1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
163 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
164 /// through the following states in the state machine:
165 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
166 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
167 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
168 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
169 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
170 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
171 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
173 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
175 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
176 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
177 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
178 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
179 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
180 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
181 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
183 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
184 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
185 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
186 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
188 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
189 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
190 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
191 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
192 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
193 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
194 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
195 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
197 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
200 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
201 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
203 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
204 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
206 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
207 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
208 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
209 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
210 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
211 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
212 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
213 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
214 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
215 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
220 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
221 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
222 (2, Committed) => {},
223 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
224 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
227 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 state: InboundHTLCState,
235 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
236 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
237 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
239 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
240 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
241 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
243 /// The amount in msat.
244 pub amount_msat: u64,
245 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
246 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
247 /// The payment hash.
248 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
251 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
252 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
254 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
256 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
257 /// states may result in `None` here.
258 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
259 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
260 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
261 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
262 /// transactions as well.
264 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
265 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
268 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
269 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
273 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
274 (0, htlc_id, required),
275 (2, amount_msat, required),
276 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
277 (6, payment_hash, required),
278 (7, state, upgradable_option),
279 (8, is_dust, required),
282 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
283 enum OutboundHTLCState {
284 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
285 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
286 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
287 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
288 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
289 /// money back (though we won't), and,
290 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
291 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
292 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
293 /// we'll never get out of sync).
294 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
295 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
296 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
298 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
299 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
300 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
301 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
302 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
303 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
304 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
305 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
306 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
307 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
308 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
309 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
310 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
311 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
312 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
315 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
317 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
318 /// through the following states in the state machine:
319 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
320 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
321 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
322 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
323 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
324 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
325 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
327 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
328 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
329 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
330 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
331 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
332 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
333 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
334 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
336 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
337 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
339 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
340 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
341 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
342 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
343 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
344 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
345 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
346 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
347 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
348 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
351 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
352 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
354 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
355 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
356 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
357 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
358 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
360 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
361 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
362 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
363 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
364 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
365 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
366 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
367 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
368 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
369 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
374 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
375 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
376 (2, Committed) => {},
377 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
378 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
382 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
383 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
384 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
385 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
386 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
389 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
390 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
392 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
393 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
398 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
399 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
401 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
402 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
407 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
408 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
412 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
413 state: OutboundHTLCState,
415 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
416 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
419 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
420 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
421 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
423 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
424 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
425 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
427 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
428 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
429 /// The amount in msat.
430 pub amount_msat: u64,
431 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
432 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
433 /// The payment hash.
434 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
435 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
437 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
438 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
440 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
442 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
443 /// states may result in `None` here.
444 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
445 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
446 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
447 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
448 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
449 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
450 /// transactions as well.
452 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
453 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
456 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
457 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
462 (0, htlc_id, required),
463 (2, amount_msat, required),
464 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
465 (6, payment_hash, required),
466 (7, state, upgradable_option),
467 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
468 (10, is_dust, required),
471 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
472 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
473 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
474 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
478 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
480 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
481 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
482 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
483 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
486 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
491 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
496 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
500 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
501 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
502 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
503 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
504 struct $flag_type(u32);
509 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
512 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
514 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
517 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
520 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
521 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
524 Ok($flag_type(flags))
529 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
531 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
533 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
535 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
539 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
542 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
544 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
546 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
547 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
549 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
551 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
553 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
554 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
557 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
558 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
560 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
563 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
565 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
567 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
570 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
571 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
573 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
574 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
575 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
576 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
577 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
578 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
579 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
580 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
582 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
584 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
586 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
587 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
589 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
591 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
593 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
594 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
596 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
597 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
599 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
600 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
605 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
608 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
609 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
610 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
611 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
612 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
613 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
614 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
615 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
616 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
617 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
618 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
619 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
620 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
621 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
625 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
627 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
628 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
629 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
630 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
631 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
632 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
633 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
634 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
635 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
636 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
637 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
638 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
639 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
640 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
645 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
646 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
647 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
648 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
649 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
650 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
655 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
656 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
657 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
658 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
659 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
660 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
661 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
662 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
663 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
664 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
665 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
666 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
667 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
668 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
673 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
674 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
675 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
676 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
677 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
678 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
679 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
680 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
684 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
685 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
686 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
688 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
689 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
690 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
691 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
692 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
694 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
695 /// funding transaction to confirm.
696 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
697 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
699 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
700 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
701 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
705 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
706 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
708 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
711 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
720 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
722 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
726 fn $clear(&mut self) {
729 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
731 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
735 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
736 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
738 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
739 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
744 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
746 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
747 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
749 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
750 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
751 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
752 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
753 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
754 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
755 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
756 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
764 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
766 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
767 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
768 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
769 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
770 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
774 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
775 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
778 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
779 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
782 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
784 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
785 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
786 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
790 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
792 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
793 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
794 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
795 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
797 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
803 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
804 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
805 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
806 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
807 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
808 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
809 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
810 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
813 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
815 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
817 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
818 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
819 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
820 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
824 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
826 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
828 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
830 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
831 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
832 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
833 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
834 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
836 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
837 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
839 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
841 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
842 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
844 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
845 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
846 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
847 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
848 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
849 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
851 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
852 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
854 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
855 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
856 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
857 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
858 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
860 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
861 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
863 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
864 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
866 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
867 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
868 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
869 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
875 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
876 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
878 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
879 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
880 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
885 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
886 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
888 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
889 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
890 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
895 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
897 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
898 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
901 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
902 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
903 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
904 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
905 self.logger.log(record)
909 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
910 where L::Target: Logger {
911 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
912 where S::Target: SignerProvider
916 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
917 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
922 macro_rules! secp_check {
923 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
926 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
931 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
932 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
933 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
934 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
935 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
936 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
937 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
938 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
940 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
942 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
944 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
948 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
950 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
951 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
952 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
954 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
955 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
957 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
958 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
959 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
960 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
961 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
963 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
964 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
968 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
974 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
977 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
978 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
979 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
980 holding_cell_msat: u64,
981 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
984 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
985 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
986 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
987 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
988 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
989 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
990 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
991 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
992 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
993 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
994 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
997 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
998 struct HTLCCandidate {
1000 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1003 impl HTLCCandidate {
1004 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1012 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1014 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1016 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1017 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1018 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1023 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1024 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1025 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1026 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1027 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1029 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1030 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1031 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1032 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1034 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1035 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1039 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1040 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1041 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1042 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1043 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1044 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1045 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1046 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1047 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1048 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1049 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1052 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1054 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1055 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1056 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1057 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1060 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1061 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1062 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1063 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1064 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1065 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1066 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1067 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1070 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1072 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1073 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1074 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1075 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1076 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1077 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1078 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1079 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1080 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1081 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1082 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1083 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1084 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1085 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1086 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1089 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1090 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1091 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1092 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1093 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1094 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1095 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1096 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1097 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1098 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1099 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1100 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1101 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1102 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1103 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1105 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1106 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1107 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1108 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1110 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1111 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1112 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1113 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1115 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1116 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1117 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1118 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1119 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1121 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1122 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1123 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1124 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1126 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1127 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1128 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1130 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1131 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1132 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1133 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1134 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1136 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1137 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1140 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1141 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1143 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1144 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1145 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1146 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1148 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1149 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1151 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1152 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1155 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1156 (0, update, required),
1159 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1160 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1161 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1162 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1163 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1164 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1167 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1168 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1169 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1171 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1173 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1174 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1175 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1179 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1181 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1182 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1183 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1188 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1189 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1190 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1191 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1192 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1194 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1195 /// in a timely manner.
1196 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1199 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1200 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1201 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1203 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1204 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1205 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1206 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1210 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1211 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1212 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1214 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1215 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1216 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1217 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1219 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1223 /// The current channel ID.
1224 channel_id: ChannelId,
1225 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1226 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1227 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1228 channel_state: ChannelState,
1230 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1231 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1233 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1234 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1235 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1237 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1238 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1239 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1240 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1242 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1243 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1245 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1247 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1248 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1249 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1251 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1252 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1253 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1255 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1256 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1257 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1258 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1259 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1260 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1262 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1263 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1264 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1265 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1266 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1267 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1269 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1271 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1272 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1273 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1275 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1276 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1277 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1278 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1279 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1280 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1281 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1283 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1284 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1285 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1287 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1288 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1289 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1290 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1291 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1292 /// outbound or inbound.
1293 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1295 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1297 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1298 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1299 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1300 // HTLCs with similar state.
1301 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1302 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1303 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1304 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1305 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1306 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1307 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1308 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1309 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1310 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1312 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1313 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1314 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1316 update_time_counter: u32,
1318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1320 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1322 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1323 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1325 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1326 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1328 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1329 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1330 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1331 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1333 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1334 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1336 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1338 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1340 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1341 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1342 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1343 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1344 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1346 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1347 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1349 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1350 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1351 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1353 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1354 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1355 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1356 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1357 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1358 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1359 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1360 channel_creation_height: u32,
1362 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1365 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1367 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1370 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1372 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1375 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1377 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1379 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1380 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1383 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1385 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1387 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1388 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1390 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1392 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1393 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1394 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1396 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1398 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1399 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1400 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1402 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1403 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1404 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1406 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1408 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1410 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1411 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1412 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1413 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1415 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1416 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1417 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1419 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1420 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1421 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1423 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1424 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1425 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1426 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1427 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1428 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1429 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1430 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1432 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1433 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1434 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1435 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1436 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1438 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1439 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1441 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1442 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1443 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1444 /// unblock the state machine.
1446 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1447 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1448 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1450 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1451 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1452 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1454 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1455 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1456 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1457 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1458 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1459 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1460 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1461 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1463 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1464 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1466 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1467 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1468 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1470 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1471 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1472 // associated channel mapping.
1474 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1475 // to store all of them.
1476 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1478 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1479 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1480 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1481 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1482 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1484 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1485 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1487 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1488 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1490 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1491 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1493 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1494 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1496 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1498 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1500 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1501 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1502 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1505 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1506 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1507 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1508 self.update_time_counter
1511 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1512 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1515 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1516 self.config.announced_channel
1519 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1520 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1523 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1524 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1525 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1526 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1529 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1530 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1531 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1534 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1535 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1536 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1537 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1538 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1539 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1540 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1543 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1544 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1545 match self.channel_state {
1546 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1547 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1548 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1549 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1550 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1551 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1552 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1554 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1556 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1557 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1561 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1562 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1563 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1564 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1565 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1566 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1569 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1570 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1571 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1575 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1576 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1577 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1578 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1579 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1582 // Public utilities:
1584 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1588 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1590 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1591 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1592 self.temporary_channel_id
1595 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1599 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1600 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1601 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1605 /// Gets the channel's type
1606 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1610 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1612 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1613 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1614 self.short_channel_id
1617 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1618 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1619 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1622 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1623 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1624 self.outbound_scid_alias
1627 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1629 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1630 return &self.holder_signer
1633 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1634 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1635 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1636 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1637 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1638 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1641 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1642 /// get_funding_created.
1643 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1644 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1647 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1648 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1649 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1650 if conf_height > 0 {
1657 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1658 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1659 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1662 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1663 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1664 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1665 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1669 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1672 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1673 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1676 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1677 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1680 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1681 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1682 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1685 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1686 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1689 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1690 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1691 self.counterparty_node_id
1694 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1695 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1696 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1699 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1700 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1701 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1704 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1705 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1707 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1708 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1709 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1710 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1712 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1716 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1717 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1718 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1721 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1722 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1723 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1726 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1727 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1728 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1730 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1731 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1736 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1737 self.channel_value_satoshis
1740 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1741 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1744 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1745 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1748 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1749 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1750 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1752 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1753 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1754 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1755 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1756 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1758 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1762 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1763 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1764 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1767 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1768 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1769 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1772 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1773 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1774 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1777 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1778 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1779 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1782 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1783 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1784 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1787 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1788 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1789 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1792 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1793 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1794 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1795 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1796 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1799 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1801 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1802 self.prev_config = None;
1806 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1807 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1811 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1812 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1813 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1814 let did_channel_update =
1815 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1816 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1817 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1818 if did_channel_update {
1819 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1820 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1821 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1822 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1824 self.config.options = *config;
1828 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1829 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1830 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1831 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1832 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1835 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1836 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1837 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1838 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1839 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1841 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1842 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1843 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1844 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1845 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1846 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1847 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1849 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1850 where L::Target: Logger
1852 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1853 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1854 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1856 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1857 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1858 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1859 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1861 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1862 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1863 if match update_state {
1864 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1865 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1866 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1867 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1868 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1870 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1874 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1875 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1876 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1878 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1880 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1881 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1882 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1884 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1885 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1886 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1887 transaction_output_index: None
1892 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1893 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1894 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1895 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1896 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1899 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1901 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1902 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1903 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1905 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1906 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1909 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1910 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1913 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1915 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1916 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1917 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1919 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1920 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1926 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1928 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1929 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1930 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1931 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1932 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1933 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1934 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1938 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1939 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1941 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1943 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1944 if generated_by_local {
1945 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1946 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1947 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1957 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1959 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1960 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1961 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1962 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1963 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1964 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1965 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1968 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1969 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1970 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1971 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1975 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1976 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1980 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1981 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1983 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1985 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1986 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1988 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1989 if !generated_by_local {
1990 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1998 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1999 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2000 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2001 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2002 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2003 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2004 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2005 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2007 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2009 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2010 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2011 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2012 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2014 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2016 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2017 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2018 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2019 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2022 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2023 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2024 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2025 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2027 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2030 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2031 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2032 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2033 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2035 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2038 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2039 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2044 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2045 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2050 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2052 let channel_parameters =
2053 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2054 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2055 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2062 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2065 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2066 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2067 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2068 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2076 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2077 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2078 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2079 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2084 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2085 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2086 /// our counterparty!)
2087 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2088 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2089 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2090 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2091 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2092 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2093 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2095 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2099 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2100 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2101 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2102 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2103 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2104 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2105 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2107 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2110 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2111 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2112 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2113 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2114 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2117 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2118 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2121 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2125 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2126 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2127 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2128 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2129 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2130 // which are near the dust limit.
2131 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2132 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2133 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2134 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2135 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2137 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2138 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2140 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2141 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2144 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2145 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2146 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2149 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2150 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2152 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2153 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2154 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2155 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2156 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2157 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2158 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2161 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2164 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2165 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2166 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2168 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2169 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2170 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2171 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2172 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2173 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2175 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2176 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2182 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2183 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2185 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2186 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2187 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2188 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2189 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2190 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2191 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2194 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2197 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2198 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2199 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2201 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2202 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2203 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2204 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2205 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2206 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2208 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2209 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2213 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2214 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2215 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2216 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2217 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2218 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2219 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2221 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2222 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2224 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2231 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2232 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2233 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2234 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2235 match holding_cell_update {
2236 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2237 holding_cell_states.insert(
2239 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2242 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2243 holding_cell_states.insert(
2245 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2248 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2249 holding_cell_states.insert(
2251 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2255 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2258 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2259 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2262 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2263 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2265 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2266 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2267 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2268 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2269 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2270 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2271 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2272 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2273 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2274 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2281 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2282 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2283 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2284 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2287 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2288 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2290 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2291 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2292 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2293 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2294 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2295 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2296 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2297 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2298 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2299 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2302 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2303 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2309 } = *holding_cell_update {
2310 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2312 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2313 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2314 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2315 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2316 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2317 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2324 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2325 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2326 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2327 /// corner case properly.
2328 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2329 -> AvailableBalances
2330 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2332 let context = &self;
2333 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2334 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2335 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2337 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2338 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2339 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2340 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2343 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2345 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2346 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2348 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2350 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2352 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2353 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2357 if context.is_outbound() {
2358 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2359 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2361 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2362 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2364 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2365 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2366 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2367 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2370 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2371 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2372 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2373 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2374 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2375 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2376 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2379 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2380 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2381 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2382 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2383 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2384 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2385 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2386 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2387 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2388 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2389 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2391 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2394 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2395 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2396 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2397 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2398 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2401 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2402 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2404 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2405 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2406 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2408 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2409 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2410 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2411 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2415 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2417 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2418 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2419 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2420 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2421 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2422 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2423 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2425 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2426 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2428 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2429 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2430 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2432 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2433 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2434 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2435 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2436 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2439 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2440 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2441 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2442 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2443 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2444 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2447 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2448 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2449 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2451 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2455 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2456 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2458 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2459 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2463 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2464 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2465 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2466 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2468 outbound_capacity_msat,
2469 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2470 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2475 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2476 let context = &self;
2477 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2480 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2481 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2483 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2484 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2486 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2487 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2489 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2490 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2491 let context = &self;
2492 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2494 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2497 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2498 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2500 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2501 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2503 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2504 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2506 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2507 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2511 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2512 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2518 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2519 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2520 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2523 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2524 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2525 included_htlcs += 1;
2528 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2529 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2533 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2534 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2535 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2536 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2537 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2538 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2543 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2545 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2546 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2551 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2552 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2556 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2557 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2558 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2561 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2562 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2564 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2565 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2566 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2568 total_pending_htlcs,
2569 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2570 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2571 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2573 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2574 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2575 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2577 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2579 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2584 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2585 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2587 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2588 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2590 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2591 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2593 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2594 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2595 let context = &self;
2596 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2598 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2601 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2602 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2604 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2605 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2607 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2608 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2610 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2611 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2615 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2616 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2622 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2623 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2624 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2625 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2626 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2627 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2630 included_htlcs += 1;
2633 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2634 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2637 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2638 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2640 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2641 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2642 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2647 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2648 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2649 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2652 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2653 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2655 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2656 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2658 total_pending_htlcs,
2659 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2660 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2661 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2663 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2664 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2665 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2667 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2669 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2674 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2675 match self.channel_state {
2676 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2677 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2678 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2679 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2689 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2691 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2692 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2695 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2697 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2698 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2699 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2703 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2704 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2705 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2708 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2710 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2711 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2714 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2715 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2716 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2717 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2718 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2719 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
2720 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2721 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2722 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2723 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2724 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2726 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2727 // return them to fail the payment.
2728 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2729 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2730 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2732 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2733 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2738 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2739 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2740 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2741 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2742 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2743 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2744 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2745 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2746 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
2747 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2748 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2749 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2750 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2751 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2752 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
2756 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2757 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
2759 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2760 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2764 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2765 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2766 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2767 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
2768 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2769 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2770 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
2771 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
2775 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2776 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2777 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2778 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2780 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2781 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2782 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2783 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2785 match &self.holder_signer {
2786 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2787 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2788 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2789 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2790 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2793 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2797 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2798 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2799 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2801 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2802 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2803 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2805 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2806 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2807 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2810 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2811 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2813 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2820 // Internal utility functions for channels
2822 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2823 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2824 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2826 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2828 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2829 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2830 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2832 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2835 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2837 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2840 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2841 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2842 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2844 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2846 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2847 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2848 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2849 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2850 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2853 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2854 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2855 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2856 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2857 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2858 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2859 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2862 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2863 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2865 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2866 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2869 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2870 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2871 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2872 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2873 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2874 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2877 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2878 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2879 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2880 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2883 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2884 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2886 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2887 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2888 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2892 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2893 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2894 trait FailHTLCContents {
2895 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2896 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2897 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2898 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2900 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2901 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2902 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2903 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2905 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2906 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2908 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2909 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2912 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
2913 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
2914 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2915 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2918 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2919 failure_code: self.1
2922 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2923 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
2925 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2926 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2928 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2929 failure_code: self.1
2934 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2935 fn name() -> &'static str;
2937 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2938 fn name() -> &'static str {
2942 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2943 fn name() -> &'static str {
2944 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2948 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2949 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2950 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2952 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2953 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2954 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2955 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2957 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2958 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2960 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2962 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2963 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2964 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2965 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2967 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2968 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2972 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2978 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2979 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2980 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2981 // outside of those situations will fail.
2982 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2986 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2991 1 + // script length (0)
2995 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2996 2 + // witness marker and flag
2997 1 + // witness element count
2998 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2999 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3000 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3001 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3002 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3003 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3005 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3006 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3007 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3013 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3014 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3015 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3016 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3018 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3019 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3020 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3022 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3023 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3024 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3025 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3026 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3027 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3030 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3031 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3034 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3035 value_to_holder = 0;
3038 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3039 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3040 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3041 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3043 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3044 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3047 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3048 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3051 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3054 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3055 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3057 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3059 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3060 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3061 where L::Target: Logger {
3062 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3063 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3064 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3065 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3066 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3067 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3068 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3069 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3073 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3074 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3075 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3076 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3078 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3079 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3082 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3083 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3084 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3086 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3087 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3088 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3089 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3090 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3091 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3092 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3094 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3095 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3096 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3098 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3099 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3101 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3104 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3105 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3109 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3113 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3114 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3115 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3116 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3117 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3118 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3121 // Now update local state:
3123 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3124 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3125 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3126 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3127 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3128 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3129 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3130 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3132 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3135 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3136 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3137 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3138 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3139 // do not not get into this branch.
3140 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3141 match pending_update {
3142 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3143 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3144 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3145 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3146 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3147 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3148 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3151 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3152 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3154 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3155 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3156 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3157 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3158 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3159 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3165 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3166 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3167 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3169 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3170 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3171 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3173 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3174 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3177 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3178 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3180 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3181 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3183 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3184 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3187 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3190 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3191 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3192 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3193 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3198 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3199 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3200 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3201 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3202 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3203 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3204 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3205 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3206 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3207 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3208 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3209 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3210 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3211 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3212 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3214 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3215 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3216 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3217 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3218 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3221 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3222 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3223 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3229 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3230 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3232 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3236 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3237 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3238 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3239 /// before we fail backwards.
3241 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3242 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3243 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3244 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3245 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3246 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3247 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3250 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3251 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3253 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3254 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3255 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3256 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3257 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3258 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3261 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3262 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3263 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3264 /// before we fail backwards.
3266 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3267 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3268 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3269 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3270 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3272 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3273 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3274 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3277 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3278 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3279 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3281 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3282 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3283 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3285 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3286 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3287 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3289 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3294 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3295 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3301 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3302 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3303 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3304 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3305 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3309 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3310 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3311 force_holding_cell = true;
3314 // Now update local state:
3315 if force_holding_cell {
3316 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3317 match pending_update {
3318 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3319 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3320 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3321 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3325 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3326 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3328 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3329 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3330 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3336 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3337 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3341 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3342 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3344 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3345 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3348 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3351 // Message handlers:
3352 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3353 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3354 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3355 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3356 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3357 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3358 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3361 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3363 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3365 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3366 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3367 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3368 debug_assert!(matches!(
3369 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3371 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3372 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3375 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3376 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3378 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3379 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3380 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3381 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3383 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3386 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3387 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3388 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3391 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3392 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3393 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3394 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3395 // when routing outbound payments.
3396 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3400 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3401 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3402 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3403 match &self.context.channel_state {
3404 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3405 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3406 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3407 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3408 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3409 check_reconnection = true;
3410 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3411 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3412 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3413 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3414 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3416 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3417 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3420 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3421 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3422 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3424 if check_reconnection {
3425 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3426 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3427 let expected_point =
3428 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3429 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3431 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3432 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3433 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3434 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3435 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3436 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3438 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3439 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3440 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3441 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3442 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3444 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3445 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3450 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3451 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3453 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3455 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3458 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3459 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3460 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3461 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3462 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3463 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3465 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3468 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3469 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3470 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3472 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3473 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3476 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3479 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3482 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3485 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3486 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3489 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3490 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3491 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3492 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3494 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3495 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3498 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3499 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3500 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3501 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3502 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3503 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3504 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3505 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3506 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3507 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3508 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3510 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3511 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3512 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3513 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3514 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3515 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3519 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3520 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3523 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3524 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3525 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3527 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3528 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3529 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3530 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3531 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3532 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3533 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3537 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3538 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3539 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3540 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3541 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3542 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3543 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3547 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3548 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3549 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3550 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3551 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3555 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3556 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3558 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3559 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3560 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3562 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3563 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3567 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3570 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3575 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3576 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3580 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3581 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3582 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3583 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3584 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3585 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3586 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3587 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3588 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3590 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3591 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3592 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3593 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3594 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3597 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3598 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3599 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3600 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3604 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3607 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3611 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3612 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3613 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3617 // Now update local state:
3618 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3619 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3620 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3621 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3622 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3623 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3624 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3629 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3631 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3632 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3633 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3634 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3635 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3636 None => fail_reason.into(),
3637 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3638 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3639 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3640 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3642 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3646 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3647 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3648 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3649 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3651 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3652 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3657 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3660 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
3661 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3664 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3668 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
3671 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3672 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3673 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3675 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3679 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3683 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3684 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3687 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3688 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3691 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3695 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3696 where L::Target: Logger
3698 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3699 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3701 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3702 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3704 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3705 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3708 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3710 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3712 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3713 let commitment_txid = {
3714 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3715 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3716 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3718 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3719 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3720 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3721 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3722 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3723 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3727 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3729 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3730 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3731 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3732 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3735 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3736 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3737 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3743 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3744 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3745 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3746 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3747 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3748 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3749 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3750 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3751 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3752 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3753 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3759 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3760 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3763 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3764 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3765 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3766 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3767 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3768 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3769 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3770 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3771 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3772 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3773 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3774 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3775 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3778 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3779 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3780 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3781 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3782 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3783 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3784 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3786 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3787 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3788 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3789 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3790 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3791 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3792 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3793 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3795 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3796 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3799 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3801 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3802 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3803 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3806 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3809 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3810 commitment_stats.tx,
3812 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3813 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3814 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3817 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3818 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3820 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3821 let mut need_commitment = false;
3822 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3823 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3824 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3825 need_commitment = true;
3829 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3830 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3831 Some(forward_info.clone())
3833 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3834 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3835 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3836 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3837 need_commitment = true;
3840 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3841 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3842 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3843 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3844 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3845 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3846 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3847 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3848 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3849 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3850 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3851 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3852 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3853 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3855 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3857 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3858 need_commitment = true;
3862 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3863 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3864 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3865 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3866 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3867 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3868 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3870 nondust_htlc_sources,
3872 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3875 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3876 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3877 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3878 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3879 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3881 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3882 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3883 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3884 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3885 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3886 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3887 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3888 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3889 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3890 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3891 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3892 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3893 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3894 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3896 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3897 &self.context.channel_id);
3898 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3901 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3902 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3903 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3904 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3905 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3906 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3907 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3908 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3909 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3913 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3914 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3915 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3916 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3919 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3920 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3921 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3922 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3923 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3924 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3925 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3927 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3928 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3929 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3932 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3933 /// for our counterparty.
3934 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3935 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3936 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3937 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3939 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3940 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3941 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3942 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3944 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3945 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3946 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3947 updates: Vec::new(),
3948 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3951 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3952 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3953 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3954 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3955 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3956 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3957 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3958 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3959 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3960 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3961 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3962 // to rebalance channels.
3963 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
3964 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3965 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3966 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3968 match self.send_htlc(
3969 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3970 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3972 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3975 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3976 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3977 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3978 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3979 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3980 // into the holding cell without ever being
3981 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3982 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3983 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3986 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3993 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3994 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3995 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3996 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3997 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3998 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3999 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4000 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4001 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4002 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4003 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4004 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4007 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4008 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4009 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4011 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4012 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4013 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4016 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4018 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4019 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4020 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4021 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4022 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4023 // for a full revocation before failing.
4024 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4025 update_fail_count += 1;
4027 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4029 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4034 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4035 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4037 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4038 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4043 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4044 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4045 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4046 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4047 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4049 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4050 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4051 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4053 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4054 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4060 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4061 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4062 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4063 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4064 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4065 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4066 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4067 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4068 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4070 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4073 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4076 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4080 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4082 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4083 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4084 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4088 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4089 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4090 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4091 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4092 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4093 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4094 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4095 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4099 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4101 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4102 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4105 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4106 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4107 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4108 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4110 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4112 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4117 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4118 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4119 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4120 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4121 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4122 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4123 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4124 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4125 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4127 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4130 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4131 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4132 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4133 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4134 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4135 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4136 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4137 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4138 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4140 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4141 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4144 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4145 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4146 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4147 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4148 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4149 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4150 let mut require_commitment = false;
4151 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4154 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4155 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4156 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4157 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4159 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4160 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4161 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4162 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4163 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4164 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4166 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4170 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4171 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4172 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4173 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4174 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4176 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4177 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4178 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4183 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4184 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4186 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4190 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4191 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4193 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
4194 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4195 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
4196 require_commitment = true;
4197 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
4198 match forward_info {
4199 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4200 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4201 require_commitment = true;
4203 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4204 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4205 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4207 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4208 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4209 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4213 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4214 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4215 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4216 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4222 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4223 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4224 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4225 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4226 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4228 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4229 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4230 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4231 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4232 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4233 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4234 require_commitment = true;
4238 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4240 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4241 match update_state {
4242 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4243 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4244 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4245 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4246 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4247 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4249 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4250 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4251 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4252 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4253 require_commitment = true;
4254 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4255 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4260 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4261 let release_state_str =
4262 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4263 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4264 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4265 if !release_monitor {
4266 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4267 update: monitor_update,
4269 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4271 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4276 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4277 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4278 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4279 if require_commitment {
4280 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4281 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4282 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4283 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4285 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4286 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4287 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4288 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4289 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4291 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4292 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4293 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4294 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4295 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4298 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4299 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4300 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4301 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4302 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4303 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4305 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4306 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4308 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4309 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4311 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4312 if require_commitment {
4313 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4315 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4316 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4317 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4318 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4320 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4321 &self.context.channel_id(),
4322 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4325 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4326 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4328 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4329 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4331 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4332 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4338 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4339 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4340 /// commitment update.
4341 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4342 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4343 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4345 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4346 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4349 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4350 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4351 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4352 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4354 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4355 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4356 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4357 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4358 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4359 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4360 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4362 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4363 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4365 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4366 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4368 if !self.context.is_live() {
4369 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4372 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4373 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4374 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4375 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4376 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4377 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4378 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4379 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4380 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4381 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4385 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4386 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4387 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4388 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4389 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4390 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4393 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4394 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4398 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4399 force_holding_cell = true;
4402 if force_holding_cell {
4403 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4407 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4408 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4410 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4411 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4416 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4417 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4419 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4421 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4422 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4423 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4424 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4428 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4429 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4430 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4434 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4435 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4438 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4439 // will be retransmitted.
4440 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4441 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4442 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4444 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4445 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4447 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4448 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4449 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4450 // this HTLC accordingly
4451 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4454 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4455 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4456 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4457 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4460 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4461 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4462 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4463 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4464 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4465 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4470 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4472 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4473 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4474 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4475 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4479 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4480 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4481 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4482 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4483 // the update upon reconnection.
4484 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4488 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4490 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4491 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4495 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4496 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4497 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4498 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4499 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4500 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4501 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4503 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4504 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4505 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4506 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4507 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4508 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4509 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4511 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4512 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4513 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4514 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4515 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4516 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4517 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4520 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4521 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4522 /// to the remote side.
4523 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4524 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4525 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4526 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4529 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4531 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4532 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4534 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4535 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4536 // first received the funding_signed.
4537 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4538 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4539 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4540 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
4542 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4544 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4545 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4546 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4547 funding_broadcastable = None;
4550 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4551 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4552 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4553 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4554 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4555 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4556 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4557 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4558 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4559 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4560 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4561 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4562 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4563 next_per_commitment_point,
4564 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4568 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4570 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4571 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4572 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4573 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4574 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4575 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4577 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4578 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4579 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4580 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4581 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4582 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4586 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4587 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4589 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4590 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4592 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4593 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4596 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4597 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4598 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4599 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4600 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4601 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4602 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4603 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4604 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4608 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4609 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4611 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4614 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4617 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4619 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4620 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4621 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4622 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4623 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4624 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4625 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4626 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4627 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4628 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4629 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4630 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4632 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4633 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4634 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4640 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4642 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4643 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4644 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4645 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4647 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4648 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4650 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4651 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4654 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4655 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4656 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4657 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4659 SignerResumeUpdates {
4666 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4667 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4668 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4669 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4670 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4671 per_commitment_secret,
4672 next_per_commitment_point,
4674 next_local_nonce: None,
4678 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4679 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4680 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4681 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4682 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4683 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4685 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4686 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4687 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4688 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4689 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4690 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4691 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4692 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4693 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4694 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4695 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4700 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4701 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4703 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4704 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4705 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4706 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4707 reason: err_packet.clone()
4710 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4711 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4712 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4713 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4714 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4715 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4718 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4719 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4720 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4721 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4722 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4729 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4730 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4731 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4732 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4736 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4737 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4738 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4739 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4740 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4741 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4742 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4746 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4747 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4749 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4750 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4751 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4752 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4757 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4758 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4763 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4764 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4765 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4766 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4767 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4768 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4769 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4774 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4775 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4777 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4778 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4779 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4780 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4781 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4782 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4783 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4784 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4787 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4789 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4790 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4791 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4792 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4793 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4796 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4797 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4801 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4802 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4803 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4804 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4805 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4806 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4807 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4809 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4810 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4811 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4812 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4813 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4816 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4817 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4818 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4819 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4820 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4821 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4822 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4823 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4827 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4828 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4829 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4830 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4831 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4832 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4833 our_commitment_transaction
4837 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4838 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4839 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4840 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4842 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4844 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4846 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4847 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4848 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4849 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4850 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4853 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4854 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4855 channel_ready: None,
4856 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4857 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4858 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4862 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4863 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4864 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4865 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4866 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4867 next_per_commitment_point,
4868 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4870 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4871 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4872 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4876 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4877 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4878 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4880 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4881 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4882 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4885 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4888 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4889 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4890 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4891 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4892 our_commitment_transaction
4896 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4897 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4898 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4899 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4900 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4901 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4902 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4904 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4906 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4907 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4908 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4909 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4910 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4911 next_per_commitment_point,
4912 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4916 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4917 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4918 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4920 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4923 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4924 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4925 raa: required_revoke,
4926 commitment_update: None,
4927 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4929 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4930 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4931 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4933 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4936 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4937 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4938 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4939 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4940 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4941 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4944 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4945 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4946 raa: required_revoke,
4947 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4948 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4951 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4952 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4953 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4954 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4955 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4958 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4959 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4960 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4961 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4966 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4967 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4968 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4969 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4971 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4973 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4975 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4976 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4977 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4978 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4979 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4980 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4981 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4982 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4984 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4985 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4986 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4987 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4988 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4990 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4991 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4992 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4993 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4996 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4997 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4998 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4999 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5000 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5001 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5002 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5003 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5004 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5005 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5006 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5007 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5008 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5009 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5010 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5012 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5015 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5016 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5019 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5020 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5021 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5022 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5023 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5024 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5027 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5028 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5029 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5030 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5031 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5032 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5033 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5035 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5041 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5042 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5043 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5044 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5046 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5047 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5048 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5049 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5050 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5051 return Ok((None, None, None));
5054 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5055 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5056 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5058 return Ok((None, None, None));
5061 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5062 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5063 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5064 return Ok((None, None, None));
5067 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5069 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5070 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5071 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5072 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5074 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5075 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5077 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5078 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5080 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5081 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5082 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5083 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5085 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5086 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5087 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5091 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5097 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5098 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5100 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5101 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5104 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5105 /// within our expected timeframe.
5107 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5108 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5109 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5112 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5115 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5116 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5120 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5121 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5123 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5124 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5126 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5127 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5128 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5129 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5132 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5133 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5137 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5139 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5140 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5143 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5144 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5145 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5148 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5151 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5152 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5153 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5154 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5156 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5159 assert!(send_shutdown);
5160 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5161 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5162 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5164 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5167 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5172 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5174 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5175 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5177 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5178 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5179 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5180 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5181 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5182 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5183 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5185 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5187 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5188 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5190 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5191 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5192 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5193 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5197 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5198 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5199 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5200 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5201 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5202 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5204 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5205 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5212 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5213 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5215 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5218 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5219 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5221 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5223 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5224 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5225 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5226 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5227 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5228 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5229 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5230 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5231 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5233 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5234 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5237 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5241 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5242 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5243 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5244 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5246 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5247 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5249 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5252 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5253 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5255 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5259 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5260 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5263 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5264 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5265 return Ok((None, None, None));
5268 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5269 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5270 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5273 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5275 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5278 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5279 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5280 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5281 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5282 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5286 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5287 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5292 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5293 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5295 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5298 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5299 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5300 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5301 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5303 monitor_update: None,
5304 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5305 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5306 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5307 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5308 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5309 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5310 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5311 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5313 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5314 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5315 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5316 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5320 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5322 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5323 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5324 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5325 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5327 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5330 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5331 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5333 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5334 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5335 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5336 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5338 monitor_update: None,
5339 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5340 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5341 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5342 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5343 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5344 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5345 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5346 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5348 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5349 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5350 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5351 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5356 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5357 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5358 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5359 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5361 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5362 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5363 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5365 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5367 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5374 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5375 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5376 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5378 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5379 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5381 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5382 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5385 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5386 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5387 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5388 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5389 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5391 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5392 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5393 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5395 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5396 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5399 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5400 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5401 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5402 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5403 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5404 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5405 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5406 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5408 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5411 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5412 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5413 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5414 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5416 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5420 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5421 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5422 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5423 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5425 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5431 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5432 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5433 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5434 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5435 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5436 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5437 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5439 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5440 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5443 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5445 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5446 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5452 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5453 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5454 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5455 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5456 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5457 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5458 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5460 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5461 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5468 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5469 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5472 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5473 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5476 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5477 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5481 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5482 &self.context.holder_signer
5486 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5488 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5489 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5490 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5491 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5492 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5493 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5495 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5497 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5505 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5506 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5510 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5511 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5512 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5513 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5516 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5517 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5518 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5519 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5522 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5523 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5524 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5525 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5526 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5527 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5530 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5531 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5532 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5533 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5534 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5535 if !release_monitor {
5536 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5545 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5546 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5549 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5550 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5551 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5553 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5554 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5556 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5557 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
5559 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5560 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5561 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5564 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5565 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5566 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5567 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5568 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5569 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5571 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5572 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5573 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5575 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5576 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5577 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5578 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5579 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5580 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5586 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5587 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5588 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5589 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5592 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5593 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5594 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5597 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5598 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5599 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5602 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
5603 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5604 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
5607 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5608 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5609 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5610 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5611 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5614 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5615 self.context.channel_update_status
5618 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5619 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5620 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5623 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5625 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5626 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5627 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5631 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5632 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5633 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5636 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5640 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5641 // channel_ready yet.
5642 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5646 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5647 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5648 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
5649 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5651 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5652 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5653 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5655 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5656 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5659 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5660 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5662 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5663 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5664 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5665 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5666 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5667 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5668 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5669 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5671 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5675 if need_commitment_update {
5676 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5677 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5678 let next_per_commitment_point =
5679 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5680 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5681 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5682 next_per_commitment_point,
5683 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5687 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5693 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5694 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5695 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5696 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5697 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5698 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5699 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5701 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5704 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5705 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5706 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5707 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5708 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5709 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5710 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5711 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5712 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5713 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5714 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5715 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5716 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5717 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5718 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5719 // channel and move on.
5720 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5721 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5723 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5724 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5725 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5727 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5728 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5729 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5730 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5731 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5732 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5733 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5734 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5739 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5740 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5741 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5742 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5743 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5746 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5747 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5748 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5749 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5750 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5751 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5754 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5755 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5756 // may have already happened for this block).
5757 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5758 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5759 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5760 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5763 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5764 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5765 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5766 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5774 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5775 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5776 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5777 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5779 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5780 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5783 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5785 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5786 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5787 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5788 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5790 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5793 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5796 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5797 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5798 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5799 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5801 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5804 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5805 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5806 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5808 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5809 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5811 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5812 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5813 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5821 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5823 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5824 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5825 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5827 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5828 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5831 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5832 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5833 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5834 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5835 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5836 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5837 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5838 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5841 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5842 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5843 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5844 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5846 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5847 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5848 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5850 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5851 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5852 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5853 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5855 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5856 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5857 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5858 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5859 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5860 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5861 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5864 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5865 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5867 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5870 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5871 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5872 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5873 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5874 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5875 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5876 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5877 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5878 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5879 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5880 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5881 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5882 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5883 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5884 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5885 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5886 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5892 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5897 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5898 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5900 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5901 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5902 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5903 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5905 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5908 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5910 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5911 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5912 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5913 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5914 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5915 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5917 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5918 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5921 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5922 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5923 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5924 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5925 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5926 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5928 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5929 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5932 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5933 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5934 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5935 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5936 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5942 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5943 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5944 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5945 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5947 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5950 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5954 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5958 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5959 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5963 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5967 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5968 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5971 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5975 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5977 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5982 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5983 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5984 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5986 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5991 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5993 None => return None,
5996 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5998 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5999 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6001 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6002 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6005 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6011 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6013 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6014 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6015 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6016 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6017 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6018 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6019 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6021 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6022 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6023 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6024 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6025 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6026 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6027 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6028 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6029 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6030 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6031 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6032 contents: announcement,
6035 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6040 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6044 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6045 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6046 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6047 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6048 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6049 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6050 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6051 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6053 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6055 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6057 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6058 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6060 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6061 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6062 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6063 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6066 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6067 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6068 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6069 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6072 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6075 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6076 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6077 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6078 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6079 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6080 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6083 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6085 Err(_) => return None,
6087 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6088 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6093 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6094 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6095 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6096 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6097 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6098 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6099 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6100 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6101 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6102 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6103 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6104 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6105 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6106 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6107 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6108 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6111 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6114 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6115 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6116 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6117 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6118 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6119 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6120 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6121 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6122 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6124 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6125 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6126 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6127 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6128 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6129 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6130 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6131 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6132 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6134 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6135 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6136 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6137 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6138 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6139 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6140 next_funding_txid: None,
6145 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6147 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6148 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6149 /// commitment update.
6151 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6152 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6153 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6154 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6155 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6156 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6157 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6160 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6161 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6162 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6164 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6165 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6170 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6171 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6173 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6175 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6176 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6178 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6179 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6180 /// regenerate them.
6182 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6183 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6185 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6186 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6187 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6188 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6189 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6190 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6191 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6192 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6194 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6195 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6196 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6198 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6200 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6201 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6202 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6205 if amount_msat == 0 {
6206 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6209 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6210 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6211 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6212 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6215 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6216 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6217 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6220 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6221 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6222 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6223 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6224 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6225 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6226 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6227 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6230 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6231 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6232 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6233 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6234 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6235 else { "to peer" });
6237 if need_holding_cell {
6238 force_holding_cell = true;
6241 // Now update local state:
6242 if force_holding_cell {
6243 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6248 onion_routing_packet,
6255 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6256 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6258 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6260 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6266 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6267 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6268 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6272 onion_routing_packet,
6276 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6281 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6282 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6283 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6284 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6286 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6287 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6288 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6290 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6291 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6295 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6296 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6297 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6298 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6299 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6300 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6301 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6304 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6305 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6306 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6307 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6308 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6309 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6312 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6314 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6315 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6316 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6317 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6318 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6320 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6321 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6324 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6325 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6326 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6327 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6328 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6329 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6330 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6331 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6332 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6333 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6334 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6335 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6337 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6339 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6343 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6344 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6345 where L::Target: Logger
6347 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6348 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6349 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6351 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6353 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6354 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6355 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6356 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6357 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6358 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6359 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6360 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6361 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6362 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6363 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6369 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6372 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6373 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6374 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6375 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6376 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6377 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6379 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6380 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6381 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6383 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6384 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6385 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6388 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6389 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6393 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6394 &commitment_stats.tx,
6395 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6396 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6397 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6398 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6400 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6402 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6403 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6404 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6405 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6407 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6408 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6409 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6410 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6411 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6412 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6416 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6417 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6421 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6422 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6424 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6430 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6431 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6433 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6434 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6435 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6436 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6437 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6438 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6439 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6440 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6442 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6443 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6444 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6447 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6448 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6449 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6455 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6457 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6458 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6459 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6460 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6461 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6463 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6465 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6471 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6472 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6473 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6474 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6475 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6477 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6478 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6479 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6482 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6483 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6485 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6486 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6488 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6489 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6491 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6492 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6493 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6496 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6499 // use override shutdown script if provided
6500 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6501 Some(script) => script,
6503 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6504 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6505 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6506 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6510 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6511 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6513 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6518 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6519 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6520 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6521 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
6522 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6524 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6525 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6526 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6527 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6528 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6529 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6530 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6532 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6534 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6535 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6537 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6538 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6539 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6542 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6543 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6544 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6545 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6546 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6548 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6549 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6556 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6557 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6559 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6562 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6563 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6564 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6566 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6567 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6571 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6575 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6576 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6577 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6578 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6581 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6582 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6583 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6584 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6585 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6586 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6587 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6588 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6590 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6591 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6592 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6593 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6595 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6596 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6598 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6599 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6601 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6602 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6603 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6605 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6606 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6608 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6609 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6610 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6611 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6612 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6615 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6616 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6618 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6619 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6621 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6623 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6625 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6626 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6627 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6628 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6631 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6632 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6634 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6635 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6636 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6637 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6641 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6642 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6643 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6647 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6648 Ok(script) => script,
6649 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6652 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6655 context: ChannelContext {
6658 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6659 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6660 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6661 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6666 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6668 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6669 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6670 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6671 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6673 channel_value_satoshis,
6675 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6677 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6678 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6681 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6682 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6685 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6686 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6687 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6688 pending_update_fee: None,
6689 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6690 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6691 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6692 update_time_counter: 1,
6694 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6696 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6697 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6698 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6699 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6700 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6701 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6703 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6704 signer_pending_funding: false,
6706 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6707 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6708 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6709 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6711 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6712 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6713 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6714 closing_fee_limits: None,
6715 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6717 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6718 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6719 short_channel_id: None,
6720 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6722 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6723 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6724 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6725 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6726 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6727 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6728 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6729 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6730 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6731 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6732 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6733 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6735 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6737 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6738 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6739 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6740 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6741 counterparty_parameters: None,
6742 funding_outpoint: None,
6743 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6745 funding_transaction: None,
6746 is_batch_funding: None,
6748 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6749 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6750 counterparty_node_id,
6752 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6754 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6756 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6757 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6759 announcement_sigs: None,
6761 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6762 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6764 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6766 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6767 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6769 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6770 outbound_scid_alias,
6772 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6773 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6775 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6776 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
6781 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6782 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
6784 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6788 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6789 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6790 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6791 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6792 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6793 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6794 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6795 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6796 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6798 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6803 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6804 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6805 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6808 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6809 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6810 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6811 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6814 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6816 next_local_nonce: None,
6820 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6821 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6822 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6823 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6824 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6825 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6826 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6827 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6828 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6829 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6830 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6833 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6834 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6836 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6838 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6839 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6840 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6841 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6844 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6845 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6847 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6849 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6850 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
6852 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6853 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6854 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6855 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6856 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6857 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6860 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6861 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6863 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6864 if funding_created.is_none() {
6865 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6866 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6868 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6869 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6870 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6871 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6879 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6880 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6881 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6882 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6883 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6884 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6885 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6886 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6887 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6888 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6891 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6892 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6893 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6894 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6895 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6896 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6902 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6903 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6904 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6905 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6906 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6907 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6909 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6911 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6913 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6914 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6919 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6920 // We've exhausted our options
6923 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6924 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6927 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6928 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6929 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6930 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6932 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6933 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6934 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6935 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6936 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6937 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6939 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6941 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6942 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6945 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6946 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6947 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6949 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6950 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6953 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6954 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6957 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6958 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6962 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6963 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6964 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6965 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6966 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6967 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6968 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6969 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6970 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6971 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6972 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6973 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6974 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6975 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6976 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6977 first_per_commitment_point,
6978 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6979 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6980 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6981 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6983 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6988 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6989 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6991 // Check sanity of message fields:
6992 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6995 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6996 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6998 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7001 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7004 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7007 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7009 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7011 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7012 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7015 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7016 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
7019 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7022 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7026 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7027 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7030 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7033 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7034 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7036 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7039 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7040 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7042 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7045 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7046 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
7049 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
7050 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7053 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7054 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7056 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7057 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7060 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7061 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7064 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7065 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7066 &Some(ref script) => {
7067 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7068 if script.len() == 0 {
7071 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7074 Some(script.clone())
7077 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7084 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
7085 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7086 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7087 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
7088 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
7090 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7091 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
7093 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
7096 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7097 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
7098 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
7099 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
7100 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7101 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
7104 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7105 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7106 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7109 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
7110 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7112 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7113 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7115 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7120 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7121 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7122 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7123 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7124 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7128 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7129 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7131 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7132 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7134 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7135 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7136 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7137 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7140 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7142 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7143 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7144 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7145 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7147 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7148 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7150 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7151 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7153 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7154 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7155 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7156 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7157 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7158 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7162 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7163 initial_commitment_tx,
7166 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7167 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7171 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7172 if validated.is_err() {
7173 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7176 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7177 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7178 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7179 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7180 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7181 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7182 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7183 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7184 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7185 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7186 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7187 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7189 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7190 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7191 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7192 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7193 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7194 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7195 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7196 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7198 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7199 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7200 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7202 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7204 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7205 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7207 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7209 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
7211 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7212 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7213 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7216 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7218 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7219 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7220 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7221 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7222 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7227 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7228 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7229 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7230 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7233 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7234 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
7235 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7236 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7237 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7238 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7239 if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
7240 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7244 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7245 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7246 // `static_remote_key`.
7247 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7250 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7251 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7254 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7255 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7258 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7260 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7261 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7268 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7269 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7270 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7271 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7272 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7273 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7274 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7275 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7276 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7277 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7278 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7281 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
7282 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7284 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7285 // support this channel type.
7286 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7288 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
7289 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7290 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7291 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7292 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
7293 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
7294 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
7295 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7296 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
7299 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
7300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
7303 // Check sanity of message fields:
7304 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
7305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
7307 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
7308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
7310 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
7311 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
7313 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7314 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
7315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7317 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
7318 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
7320 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7321 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7323 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
7325 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7326 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
7327 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
7329 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7332 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7333 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7336 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7337 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
7338 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
7340 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7343 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7344 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7346 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7347 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7349 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7350 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7352 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7353 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7355 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7356 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7359 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
7361 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
7362 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
7363 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
7367 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
7368 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7369 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7370 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7371 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7373 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
7374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
7376 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7377 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
7378 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7380 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
7381 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7384 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
7385 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
7386 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7387 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7391 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7392 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7393 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7394 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7397 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7398 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7399 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7400 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7401 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7404 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7405 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7406 &Some(ref script) => {
7407 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7408 if script.len() == 0 {
7411 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7412 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7414 Some(script.clone())
7417 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7424 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7425 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7426 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7427 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7431 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7432 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7433 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7437 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7438 Ok(script) => script,
7439 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7442 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7443 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7445 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7448 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7452 context: ChannelContext {
7455 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7456 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7458 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7463 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7465 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7466 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7467 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7468 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7470 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7473 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7475 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7476 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7479 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7480 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7481 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7483 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7484 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7485 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7486 pending_update_fee: None,
7487 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7488 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7489 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7490 update_time_counter: 1,
7492 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7494 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7495 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7496 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7497 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7498 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7499 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7501 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7502 signer_pending_funding: false,
7504 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7505 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7506 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7507 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7509 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7510 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7511 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7512 closing_fee_limits: None,
7513 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7515 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7516 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7517 short_channel_id: None,
7518 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7520 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7521 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7522 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7523 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7524 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7525 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7526 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7527 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7528 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7529 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7530 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7531 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7534 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7536 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7537 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7538 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7539 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7540 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7541 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7542 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7544 funding_outpoint: None,
7545 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7547 funding_transaction: None,
7548 is_batch_funding: None,
7550 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7551 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7552 counterparty_node_id,
7554 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7556 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7558 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7559 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7561 announcement_sigs: None,
7563 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7564 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7565 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7566 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7568 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7569 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7571 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7572 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7574 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7575 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7577 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7578 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
7583 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
7585 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7587 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7593 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7594 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7596 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7597 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7598 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7599 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7602 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7603 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7605 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7607 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7608 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7611 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7614 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7615 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7616 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7618 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7619 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7620 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7621 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7623 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7624 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7625 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7626 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7627 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7628 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7629 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7630 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7631 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7632 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7633 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7634 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7635 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7636 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7637 first_per_commitment_point,
7638 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7639 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7640 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7642 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7644 next_local_nonce: None,
7648 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7649 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7651 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7653 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7654 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7657 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7658 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7660 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7661 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7662 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7663 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7664 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7665 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7666 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7667 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7668 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7669 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7670 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7672 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7675 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7676 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7677 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7681 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7682 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7685 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7686 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7688 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7689 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7691 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7693 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7694 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7695 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7696 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7699 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7700 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7701 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7702 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7703 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7705 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7707 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7708 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7709 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7712 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7713 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7714 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7718 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7719 initial_commitment_tx,
7722 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7723 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7726 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7727 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7730 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7732 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7733 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7734 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7735 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7737 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7739 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7740 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7741 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7742 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7743 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7744 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7745 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7746 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7747 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7748 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7749 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7751 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7752 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7753 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7754 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7755 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7756 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7757 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7759 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7760 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7762 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7763 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7764 let mut channel = Channel {
7765 context: self.context,
7767 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7768 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7770 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7774 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7775 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7777 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7783 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7784 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7785 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7786 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7787 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7789 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7790 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7791 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7792 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7798 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7799 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7800 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7801 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7802 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7803 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7808 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7809 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7810 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7811 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7813 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7814 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7815 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7816 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7821 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7822 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7823 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7824 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7825 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7826 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7831 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7832 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7833 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7836 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7838 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7839 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7840 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7841 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7842 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7844 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7845 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7846 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7847 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7849 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7851 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7852 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7853 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7855 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
7857 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7859 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7861 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7863 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7864 // deserialized from that format.
7865 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7866 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7867 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7869 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7871 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7872 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7873 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7875 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7876 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7877 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7878 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7881 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7882 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7883 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7886 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7887 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7888 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7889 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7891 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7892 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7894 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7896 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7898 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7900 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7903 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7905 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7910 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7911 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7912 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7914 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7915 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7916 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7917 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7918 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7919 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7920 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7922 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7924 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7926 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7929 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7930 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7931 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7934 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7936 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7937 preimages.push(preimage);
7939 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7940 reason.write(writer)?;
7942 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7944 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7945 preimages.push(preimage);
7947 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7948 reason.write(writer)?;
7951 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7952 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7955 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7956 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7957 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7958 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7959 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7960 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7962 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7963 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7964 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7967 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7968 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7969 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7970 source.write(writer)?;
7971 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7973 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7974 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7976 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7978 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7979 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7981 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7983 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7984 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7986 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7987 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7989 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7990 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7991 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7993 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7995 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7996 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8001 match self.context.resend_order {
8002 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8003 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8006 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8007 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8008 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8010 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8011 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8012 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8013 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8016 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8017 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8018 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8019 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8020 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8023 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8024 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8025 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8026 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8028 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8029 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8030 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8032 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8034 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8035 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8036 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8037 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8039 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8040 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8041 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8042 // consider the stale state on reload.
8045 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8046 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8047 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8049 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8050 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8051 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8053 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8054 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8056 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8057 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8058 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8060 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8061 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8063 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8066 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8067 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8068 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8070 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8073 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8074 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8076 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8077 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8078 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8080 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8082 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8084 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8086 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8087 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8088 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8089 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8090 htlc.write(writer)?;
8093 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8094 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8095 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8097 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8098 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8100 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8101 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8102 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8103 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8104 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8105 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8106 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8108 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8109 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8110 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8111 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8112 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8114 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8115 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8117 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8118 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8119 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8120 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8122 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8124 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8125 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8126 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8127 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8128 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8129 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8130 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8132 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8133 (2, chan_type, option),
8134 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8135 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8136 (5, self.context.config, required),
8137 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8138 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8139 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8140 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8141 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8142 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8143 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8144 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8145 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8146 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8147 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8148 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8149 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8150 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8151 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8152 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8153 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8154 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8155 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8156 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8157 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8158 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8159 (45, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8166 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8167 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8169 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8170 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8172 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8173 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8174 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8176 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8177 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8178 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8179 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8181 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8183 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8184 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8185 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8186 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8187 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8189 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8190 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8193 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8194 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8195 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8197 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8199 let mut keys_data = None;
8201 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8202 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8203 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8204 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8205 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8206 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8207 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8208 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8209 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8210 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8214 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8215 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8216 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8219 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8221 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8222 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8223 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8225 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8227 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8228 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8229 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8230 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8231 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8232 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8233 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8234 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8235 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
8236 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
8237 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8238 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8239 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8244 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8245 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8246 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8247 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8248 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8249 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8250 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8251 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8252 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8253 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8254 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8255 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8257 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8258 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8261 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8265 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8266 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8268 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8270 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8271 blinding_point: None,
8275 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8276 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8277 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8278 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8279 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8280 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8281 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8282 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8283 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8284 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8285 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8286 blinding_point: None,
8288 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8289 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8290 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8292 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8293 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8294 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8296 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8300 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8301 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8302 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8303 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8306 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8307 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8308 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8310 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8311 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8312 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8313 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8316 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8317 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8318 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8319 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8322 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8324 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8326 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8327 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8328 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8329 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8331 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8332 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8333 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8334 // consider the stale state on reload.
8335 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8338 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8339 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8340 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8342 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8345 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8346 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8347 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8349 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8350 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8351 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8352 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8354 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8355 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8357 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8358 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8360 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8361 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8362 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8364 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8366 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8367 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8369 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8370 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8373 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8375 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8376 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8377 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8378 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8380 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8383 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8384 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8386 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8388 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8389 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8391 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8392 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8394 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8396 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8397 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8398 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8400 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8401 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8402 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8406 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8407 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8408 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8410 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8416 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8417 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8418 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8419 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8420 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8421 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8422 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8423 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8424 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8425 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8427 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8428 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8429 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8430 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8431 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8432 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8433 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8435 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8436 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8437 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8438 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8440 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8442 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8443 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8445 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8447 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8449 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8450 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8452 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8454 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8455 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8456 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8457 (2, channel_type, option),
8458 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8459 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8460 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8461 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8462 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8463 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8464 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8465 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8466 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8467 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8468 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8469 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8470 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8471 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8472 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8473 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8474 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8475 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8476 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8477 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8478 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8479 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8480 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8481 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8482 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8483 (45, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
8486 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8487 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8488 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8489 // required channel parameters.
8490 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8491 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8493 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8495 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8496 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8497 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8498 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8501 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8502 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8503 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8505 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8506 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8508 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8509 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8514 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8515 if iter.next().is_some() {
8516 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8520 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8521 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8522 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8523 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8524 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8527 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8528 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8529 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8531 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8532 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8534 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8535 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8536 // separate u64 values.
8537 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8539 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8541 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8542 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8543 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8544 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8546 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8547 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8549 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8550 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8551 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8552 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8553 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8556 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8557 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8559 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8560 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8561 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8562 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8564 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8565 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8567 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8568 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8569 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8570 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8571 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8574 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8575 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8578 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8579 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8580 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8581 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8582 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8583 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8586 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8587 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8588 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8590 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8595 context: ChannelContext {
8598 config: config.unwrap(),
8602 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8603 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8604 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8607 temporary_channel_id,
8609 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8611 channel_value_satoshis,
8613 latest_monitor_update_id,
8615 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8616 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8619 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8620 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8623 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8624 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8625 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8626 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8630 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8631 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8632 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8633 monitor_pending_forwards,
8634 monitor_pending_failures,
8635 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8637 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8638 signer_pending_funding: false,
8641 holding_cell_update_fee,
8642 next_holder_htlc_id,
8643 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8644 update_time_counter,
8647 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8648 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8649 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8650 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8652 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8653 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8654 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8655 closing_fee_limits: None,
8656 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8658 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8659 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8661 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8663 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8664 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8665 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8666 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8667 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8668 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8669 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8670 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8671 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8674 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8676 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8677 funding_transaction,
8680 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8681 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8682 counterparty_node_id,
8684 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8688 channel_update_status,
8689 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8693 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8694 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8696 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8698 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8699 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8701 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8702 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8703 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8705 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8706 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8709 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8711 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8714 local_initiated_shutdown,
8716 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8725 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8726 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8727 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8728 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8729 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8730 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8731 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8732 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8733 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8734 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8735 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8736 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8737 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8738 use crate::ln::msgs;
8739 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8740 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8741 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8742 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8743 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8744 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8745 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8746 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8747 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8748 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8749 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8750 use crate::util::test_utils;
8751 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8752 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8753 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8754 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8755 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8756 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8757 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8758 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8759 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8760 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8761 use crate::prelude::*;
8764 fn test_channel_state_order() {
8765 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
8766 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
8767 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
8769 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
8770 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8771 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8772 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
8775 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8778 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8779 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8785 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8786 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8787 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8788 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8792 signer: InMemorySigner,
8795 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8796 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8799 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8800 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8802 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8804 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8805 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8808 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8812 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8814 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8815 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8816 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8817 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8818 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8821 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8822 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8823 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8824 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8828 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8829 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8830 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8834 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8835 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8836 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8837 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8840 let seed = [42; 32];
8841 let network = Network::Testnet;
8842 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8843 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8844 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8847 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8848 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8849 let config = UserConfig::default();
8850 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8851 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8852 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8854 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8855 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8859 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8860 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8862 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8863 let original_fee = 253;
8864 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8865 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8866 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8867 let seed = [42; 32];
8868 let network = Network::Testnet;
8869 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8871 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8872 let config = UserConfig::default();
8873 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8875 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8876 // same as the old fee.
8877 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8878 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8879 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8883 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8884 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8885 // dust limits are used.
8886 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8887 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8888 let seed = [42; 32];
8889 let network = Network::Testnet;
8890 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8891 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8892 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8894 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8895 // they have different dust limits.
8897 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8898 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8899 let config = UserConfig::default();
8900 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8902 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8903 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8904 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8905 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8906 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8908 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8909 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8910 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8911 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8912 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8914 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8915 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8916 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8917 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8919 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8920 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8921 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8923 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8924 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8925 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8927 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8928 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8929 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8931 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8932 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8933 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8934 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8937 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8939 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8940 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8941 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8942 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8943 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8944 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8945 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8946 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8947 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8949 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8950 blinding_point: None,
8953 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8954 // the dust limit check.
8955 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8956 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8957 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8958 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8960 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8961 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8962 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8963 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8964 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8965 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8966 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8970 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8971 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8972 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8973 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8974 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8975 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8976 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8977 let seed = [42; 32];
8978 let network = Network::Testnet;
8979 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8981 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8982 let config = UserConfig::default();
8983 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8985 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8986 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8988 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8989 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8990 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8991 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8992 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8993 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8995 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8996 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8997 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8998 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8999 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9001 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9003 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9004 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9005 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9006 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9007 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9009 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9010 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9011 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9012 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9013 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9017 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9018 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9019 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9020 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9021 let seed = [42; 32];
9022 let network = Network::Testnet;
9023 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9024 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9025 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9027 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9029 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9030 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9031 let config = UserConfig::default();
9032 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9034 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9035 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9036 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9037 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9039 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9040 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9041 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9043 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9044 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9045 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9046 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9048 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9049 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9050 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9052 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9053 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9054 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9056 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9057 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9058 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9059 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9060 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9061 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9062 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9064 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9066 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9067 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9068 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9069 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9070 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9074 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9075 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9076 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9077 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9078 let seed = [42; 32];
9079 let network = Network::Testnet;
9080 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9081 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9082 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9084 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9085 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9086 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9087 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9088 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9089 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9090 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9091 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9093 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9094 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9095 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9096 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9097 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9098 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9100 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9101 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9102 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9103 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9105 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9107 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9108 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9109 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9110 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9111 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9112 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9114 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9115 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9116 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9117 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9119 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9120 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9121 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9122 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9123 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9125 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9126 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9128 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9129 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9130 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9132 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9133 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9134 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9135 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9136 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9138 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9139 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9141 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9142 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9143 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9147 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9149 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9150 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9151 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9153 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9154 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9155 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9156 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9158 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9159 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9160 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9162 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9164 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9165 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9168 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9169 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9170 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9171 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9172 let seed = [42; 32];
9173 let network = Network::Testnet;
9174 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9175 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9176 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9179 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9180 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9181 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9183 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9184 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9186 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9187 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9188 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9190 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9191 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9193 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9195 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9196 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9198 // Channel Negotiations failed
9199 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9200 assert!(result.is_err());
9205 fn channel_update() {
9206 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9207 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9208 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9209 let seed = [42; 32];
9210 let network = Network::Testnet;
9211 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9212 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9213 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9215 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9216 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9217 let config = UserConfig::default();
9218 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9220 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9221 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9222 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9223 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9224 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9226 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9227 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9228 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9229 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9230 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9232 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9233 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9234 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9235 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9237 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9238 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9239 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9241 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9242 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9243 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9245 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9246 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9247 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9249 short_channel_id: 0,
9252 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9253 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9254 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9256 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9257 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9259 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9261 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9263 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9264 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9265 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9266 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9268 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9269 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9270 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9272 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9275 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9279 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9280 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9282 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9283 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9284 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9285 let seed = [42; 32];
9286 let network = Network::Testnet;
9287 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9288 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9290 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9291 let config = UserConfig::default();
9292 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9293 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9294 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9296 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9297 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9298 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9300 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9301 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9302 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9304 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9305 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9306 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9307 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9308 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9311 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9313 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9314 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9315 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9316 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9320 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9321 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9322 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9324 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9327 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9329 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9330 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9331 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9332 blinding_point: None,
9334 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9335 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9337 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9340 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9343 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9345 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9348 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9349 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9350 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9352 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9353 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9356 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9357 blinding_point: None,
9359 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9360 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9363 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9364 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9366 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9367 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9369 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9372 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9373 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9374 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9375 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9376 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9377 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9378 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9379 } = &mut dummy_add {
9380 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9381 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9383 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9384 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9385 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9387 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9390 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9392 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9393 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9394 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9395 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9396 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9397 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9398 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9399 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9402 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9404 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9405 use bitcoin::sighash;
9406 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9407 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9408 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9409 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9410 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9411 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9412 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9413 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9414 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9415 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9416 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9417 use crate::sync::Arc;
9418 use core::str::FromStr;
9419 use hex::DisplayHex;
9421 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9422 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9423 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9424 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9426 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9428 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9429 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9430 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9431 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9432 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9434 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9435 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9441 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9442 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9443 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9445 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9446 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9447 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9448 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9449 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9450 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9452 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9454 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9455 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9456 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9457 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9458 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9459 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9461 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9462 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9463 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9464 selected_contest_delay: 144
9466 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9467 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9469 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9470 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9472 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9473 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9475 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9476 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9478 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9479 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9480 // build_commitment_transaction.
9481 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9482 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9483 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9484 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9485 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9487 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9488 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9489 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9490 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9494 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9495 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9496 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9497 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9501 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9502 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9503 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9505 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9506 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9508 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9509 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9511 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9513 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9514 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9515 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9516 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9517 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9518 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9519 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9521 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9522 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9523 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9524 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9526 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9527 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9528 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9530 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9532 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9533 commitment_tx.clone(),
9534 counterparty_signature,
9535 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9536 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9537 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9539 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9540 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9542 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9543 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9544 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9546 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9547 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9550 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9551 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9553 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9554 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9555 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9556 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9557 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9558 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9559 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9560 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9562 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9565 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9566 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9567 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9571 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9574 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9575 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9576 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9577 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9578 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9579 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9581 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9582 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9583 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9584 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9586 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9587 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9588 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9589 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9590 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9592 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9593 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9594 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9595 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9596 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9597 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9599 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9603 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9604 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9605 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9606 "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", {});
9608 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9609 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9611 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9612 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9613 "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", {});
9615 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9616 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9617 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9618 "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", {});
9620 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9621 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9623 amount_msat: 1000000,
9625 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9626 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9628 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9631 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9632 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9634 amount_msat: 2000000,
9636 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9637 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9639 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9642 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9643 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9645 amount_msat: 2000000,
9647 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9648 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9649 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9650 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9651 blinding_point: None,
9653 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9656 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9657 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9659 amount_msat: 3000000,
9661 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9662 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9663 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9664 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9665 blinding_point: None,
9667 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9670 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9671 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9673 amount_msat: 4000000,
9675 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9676 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9678 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9682 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9683 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9684 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9686 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9687 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9688 "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", {
9691 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9692 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9693 "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" },
9696 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9697 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9698 "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" },
9701 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9702 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9703 "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" },
9706 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9707 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9708 "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" },
9711 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9712 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9713 "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" }
9716 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9717 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9718 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9720 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9721 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9722 "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", {
9725 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9726 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9727 "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" },
9730 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9731 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9732 "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" },
9735 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9736 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9737 "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" },
9740 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9741 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9742 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9745 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9746 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9747 "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" }
9750 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9751 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9752 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9754 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9755 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9756 "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", {
9759 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9760 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9761 "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" },
9764 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9765 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9766 "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" },
9769 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9770 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9771 "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" },
9774 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9775 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9776 "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" }
9779 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9780 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9781 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9782 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9784 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9785 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9786 "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", {
9789 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9790 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9791 "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" },
9794 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9795 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9796 "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" },
9799 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9800 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9801 "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" },
9804 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9805 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9806 "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" }
9809 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9810 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9811 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9812 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9814 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9815 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9816 "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", {
9819 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9820 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9821 "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" },
9824 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9825 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9826 "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" },
9829 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9830 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9831 "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" },
9834 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9835 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9836 "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" }
9839 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9840 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9841 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9843 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9844 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9845 "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", {
9848 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9849 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9850 "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" },
9853 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9854 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9855 "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" },
9858 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9859 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9860 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9863 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9864 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9865 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9867 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9868 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9869 "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", {
9872 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9873 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9874 "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" },
9877 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9878 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9879 "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" },
9882 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9883 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9884 "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" }
9887 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9888 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9889 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9891 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9892 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9893 "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", {
9896 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9897 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9898 "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" },
9901 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9902 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9903 "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" }
9906 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9907 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9908 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9909 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9910 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9911 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9913 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9914 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9915 "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", {
9918 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9919 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9920 "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" },
9923 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9924 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9925 "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" }
9928 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9929 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9930 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9931 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9932 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9934 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9935 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9936 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9939 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9940 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9941 "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" },
9944 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9945 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9946 "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" }
9949 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9950 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9951 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9953 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9954 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9955 "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", {
9958 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9959 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9960 "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" }
9963 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9964 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9965 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9966 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9967 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9969 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9970 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9971 "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", {
9974 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9975 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9976 "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" }
9979 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9980 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9981 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9982 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9983 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9985 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9986 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9987 "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", {
9990 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9991 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9992 "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" }
9995 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9996 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9997 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9998 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10000 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10001 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10002 "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", {});
10004 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10005 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10006 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10007 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10008 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10010 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10011 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10012 "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", {});
10014 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10015 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10016 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10017 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10018 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10020 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10021 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10022 "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", {});
10024 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10025 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10026 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10028 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10029 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10030 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10032 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10033 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10034 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10035 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10036 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10038 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10039 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10040 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10042 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10043 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10044 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10045 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10046 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10048 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10049 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10050 "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", {});
10052 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10053 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10054 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10055 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10056 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10057 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10059 amount_msat: 2000000,
10061 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10062 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10064 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10067 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10068 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10069 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10071 amount_msat: 5000001,
10073 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10074 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10075 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10076 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10077 blinding_point: None,
10079 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10082 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10083 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10085 amount_msat: 5000000,
10087 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10088 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10089 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10090 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10091 blinding_point: None,
10093 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10097 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10098 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10099 "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", {
10102 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10103 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10104 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce501473044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
10106 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10107 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10108 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
10110 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10111 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10112 "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" }
10115 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10116 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10117 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10118 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10121 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10122 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10123 "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" },
10125 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10126 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10127 "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" },
10129 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10130 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10131 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a183483045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
10136 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10137 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10139 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10140 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10141 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10142 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10144 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10145 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10146 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10148 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10149 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10151 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10152 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10154 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10155 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10156 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10160 fn test_key_derivation() {
10161 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10162 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10164 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10165 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10167 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10168 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10170 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10171 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10173 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10174 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10176 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10177 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10179 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10180 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10184 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10185 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10186 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10187 let seed = [42; 32];
10188 let network = Network::Testnet;
10189 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10190 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10192 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10193 let config = UserConfig::default();
10194 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10195 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10197 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10198 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10200 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10201 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10202 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10203 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10204 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10205 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10206 assert!(res.is_ok());
10210 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10211 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10212 // resulting `channel_type`.
10213 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10214 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10215 let network = Network::Testnet;
10216 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10217 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10219 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10220 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10222 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10223 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10225 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10226 // need to signal it.
10227 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10228 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10229 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10230 &config, 0, 42, None
10232 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10234 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10235 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10236 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10238 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10239 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10240 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10244 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10245 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10246 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10247 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10248 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10251 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10252 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10256 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10257 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10258 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10259 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10260 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10261 let network = Network::Testnet;
10262 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10263 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10265 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10266 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10268 let config = UserConfig::default();
10270 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10271 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10272 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10273 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10274 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10276 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10277 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10278 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10282 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10283 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10284 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
10286 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10287 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10288 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10289 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10290 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10291 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10293 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10297 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10298 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10300 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10301 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10302 let network = Network::Testnet;
10303 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10304 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10306 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10307 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10309 let config = UserConfig::default();
10311 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10312 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10313 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10314 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10315 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10316 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10317 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10318 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10320 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10321 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10322 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10323 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10324 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10325 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10329 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10330 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10332 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10333 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10334 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10335 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10337 assert!(res.is_err());
10339 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10340 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10341 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10343 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10344 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10345 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10348 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10350 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10351 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10352 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10353 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10356 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10357 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10359 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10360 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10362 assert!(res.is_err());
10366 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10367 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10368 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10369 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10370 let seed = [42; 32];
10371 let network = Network::Testnet;
10372 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10373 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10374 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10376 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10377 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10378 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10379 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10381 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10382 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10383 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10388 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10398 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10399 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10400 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10405 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10406 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10412 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10415 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10416 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10417 &accept_channel_msg,
10418 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10419 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10422 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10423 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10424 let tx = Transaction {
10426 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10430 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10433 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10436 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10437 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10438 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10439 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10440 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10441 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10445 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10446 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10454 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10455 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10456 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10457 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10459 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10460 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10467 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10468 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10469 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10470 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10471 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10473 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10474 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10475 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10483 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10484 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10487 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10488 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10489 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10490 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());