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3890 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3891 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3894 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3895 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3896 /// to the remote side.
3897 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3898 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3899 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3900 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3903 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3905 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3906 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3908 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3909 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3910 // first received the funding_signed.
3911 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3912 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3913 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3915 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3916 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3917 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3918 funding_broadcastable = None;
3921 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3922 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3923 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3924 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3925 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3926 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3927 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3928 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3929 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3930 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3931 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3932 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3933 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3934 next_per_commitment_point,
3935 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3939 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3941 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3942 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3943 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3944 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3945 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3946 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3948 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3949 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3950 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3951 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3952 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3953 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3957 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3958 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3960 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3961 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3963 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3964 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3967 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3968 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3969 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3970 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3971 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3972 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3973 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3974 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3975 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3979 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3980 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3982 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3983 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3985 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3986 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3988 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3989 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3991 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3992 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3993 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3994 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3995 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3996 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3997 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3998 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3999 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4000 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4001 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4002 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4003 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4004 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4006 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4007 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4008 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4014 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4017 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4018 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4019 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4021 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4022 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4024 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4025 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4027 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4028 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4031 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4032 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4033 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4034 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4035 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4037 SignerResumeUpdates {
4045 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4046 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4047 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4048 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4049 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4050 per_commitment_secret,
4051 next_per_commitment_point,
4053 next_local_nonce: None,
4057 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4058 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4059 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4060 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4061 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4062 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4064 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4065 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4066 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4067 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4068 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4069 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4070 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4071 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4072 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4073 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4078 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4079 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4081 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4082 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4083 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4084 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4085 reason: err_packet.clone()
4088 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4089 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4090 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4091 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4092 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4093 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4096 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4097 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4098 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4099 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4100 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4107 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4108 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4109 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4110 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4114 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4115 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4116 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4117 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4118 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4119 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4120 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4124 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4125 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4126 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4130 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4131 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4136 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4137 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4138 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4139 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4140 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4141 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4142 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4147 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4148 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4150 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4151 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4152 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4153 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4154 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4155 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4156 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4157 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4160 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4162 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4163 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4164 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4165 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4166 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4169 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4170 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4174 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4175 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4176 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4177 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4178 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4181 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4182 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4183 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4184 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4185 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4188 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4189 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4190 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4191 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4192 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4193 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4194 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4195 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4199 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4200 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4201 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4202 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4204 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4208 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4209 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4210 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4211 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4213 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4215 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4217 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4218 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4219 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4220 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4221 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4224 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4225 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4226 channel_ready: None,
4227 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4228 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4229 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4233 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4234 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4235 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4236 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4237 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4238 next_per_commitment_point,
4239 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4241 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4242 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4243 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4247 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4248 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4249 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4251 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4252 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4253 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4256 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4262 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4263 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4264 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4265 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4266 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4267 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4268 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4270 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4272 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4273 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4274 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4275 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4276 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4277 next_per_commitment_point,
4278 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4282 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4283 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4284 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4286 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4289 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4290 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4291 raa: required_revoke,
4292 commitment_update: None,
4293 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4295 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4296 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4297 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4299 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4302 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4303 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4304 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4305 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4306 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4307 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4310 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4311 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4312 raa: required_revoke,
4313 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4314 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4318 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4322 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4323 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4324 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4325 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4327 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4329 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4331 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4332 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4333 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4334 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4335 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4336 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4337 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4338 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4340 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4341 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4342 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4343 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4344 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4346 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4347 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4348 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4349 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4352 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4353 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4354 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4355 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4356 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4357 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4358 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4359 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4360 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4361 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4362 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4363 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4364 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4365 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4366 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4368 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4371 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4372 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4375 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4376 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4377 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4378 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4379 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4380 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4383 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4384 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4385 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4386 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4387 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4388 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4391 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4397 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4398 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4399 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4400 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4402 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4403 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4404 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4405 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4406 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4407 return Ok((None, None, None));
4410 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4411 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4412 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4414 return Ok((None, None, None));
4417 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4418 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4419 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4420 return Ok((None, None, None));
4423 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4425 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4426 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4427 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4428 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4430 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4431 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4433 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4434 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4436 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4437 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4438 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4439 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4441 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4442 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4443 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4450 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4451 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4453 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4454 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4457 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4458 /// within our expected timeframe.
4460 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4461 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4462 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4465 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4468 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4469 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4473 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4474 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4476 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4479 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4480 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4481 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4482 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4485 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4486 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4490 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4492 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4493 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4496 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4497 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4498 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4501 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4504 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4505 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4506 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4507 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4509 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4512 assert!(send_shutdown);
4513 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4514 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4515 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4517 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4518 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4520 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4525 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4527 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4528 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4530 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4531 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4532 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4533 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4534 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4535 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4538 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4539 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4541 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4542 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4543 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4544 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4548 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4549 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4550 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4551 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4552 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4553 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4555 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4556 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4563 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4564 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4566 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4569 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4570 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4572 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4574 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4575 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4576 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4577 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4578 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4579 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4580 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4581 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4582 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4584 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4585 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4588 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4592 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4593 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4594 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4595 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4597 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4600 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4603 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4604 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4606 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4607 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4610 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4614 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4615 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4616 return Ok((None, None, None));
4619 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4620 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4621 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4622 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4624 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4626 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4629 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4630 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4631 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4632 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4633 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4637 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4638 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4639 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4643 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4644 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4645 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4646 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4647 monitor_update: None,
4648 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4649 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4651 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4652 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4653 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4654 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4658 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4660 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4661 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4662 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4663 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4665 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4668 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4669 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4671 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4672 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4673 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4674 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4675 monitor_update: None,
4676 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4677 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4679 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4680 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4681 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4682 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4687 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4688 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4689 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4690 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4692 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4693 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4694 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4696 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4702 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4703 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4704 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4706 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4707 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4709 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4710 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4713 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4714 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4715 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4716 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4717 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4719 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4720 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4721 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4723 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4724 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4727 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4728 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4729 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4730 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4731 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4732 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4733 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4734 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4736 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4739 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4740 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4741 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4742 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4744 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4748 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4749 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4750 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4751 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4753 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4759 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4760 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4761 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4762 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4763 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4764 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4765 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4767 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4768 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4771 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4773 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4774 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4780 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4781 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4782 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4783 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4784 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4785 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4786 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4788 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4789 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4796 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4797 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4800 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4801 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4804 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4805 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4809 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4810 &self.context.holder_signer
4814 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4816 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4817 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4818 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4819 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4820 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4821 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4823 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4825 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4833 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4834 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4838 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4839 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4840 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4841 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4844 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4845 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4846 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4847 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4850 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4851 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4852 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4853 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4854 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4855 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4858 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4859 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4860 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4861 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4862 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4863 if !release_monitor {
4864 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4873 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4874 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4877 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4878 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4879 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4881 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4882 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4883 if self.context.channel_state &
4884 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4885 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4886 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4887 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4888 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4891 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4892 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4893 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4894 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4895 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4896 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4898 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4899 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4900 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4902 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4903 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4904 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4905 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4906 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4907 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4913 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4914 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4915 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4918 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4919 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4920 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4923 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4924 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4925 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4928 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4929 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4930 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4931 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4932 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4933 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4938 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4939 self.context.channel_update_status
4942 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4943 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4944 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4947 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4949 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4950 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4951 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4955 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4956 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4957 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4960 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4964 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4965 // channel_ready yet.
4966 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4970 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4971 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4972 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4973 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4974 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4976 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4977 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4978 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4980 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4981 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4984 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4985 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4986 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4987 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4988 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4989 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4990 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4991 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4992 self.context.channel_state);
4994 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4998 if need_commitment_update {
4999 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5000 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5001 let next_per_commitment_point =
5002 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5003 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5004 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5005 next_per_commitment_point,
5006 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5010 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5016 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5017 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5018 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5019 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5020 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5021 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5022 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5024 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5027 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5028 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5029 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5030 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5031 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5032 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5033 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5034 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5035 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5036 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5037 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5038 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5039 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5040 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5041 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5042 // channel and move on.
5043 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5044 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5046 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5047 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5048 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5050 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5051 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5052 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5053 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5054 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5055 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5056 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5057 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5062 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5063 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5064 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5065 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5066 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5069 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5070 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5071 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5072 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5073 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5074 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5077 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5078 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5079 // may have already happened for this block).
5080 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5081 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5082 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5083 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5086 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5087 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5088 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5089 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5097 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5098 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5099 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5100 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5102 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5103 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5106 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5108 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5109 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5110 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5111 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5113 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5116 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5119 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5120 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5121 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5122 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5124 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5127 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5128 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5129 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5131 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5132 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5134 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5135 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5136 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5144 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5146 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5147 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5148 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5150 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5151 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5154 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5155 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5156 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5157 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5158 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5159 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5160 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5161 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5162 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5165 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5166 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5167 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5168 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5170 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5171 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5172 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5174 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5175 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5176 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5177 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5179 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5180 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5181 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5182 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5183 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5184 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5185 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5188 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5189 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5191 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5194 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5195 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5196 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5197 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5198 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5199 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5200 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5201 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5202 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5203 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5204 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5205 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5206 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5207 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5208 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5209 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5210 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5216 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5221 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5222 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5224 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5225 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5226 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5227 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5229 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5232 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5234 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5235 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5236 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5237 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5238 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5239 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5241 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5242 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5245 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5246 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5247 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5248 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5249 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5250 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5252 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5253 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5256 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5257 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5258 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5259 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5260 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5266 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5267 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5268 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5269 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5271 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5274 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5278 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5282 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5283 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5287 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5291 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5292 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5295 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5299 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5301 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5306 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5307 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5308 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5310 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5315 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5317 None => return None,
5320 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5322 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5323 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5325 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5326 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5332 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5334 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5335 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5336 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5337 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5338 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5339 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5340 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5342 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5343 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5344 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5345 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5346 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5347 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5348 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5349 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5350 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5351 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5352 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5353 contents: announcement,
5358 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5362 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5363 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5364 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5365 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5366 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5367 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5368 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5369 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5371 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5373 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5375 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5376 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5378 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5379 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5380 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5381 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5384 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5385 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5386 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5387 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5390 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5393 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5394 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5395 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5396 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5397 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5398 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5401 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5403 Err(_) => return None,
5405 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5406 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5411 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5412 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5413 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5414 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5415 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5416 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5417 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5418 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5419 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5420 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5421 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5422 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5423 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5424 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5425 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5426 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5429 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5432 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5433 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5434 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5435 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5436 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5437 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5438 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5439 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5440 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5442 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5443 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5444 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5445 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5446 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5447 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5448 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5449 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5450 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5452 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5453 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5454 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5455 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5456 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5457 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5458 next_funding_txid: None,
5463 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5465 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5466 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5467 /// commitment update.
5469 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5470 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5471 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5472 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5473 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5474 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5475 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5478 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5479 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5480 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5482 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5483 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5488 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5489 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5491 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5493 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5494 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5496 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5497 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5498 /// regenerate them.
5500 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5501 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5503 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5504 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5505 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5506 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5507 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5508 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5509 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5511 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5512 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5514 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5515 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5516 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5519 if amount_msat == 0 {
5520 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5523 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5524 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5525 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5526 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5529 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5530 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5531 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5534 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5535 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5536 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5537 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5538 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5539 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5540 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5541 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5544 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5545 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5546 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5547 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5548 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5549 else { "to peer" });
5551 if need_holding_cell {
5552 force_holding_cell = true;
5555 // Now update local state:
5556 if force_holding_cell {
5557 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5562 onion_routing_packet,
5568 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5569 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5571 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5573 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5578 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5579 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5580 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5584 onion_routing_packet,
5587 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5592 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5593 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5594 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5595 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5597 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5598 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5599 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5601 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5602 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5606 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5607 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5608 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5609 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5610 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5611 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5612 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5615 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5616 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5617 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5618 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5619 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5620 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5623 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5625 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5626 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5627 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5628 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5629 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5631 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5632 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5635 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5636 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5637 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5638 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5639 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5640 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5641 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5642 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5643 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5644 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5645 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5648 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5652 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5653 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5654 where L::Target: Logger
5656 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5657 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5658 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5660 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5662 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5663 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5664 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5665 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5666 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5667 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5668 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5669 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5670 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5671 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5672 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5678 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5681 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5682 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5683 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5684 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5685 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5686 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5688 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5689 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5690 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5692 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5693 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5694 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5697 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5698 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5702 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5703 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5705 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5707 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5708 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5709 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5710 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5712 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5713 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5714 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5715 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5716 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5717 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5721 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5722 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5726 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5727 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5732 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5733 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5735 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5736 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5737 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5738 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5739 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5740 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5741 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5742 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5744 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5745 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5746 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5749 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5750 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5751 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5757 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5759 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5760 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5761 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5762 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5763 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5765 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5767 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5773 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5774 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5776 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5777 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5778 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5779 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5780 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5782 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5783 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5784 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5787 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5788 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5789 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5791 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5792 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5795 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5796 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5798 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5799 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5800 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5803 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5804 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5805 let mut chan_closed = false;
5806 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5810 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5812 None if !chan_closed => {
5813 // use override shutdown script if provided
5814 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5815 Some(script) => script,
5817 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5818 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5819 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5820 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5824 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5825 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5827 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5833 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5834 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5835 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5836 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5837 monitor_update: None,
5838 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5839 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5841 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5842 Some(shutdown_result)
5844 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5847 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5849 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5850 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5851 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5852 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5853 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5854 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5857 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5858 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5860 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5861 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5862 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5865 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5866 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5867 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5868 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5869 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5871 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5872 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5879 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5880 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5882 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5885 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5886 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5887 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5889 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5890 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5894 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5898 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5899 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5900 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5901 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5904 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5905 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5906 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5907 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5908 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5909 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5910 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5911 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5913 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5914 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5915 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5916 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5918 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5919 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5921 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5922 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5924 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5925 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5926 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5928 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5929 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5931 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5932 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5933 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5934 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5935 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5938 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5939 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5941 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5942 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5944 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5946 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5948 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5949 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5950 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5954 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5955 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5957 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5958 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5959 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5960 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5964 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5965 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5966 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5970 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5971 Ok(script) => script,
5972 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5975 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
5978 context: ChannelContext {
5981 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5982 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5983 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5984 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5989 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5991 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5992 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5993 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5994 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5996 channel_value_satoshis,
5998 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6000 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6001 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6004 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6005 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6008 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6009 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6010 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6011 pending_update_fee: None,
6012 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6013 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6014 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6015 update_time_counter: 1,
6017 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6019 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6020 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6021 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6022 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6023 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6024 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6026 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6027 signer_pending_funding: false,
6029 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6030 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6031 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6032 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6034 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6035 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6036 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6037 closing_fee_limits: None,
6038 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6040 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6041 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6042 short_channel_id: None,
6043 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6045 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6046 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6047 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6048 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6049 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6050 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6051 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6052 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6053 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6054 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6055 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6056 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6058 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6060 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6061 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6062 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6063 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6064 counterparty_parameters: None,
6065 funding_outpoint: None,
6066 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6068 funding_transaction: None,
6069 is_batch_funding: None,
6071 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6072 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6073 counterparty_node_id,
6075 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6077 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6079 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6080 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6082 announcement_sigs: None,
6084 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6085 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6086 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6087 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6089 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6090 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6092 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6093 outbound_scid_alias,
6095 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6096 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6099 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6104 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6106 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6110 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6111 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6112 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6113 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6114 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6115 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6116 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6117 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6118 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6119 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6120 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6122 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6123 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6125 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6126 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6127 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6128 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6131 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6132 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6134 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6136 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6137 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6139 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6140 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6141 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6142 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6143 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6144 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6147 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6148 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6150 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6151 if funding_created.is_none() {
6152 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6153 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6154 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6158 let channel = Channel {
6159 context: self.context,
6162 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6165 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6166 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6167 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6168 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6169 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6170 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6171 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6172 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6173 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6174 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6177 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6178 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6179 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6180 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6181 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6182 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6188 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6189 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6190 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6191 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6192 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6193 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6195 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6197 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6198 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6199 // We've exhausted our options
6202 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6203 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6206 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6207 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6208 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6209 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6211 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6212 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6213 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6214 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6215 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6216 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6218 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6220 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6221 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6224 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6225 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6226 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6228 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6229 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6232 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6233 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6236 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6237 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6241 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6242 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6243 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6244 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6245 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6246 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6247 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6248 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6249 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6250 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6251 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6252 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6253 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6254 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6255 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6256 first_per_commitment_point,
6257 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6258 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6259 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6260 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6262 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6267 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6268 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6270 // Check sanity of message fields:
6271 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6274 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6277 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6280 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6283 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6286 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6288 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6290 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6291 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6294 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6295 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6298 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6301 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6305 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6306 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6309 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6312 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6315 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6318 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6321 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6324 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6328 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6329 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6332 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6333 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6335 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6336 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6339 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6340 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6343 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6344 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6345 &Some(ref script) => {
6346 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6347 if script.len() == 0 {
6350 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6351 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6353 Some(script.clone())
6356 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6363 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6364 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6365 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6366 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6367 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6369 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6370 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6372 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6375 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6376 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6377 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6378 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6379 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6380 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6383 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6384 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6385 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6388 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6389 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6391 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6392 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6398 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6399 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6400 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6401 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6404 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6405 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6406 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6407 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6408 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6409 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6410 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6411 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6412 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6413 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6414 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6417 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6419 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6420 // support this channel type.
6421 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6422 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6426 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6427 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6428 // `static_remote_key`.
6429 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6430 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6432 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6433 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6436 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6439 channel_type.clone()
6441 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6442 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6448 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6449 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6450 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6451 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6452 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6453 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6454 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6455 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6456 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6459 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6460 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6463 // Check sanity of message fields:
6464 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6465 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6467 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6468 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6470 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6471 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6473 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6474 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6475 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6477 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6478 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6480 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6481 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6483 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6485 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6486 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6487 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6489 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6490 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6492 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6493 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6496 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6497 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6498 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6500 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6501 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6503 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6504 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6506 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6507 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6509 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6510 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6512 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6513 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6515 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6516 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6519 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6521 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6522 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6523 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6527 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6528 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6529 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6530 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6531 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6533 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6534 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6536 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6537 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6538 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6540 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6541 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6544 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6545 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6546 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6547 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6551 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6552 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6553 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6554 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6557 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6558 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6559 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6560 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6561 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6564 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6565 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6566 &Some(ref script) => {
6567 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6568 if script.len() == 0 {
6571 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6572 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6574 Some(script.clone())
6577 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6584 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6585 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6586 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6587 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6591 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6592 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6593 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6597 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6598 Ok(script) => script,
6599 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6602 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6603 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6605 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6608 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6612 context: ChannelContext {
6615 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6616 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6618 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6623 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6625 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6626 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6627 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6628 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6631 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6633 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6634 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6637 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6638 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6639 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6641 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6642 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6643 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6644 pending_update_fee: None,
6645 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6646 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6647 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6648 update_time_counter: 1,
6650 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6652 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6653 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6654 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6655 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6656 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6657 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6659 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6660 signer_pending_funding: false,
6662 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6663 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6664 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6665 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6667 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6668 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6669 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6670 closing_fee_limits: None,
6671 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6673 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6674 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6675 short_channel_id: None,
6676 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6678 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6679 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6680 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6681 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6682 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6683 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6684 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6685 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6686 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6687 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6688 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6689 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6692 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6694 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6695 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6696 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6697 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6698 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6699 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6700 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6702 funding_outpoint: None,
6703 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6705 funding_transaction: None,
6706 is_batch_funding: None,
6708 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6709 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6710 counterparty_node_id,
6712 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6714 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6716 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6717 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6719 announcement_sigs: None,
6721 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6722 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6723 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6724 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6726 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6727 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6729 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6730 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6732 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6733 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6735 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6736 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6741 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6743 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6749 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6750 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6752 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6753 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6754 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6755 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6757 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6758 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6760 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6761 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6764 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6767 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6768 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6769 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6771 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6772 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6773 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6774 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6776 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6777 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6778 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6779 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6780 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6781 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6782 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6783 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6784 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6785 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6786 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6787 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6788 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6789 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6790 first_per_commitment_point,
6791 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6792 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6793 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6795 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6797 next_local_nonce: None,
6801 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6802 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6804 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6806 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6807 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6810 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6811 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6813 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6814 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6815 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6816 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6817 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6818 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6819 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6820 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6821 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6822 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6823 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6825 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6828 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6829 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6830 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6834 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6835 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6837 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6838 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6839 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6841 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6843 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6844 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6845 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6846 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6849 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6850 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6851 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6852 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6853 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6855 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6857 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6858 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6859 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6862 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6863 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6864 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6868 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6869 initial_commitment_tx,
6872 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6873 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6876 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6877 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6880 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6882 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6883 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6884 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6885 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6887 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6889 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6890 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6891 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6892 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6893 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6894 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6895 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6896 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6897 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6898 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6899 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6901 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6903 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6904 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6905 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6906 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6907 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6908 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6910 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6911 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6913 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6914 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6915 let mut channel = Channel {
6916 context: self.context,
6918 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6919 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6921 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6925 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6926 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6928 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6934 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6935 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6936 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6937 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6938 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6940 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6941 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6942 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6943 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6949 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6950 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6951 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6952 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6953 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6954 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6959 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6960 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6961 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6962 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6964 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6965 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6966 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6967 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6972 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6973 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6974 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6975 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6976 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6977 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6982 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6983 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6984 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6987 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6989 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6990 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6991 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6992 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6993 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6995 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6996 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6997 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6998 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7000 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7001 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
7002 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7004 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7006 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7007 // deserialized from that format.
7008 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7009 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7010 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7012 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7014 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7015 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7016 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7018 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7019 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7020 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7021 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7024 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7025 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7026 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7029 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7030 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7031 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7032 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7034 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7035 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7037 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7039 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7041 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7043 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7046 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7048 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7053 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7054 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7056 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7057 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7058 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7059 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7060 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7061 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7062 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7064 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7066 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7068 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7071 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7072 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7073 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7076 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7078 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7079 preimages.push(preimage);
7081 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7082 reason.write(writer)?;
7084 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7086 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7087 preimages.push(preimage);
7089 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7090 reason.write(writer)?;
7093 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7094 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7095 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7097 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7098 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7099 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7103 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7104 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7105 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7107 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7108 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7112 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7113 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7114 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7115 source.write(writer)?;
7116 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7118 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7119 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7120 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7122 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7123 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7125 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7127 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7128 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7130 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7132 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7133 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7138 match self.context.resend_order {
7139 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7140 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7143 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7144 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7145 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7147 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7148 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7149 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7150 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7153 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7154 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7155 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7156 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7157 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7160 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7161 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7162 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7163 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7165 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7166 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7167 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7169 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7171 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7172 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7173 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7174 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7176 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7177 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7178 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7179 // consider the stale state on reload.
7182 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7183 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7184 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7186 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7187 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7188 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7190 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7191 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7193 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7194 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7195 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7197 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7198 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7200 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7203 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7204 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7205 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7207 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7210 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7211 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7213 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7214 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7215 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7217 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7219 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7221 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7223 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7224 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7225 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7226 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7227 htlc.write(writer)?;
7230 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7231 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7232 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7234 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7235 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7237 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7238 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7239 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7240 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7241 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7242 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7243 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7245 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7246 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7247 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7248 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7249 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7251 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7252 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7254 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7255 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7256 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7257 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7259 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7261 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7262 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7263 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7264 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7265 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7266 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7267 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7269 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7270 (2, chan_type, option),
7271 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7272 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7273 (5, self.context.config, required),
7274 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7275 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7276 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7277 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7278 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7279 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7280 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7281 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7282 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7283 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7284 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7285 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7286 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7287 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7288 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7289 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7290 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7291 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7292 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7299 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7300 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7302 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7303 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7305 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7306 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7307 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7309 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7310 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7311 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7312 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7314 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7316 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7317 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7318 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7319 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7323 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7327 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7328 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 let mut keys_data = None;
7334 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7335 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7336 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7337 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7338 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7339 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7340 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7341 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7342 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7343 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7347 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7348 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7349 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7352 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7354 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7355 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7356 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7358 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7360 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7361 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7362 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7363 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7364 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7365 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7366 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7367 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7368 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7369 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7370 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7371 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7372 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7377 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7379 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7380 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7381 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7382 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7383 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7384 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7385 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7386 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7387 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7388 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7390 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7391 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7394 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7395 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7398 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7399 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7401 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7403 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7407 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7408 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7409 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7410 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7411 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7412 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7413 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7414 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7415 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7416 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7417 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7419 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7420 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7421 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7423 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7424 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7425 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7427 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7431 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7432 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7433 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7434 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7437 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7438 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7439 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7441 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7443 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7444 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7447 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7448 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7449 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7450 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7453 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7457 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7458 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7459 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7460 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7462 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7463 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7464 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7465 // consider the stale state on reload.
7466 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7469 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7470 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7471 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7473 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7476 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7481 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7482 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7483 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7485 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7486 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7488 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7489 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7491 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7493 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7495 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7497 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7498 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7500 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7501 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7504 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7506 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7507 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7508 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7509 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7511 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7514 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7517 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7519 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7520 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7522 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7523 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7525 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7527 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7528 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7529 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7531 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7532 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7533 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7537 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7538 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7539 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7541 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7547 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7548 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7549 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7550 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7551 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7552 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7553 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7554 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7555 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7556 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7558 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7559 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7560 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7561 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7562 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7563 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7564 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7566 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7567 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7568 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7569 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7571 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7573 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7574 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7576 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7578 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7579 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7580 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7581 (2, channel_type, option),
7582 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7583 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7584 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7585 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7586 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7587 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7588 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7589 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7590 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7591 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7592 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7593 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7594 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7595 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7596 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7597 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7598 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7599 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7600 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7601 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7602 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7603 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7606 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7607 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7608 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7609 // required channel parameters.
7610 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7611 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7612 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7614 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7616 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7617 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7618 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7619 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7622 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7623 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7624 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7626 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7627 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7629 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7630 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7635 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7636 if iter.next().is_some() {
7637 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7641 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7642 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7643 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7644 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7645 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7648 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7649 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7650 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7652 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7653 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7655 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7656 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7657 // separate u64 values.
7658 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7660 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7662 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7663 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7664 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7665 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7667 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7668 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7670 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7671 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7672 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7673 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7674 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7677 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7678 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7682 context: ChannelContext {
7685 config: config.unwrap(),
7689 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7690 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7691 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7694 temporary_channel_id,
7696 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7698 channel_value_satoshis,
7700 latest_monitor_update_id,
7702 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7703 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7706 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7707 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7710 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7711 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7712 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7713 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7717 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7718 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7719 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7720 monitor_pending_forwards,
7721 monitor_pending_failures,
7722 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7724 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7725 signer_pending_funding: false,
7728 holding_cell_update_fee,
7729 next_holder_htlc_id,
7730 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7731 update_time_counter,
7734 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7735 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7736 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7737 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7739 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7740 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7741 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7742 closing_fee_limits: None,
7743 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7745 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7746 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7748 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7750 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7751 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7752 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7753 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7754 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7755 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7756 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7757 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7758 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7761 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7763 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7764 funding_transaction,
7767 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7768 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7769 counterparty_node_id,
7771 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7775 channel_update_status,
7776 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7780 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7781 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7782 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7783 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7785 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7786 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7788 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7789 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7790 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7792 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7793 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7795 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7796 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7798 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7801 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7810 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7811 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7812 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7813 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7814 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7816 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7817 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7818 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7819 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7820 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7821 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7822 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7823 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7824 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7825 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7826 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7827 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7828 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7829 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7830 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7831 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7832 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7833 use crate::util::test_utils;
7834 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7835 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7836 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7837 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7838 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7839 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7840 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7841 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7842 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7843 use crate::prelude::*;
7845 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7848 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7849 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7855 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7856 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7857 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7858 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7862 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7863 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7864 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7865 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7866 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7867 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7868 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7869 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7873 signer: InMemorySigner,
7876 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7877 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7880 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7881 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7883 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7884 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7887 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7891 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7893 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7894 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7895 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7896 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7897 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7900 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7901 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7902 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7903 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7907 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7908 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7909 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7913 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7914 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7915 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7916 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7918 let seed = [42; 32];
7919 let network = Network::Testnet;
7920 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7921 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7922 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7925 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7926 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7927 let config = UserConfig::default();
7928 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
7929 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7930 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7932 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7933 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7937 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7938 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7940 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7941 let original_fee = 253;
7942 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7943 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7944 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7945 let seed = [42; 32];
7946 let network = Network::Testnet;
7947 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7949 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7950 let config = UserConfig::default();
7951 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7953 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7954 // same as the old fee.
7955 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7956 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7957 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7961 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7962 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7963 // dust limits are used.
7964 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7965 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7966 let seed = [42; 32];
7967 let network = Network::Testnet;
7968 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7969 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7970 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7972 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7973 // they have different dust limits.
7975 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7976 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7977 let config = UserConfig::default();
7978 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7980 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7981 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7982 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7983 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7984 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7986 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7987 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7988 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7989 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7990 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7992 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7993 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7994 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7995 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7997 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7998 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7999 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8001 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8002 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8004 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8005 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8006 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8008 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8009 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
8010 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8011 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8014 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8016 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8017 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
8018 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8019 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8020 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8021 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8022 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8023 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8024 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8026 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8029 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8030 // the dust limit check.
8031 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8032 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8033 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8034 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8036 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8037 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8038 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8039 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8040 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8041 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8042 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8046 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8047 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8048 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8049 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8050 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8051 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8052 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8053 let seed = [42; 32];
8054 let network = Network::Testnet;
8055 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8057 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8058 let config = UserConfig::default();
8059 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8061 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8062 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8064 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8065 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8066 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8067 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8068 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8069 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8071 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8072 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8073 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8074 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8075 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8077 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8079 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8080 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8081 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8082 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8083 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8085 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8086 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8087 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8088 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8089 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8093 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8094 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8095 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8096 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8097 let seed = [42; 32];
8098 let network = Network::Testnet;
8099 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8100 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8101 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8103 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8105 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8106 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8107 let config = UserConfig::default();
8108 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8110 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8111 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8112 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8113 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8115 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8116 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8117 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8119 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8120 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8121 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8122 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8124 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8125 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8126 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8128 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8129 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8131 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8132 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8133 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8134 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8135 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8136 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8137 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8139 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8141 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8142 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8143 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8144 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8145 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8149 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8150 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8151 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8152 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8153 let seed = [42; 32];
8154 let network = Network::Testnet;
8155 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8156 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8157 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8159 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8160 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8161 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8162 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8163 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8164 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8165 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8166 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8168 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8169 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8170 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8171 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8172 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8173 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8175 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8176 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8177 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8178 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8180 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8182 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8183 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8184 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8185 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8186 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8187 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8189 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8190 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8191 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8192 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8194 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8195 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8196 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8197 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8198 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8200 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8201 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8203 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8204 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8205 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8207 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8208 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8209 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8210 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8211 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8213 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8214 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8216 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8217 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8218 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8222 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8224 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8225 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8226 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8228 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8229 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8230 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8231 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8233 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8234 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8235 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8237 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8239 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8240 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8243 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8244 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8245 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8246 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8247 let seed = [42; 32];
8248 let network = Network::Testnet;
8249 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8250 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8251 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8254 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8255 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8256 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8258 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8259 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8261 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8262 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8263 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8265 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8266 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8268 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8270 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8271 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8273 // Channel Negotiations failed
8274 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8275 assert!(result.is_err());
8280 fn channel_update() {
8281 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8282 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8283 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8284 let seed = [42; 32];
8285 let network = Network::Testnet;
8286 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8287 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8288 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8290 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8291 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8292 let config = UserConfig::default();
8293 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8295 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8296 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8297 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8298 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8299 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8301 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8302 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8303 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8304 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8305 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8307 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8308 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8309 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8310 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8312 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8313 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8314 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8316 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8317 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8319 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8320 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8321 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8323 short_channel_id: 0,
8326 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8327 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8328 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8330 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8331 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8333 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8335 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8337 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8338 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8339 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8340 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8342 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8343 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8344 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8346 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8349 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8352 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8354 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8355 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8356 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8357 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8358 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8359 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8360 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8361 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8362 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8363 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8364 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8365 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8366 use crate::sync::Arc;
8368 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8369 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8370 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8371 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8373 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8375 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8376 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8377 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8378 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8379 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8381 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8382 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8388 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8389 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8390 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8392 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8393 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8394 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8395 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8396 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8397 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8399 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8401 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8402 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8403 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8404 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8405 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8406 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8408 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8409 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8410 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8411 selected_contest_delay: 144
8413 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8414 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8416 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8417 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8419 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8420 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8422 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8423 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8425 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8426 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8427 // build_commitment_transaction.
8428 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8429 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8430 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8431 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8432 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8434 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8435 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8436 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8437 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8441 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8442 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8443 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8444 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8448 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8449 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8450 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8452 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8453 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8455 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8456 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8458 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8460 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8461 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8462 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8463 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8464 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8465 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8466 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8468 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8469 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8470 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8471 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8473 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8474 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8475 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8477 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8479 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8480 commitment_tx.clone(),
8481 counterparty_signature,
8482 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8483 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8484 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8486 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8487 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8489 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8490 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8491 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8493 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8494 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8497 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8498 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8500 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8501 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8502 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8503 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8504 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8505 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8506 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8507 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8509 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8512 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8513 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8514 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8518 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8521 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8522 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8523 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8524 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8525 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8526 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8528 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8529 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8530 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8531 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8533 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8534 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8535 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8536 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8537 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8539 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8540 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8541 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8542 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8543 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
8544 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8546 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8550 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8551 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8552 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8553 "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", {});
8555 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8556 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8558 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8559 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8560 "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", {});
8562 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8563 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8564 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8565 "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", {});
8567 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8568 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8570 amount_msat: 1000000,
8572 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8573 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8575 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8578 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8579 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8581 amount_msat: 2000000,
8583 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8584 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8586 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8589 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8590 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8592 amount_msat: 2000000,
8594 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8595 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8596 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8597 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8599 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8602 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8603 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8605 amount_msat: 3000000,
8607 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8608 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8609 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8610 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8612 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8615 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8616 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8618 amount_msat: 4000000,
8620 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8621 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8623 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8627 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8628 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8629 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8631 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8632 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8633 "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", {
8636 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8637 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8638 "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" },
8641 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8642 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8643 "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" },
8646 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8647 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8648 "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" },
8651 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8652 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8653 "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" },
8656 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8657 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8658 "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" }
8661 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8662 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8663 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8665 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8666 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8667 "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", {
8670 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8671 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8672 "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" },
8675 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8676 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8677 "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" },
8680 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8681 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8682 "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" },
8685 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8686 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8687 "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" },
8690 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8691 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8692 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8695 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8696 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8697 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8699 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8700 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8701 "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", {
8704 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8705 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8706 "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" },
8709 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8710 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8711 "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" },
8714 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8715 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8716 "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" },
8719 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8720 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8721 "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" }
8724 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8725 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8726 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8727 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8729 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8730 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8731 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8734 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8735 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8736 "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" },
8739 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8740 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8741 "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" },
8744 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8745 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8746 "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" },
8749 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8750 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8751 "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" }
8754 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8755 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8756 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8757 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8759 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8760 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8761 "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", {
8764 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8765 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8766 "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" },
8769 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8770 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8771 "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" },
8774 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8775 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8776 "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" },
8779 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8780 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8781 "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" }
8784 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8785 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8786 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8788 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8789 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8790 "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", {
8793 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8794 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8795 "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" },
8798 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8799 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8800 "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" },
8803 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8804 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8805 "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" }
8808 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8809 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8810 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8812 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8813 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8814 "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", {
8817 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8818 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8819 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8822 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8823 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8824 "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" },
8827 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8828 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8829 "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" }
8832 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8833 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8834 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8836 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8837 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8838 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8841 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8842 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8843 "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" },
8846 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8847 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8848 "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" }
8851 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8852 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8853 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8854 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8855 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8856 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8858 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8859 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8860 "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", {
8863 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8864 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8865 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8868 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8869 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8870 "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" }
8873 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8874 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8875 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8876 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8877 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8879 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8880 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8881 "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", {
8884 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8885 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8886 "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" },
8889 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8890 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8891 "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" }
8894 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8895 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8896 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8898 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8899 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8900 "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", {
8903 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8904 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8905 "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" }
8908 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8909 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8910 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8911 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8912 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8914 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8915 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8916 "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", {
8919 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8920 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8921 "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" }
8924 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8925 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8926 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8927 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8928 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8930 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8931 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8932 "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", {
8935 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8936 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8937 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8940 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8941 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8942 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8943 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8945 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8946 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8947 "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", {});
8949 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8950 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8951 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8952 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8953 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8955 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8956 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8957 "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", {});
8959 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8960 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8961 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8962 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8963 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8965 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8966 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8967 "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", {});
8969 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8970 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8971 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8973 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8974 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8975 "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", {});
8977 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8978 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8979 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8980 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8981 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8983 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8984 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8985 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8987 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8988 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8989 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8990 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8991 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8993 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8994 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8995 "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", {});
8997 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8998 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8999 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9000 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9001 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9002 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9004 amount_msat: 2000000,
9006 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9007 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9009 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
9012 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9013 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9014 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9016 amount_msat: 5000001,
9018 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9019 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9020 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9021 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9023 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
9026 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9027 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9029 amount_msat: 5000000,
9031 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9032 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9033 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9034 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9036 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
9040 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9041 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9042 "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", {
9045 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9046 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9047 "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" },
9049 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9050 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9051 "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" },
9053 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9054 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9055 "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" }
9058 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9059 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9060 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9061 "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", {
9064 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9065 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9066 "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" },
9068 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9069 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9070 "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" },
9072 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9073 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9074 "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" }
9079 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9080 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9082 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9083 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9084 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9085 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9087 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9088 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9089 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9091 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9092 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9094 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9095 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9097 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9098 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9099 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9103 fn test_key_derivation() {
9104 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9105 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9107 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9108 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9110 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9111 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9113 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9114 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9116 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9117 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
9119 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9120 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9122 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9123 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9125 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9126 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9130 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9131 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9132 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9133 let seed = [42; 32];
9134 let network = Network::Testnet;
9135 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9136 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9138 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9139 let config = UserConfig::default();
9140 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9141 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9143 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9144 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9146 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9147 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9148 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9149 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9150 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9151 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9152 assert!(res.is_ok());
9156 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9157 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9158 // resulting `channel_type`.
9159 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9160 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9161 let network = Network::Testnet;
9162 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9163 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9165 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9166 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9168 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9169 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9171 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9172 // need to signal it.
9173 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9174 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9175 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9176 &config, 0, 42, None
9178 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9180 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9181 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9182 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9184 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9185 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9186 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9190 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9191 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9192 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9193 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9194 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9197 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9198 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9202 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9203 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9204 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9205 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9206 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9207 let network = Network::Testnet;
9208 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9209 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9211 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9212 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9214 let config = UserConfig::default();
9216 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9217 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9218 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9219 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9220 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9222 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9223 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9224 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9228 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9229 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9230 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9232 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9233 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9234 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9235 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9236 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9237 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9239 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9243 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9244 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9246 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9247 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9248 let network = Network::Testnet;
9249 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9250 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9252 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9253 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9255 let config = UserConfig::default();
9257 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9258 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9259 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9260 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9261 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9262 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9263 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9264 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9266 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9267 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9268 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9269 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9270 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9271 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9275 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9276 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9278 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9279 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9280 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9281 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9283 assert!(res.is_err());
9285 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9286 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9287 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9289 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9290 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9291 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9294 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9296 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9297 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9298 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9299 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9302 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9303 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9305 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9306 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9308 assert!(res.is_err());
9312 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9313 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9314 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9315 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9316 let seed = [42; 32];
9317 let network = Network::Testnet;
9318 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9319 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9320 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9322 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9323 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9324 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9325 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9327 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9328 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9329 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9334 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9344 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9345 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9346 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9351 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9352 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9358 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9361 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9362 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9363 &accept_channel_msg,
9364 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9365 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9368 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9369 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9370 let tx = Transaction {
9372 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9376 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9379 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9382 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9383 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9388 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9389 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9390 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9394 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9395 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9403 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9404 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9405 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9406 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9411 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9418 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9419 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9420 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9421 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9423 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9424 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9425 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9428 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9429 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9430 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9438 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9439 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9440 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9441 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9444 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9445 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9447 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9448 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9449 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9451 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());